Wiener - Quentin Skinner´s Hobbes

8/11/2019 Wiener - Quentin Skinners Hobbes

1/11

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

Quentin Skinner's HobbesAuthor(s): Jonathan M. Wiener

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug., 1974), pp. 251-260Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190779Accessed: 13-08-2014 23:34 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.

For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 23:34:08 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/190779http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/190779http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/


2/11

POLITICAL

THOUGHT

AND

POLITICAL

ACTION:

A

Symposium

on Quentin Skinner

1. QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBES

JONATHAN M.

WIENER

University of California (Irvine)

OR

A

LONG

TIME

it

has

seemed to

many

that

Hobbes

must

be

understood in

the

context

of

social and

political change

m

seventeenth-

century

England,

particularly

in relation to the Civil War, which so

frightened

and

preoccupied

him.

Aubrey

wrote that

Hobbes's interest

in

politics

and the

war

was

so

great

that

"for ten

years

altogether

his

thoughts

were

much,

or

almost

altogether,

unhinged

from the mathemat-

ics,"

and Hobbes

himself

wrote,

"if

in time as in

place,

there

were

degrees

of

high

and

low,

I

verily

believe the

highest

of

time would be that which

passed

betwixt

1640

and

1660."'

While

many

have considered the

links between Hobbes's

thought

and

his

time,

a recent

senes

of articles

by

Quentin

Skinner

has made an

important

contribution

to the

argument.

Sklnner has

placed

Hobbes's

political

thought

in the context

of

mid-seventeenth-century English

political

and intellectual

history,

arguing

that

those

who have

not

done

so-particularly

Warrender-have

come to

"historically

absurd"

nterpreta-

tions

of the

texts,

and that those who

previously

made

the

effort

have

seriously

exaggerated

he

extent of

Hobbes's

solation

from his

contempo-

raries.

EDITORS' NOTE. This Symposium was organized by Professor Benamin Barber, at

the time our

Modern

Political

Theory

Editor,

now

an

editor

Political

Theory,

Vol. 2 No.

3,

August

1974,

?

1974

Sage

Publications,

Inc.

[2511

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/11

[2521

POLITICAL

THEORY

/ AUGUST 1974

Skinner'smost

recent

article

begins

with

the

political

situation

m

1649

The

king

had been

executed,

the House of

Lords

abolished,

and

Cromwell

declaredhead of the new Commonwealth;he newgovernment's irst task

was to

persuade

moderate

and hostile

groups

that

the

revolution

was

really

over.

That

is,

Cromwell

needed

a

theory

of

political

obligation

which

could

persuade

Presbyterians

and

Royalists

to

abandon

their

sworn

obligations

to

protect

the life

of the

king,

take

the

oath of

allegiance

to

the

Commonwealth,

and

obey

what

they

considered to

be

a

usurping

power.

Such

a

theory

was formulated

by

a

group

of

moderate

intellectuals,

first

uncovered

by Zagornn

nd often called the

"Engagers",

n their

own

day,

many

were considered

"Hobblsts,"

but their

relations with

Hobbes

were

virtually

unknown

until Skinner's

studies.2

For

Skinner,

this

group

"provides

the

context

within

which the main

alms

and

severalof

the most

characteristic doctrines

of Hobbes's

political

philosophy

can best be

understood."3

The earliest

form of

their

argument

was that

the

Pauline

njunction

to

obey

the

powers

that be

as ordained

by

God

was

valid

even

for

usurping

powers.

But

Royalists

and

Presbyterians

could

argue

on

good

scriptural

authoritythat God neverordainsbut often permitsthe wickedto rule,and

that the

Apostle

does

not

require

hat

tyranny

not be resisted.

