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A F R I C A D E P A R T M E N T 1

Summary

– Editorial

– Entretien avec Koen Vervaeke, Coordinateur Principal de l'UE pour la Région des Grands Lacs

– L'auteur franco-ivoirien Flé Doumbia nous présente son ouvrage "L'Union Européenne et l'Afrique (le G80) – La Photographie du Commerce, Exportateurs et Importateurs les Locomotives"

– Delegations in Africa – African Union

– Where are they now? Thoughts from retirement by Jeremy Lester

– EU Delegations in Africa: investing in Africa-Europe relations – Article by Damien Helly, ECDPM

– Nos interlocuteurs: – Gilles de Kerchove, Coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme au

niveau de l'Union européenne

– Interview with Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution

– Farewell interview with Nick Westcott

– Africa Department on the move

– Departing colleagues

– Glossary


Editorial

Our number 3 of AFRICA YEEAS! comes out during a period of transition in the Department. Our first Managing Director, Nick Westcott, moved to the Middle East and North Africa Department and the process of selecting his successor is ongoing. Meanwhile, our acting MD is Koen Vervaeke and both he and Nick are present in our pages, Koen in his role of EU Coordinator for the Great Lakes and Nick in a farewell interview he gave us in the summer.

We start a new section called "Where are they now?" that intends to show the activities of colleagues who previously worked in the Africa Department and moved out either to retire or pursue their careers somewhere else. Jeremy Lester, one of our former Heads of Division, starts the ball rolling and you can see how busy he is in retirement.

One of our objectives from the beginning was to provide a space to academics and researchers studying Africa to share their projects and ideas with our readership. We are happy to welcome Damien Helly from ECDPM as the first scholar to write specifically for our newsletter and about a very interesting subject: our EU delegations.

Another objective we are targeting is to have more voices from the African (and ACP) side. Scrolling down you will find two interviews, one with author and researcher Flé Doumbia, about his book on trade statistics, and another with renowned scholar Adekeye Adebajo who pulls no punches in his views of European presence in Africa.

As before, we are interested in your feedback, what you like or what you dislike, or any comments you might have about our contributors' opinions. Therefore don't hesitate to contact us with ideas and proposals.

Finally, a word of warm welcome to a group of new colleagues that just started working in the Department. Some of them are posing for posterity in a photo below.

The Editor


Entretien avec Koen Vervaeke, Coordinateur Principal de l'UE pour la Région des Grands Lacs

Q – Quelles sont selon toi les principales racines des conflits dans la région des Grands Lacs?

KV – Permettez-moi d'évoquer tout d'abord l'importance de la région des Grands Lacs pour l'avenir du continent africain dans son ensemble. Quand on voit une carte de l'Afrique, on remarque en son centre un espace extrêmement étendu auquel la communauté internationale ne prête sans doute pas suffisamment d'attention, parce qu'elle est aujourd'hui très concentrée sur le Sahel et sur la Corne de l'Afrique, son voisinage plus immédiat. Même si des progrès ont été accomplis ces dernières années, les facteurs de fragilité et de conflit dans la région des Grands Lacs persistent. Ces facteurs ont été hérités de l'époque coloniale et postcoloniale. Tant le régime du Président Mobutu en RDC que les différents régimes au Burundi et Rwanda après l'indépendance ont porté en germe des éléments endogènes de conflit de nature sociale, ethnique et politique. Un Etat aussi étendu que la RDC a eu les plus grandes difficultés à établir son autorité sur l'ensemble du territoire. Toute la région a aussi été profondément affectée par l'impact terrible du génocide

au Rwanda. La reconstruction de la légitimité de l'Etat aux yeux de sa propre population dans chacun de ces pays est donc un travail de longue haleine. Qu'attendent les populations? La sécurité, un meilleur avenir et un système politique qui garantisse leurs droits. Chaque pays s'y attèle à sa manière en cherchant un modèle de réconciliation et de développement national, même s'il est clair que ce travail n'est pas durablement achevé à ce jour. On le voit maintenant au Burundi suite aux dernières élections présidentielles et législatives dont le

résultat est contesté dans la rue. C'est aussi le cas en RDC dans le contexte pré-électoral ou encore au Rwanda

en dépit des progrès économiques indéniables. C'est pourquoi un réel travail des acteurs locaux s'avère nécessaire afin de consolider les progrès et prévenir de nouveaux conflits, avec l'appui actif de la communauté internationale et de la mission des Nations unies en RDC. L'Union européenne, l'Union africaine, ainsi que d'autres partenaires tels que les Etats Unis ont un rôle essentiel à jouer.

Q – Si on prend le cas de la RDC, on voit un pays très riche en ressources naturelles qui

Koen Vervaeke a été nommé Coordinateur Principal de l'UE pour la région des Grands Lacs en novembre 2011. Il occupe également la fonction de Directeur en charge de la Corne de l'Afrique, de l'Afrique Orientale et Australe, et de l'Océan Indien au Service européen pour l'Action extérieure. Nous avons rencontré Koen pour l'interroger sur les racines des conflits dans la région des Grands Lacs et sur la contribution de la communauté Internationale, et de l'UE en particulier, à la recherche de solutions, en coopération avec les partenaires africains.

"La coopération sincère entre les Etats de la région des Grands Lacs est un prérequis essentiel pour lutter contre les réseaux mafieux qui sévissent dans la région"


est entouré de voisins qui le sont moins mais qui sont en général mieux organisés d'un point de vue politique. Est-ce que cela crée des tensions spécifiques?

KV – Il est clair que le potentiel économique et surtout les richesses énormes de la RDC sont convoités par d'autres acteurs dans la région. Ceci est essentiellement la conséquence de la faiblesse de l'Etat congolais, parce que c'est seulement avec un Etat plus fort et mieux gouverné qu'il serait possible de tirer le meilleur parti de ces richesses, en particulier en faveur des congolais les plus pauvres. La coopération sincère entre les Etats de la région des Grands Lacs est un prérequis essentiel pour lutter contre les réseaux mafieux qui sévissent dans la région et pour améliorer le sort des populations.

Cette question est importante car les événements négatifs qui se produisent dans un pays ont nécessairement un impact sur ses voisins. L'un des grands enjeux de l'Accord-cadre de paix, de sécurité et coopération pour la RDC et la région qui a été conclu sous l'égide des Nations unies en février 2013 était précisément de mettre en œuvre des engagements nationaux, régionaux et internationaux pour le bien de tous les pays de la région. La cohérence entre ces trois niveaux est essentielle.

Malheureusement, la dynamique régionale autour de cet accord s'est essoufflée quelque peu. En tant que partie prenante de cet Accord-cadre, l'UE appuie les efforts de l'Union africaine et des Nations unies en vue de le raviver. Sans une bonne entente et une vision commune entre les leaders de la région, il sera très difficile de stabiliser la région des Grands Lacs.

Q – Doit-on plutôt privilégier les efforts des partenaires africains et/ou de la communauté internationale en vue de résoudre les conflits dans la région des Grands Lacs?