The

politically

necessary

reply

to this

argument

was

formulated

first

by

Anthony

Ascham,

not

by

Hobbes. Ascham wrote in

1649,

shortly

before

Leviathanwas

published,

that men

were

obligated

to

obey

whatever

power

existed,

simply

because

it was

protecting

them from each

other,

which

was

its

essential

duty,

and

that

the alternativewas a war

of

all

against

all. This

argument

was

then

taken

up

by

MarchamontNedham and

a series of

intellectuals Skinner

identifies

and

discusses,

all of whom

managed

to

"avoidquestions about providenceby focusing instead on the questionof

what

political

society

is

for,

and

answenng

that

it

is

essentially

a

product

of

necessity

and a

means

to secure

peace

and

protection,"

and

that such

protection required

absolute

power.4

But while these

"de

facto"

theonsts

as Skinner calls

them,

made

their

new

theory

of

obligation

explicit,

"none of them

argued

for

it

in

a

very

systematic

way,

and

few of

them

ever

stated,

except

in

a

very fragmentary

manner,

the

pessirmstic

view

of

man's

political

nature

upon

which the

theory

depended."

Only

one,

in

fact,

managed

to

"elirmnate

all

invoca-

tions of God's

providence,

and to

predicate

a de facto theory of

political

obligation

entirely

on an account

of

the

political

nature

of

man."5 That

man

was

Thomas

Hobbes.



4/11

Wiener

/

SYMPOSIUM

[2531

Between

February

1650 and the

middle

of

1651,

five of Hobbes's

political

works

were

published,

the

last of which was

Levauthan.

According

to Shknner,"they were immediatelyrecognizedby the other lay defenders

of

de

facto

powers

as

giving

the most authoritative

presentation

of

a

view

of

political

obligation

at which

they

had all

independently

arnved."

Hobbes,

in

Skinner's

view,

"endorses

all

the most

characterstic

claims of

the

de

facto

theorists",

his doctrines

represent

"a somewhat belated

though highly important

contribution to

the

lay

defense of

'engage-

ment.'

"6 And it was Hobbes's

explicit

intention to

provide

such

a

defense,

Slknner

wntes,

pointing

to

Hobbes's

proud

claim in

1656

that the

Levtathan

"framed

the

minds

of a thousand

gentlemen

to a conscientious

obedience to

present

government,

which otherwise

would

have

wavered

on

that

point,"

and

to the

conclusion

of

Leviathan,

where Hobbes wrote that

his book

was

motivated

by

the

discovery

that "the civil warshave

not

yet

sufficiently

taught

men

in

what

point

of time it is

that a

subject

becomes

obliged

to

the

conqueror;

nor what is

conquest;

nor how it

comes

about,

that

it

obliges

men to

obey

its laws."7

"There is

nothing

unusual or even

particularly

onginal

about Hobbes's

most characteristic

political

beliefs,"

Skinner

concludes.

Yet

the

'Hobblsts'

of the 1650s were second- and third-ratethinkers, the ideological troops

who

forged

the

intellectual

weapons

for

Cromwell's

cause,

whose own

work

is

distinctly

unmemorable.

Does Skiner

mean

to reduce

Hobbes to

their level? On

the

contrary;

Skinner's

conclusion is that Hobbes's

"special

status

as a

political

writer" is a

consequence

of

his

method,

"the reasons

he

gave

for

holding

his

political

beliefs,

rather than in the

beliefs

themselves."8

The

question

then becomes

whether

Skinner's

historical

perspective

on

Hobbes

changes

our

reading

of his

political thought,

or whether it

provides

simply "another dimension," one of interest to political and intellectual

historians,

but not

necessarily

to

political

theorists and

philosophers.

Skinner

takes

his

analysis

to

indicate that

the

interpretation

offered

by

Taylor,

Warrender,

and F

C.

Hood,

who

depend

exclusively

on

a close

reading

of the

texts

to

argue

that

Hobbes saw

the

laws

of

nature

as

commands of

God,

can

be

shown to

be

"historcally

absurd."9 The

understanding

of

texts,

Skinner

writes,

"presupposes

the

grasp

both

of

what

they

were intended to

mean,

and how

this

meaning

was

intended

to

be

taken."