KV – Il va de soi qu'un engagement et une vision africaine sont indispensables pour résoudre les conflits dans la région des Grands Lacs. On sous-estime à ce jour les risques de contagion si cette région retombait dans l'instabilité chronique. Presque tout le continent africain en serait affecté, ceci alors qu'un arc de crises s'est constitué aux marges septentrionales de l'Afrique centrale où des Etats tels que la République centrafricaine et le Sud Soudan sont quasiment faillis. Au Cameroun, Boko Haram est une menace tangible. Al Shaabab continue d'opérer en Somalie. Même des pays plus riches et stables tels que l'Angola ou l'Afrique du Sud payeraient les conséquences d'une déstabilisation de l'Afrique centrale. Un engagement fort de l'Afrique, fondé sur les principes d'alternance, d'approfondissement de la démocratie, mais aussi en faveur de la stabilité, est donc essentiel. La charte sur la démocratie et les élections de l'Union africaine constitue un excellent point de référence. Si un président africain venait parler avec ses pairs de la région des Grands Lacs pour leur demander d'appuyer

Diplomate belge, Koen Vervaeke a servi son pays dans la Délégation à Genève et dans les Ambassades à Bujumbura et Tunis avant d’être nommé Envoyé Spécial de la Belgique pour la région des Grand Lacs. Il fut aussi le Chef de la Cellule Afrique à l'Unité Politique de le Haut Représentant de l'UE pour la PESD Javier Solana et à partir de 2007 et jusqu'à 2011 le Représentant Spécial de l’UE pour l'Union africaine et en parallèle le Chef de Délégation de la Commission Européenne auprès de la même organisation. Depuis 2011 il occupe son poste actuel de Directeur pour la Corne d'Afrique, l'Afrique Orientale et l'Océan Indien qu'il accumule avec ses tâches de Coordinateur pour les Grands Lacs.


Envoyés spéciaux pour la région des Grands Lacs

un processus démocratique et inclusif respectueux des dispositions constitutionnelles, ce serait vraiment formidable.

Q – Est-ce que les organisations sous régionales ont la capacité d'aider à établir la paix dans la région?

KV – Il faut bien reconnaître que des organisations telles que la Communauté Economique pour les Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) ou la Conférence Internationale pour les Grands Lacs (CIRGL) sont assez faibles, mais elles ont le mérite d'exister. Si on prend le cas de la CIRGL, celle-ci organise régulièrement des rencontres ministérielles et des Sommets des Chefs d'Etat. Il y a donc une conscience de la nécessité de travailler ensemble et de coopérer, notamment avec l'UE. L'Union africaine a aussi un rôle essentiel à jouer. L'important est d'assurer la cohérence des efforts et que l'UE puisse accompagner et appuyer les efforts de paix et de stabilité dans la région.

Q – Passons au rôle de l'UE dans la région des Grands Lacs. Pendant longtemps, l'UE était dotée d'un Représentant Spécial. Tu occupes depuis 2011 la fonction de Coordinateur Principal de l'UE pour la Région des Grands Lacs. Est-ce qu'il y a une différence notable entre les deux fonctions ou s'agit-il de titres différents en vue de remplir la même mission?

KV – Sur le papier, le titre de Coordinateur Principal pour la région des Grands Lacs semble plus long et plus compliqué que celui de Représentant Spécial… Mais parlons d'abord de l'UE qui a joué un rôle crucial dans la région au cours des dernières années. Il convient de rappeler que le tout premier Représentant Spécial de l'Union européenne (RSUE) avait été nommé en 1996 pour couvrir la région des Grands Lacs. Cela illustre tout l'intérêt que

l'Europe y portait et le besoin de la voir pacifiée, compte tenu de la dimension continentale de la crise. Après 1996 et avec le concours des différents RSUE qui se sont succédé, l'UE a déployé tous ses instruments pour contribuer à stabiliser cette région. Ce fut notamment le cas avec le déploiement de militaires européens en Ituri en 2003, puis à Kinshasa en 2006 afin d'assurer des élections pacifiques.

Avec l'opération EUFOR Kinshasa, c'était la toute première fois que l'Allemagne participait à une mission PESD au cœur de l'Afrique. Notre niveau d'engagement était donc assez révolutionnaire. Espérons que l'Europe ne sera pas appelée à renouveler cette opération à l'avenir dans des circonstances dramatiques. Par ailleurs, l'UE a poursuivi son action à travers un engagement fort et à long terme dans la réforme du secteur de sécurité en RDC à travers des missions de conseil et de formation de la police et de l'armée (EUPOL et EUSEC).

Même si dans la région, on ne fait guère de différence et on continue de parler d' « Envoyé de l'Union européenne », le rôle de Coordinateur Principal pour la région des Grands Lacs n'est pas exactement le même que celui de RSUE. Il ne s'agit pas d'une fonction à temps plein et je ne dispose pas


des mêmes moyens et des mêmes ressources financières qu'un RSUE. Malgré ces handicaps, au cours des dernières années, j'ai personnellement essayé de maintenir autant que possible le même niveau d'ambition et d'engagement politique que par le passé avec des résultats tangibles. La visibilité de l'action de l'UE a persisté avec l'appui actif du Service européen pour l'Action extérieure. C'est donc aussi une illustration des progrès dans la diplomatie européenne depuis le Traité de Lisbonne. La collaboration avec les services de la Commission (DEVCO, ECHO, TRADE) et l'Instrument de Politique étrangère, et les délégations de l'UE dans la région a été un facteur essentiel afin d'assurer la cohérence de l'action de l'UE.

Vers l'extérieur, la clé du succès est la coopération entre les Envoyés Spéciaux qui travaillent dans la région. Composée de représentants des Nations unies, de l'Union africaine, des États-Unis et de l'UE, cette équipe d'Envoyés travaille de façon exemplaire. Elle échange quotidiennement des informations et des analyses. Des missions communes ont été organisées dans la région, ce qui est un signal très fort de l'unité de vues de la communauté internationale dans la région des Grands Lacs en soutien à des changements positifs. Alors que Goma a été brièvement occupé

par le mouvement rebelle du M23, les Envoyés ont joué un rôle actif en vue de gérer la crise dans l'intérêt du bien commun. Nous avons eu des contacts avec les partenaires congolais et certains pays de la région, en particulier le Rwanda et

l'Ouganda pour faire en sorte que le M23 soit défait militairement et politiquement.

Q – En dépit des difficultés et blocages persistants, restes-tu quand même optimiste sur l'avenir de la région des Grands Lacs?

KV – Nous n'avons pas d'autre choix. Le grand défi pour les deux ans à venir sera de réussir les cycles électoraux, non seulement dans la région des Grands Lacs, Burundi, RDC et Rwanda, mais aussi dans les autres pays qui composent l'Afrique centrale. Dans ces pays, les élections doivent servir à consolider la démocratie tout en garantissant la stabilité. Ceci n'est évidemment pas facile. On l'a vu récemment au Burundi où l'obstination d'un Président a fait retomber le pays dans les travers du passé. En ce qui concerne la RDC, des décisions fondamentales doivent encore être prises par la classe politique congolaise afin d'organiser les élections présidentielles et législatives de 2016 dans un climat apaisé et consensuel. Nous nous efforçons de dialoguer étroitement avec les responsables politiques congolais (gouvernement, opposition, Commission électorale) pour que le pays aille dans la meilleure direction possible en vue des élections. Ceci passe par un soutien politique de l'UE et par un éventuel soutien financier si les conditions sont réunies. Les dirigeants de la région sont vraiment conscients des enjeux. C'est aussi le cas de nombreux responsables politiques et de leaders de la société civile qui aspirent au changement pacifique.

"Le grand défi pour les deux ans à venir sera de réussir les cycles électoraux"

A view of the Ruzizi River in Burundi


"Je pense que le commerce est la voie la mieux indiquée pour mobiliser des ressources financières en faveur du développement de l'Afrique, car source de croissance, et de création d'emplois"

Interview avec Flé Doumbia

Q – La deuxième édition de votre ouvrage vient de paraître. Il s'agit d'une collection de données statistiques et une analyse sur le secteur du commerce entre l'Europe et l'Afrique. Qu'est-ce qui vous a poussé à faire vos recherches dans ce domaine spécifique? L'absence de statistiques régulières et fiables sur ce commerce?

FD – L'objectif principal, c'est la recherche d'une solution durable pour financer le développement de l'Afrique et aussi mettre à la disposition des décideurs et milieux d'affaires européens et africains (Institutions, Administrations, Grandes entreprises, PME PMI,…), un ouvrage de référence pour augmenter leur volume d'affaire. Il servira aussi au suivi du Commerce UE-Afrique, de l'après APE.

Je pense que le commerce est la voie la mieux indiquée pour mobiliser des ressources financières en faveur du développement de l'Afrique, car source de croissance, et de création d'emplois. Les pays comme la Chine ou l'Allemagne peuvent être cités en exemple. D'autre part, le commerce s'inscrit aussi dans la stratégie conjointe UE-Afrique, du Sommet

de Lisbonne en 2007. Je propose un nouveau concept dans ce cadre, celui des locomotives européennes et africaines du commerce.

Les critères de sélection des locomotives sont précis. Parmi ceux-ci:

Une locomotive européenne, importe au moins un milliard de dollars de produits africains, d'une grande diversité.

Une locomotive africaine, exporte au moins un milliard de dollars de produits africains, et au mieux d'une grande diversité.

Un indicateur annuel permet de mesurer la diversité des produits importés ou exportés. Le seuil minimal pour les locomotives européennes est de 10%.

Ces locomotives contribuent à une dynamique de croissance pour les économies européennes et africaines.

L'auteur franco-ivoirien Flé Doumbia vient de publier la deuxième édition du livre "L'Union Européenne et l'Afrique (le G80) – La Photographie du Commerce, Exportateurs et Importateurs les Locomotives"(1) en versions anglaise et française, préfacé par l'ancien Ministre du Commerce et Développement irlandais Joe Costello. C'est un ouvrage de référence très fouillé, un outil de travail pour les opérateurs économiques et institutions de coopération, ainsi que tous ceux qui s'intéressent au commerce entre les deux continents et à l'importance de celui-ci dans le développement de l'Afrique. Depuis quelques années l'auteur plaide pour le renforcement des relations économiques entre l'ensemble des pays de l'Union européenne et l'Afrique. Avec la perspective des APE (Accords de partenariat économiques, récemment signés), il défend dans ses travaux le commerce UE-Afrique, accompagné par un partenariat industriel, comme un outil de développement pour l'Afrique, bénéfique aussi pour la croissance en Europe.

Nous avons eu l'occasion d'évoquer avec lui son ouvrage, le rapport entre développement et commerce et l'impact des APE.


Mes travaux ont permis ainsi d'identifier 39% de locomotives européennes sur les 28 pays et 37% de locomotives africaines sur les 54 pays. Avec cette édition, les locomotives européennes et africaines représentent respectivement 94% et 92% du volume d'affaire de l'UE et l'Afrique. J'ai analysé un volume d'affaire de près de 359 milliards de dollars, et un groupe de référence de 120 familles ou groupes de produits sur l'année 2013. Ce volume est reparti en près de 58% pour les exportations africaines vers l'Europe, et 42% pour les exportations européennes vers l'Afrique, et une balance commerciale de l'ordre de +58 milliards de dollars en faveur de l'Afrique. La moyenne de la balance de l'Afrique avec les locomotives européennes est de l'ordre de +6 milliards USD. La moyenne de la balance commerciale des locomotives africaines est de l'ordre de +3,5 milliard USD en leur faveur. L'activité des principales zones économiques africaines (Afrique du Nord, CEDEAO, CEMAC, COMESA, SADC, UEMOA)(2) est aussi analysée.

L'Europe et l'Afrique devraient travailler ensemble pour évoluer vers un seuil de 100% de locomotives européennes et africaines. Cela contribuera à la lutte contre la pauvreté et la réduction des flux migratoires.

Je qualifie ces locomotives comme les équipes nationales de l'UE, et de l'Afrique face à la mondialisation.

Q – Mais vous êtes d'accord qu'il nous manque des statistiques crédibles?

FD – Tout à fait. Cela vient en complément, le livre apporte aussi de sérieux éléments d'évaluation et d'appréciation aux décideurs européens et africains pour une bonne conduite de leurs activités.

Q – Vous dites dans votre livre que vous voyez le commerce comme le moteur des relations économiques entre l'Europe et l'Afrique, plutôt que l'aide au développement. Alors, pensez-vous qu'à l'avenir le premier peut remplacer la deuxième?

FD – Les deux restent encore complémentaires, car l'aide au développement doit servir à la mise en place des infrastructures de base nécessaires pour

l'économie, même si elle a montré ses limites. Le commerce est le levier dont dispose l'Europe pour contribuer efficacement au développement de l'Afrique. Il touche de nombreux secteurs de l'économie, une grande partie des populations et contribue aux recettes des Etats. Il sera aussi bénéfique pour l'Europe, en termes de croissance, et d'emplois. C'est du gagnant-gagnant. En effet, l'Afrique dispose d'un marché potentiel intérieur important. L'UE est un pôle du commerce mondial, qui alimente la croissance d'autres zones (Asie, Amériques, …).

J'ai constaté par exemple que les locomotives européennes ne réalisent leur volume d'affaire, qu'avec en moyenne 36% des pays africains. Ils ont donc une marge importante, pour accroître leur part de marché. De même, les locomotives africaines ne réalisent leur

"Le commerce est le levier dont dispose l'Europe pour contribuer efficacement au développement de l'Afrique"

Flé Doumbia est mathématicien, ingénieur, économiste et consultant en business intelligence et à l'accompagnement au développement à l'international. Il a travaillé dans sa carrière professionnelle pour de grandes entreprises françaises et autres institutions, avec une expérience à l'international. Il a aussi enseigné les Mathématiques à Grenoble.


volume d'affaire, qu'avec en moyenne 38% des pays européens.

D'ailleurs, un des résultats importants de mes travaux a été, par exemple, d'élaborer un indicateur (un indice d'une valeur entre 0 et 100), une sorte de boussole annuelle attribuée à chacun des 82 pays (UE (28), Afrique (54)), pour un meilleur suivi du commerce entre l'UE et l'Afrique. Il permet de sélectionner les locomotives, et devrait être complémentaire à la règle adoptée pour les pays occidentaux, qui consiste à transférer un pourcentage (0,7%) de leur PIB pour financer le développement. Il va permettre de financer le commerce avec l'Afrique en complément de l'aide au développement.

Q – En lisant votre livre, on remarque, néanmoins, la continuité d'un vieux cliché: l'Afrique exporte toujours des matières premières à faible valeur ajouté et elle

importe des produits manufacturés. Qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire pour changer cette donne?

FD – Il faudra favoriser la mise en place d'un partenariat industriel, comme je le développe dans mon livre. Si j'avais une proposition à faire, je dirais, par exemple, qu'il faudrait orienter le principal outil européen de l'aide au développement, le FED, dans le sens de servir de garantie pour les investissements industriels destinés à améliorer la transformation des produits africains. Cette garantie serait destinée aux industriels, investissant dans la transformation locale afin de couvrir une partie des risques d'investissements. Un système de co-entreprise, qui semble-t-il, est favorisé avec les pays d'Afrique du Nord: Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie, Egypte, peut aussi être appliqué.

Ces schémas peuvent être utilisés pour toute implantation d'usine, qui prendra en compte les intérêts réciproques, européens et africains.

Un travail d'information et de sensibilisation devra aussi être fait auprès des industriels européens et africains, sur la question. Tout cela pouvant conduire à la création d'emplois, et l'émergence d'une classe moyenne de consommateurs en Afrique.

L'Europe y gagnera aussi pour la croissance de son économie, en consolidant ses positions face à ses concurrents chinois, américains, indiens, ou autres; elle bénéficiera du potentiel que lui offre le marché intérieur africain pour ses produits.