The social

context

provides

"an

ultimate

framework"for this

"recovery of

intentions."'0

If Warrender's

nterpretation

of Hobbes is

correct,

then

"every

contemporary-every

follower,

every

opponent,

every

sympathizer-all equally

missed

the

point

of

his

theory

All of

them,



5/11

(254]

POLITICAL

THEORY

/ AUGUST

1974

moreover

(surely

an

astounding

coincidence),

were

mistaken n

exactly

the

same

way,"

since

every

single

contemporary

cited

Hobbes

as

having

"located the groundsof political obligation in the paramountneed for

protection,"

tself a

consequence

of

man's

nasty

and brutish

nature.

1

If

Warrender's

nterpretation

s

correct,

Hobbeshimself

must

be

seen

as

having

presented

"a

traditional

type

of

natural

aw

theory

in

a

mannerso

convoluted that

it

was

everywhere

taken for

the

work

of

a

complete

utilitarian,"

yet

Hobbes "failed

altogether

either

to

disown

the

alarmungly

radicalwriterswho

cited

hLs

uthority,

or

to disarm

his

innumerable

ritics

by

pointing

out their

misconceptions

of

his

intentions."

To

prove

this

point,

Skinner has

published

a

previously

unknown

manuscript

of

Hobbes's,

his

only

known

reply

to a

critic,

in which he reiteratesthe

preeminentplace

of self-interest

n

his

theory

of

obligation.i

2

Skinner's

work thus constitutes

a

most

impressive

demonstration

of the

argument

hat

"the

question

of

what Hobbes's

theory

is" is neither

"prior

to"

nor

separate

from

the

question

of its historical

location;

Warrender's

demand

for

an

exclusive

adherenceto

the text should

be

rejected

because

it

has

led

to

"historically

absurd" conclusions

about the intentions

of

everyone

present,

including

Hobbes;

we

need

"less

philosophy,

and

more

history"

n

the

study

of

Hobbes.1

From this

perspective,

MacPherson's

work

on

Hobbes

is

plausible

but

incomplete.

His

method

for

uncovering

the

assumptions

governing

Hobbes's

thinking

is the same

as Warrender's:

closer

reading

of

the

text.

But,

Skinner

argues,

if

MacPherson

is

to

prove

that certain

social

conditions influenced

and

limited Hobbes's

assumptions

about

man,

he

must

go

outside

the

text and

provide

historical

evidence

that

a

"possessive

market"

society

actually

existed m

Hobbes's

day

and thereforecould

have

determined

Hobbes's

assumptions.1

Skinnersees S. I. Mintz'sHuntingof Leviathanas the most important

recent

interpretive

work

because

it

goes

outside

Hobbes's

text to

locate

him

"within

contemporary

ethical

debate."

The

problem

with Mintz

is

that

he

is

simply

wrong

in

supporting

the

conventional

interpretation

of

Hobbes

as

having

been

important

m

his

time

only

for the "intense

opposition"

he

provoked.

His

influence,

Skinner

shows

conclusively,

was

not

entirely

negative,

and he was

not

an isolated

figure.

Here

Skinner

presents

some

fascinating

vidence

that

Hobbes

was

widely

read in

his

day,

apparently

a best-seller.

Skinner

cites a

catalogue

of "the most

vendible

books in England" or 1658 which lists Hobbesas the thirdbiggest-selling

writer,

surpassed

only

by

Bacon

and

Raleigh.

Samuel

Pepys

as

late

as

1668

found Leviathan

"so

mightily

called

for"

that

he

had to

spend

three

times



6/11

Wiener

/

SYMPOSIUM

[2551

the

original

price

to

get

a

copy,

even

though

two additional editions had

been

published

that

year.

Hobbes was

widely enough

known so that the

"Hobbist"becamea familiar

figure

on the Restoration

stage.

6

But

Mintz's

problem

is not

just

his

conclusions;

his method too

is

faulty

Skinner

observes

that Mintz's concern is

exclusively

for

the

reactions

of

other intellectuals

to

Hobbes,

rather

than

his

relations

with

them;

Mintz fails to

"include some account of

political theory

as a social

activity

"'

7

But

it

is at

precisely

this

point

that

Skinner's own

analysis

is least

complete.

His

conception

of

"political

theory

as a social

activity"

is

restricted

too

narrowly

to the

political positions

of

the

intellectuals

on

the

issues

of the

early

1650s,

without

considering

their

location in the

larger

society,

their own

experience

of social

change

and

political

unrest,

and

their

relations to

particular

social

classes and

political

groups.