Enfin, l'Afrique doit pouvoir compter sur elle-même, en engageant une réflexion, sur la mutualisation des pôles de compétences qui existent déjà dans ses différentes zones (Afrique du Nord, SADC, CEDEAO, COMESA,

A F R I C A D E P A R T M E N T 1 0

CEMAC, UEMOA), pour la mise en place ou le développement de son industrie de transformation.

Q – Voyez-vous un rôle pour les transferts de technologie dans ce partenariat industriel que vous proposez?

FD – Oui, bien sûr. Mais dans un premier temps, il faut envisager un apport de technologie, pour donner une plus grande valeur ajoutée aux matières premières africaines. Le transfert de technologie pourra être fait dans la suite. Par exemple, le secteur de l'agro-industrie, est celui où l'on pourrait mettre en œuvre ce partenariat, avec pour objectif initial de satisfaire à la demande du marché intérieur. J'ai constaté dans mes travaux que l'Afrique importe une part importante de ses besoins pour certaines branches identifiées. Le volume d'affaire global de cette activité se répartit en 17% d'exportations africaines, et 83% d'importations. Ces branches sont portées par l'Afrique du Sud, le Maroc, et la Côte d'Ivoire.

Q – Pensez-vous que les Accords de Partenariat Économique (APE) récemment signés pourront jouer un rôle important dans ce passage de l'aide au commerce comme moteur de l'activité économique en Afrique?

FD – En effet, ces accords vont certainement jouer un rôle, car ils présentent d'énormes possibilités de débouchés pour les produits africains. Lorsque l'on regarde l'exemple des pays africains qui ont signé des accords avec l'UE, comme l'Afrique du Sud (Accord commerce et développement), ou ceux de l'Afrique du Nord (Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Egypte) – Accords d'association, ils représentent ensemble 53% du volume d'affaire global de l'Afrique avec l'UE. Ils ont en moyenne, un indice d'exportation de 52% (cela signifie qu'ils exportent une

grande diversité de produits vers l'Europe). Ils exportent aussi des produits industriels vers l'Europe, même si en moyenne, la balance commerciale est en faveur de l'UE. On peut en déduire que cela va engendrer un volume d'affaire important.

Pour les APE, même si l'on considère que les pays signataires ont leur spécificité, je pense que cela apportera certainement une évolution dans leur volume d'affaire avec l'UE. Toutefois, la capacité des pays africains à exporter des produits finis reste

un point à améliorer, pour faire des APE un outil véritable de développement pour les pays africains. Une

attention sera portée dans mes travaux sur le suivi et l'évolution du commerce de l'après APE.

Q – Et cela pourra avoir un effet bénéfique sur le commerce intra-africain qui ne marche pas aussi bien qu'on le souhaiterait, à votre avis?

FD – Tout à fait, c'est justement un des points de mes travaux. Le taux du commerce intra-Afrique est de l'ordre de 11% du commerce global de l'Afrique avec le reste du monde. Ce taux est faible, lorsque l'on le compare aux taux d'autres zones qui sont de l'ordre de 80% ou plus.

Mon ouvrage présente les produits que chacun des pays africains exporte vers l'Europe et ceux qu'il importe. Ces produits africains peuvent aussi être exportés vers d'autres pays africains qui en ont besoin. Par exemple, dans le secteur préparations de poissons, viandes, …, les importations africaines de l'UE ne représentent que 19% de la capacité d'exportation de l'Afrique vers l'UE. L'Afrique peut donc satisfaire ses besoins par le commerce intra-Afrique. Le COMESA et l'Afrique du Nord peuvent fournir tout le reste de l'Afrique.

Les importateurs et exportateurs africains qui auront lu l'ouvrage prendront

"Le taux du commerce intra-Afrique est de l'ordre de 11% du commerce global de l'Afrique avec le reste du monde"


connaissance de leurs possibilités de coopération commerciales avec les autres régions africaines. Cela augmentera le commerce intra-Afrique. On peut prévoir que l'évolution du commerce liée à l'avènement des APE, aura un impact sur le commerce intra-Afrique.

Q – Après une première édition en 2012, vous publiez maintenant la deuxième édition. Vous travaillez déjà à la prochaine édition? Quand est-ce qu'elle verra le jour?

FD – Effectivement les travaux de la prochaine édition sont en cours. D'une édition à l'autre, il faut affiner les travaux et prendre en compte les observations éventuelles. On peut s'attendre à une publication au début de l'année prochaine. Encore une fois cela servira à faire un suivi du commerce et son amélioration, en tant qu'instrument du développement pour

l'Afrique et de croissance pour l'Europe. Il s'inscrit d'ailleurs dans la stratégie de l'Europe. Cet ouvrage servira autant un décideur d'une institution, qu'une grande entreprise, une PME ou PMI. En effet, l'Europe et l'Afrique sont deux continents voisins, liés par l'histoire, les langues. Ils ont besoin l'un de l'autre pour l'avenir, l'UE avec son pouvoir d'achat, son poids dans l'économie mondiale, son élargissement; et l'Afrique avec son potentiel économique et son économie en croissance. Avec l'évolution de l'économie mondiale, leur coopération a besoin d'un nouveau souffle, et d'une adaptation. Le commerce me semble être un élément essentiel de cette adaptation, qui aura un bénéfice réciproque pour l'un et pour l'autre. Mes travaux et le concept que je propose sont une contribution à cela, au service des stratégies des deux partenaires.

(1) Editions Sides, 300 pages, Prix: 120€, en librairie

(2) Afrique du Nord (Algérie, Egypte, Libye, Maroc, Tunisie), 5 pays

CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), 15 pays

CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale), 6 pays

COMESA (Marché Commun de l'Afrique Orientale et Australe), 19 pays

SADC (Communauté de Développement de l'Afrique Australe), 15 pays

UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine), 8 pays


Gary Quince meeting AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, for the signature of the Peace and Security Assistance Agreement

Delegations in Africa – African Union

The EU Delegation to the African Union: what do we do?

The EU and Africa established their Partnership and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy at the EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon in December 2007. The EU Delegation to the African Union opened its doors in Addis Ababa just a few months later. Even though this was before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Delegation was set up from day one as an EU Delegation. This was achieved by giving the Head of Delegation the double hat of EU Special Representative to the AU, with staffing drawn from European Commission officials, EU Council and member state diplomats on secondment as well as staff on contract with the EUSR. This arrangement continued until mid-2014 when the EUSR mandate was terminated. Since then, the Delegation functions like all other EU Delegations with a mixture of EEAS, Commission and EU Member State diplomats as temporary agents, all working as a single team under the authority of the Head of Delegation, who is accredited to the Africa Union Commission and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, both based in Addis Ababa. There is, however, one important difference in the organisational structure of this Delegation: in addition to the usual sections that one will find in other delegations (political, press and information; operations; finance and contracts; administration) we also have a section dedicated to Peace and Security issues, including seconded military and police experts, reflecting the important work of the Delegation in helping Africa to anticipate and overcome crises and conflicts. Another distinctive feature is that there are two EU Delegations in Addis Ababa: in addition to the Delegation to the AU there is also an important EU Delegation to Ethiopia. The EU is not alone in this: the USA and China both have missions to the AU in addition to their bilateral missions.

Since 2007, Africa has established new partnerships with a number of countries and regions. The EU very much welcomes this trend which confirms what we already knew: that Africa's political, economic and social importance in the world is growing fast. When looking at the range of Africa's partnerships, the question for us as Europe is not so much how does our partnership with Africa compare to what others have to offer. Instead the key question is: how can we best work with Africa to maximise the value added from our Partnership?

We stop now in Addis on the tour of EU delegations in Africa, which we started in our number 1 issue, to look at our only multilateral delegation in the continent, the Delegation to the Africa Union. Gary Quince, the Head of Delegation, explains what is our multi-layered relationship with the organisation striving for Africa integration.


So what is Europe's value added?

A first obvious factor is that we are each other's closest neighbour and, however much the world will continue to change, this fact will stay the same. What happens in Africa has a direct impact on Europe and vice versa. And this proximity has contributed in turn to the long and close history of relations between our two continents. We share a common history, cultures and languages. Our shared experiences, both good and bad, continue to shape our current relations. Many of Africa's political institutions and constitutional arrangements are shaped by European models. And at the political level we have wide ranging and intensive political dialogues at national, regional and continental levels. The AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee have developed a particularly close working relationship and last February undertook a first joint mission to Mali to improve mutual understanding on approaches to crises and post conflict situations. The EU Head of Delegation is systematically invited to open sessions of the AU PSC and has the opportunity to deliver statements setting out the EU's views on the issues being discussed.

Second, in the economic sphere, Europe is Africa's biggest trading partner, with our trade increasing by over 40% since 2007, and with a continuing trade surplus in favour of Africa.

And the make-up of our trade is already quite diversified, with many processed products with high value added being exported from Africa to Europe. Furthermore, European businesses have major investments in Africa: European investment stock in Africa totals more than USD 250 billion and is growing by around USD 10 billion every year. European businesses and African subsidiaries employ many thousands of people across the continent and make a major contribution to Africa's economic growth. A strong framework for our future economic relations is laid down by the Economic Partnership Agreements with West, East and Southern African regions, while Africa's Least Developed Countries continue to enjoy trade preferences

under the Everything But Arms initiative, and North African countries are negotiating Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Europe.

Thirdly, the EU and its Member States remains the major development partner for official development aid, providing more than half of global ODA. Africa has been a privileged partner of Europe for many years with bilateral programmes with every African country and important regional programmes in support of regional integration across Africa. More recently, with the launch of the Africa-EU Partnership, Europe has stepped up its support to continental integration, particularly with the launch in 2014 of the Pan African Programme which enables the EU to support continent wide programmes and treat "Africa as One".

But when looking at the particular value added of our Partnership, I would argue that our main asset is the experience we have gained in building the European continental project over more than 50 years. We can offer this unique experience to the African Union in achieving its objective of an integrated continent as established in the AU's Agenda 2063, which sets out Africa's vision for where it wants to be in 50 years' time. At the institutional level we have already developed strong links between the AU Commission and the European Commission, as evidenced by the very productive 7th College to College meeting that took place last April. We are also building partnerships between the Pan African Parliament and the European Parliament, between the African Court of Human and People's Rights and the

Our Head of Delegation speaking to the participants in the High-Level Meeting for the Africa-EU Energy Partnership


European Court of Justice as well as the joint AU PSC-EU PSC work already mentioned. And our experience in building a united Europe enables us to provide practical advice and material support to the AU on many of the major African flagship programmes: Agenda 2063, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), African Governance Architecture (AGA), Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), single air transport market, migration and mobility including the freedom of movement of people and the list goes on.

All these factors are reflected in the decisions reached by Africa and Europe's leaders at the 4th EU-Africa Summit in April 2014. The Joint Roadmap 2014-2017 identifies five priority areas for our work over the current three years: Peace and Security; Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights, Human Development; Sustainable and Inclusive Development, Continental Integration and Growth; and Cooperation in Global and Emerging Issues. We are now taking all these issues forward in close cooperation with our African partners. The past 18 months since that last Summit has been one of the busiest and most productive periods under the Partnership to date and this momentum is expected to carry on building up with major global decisions on Financing for Development, post 2015 Agenda and Climate Change alongside key continental decisions which will shape Africa's future: launch of the implementation of Agenda 2063, CFTA negotiations, Migration, and our joint work to address the major African peace and security crises, improve governance and human rights and face up to new challenges such as terrorism and organised crime.

One highly topical joint challenge is migration. Africa continues to face demographic pressures, extreme poverty, conflict and environmental stress which have spilled over in population displacement to neighbouring countries and beyond. At the same time it is important to remember that 80% of African migrants stay within Africa, working and contributing to Africa's growth and development and sending back money to their families. Indeed, remittances from the African diaspora amount to USD 65 billion each year, exceeding Official Development Aid or Foreign Direct Investment. The challenge facing Africa and Europe is how to work together to maximise the benefits of migration, while tackling the root causes that push people to take the extreme risks of crossing deserts and seas, often at the mercy of unscrupulous human traffickers. These issues will be discussed at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November when it is hoped that a joint action plan will be agreed.

Despite Africa's impressive economic and social progress in recent years, it is clear that the continent cannot achieve all of its ambitious objectives alone. It needs its partners to help provide the resources and expertise it lacks. All of Africa's partnerships have a role to play. And Europe, for all the reasons I have given, can perhaps play the biggest role of all. The EU Delegation to the African Union will continue to be an active player in this process.

Gary Quince

Gary and the Head of the Peace and Security section, Jean-François Hasperue, debriefing visitors from British Columbia University about EU-Africa relations


Where are they now?

Thoughts from retirement by Jeremy Lester

In March 2014, I left the EU institutions which I had joined back in 1976.

I did not return to the country of my childhood, and nor did I stay in Brussels. I chose to go to Copenhagen, and to spend time too in Penne, Abruzzo in Italy.

The two locations are very different. Denmark is orderly, and places high value on openness and on equality. It is comfortably off in a middle of the road, bicycling sort of way. Abruzzo is poor, and Penne has experienced two millennia of decline and depopulation. It is also beautifully located between the mountains and the sea, and has a population which has welcomed me to a degree I have not experienced in my previous abodes. I commend all to get to know both Copenhagen and Penne, for each can inform one's sense of community. Write to me at [email protected] for suggestions!

Both appeal to me. I am putting effort into overcoming my language frailties – neither Danish nor Italian can be

learned by osmosis alone. Copenhagen appeals because it is a relief from the incessant, noisy freeloading of London, and Penne because one is confronted with living with loss, a bit like admitting one's mortality instead of forever pretending that tomorrow will bring more prosperity, more consumption, more…

When I was a civil servant, my objectives, albeit always seen through the lens of my own values, were those of the organisation. To promote the standing of the European Union, in the eyes of its own citizens as well as in Africa, and to promote the well-being of the African continent. I feel a gnawing in my guts that neither objective has flourished in the decades I worked in the institutions. To some extent the gnawing becomes anger, particularly because the European Union's objectives of peace and social progress

seem eclipsed by the desire to make the EU a favoured capitalist haunt. What a travesty too that the European construction is seen as undemocratic while some populist politicians flaunt their simplistic nationalist messages as if they were the defenders of democracy. The European Commission and Parliament must do much more to promote Europe despite (or because of) the backsliding of so many Member States.

We all received those farewell mails from colleagues that have either decided to retire, return to previous occupations or look for new horizons. Sometimes we stay in touch, sometimes they become gradually just a feeble souvenir. Therefore, we thought it would be interesting to our readership to know what become of some of our previous workmates and start a new series dedicated to that purpose. Our first guest is former Head of Division for Eastern Africa, Jeremy Lester, who retired last year. The images below show African artefacts offered by Jeremy to the EEAS colleagues upon his departure from the Service.


While still a civil servant, I was for many years an activist. I never let there be a shred of conflict of interest in working for what I valued, be it through or outside the institutions. I was treasurer of Oxfam Solidarity (Belgium). I used to work with Agenor, a red-green publication pioneered by John Lambert who was a leading inspiration for the European Parliament's 1989-1994 Rainbow Group. I worked with Pierre Galand, later a Belgian senator, in buying and running a safe house for the African National Congress, a house now used by the General Delegation of Palestine to Belgium and the EU. I became a Quaker, and that is perhaps the thread which has guided me through both in my time as a civil servant and in my free-floating today.