Skinner

shows

convincingly

that Hobbes is

part

of a

group

of

ideologists,

but he

never

says

precisely

whose

ideology

it is-whether

their

particular

defense

of the Commonwealth

was

based

on the

world

view of a small

circle

of

rootless

intellectuals,

unrelated to

any

of

the

significant

social

and

political

forces

of the

time,

or whether

they represented

particulargroups.

A study dealing with these questionswould requirea knowledgeof the

political sociology

of

seventeenth-century

England;

uch

a

study

is

possible

now

more

than

ever

before.

We

now

possess

a

substantial

body

of

secondary

literature

on the

relationship

among

politics,

social

structure,

and social

change

m

seventeenth-century

England,

more than

we have on

any

other historical

period.i

8

We not

only

have some

of the

necessary

secondary

sources;

we

also

have some models for how the

necessary

ideological analysis

could

be

carried out. If we are to take

seriously

Skinner's claim that Hobbes's

theory was not the work of an isolated individual,but ratherthe mutual

creation

of a self-conscious

group

of

intellectuals,

then we

should consider

that

group

m the

terms

set

by

Lucien

Goldmann's

tudy

of the

Jansenists

and Michael Walzer's

work on

the Puritan

clergy;

both

writers

deal with

the

ways

small

groups

of

self-conscious

itellectuals

create new world

views

out

of

particularexperiences

of

social

change,

which

bnng

them to

distinctive

political

positions.'

9

Skinner's

focus

on

Hobbes's

intentions

m

publishing

Leviathanm

1651

puts

his

political theory

in too narrowa

historicalcontext. Skinnershows

convincingly what those intentions were; but Leviathan was not only a

defense

of

the Commonwealth. The

argument

m it is

remarkably

lose

to

that

of the Elements

of

Law

and

De

Cive,

which were

written much



7/11

[256]

POLITICAL

THEORY

/

AUGUST 1974

earlier,

and

published

in

1640

and

1642;

Hobbes's

political

philosophy

seems

to

have been worked

out,

not

at

all

as a

response

o the

engagement

controversy,but much earlier, in the 1630s, and it seems to have been

substantiallycomplete

before

he 'fled'

England.

Hobbes

In

the

1630s could not have been

intending

to

provide

a

philosophical

defense of

future

regicides.

Even

in terms

of

Skinner's

own

rather narrow interest

in

"intentions,"

it is

necessary

o look at Hobbes

in

a

broaderhistorical

context

and to

examine

at

least the

political

character

of

his

philosophy

in

the 1630s. It

was first

of all

absolutist,

a defense

of

the recent moves

toward

absolutism

by

Elizabeth,James,

and Charles-a

theory

of absolutism

distinguishedby

an

absence of

religious

content;

a

theory

perhaps

informed

by

Hobbes's

knowledge

of

continental

absolut-

ism,

which

he observed

on his travels

to France

n

the

1630s.

Skinner

touches

on some

of these

separate

points,

but never

puts

them

together.

He observes

that the

"need

for

absolute

power"

was

the

"most

notable

feature"

of

Hobbes's

theory

in

its

day;

he uncovers

impressive

evidence

in

Hobbes's

correspondence

that uhs

political

ideas were

"widely

accepted"

on

the

continent,

particularly

among

French

scientists,

who

"recognized

and

sympathized

with his most

ambitious

hopes

for

a

Science

of Politics."20 Moreprecisely,

it was Hobbes's

science

of absolutism

that

aroused

the enthusiasm

of French

scientists;

they

seem to have

recognized

the

intellectual

importance

of

replacing

the Divine

Right

justification

of

the

French absolute

state

with a

more

modern

and rational

one.

Further

study

of Hobbes's

relations

with French

society

and

politics

would

illuminate

this

point.