Before I retired (and in so doing became invisible!) I made a point of joining the boards of three organisations.

Refugee Action in the UK is forthright in arguing that all asylum seekers, whether accepted as refugees or not, must be treated with dignity. Pauperization of migrants is not a legitimate substitute for intelligent (European) policy towards refugees and migrants.

Conciliation Resources champions the inclusion of ordinary people in peace processes. Peace is not made at the negotiating table alone, but also in bringing people to discard their differences and build on their communalities. I am pleased the EU is a major supporter of their work – in Africa, in the Caucasus, in Asia.

Saferworld is the third organisation I guide through my role as trustee. Saferworld espouses values which I hold dear. A safer world comes through sound community policing, through disarmament, through justice and gender equality. Take a look at their strategic plan – on line – for a better idea.

I hope to continue to do work with organisations such as these three for many years to come.

Ceasing to be a civil servant is not easy. It is identity bending. One's mask is torn off. I do recommend to all to prepare for retirement. It would be so much better for both staff and for the institutions were this to be better provided for in career planning. My personal decision to work half time in my last couple of years should be a normal path for older employees. Mentoring, not bossing, should be the principal activity of those approaching career end.

In some ways I am sorry that I do not have a 'heimat' to which to return and in which to snuggle. I am happy though that Europe continues to be my home, and hope that one day it will again be one of which I am very proud.

Jeremy Lester has a degree in philosophy and economics from the University of Cambridge and another in development economics and administration from Norwich University. He joined the EU institutions in 1976 where he worked mainly with African countries (with a slight detour around the former Soviet Union). He was Head of Delegation in Rwanda and then Niger and started his work at the EEAS as head of the division responsible for the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. He was adviser on Conflict Prevention to the Africa Department when he retired in 2014. Interested in peace-building, restorative justice and refugee issues as well as in societal change, he is a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers), and is on the boards of trustees of Refugee Action, Saferworld, and Conciliation Resources in the UK.


AFRICA YEEAS! was conceived from the beginning not only as a newsletter portraying the work and initiatives of the Africa Department of the EEAS but also as a space for debating ideas open to scholars and experts from outside the EU institutions. Therefore, we are very happy to publish an article by Damien Helly from ECDPM who has been working lately in the analysis of the role of the EU Delegations. You can read his views below and both him and us would welcome any comments from our staff in Delegations or from any other interested readers. We will endeavour to have in future numbers other academic contributions from the think-tank community both in Europe and Africa.

EU Delegations in Africa: investing in Africa-Europe relations – By Damien Helly, ECDPM

The image of the EU is largely made in-country, and at the elite level is largely influenced by the extent to which the EU Delegation (EUD) manages to earn credibility vis-à-vis the country authorities and civil society. The ultimate success of the EUDs depends on leadership and the willingness of all European actors (in Brussels and on the African continent) to develop effective internal and external relationships. In Africa, EUDs play an essential political and development role, especially in countries where not all Member States are represented.

EU Delegations in a post-Lisbon era: representing the whole of the EU

EUDs are hybrid administrative constructs that combine diplomatic tasks (in virtue of their belonging to the EEAS) and operational tasks such as development cooperation and trade (a role inherited from EC Delegations).

The EUDs perform new function since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. They act as chair of the EU presidency and are responsible for coordinating with the diplomatic missions of Member States and ensure the external representation of EU foreign policy with third countries and multilateral organisations (the African Union, the RECs and some international organisations based in Africa). They are in charge of representing EU's foreign policy, defending EU's values and interests. They are also responsible for presenting and implementing EU common policies such as trade, development, fisheries, health, common agricultural policy, etc.

EUDs are also responsible of EU multi-annual development cooperation programmes, playing a key role in the programming of aid, and in the implementation of all development actions supported by the EU.


A key role for the Heads of Delegations

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the role of Head of Delegations (HoDs) has significantly expanded. They regularly chair Head of Missions (HoMs) meetings; lead on EU political dialogue processes; and invest in demarches. They also hold the overall responsibility for clearly communicating the role of EUDs, EU policies and positions. In addition to these diplomatic coordination roles, HoDs are also ultimately responsible for signing off all the EUDs' financial transactions.

Our research(1) has shown that a HoD with an EC/DEVCO background appear to be more at ease with EC programme management procedures than national seconded diplomats, who in some cases may even feel alienated by technical and administrative tasks, or show a limited interest in development cooperation altogether. Over the longer term having a “development cooperation management bias” may not always be an asset, especially in those countries where the EU is phasing out development aid. Yet even in countries where development cooperation is phasing out (such as South Africa), having an understanding of development cooperation is still important at all levels of the EUD in the medium term.

A question to be explored is whether EU Member States national seconded diplomats will prove to be more skilful diplomats than those HoDs with an EC background, as a priori the latter were not specifically recruited to be whole-of-EU diplomats, but primarily in the past as EC representatives and administrators of funds.

In any case, what appears key to the success of a HoD is her or his ability to exert leadership and gain the trust and respect of Member States' ambassadors to enhance EU's foreign policy while respecting Member States’ competencies and interests. Having knowledge of the context in which Member States' ambassadors operate can be of help for this task. A lack of leadership not only undermines their role but the credibility of the EEAS altogether.

EU Delegations as a melting-pot

A number of interviews conducted last year also reveal that EUD staff in Africa actually value the “biodiversity” of their new working environment, and appreciate the expertise brought by their fellow

national seconded diplomats (NSD) – while the NSD also are generally impressed by the qualities, network contacts and “Brussels knowledge” of their Commission counterparts. One of the challenges for EUDs will thus be to spread a common EU diplomatic practice, from analysis and reporting down to compliance and security rules. Local staff also contributes to this diversity and are a key resource, particularly with regards keeping an “institutional memory” and also have their own in country networks which are very useful to the EUD. Bringing together EC staff, NSDs and local staff is enriching and favours the creation of a common EU foreign affairs culture.

Our research on EUDs has also identified a number of assumptions on which our Centre is planning to work more in depth, in particular:

Damien Helly, who holds a PhD in Political Science (Sciences Po) has published extensively on the EU's external action. He is currently Deputy Head of the Strengthening European External Action Programme at ECDPM, that he joined in 2013, where he deals with EU's regional strategies in Africa, and EU-Africa relations more generally. He was formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies and he remains visiting professor at the International Relations and Diplomacy Department of the College of Europe in Bruges where he teaches a Masters level course on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).


Relations between EEAS and COM staff working in EUDs are generally constructive. But unresolved sources of tension may lead to a progressive disconnect between operational and political sections, and a gradual de-motivation of staff, which in its turn negatively affects EUDs performance in the long-run. The need for beefed-up political sections in EUDs is another conclusion we drew from our research on their peace and security role.

Commission's Directorate Generals with a strong external relations component will continue to rely on EUDs for logistical support, and retain the technical expertise and the “diplomatic leadership” in relations with the country authorities.

Over time and provided that EUDs dispose of the sufficient human resources, the EU agenda in third country will increasingly be defined by EUDs, with input from HoM meetings.

However, ECDPM has already found out that, for a variety of reasons, thematic expertise for instance in governance, decentralisation, security sector reform, climate change, energy or diplomacy (which is an expertise in itself) is not always available in EUDs or even in headquarters in Brussels to guide project planning and implementation. While Member States and EU institutions are increasingly engaged in joint programming of aid in third countries (a process whereby they adopt joint cooperation strategies try to synchronise their programming cycles) the question of the availability and sharing of thematic expertise among Europeans (and not only with EU institutions) in specific sectors will become also highly relevant.