The

view

of Hobbes

as

having

orginally

developed

his

philosophy

as

a

defense of

absolutism,

particularly

hat of

James

and

Charles,

s

not at

all

incompatible

with

Skinner's

picture

of

Hobbes

in

1651

arguing

for

Cromwell,as R S. Petershas suggested.He sees Hobbesas arguingthat,

since

Charles's

move

toward

absolutism

had

been

defeated,

the

next

best

thing

for

England

was

an

absolute

government

headed

by

Cromwell-who

"should

become

king by

common

consent

and

dispense

with

incompetent

Parliamentarians."2

If

we are

to

have

a full

account

of

the creation

of

this science

of

absolutism

"as

a

social

activity,"

we

need

to examine the

relationship

between

Hobbes's

own

experience

in

society

and his distinctive

world

view,

to

determine

whether

there

is an

identifiable

social

position

from

which he gaied his particularperspectiveon politicsandsociety Skinner

does an

outstanding

ob

on Hobbes's

intellectual

milieu

in the

1650s,

but

he

does

not

consider

Hobbes'srelations

with

society

in the

first

fifty years



8/11

Wiener

/

SYMPOSIUM

[2571

of uhs

ife,

the

penod

before 1640 when he was

developing

his science

of

absolutism

as a member of the household of the

great

aristocratic and

royalist family of the Cavendishes.Hobbeshad been "one of the common

people,"

as he himself

admitted,

before

entering

the Cavendish

household;

in exile after

1640,

he tutored the future Charles

II,

and later the Earlof

Clarendon

wrote of Hobbes's close

relationship

with the

"nobility, by

whose

bread

he

hath been

always

sustained."22

Thus

Hobbes's

own social

position,

at least to the time he was

fifty,

was

that

of a

common-bor

intellectual

who "made it"

into the

heart

of

aristocratic and

royalist

circles. He

was

as close as

any

commoner

could be

to

the

top

of

Englishsociety;

this

position

must

have

played

a

significant

role in

the formation

of

his ideas about

man's

nasty

and

competitive

nature,

and about the

resulting

need

for

absolute

power.

A

clearer

conception

of the

relationship

between social

class

and absolutism in this

period

would

clarify

Hobbes's

position considerably

23

An

alternative

to

viewing

Hobbes

primarily

n

terms of his

relationship

to the

top

of

English society

is to

consider

his

own

experience

of

social

mobility

in a time of

rapid

social

change

and

widespread political

unrest.

Such

an

interpretation

of Hobbes is

suggested

in Michael

Walzer's

Revolution of the Saints. Walzer suggests that Hobbes's science of

absolutism

can

best be

interpreted

as an

"ideology

of transition"

which

"met

the human

needs that

arise whenever

traditional

controls

give way

and

hlerarcuhcal

tatus and

corporate

privilege

are called into

question."

Hobbes

responded

to

social

"unsettledness"

by

calling

for an absolute

central

power,

on

the

one

hand,

and a

narrowing

of

people's

energies

rom

political

to

economic

competition,

on the other.

In this

view,

Hobbes

was

responding

not so much to

particular

elements

of

the

traditional

order,

such

as the

monarchy

and its

interests,

as he was

to

the

"disorder

of the

transition period." The old order was only a part, and not the most

important

part,

of his

experience;

he

lived

most

of

his life amid the

breakdown

of

that

order and in

exile from that

breakdown. The

advocacy

of

absolutism

can

be seen

as one of the

ways

in

which

some men seek

to

cope

with their

experience

of

the breakdown

of the

old

order;

Puritan

sainthood is

another

way

24

In

Slknner's

work

on

Hobbes,

then,

he has

considered

the

methodolog-

ical

problem

of

the

relationship

of

political thought

to

history

and

argued

that

political

ideas cannot be

understood

apart

from

their historical

context. His studies of Hobbes's

relationship

o the

engagement

controver-

sy

of the

1650s

can be

considered

a

case

study

of the method

he

is

advocating

for

the

history

of

political

theory

as a

whole.

These

studies,

it



9/11

[258]

POLITICAL

THEORY /AUGUST

1974

seems to

me,

identify conclusively

the

contemporary

political

and

intellectual context

of Leviathan and

demonstrate

that

an

exclusive

reliance on textual analysis eads to a faulty understanding, articularly f

Hobbes's

heory

of

obligation.