(1) The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has published 2 papers on the EU Delegations and the ECDPM Multimedia Guide to EU decisions on Africa:

Helly, D., Herrero, A., Knoll, A., Galeazzi, G., Sherriff, A. 2014. A closer look into EU's external action frontline: Framing the challenges ahead for EU Delegations (ECDPM Briefing Note 62). Maastricht: ECDPM.

Helly, D., Galeazzi, G. 2014. Planting seeds and breaking eggs: EU Delegations dealing with peace and security - the Sahel case and beyond. (Briefing Note 70). Maastricht: ECDPM.

They are available at www.ecdpm.org. For more information, contact Damien Helly, [email protected].

A somehow more formal Damien, this time in the European Parliament, attending a meeting of the DEVE Committee about the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

http://ecdpm.org/multimedia/guide-eu-decision-making-africa/

http://ecdpm.org/multimedia/guide-eu-decision-making-africa/

http://www.ecdpm.org/

mailto:[email protected]


Nous sommes allés voir Gilles de Kerchove, le coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme au sein de l'UE depuis 2007. Il nous explique la portée de son mandat ainsi que les raisons du développement de la menace terroriste en Afrique, comme d'habitude sans barrières ni tabous.

Né en Belgique, juriste de formation avec une licence à Louvain-la-Neuve et une maîtrise à Yale, Gilles de Kerchove d'Ousselghem a été Chef de cabinet du Président du Gouvernement wallon et du vice-premier ministre du Gouvernement fédéral. Il a travaillé à la Commission européenne (DG concurrence) et depuis 1995 au Secrétariat Général du Conseil de l'UE comme Directeur pour les questions de Justice et d'Affaires Intérieures avant de devenir en 2007 le Coordinateur européen de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Il trouve aussi le temps d'être maître de Conférences dans des Universités belges et siège au Conseil d'administration de diverses entités culturelles dans son pays.

Nos interlocuteurs

Gilles de Kerchove, Coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme au niveau de l'Union européenne

Q – Gilles, tu es le coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme au niveau de l'Union européenne, mais il y a des observateurs qui considèrent que cette lutte relève avant tout des administrations nationales. Ils se demandent comment un individu repris sur une liste de suspects en France puisse venir en Belgique pour acheter des armes, retourner en France puis attaquer un train, par exemple. Alors on peut se demander si la coordination fonctionne réellement. Que peux-tu nous dire à ce sujet qui touche ton mandat, ses limites et ses ambitions?

GdK – C'est effectivement une fonction atypique, il n'y a pas d'autre matière qui fait l'objet d'un coordinateur directement nommé par le Conseil Européen. Après l'attentat de Madrid, les chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement ont souhaité faire travailler davantage ensemble plusieurs communautés – services de renseignement, policiers, magistrats, ministères des finances et diplomates. Le centre de gravité reste national malgré l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne qui a fait de la sécurité intérieure une compétence partagée entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-membres, comme c'est le cas dans beaucoup

d'autres domaines (marché intérieur, agriculture, environnement, énergie, transports, etc.). En matière de sécurité aujourd'hui, mais cela peut évoluer, la relation est 90% Etats-membres, 10% UE. En matière de terrorisme, c'est encore plus fort – 95% Etats-membres, 5% UE – notamment parce que le Traité a prévu une réserve de compétence pour les Etats-membres en matière de renseignements. En l'état actuel, l'UE a un rôle d'appui de l'action des Etats-membres. Cela ne veut pas dire que l'action de l'Union soit sans importance: définir le cadre législatif, mobiliser des moyens financiers, créer des agences, établir des mécanismes de coopération, aider les pays tiers à prévenir et lutter contre le terrorisme dans le respect de l'Etat de droit et des droits fondamentaux et mobiliser les politiques interne et externe sont autant de façon pour l'UE de renforcer l'effectivité de l'action des Etats-membres. L'exemple des combattants étrangers, plus de 5.000 européens partis se battre en Syrie, en est une bonne illustration.


Ma responsabilité est multiple. Il s'agit tout d'abord de faire périodiquement rapport au Conseil européen et au Conseil sur l'état de mise en œuvre de la stratégie européenne de lutte contre le terrorisme adoptée par le Conseil européen en 2005. Et d'identifier là où des progrès sont souhaitables. Je fais des "policy papers" que je soumets aux Ministres avec des propositions précises. Si je prends la question des combattants étrangers, j'ai dès janvier 2013 attiré l'attention du Conseil sur ce phénomène qui a pris ensuite une ampleur inédite. À l'époque certains de nos Etats-membres n'avaient pas encore pris toute la mesure du phénomène. Deux mois plus tard, j'ai soumis au Conseil une note d'analyse et en juin 22 propositions d'action. Ces propositions ont été reprises à 95% dans la Résolution du Conseil de Sécurité des NU 2178 adoptée sur la base du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies en septembre 2014. Donc, l'UE a anticipé et défini une politique que l'ensemble de la communauté internationale a repris plus d'un an après.

Mon rôle est ensuite de personnifier l'UE en la matière. Après les attentats de Charlie Hebdo, j'ai été beaucoup sollicité par les medias français et internationaux. Plusieurs hommes politiques français m'ont exprimé leur satisfaction de voir que l'Union était incarnée. L'Europe avait un visage. L'émotion en France était très vive et mes

explications ont sans doute contribué à mieux faire comprendre la nature de la menace et le rôle de l'UE.

Mon rôle consiste aussi, comme le titre de ma fonction le suggère, à promouvoir la coordination entre tous les acteurs. C'est assurément un défi. Coopération entre les institutions de l'UE. Coopération entre l'UE et les Etats-membres. Et enfin coopération étroite entre toutes les communautés que j'évoquais plus haut, communautés qui connaissent des logiques de fonctionnement différentes. Je voyage beaucoup, dans l'UE et dans les pays tiers et j'essaye de créer des liens et des ponts entre des services que ne travaillent pas toujours spontanément ensemble.

Mon objectif principal c'est d'identifier les sujets sur lesquels l'UE peut apporter une valeur ajoutée à l'action des Etats-membres. Ce qui contribuera à crédibiliser

l'UE et, qui sait, à faire croître les 5% que j'évoquais ci-dessus. Non que cela soit un objectif en soi, mais il nous faut travailler plus étroite-ment ensemble. Il y a une dimension de confiance, qui doit s'intensifier entre les différentes commu-nautés. Par exemple aux Etats-Unis le rapport de la Commission du 11 Septembre a démontré qu'il n'y avait pas assez de confiance et donc de partage d'informations

entre la CIA, le FBI et autres agences. J'espère que mon action contribue à construire la crédibilité de l'Union et la confiance entre les acteurs.

Q – Cela devrait aboutir alors à la création d'une Agence Européenne de Renseignements?