Skinner

has

thus

made

an

important

contribution

to

the

study

of

Hobbes.

However,

his

conception

of

the "historical context"

must

be

broadened-from

a focus on the

political

intentions

of the

Hobbist

intellectuals in relation to

the

Commonwealth,

to

a

concern for

the

social

origins

of Hobbes's

philosophy

before

the Civil

War,

and more

generally

o

the relations between

social

change,

the

new

science,

and

the

politics

of

absolutism

in

the

sixteenth

and seventeenth

centuries.

This

would

appear

to

require

a

way

of

doing history

ratherdifferent fromSkinner's-one tied

less

exclusively

to the intellectual

history

of the

1650s,

one

explicitly

comparative,

peculative,

and theoretical.

NOTES

1.

John

Aubrey, Brief

Lives,

ed. A.

Clark,

2

vols.

(Oxford, 1898), I,

333;

The

English

Works

of

Thomas

Hobbes,

ed.

W

Molesworth,

11

vols.

(London, 1839), VI,

165.

2. Perez

Zagorn,

A

History of

Political

Thought

in

the

English

Revolution

(London, 1954).

3.

Quentin

Skinner,

"Conquest

and

Consent:

Thomas

Hobbes

and

the

Engage-

ment

Controversy,"

in

G.

E.

Aylmer

(ed.),

The

Interregnum:

The

Quest

for

Settlement,

1646-1660

(London,

1972),

80.

This

group

is

also

discussed

by

Skmner

in

"History

and

Ideology

in

the

English

Revolution,"

Historical

Journal

8

(1965),

151-178,

and

"The

Ideological

Context

of Hobbes's

Political

Thought,"

Historical

Journal

9

(1966),

287-317;

this article has

been revised:

"The

Context

of Hobbes's

Theory

of Political

Obligation,"

in

Maurice Cranston

and Richard S.

Peters

(eds.),

Hobbes

and Rousseau

(Garden City,

N.Y., 1972),

109-142.

4.

"Conquest

and

Consent," 88,

91.

5.

"Conquest

and

Consent,"

94.

6.

"Conquest

and

Consent,"

94, 95,

96.

7

EW

VII,

335-336,

Thomas

Hobbes,

Leviathan,

ed.,

C. B.

MacPherson

(Baltimore,

1968),

719.

8.

"Conquest

and

Consent,"

97-98.

9.

"Context

of Hobbes's

Theory,"

142;

A.

E.

Taylor,

"The

Ethical Doctrine

of

Hobbes,"

Philosophy

103

(1938),

109;

H.

Warrender,

The

Political

Philosophy

of

Hobbes

(Oxford,

1957);

F C.

Hood,

The Devine

Politics

of

Thomas

Hobbes

(Oxford,

1964).

Hood

is

important,

Skinner

writes,

for

making

"only

the most colorful

and

least plausible contribution to a type of study which is itself misconceived." Skinner,

"Hobbes's

Leviathan,"

Historcal

Journal

7

(1964),

322.



10/11

Wiener

/

SYMPOSIUM

[2591

10.

Quentin

Skinner,

"Meaning

and

Understanding

m

the

History

of

Ideas,"

History

and

Theory

8

(1969),

48-49

11. "Context of Hobbes's Theory," 137-138.

12. "Context

of Hobbes's

Theory,"

141,

Skinner,

"Hobbes on

Sovereignty

An

Unknown

Discussion,"

Political Studies

13

(1965),

213-218.

13.

"Hobbes's

Levtathan,"

333.

14. C. B.

MacPherson,

The Political

Theory

of

Possessive Individualism

(Oxford,

1964);

"Hobbes's

Leviathan,"

323.

15.

Samuel

1.

Mintz,

The

Hunting

of

Leviathan

(Cambridge,

1962),

155. This is

the

analysis

of

virtually

all

commentators until

Skinner;

for

references

see

"Context

of Hobbes's

Theory,"

109-110.

16. "Context

of Hobbes's

Theory,"

113,

115-116.

17

"Hobbes's

Leviathan,"

333.

18.

The

most

important

works include

Lawrence

Stone,

Causes

of

the

English

Revolution,

1529-1642

(New

York,

1972),

and

Criss

of

the

Aristocracy,

1558-1641

(Oxford,

1965);

R. H.

Tawney,

"The Rise of the

Gentry,"

Economic

History

Review

11

(1941),

1-38;

H.

R.

Trevor-Roper,

"The General

Crisis of

the

Seventeenth

Century,"

Past

and Present

16

(1959), 31-64,

Christopher

Hill,

Century of

Revolution

1603-1714

(London,

1961);

Patrick

Collinson,

The

Elizabethan Puritan

Movement

(Berkeley,

1967);

Robert

Brenner,

"The Civil

War

Politics

of London's Merchant

Community,"

Past

and Present

58

(February,

1973).

19.

Luclen

Goldmann,

The Hidden

God

(New

York,

1964);

Michael

Walzer,

Revolution

of

the

Saints

(Cambridge,

1965).

20. "Conquest and Consent," 92; Quentin Skiner, "Thomas Hobbes and His

Disciples

in

France

and

England,"

Comparative

Studies in

Society

and

History

8

(1965-66),

164.

For Hobbes's relations with

English

scientists,

see

Skinner,

"Thomas

Hobbes and

the Nature

of

the

Early

Royal Society,"

Historical Journal

12

(1969),

217-239. Skinner

does

not

place

the

seventeenth-century

French

scientists

with

whom Hobbes

associated

in their own

political

context;

for

instance,

the

patron

of

Mersenne's

circle was

Richelieu,

who

played

a definitive role m the

development

of

French

absolutism. Hobbes's influence

on

subsequent

continental

absolutist

theory

has

been

noted

by

Skinner;

"the

apologists

for absolutism

in

France

accepted

the

relevance of Hobbes's doctrine."

"Ideological

Context,"

289

21. Richard

S.

Peters,

Hobbes

(London, 1967),

35.

22. Cited In

Christopher

Hill,

The World Turned

Upside

Down

(London, 1972),

313. The Cavendish

family

is discussed

frequently

m

Stone, Crisls

of Aristocracy.

23.

The

starting

point

for a consideration of

social class

in relation

to

absolutism

is

Barrington

Moore, Jr.,

Social

Origins of

Dictatorship

and

Democracy

(Boston,

1966),

esp.

chs.

1,

2,

7

24.

Walzer,

Revolution

of

Saints,

312-313.

Selected Works

by

Quentin

Skinner

"Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy," in G. E.

Aylmer

(ed.),

The

Interregnum:

The

Quest

for

Settlement,

1646-1660

(London,

1972).



11/11

[260]

POLITICAL

THEORY

/

AUGUST 1974

"The Context

of Hobbes's

Theory

of

Political

Obligation,"

in

Maurice

Cranston

and

Richard

S.

Peters

(eds.),

Hobbes and

Rousseau

(Garden

City,

N.Y.,

1972),

109-142.

"History

and

Ideology

in

the

English

Revolution,"

Historical Journal

8

(1965),

151-178.

"Hobbes's

Leviathan,"

Historical

Journal

7

(1964),

321-333.

"Hobbes

on

Soverelgnty

An

Unknown

Discussion,"

Political Studies

13

(1965),

213-218.

"The

Ideological

Context

of

Hobbes's Political

Thought,"

Historcal

Journal 9

(1966),

286-317

"The Limits of

Historical

Explanations,"

Philosophy

41

(1966),

199-215.

"Meaning

and

Understanding

in the

History

of

Ideas,"

History

and

Theory

8

(1969),

3-53.

"Thomas Hobbes

and

His

Disciples

in France and

England," Comparative

Studies

in

Society

and

History

8

(1965-66),

153-167

"Thomas

Hobbes

and the

Nature

of

the

Early Royal

Society,"

Historical Journal

12

(1969), 217-239.

Thi t t d l d d f 146 155 94 33 W d 13 A 2014 23 34 08 UTC
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

Wiener - Quentin Skinner´s Hobbes

Documents

Transcript of Wiener - Quentin Skinner´s Hobbes