"L'UE a anticipé et définit une politique que l'ensemble de la communauté internationale a repris plus d'un an après"

Une partie essentielle du travail de Gilles implique des contacts réguliers avec les medias


GdK – C'est 'juridiquement parlant' totalement exclu aujourd'hui. Je ne dis pas que dans vingt ans cela ne sera pas le cas. Mais la révision des traités n'étant pas à l'ordre du jour, il est peu vraisemblable que l'UE se voit dotée d'une compétence matérielle en matière de renseignements à bref délai. Ce qu'il faut en revanche encourager c'est une coopération plus étroite entre les services de renseignement et les services de police. Sur la question que tu as posée du Marocain qui s'apprêtait à commettre un attentat terroriste dans le Thalys - qu'est-ce qu'on a découvert? Il a beaucoup voyagé en Europe avant sa tentative. Il a quitté Berlin pour aller en Turquie, vraisemblablement pour se rendre

ensuite en Syrie. Il est revenu par les Balkans (Albanie). Il a payé son billet en cash et juste avant d'agir, il est allé consulter sur son portable un site de prédicateurs prêchant la haine. Sur tous ces sujets les collègues de la Commission et du service européen d'action extérieure sont mobilisés: sur le rôle d'internet dans la radicalisation, sur le contrôle aux frontières extérieures et l'utilisation du SIS (la base de donnés Schengen) ce qui suppose de convaincre les services de renseignement, lorsqu'ils ont identifié un candidat au jihad, d'insérer cette information dans le SIS, de sorte que lorsque l'on procède à des contrôles d'identité au sein de l'espace Schengen ou aux frontières extérieures on puisse les

identifier. Travailler avec les pays de transit, la Turquie notamment, travailler avec les pays des Balkans et essayer d'assurer la sécurité du transport ferroviaire. Tous sujets sur lesquels l'UE travaille activement depuis deux ans et sur lesquels je me suis personnellement beaucoup investi.

Q – Passons à l'Afrique où malheureusement le fléau du terrorisme est aussi une réalité. On a Boko Haram au Nigéria, Al-Qaida Maghreb au Sahel, al-Shabaab en Somalie. Pourquoi ce phénomène en Afrique, quelles sont les raisons et les motivations qui nous obligent à nous pencher sur ce problème?

GdK – Je pense qu'il y a plusieurs facteurs. Il y a certainement un problème de gouvernance; là où l'Etat est faible, voire absent, le terrorisme se développe. Non seulement le terrorisme mais aussi d'autres formes de criminalité: trafic de drogues, ou trafic d'êtres humains, par exemple. Je pense qu'il y a aussi une transformation de l'Islam en Afrique. Alors qu'historiquement la plupart des pays africains connaissait un Islam

malekite/sufi, le salafisme gagne du terrain. Parce que l'Etat était défaillant, l'éducation était faible, des écoles coraniques ont été construites avec des financements externes. Parce que l'Etat était faible, des organisations caritatives ont pris le relais.

La radicalisation se nourrit aussi de la pauvreté, de l'absence d'éducation, de

l'absence de perspectives et d'emplois. Quelles sont les perspectives pour un jeune qui vit à Kidal, sinon de travailler pour un réseau de trafic de cocaïne ou d'êtres humains ou pour les katibah d'AQMI ou de al-Morabitoun. Il y a ensuite des facteurs circonstanciels, certainement au Sahel, comme l'implosion de la Libye, la

"La radicalisation se nourrit aussi de la pauvreté, de l'absence d'éducation, de l'absence de perspectives et d'emplois"

Gilles encore une fois donnant une interview en face du bâtiment Justus Lipsius


"L'Europe a beaucoup à partager parce qu'elle a malheureusement et douloureusement été confrontée au terrorisme depuis quarante ans"

prolifération des armes, le retour des touarègs qui étaient employés par Kadhafi. Il y a des effets de contagion régionale. Le chaos somalien, qui a permis le développement des Shabaab, s'est propagé au Kenya voire à la Tanzanie.

Un autre problème qui me préoccupe est la proximité de plus en plus forte entre le terrorisme et le crime organisé.

Je dois évoquer encore un point important: la faiblesse de l'appareil sécuritaire de beaucoup de ces pays, une police insuffisamment formée, une justice défaillante. C'est une de mes grandes préoccupations: peu de pays africains confrontés au terrorisme sont capables de condamner, au terme d'un procès équitable, une personne suspectée de terrorisme. L'impunité envoie en effet un très mauvais signal. Alors que des condamnations au terme d'un procès équitable contribuent à rappeler que le terrorisme est un crime et non une forme d'action politique ou idéologique et à "déglamouriser" le jihad. L'UE a là un formidable chantier, le chantier de la gouvernance et du développement, le chantier du renforcement du secteur de la sécurité dont la bonne illustration est notre stratégie sur le Sahel qui essaye de conjuguer développement, sécurité, gouvernance, lutte contre la corruption, prévention de la radicalisation et réforme du secteur de la sécurité.

Q – C'est à dire que la réponse plutôt militaire jusqu'à maintenant des Africains n'est pas suffisante?

GdK – Au niveau conceptuel, j'ai été impressionné par la qualité des débats qui ont eu lieu à Nairobi pendant la Réunion du

Comité de Paix et Sécurité de l'Union africaine (au niveau chefs d'Etat) l'année dernière. Le document produit par l'Union africaine et les interventions étaient vraiment intéressants. Il n'y a pas de différences entre les approches conceptuelles de l'UE et de l'UA sur le terrorisme. Sur le papier ce n'était pas que les réponses militaires ou kinétiques qui étaient privilégiées, c'était aussi l'importance de la prévention de la radicalisation, de la dimension judiciaire, du renseignement, etc. Toute la difficulté est évidemment de concrétiser ces intentions politiques. Dans tous ces domaines, il y a en effet beaucoup à faire en Afrique. L'Europe a beaucoup à partager parce qu'elle a malheureusement et douloureusement été confrontée au terrorisme depuis quarante ans et que donc, elle a beaucoup travaillé sur les questions de la prévention, du rôle de la justice, de la transformation du renseignement en preuve judiciaire, des frontières notamment. Avec Schengen l'UE a développé une réelle expertise en matière de gestion intégrée des frontières qui, à mon avis, est pertinente et utile pour les pays du Sahel où il est illusoire d'espérer avoir des systèmes étanches aux frontières – la géographie rend cet objectif illusoire. Il faut à la fois améliorer le contrôle à la frontière et développer ce que nous avons appelé les mesures compensatoires: avoir des bases de données policières communes, des politiques harmonisées d'asile, des systèmes de coopération judiciaire plus étroits. L'UE cherche à promouvoir des plateformes de coopération (je crois au potentiel de la plateforme du G5 au Sahel, par exemple), d'initiatives comme le processus de Nouakchott en matière de renseignement ou des coopérations en matière de la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme dans la Corne de l'Afrique.


Dr Adekeye Adebajo studied in his native Nigeria and in the USA before concluding, through a Rhodes scholarship, a doctorate in philosophy at Oxford University. A published author and a prolific collaborator to several media outlets, he worked for prestigious entities like Brookings, Stanford University, Columbia University and the International Peace Institute, amongst others. Since 2003, he is the Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town and is also now teaching at the University of Johannesburg as a visiting Professor.

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution

Q - Africa is in better shape now than in the past. Notwithstanding some conflicts remain especially in the arc that goes from Mauritania to Somalia and in the Great Lakes. Why some areas of Africa are growing exponentially while others are mired in conflict, what are the root causes for this situation?

AA – I think it is true to say that some of the conflicts that resulted from the proxy wars of the Cold War days, for example, are still with us. When you see instability in places like Somalia, places like the Horn of Africa, this is directly linked with the conflicts of that time. Of course, there are also issues of autocracy, the fact that only one ruling party in Africa lost power between 1960 and 1991. So, you had both internal and external reasons. The fact that minorities were often not accorded political power and autonomy, because there was this sense that states had to be converted into nations, was part of the problem as well. Of course the states were not often strong enough to deliver on social services to their population. You had multiple issues that created this situation but we also need to look at the positive side. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone that were running from the 1990's have been calmed as was the case in Angola and Mozambique.

One of the things one has to look at in terms of the more recent conflicts is that one cannot rule out that NATO intervention in Libya created a lot of instability in the region because the removal of Khadafy, as much of a dictator as he might have been,

and the lack of planning for the post-conflict phase basically meant that instability blew over into the rest of the Sahel, into Mali. The intervention in northern Mali that had to be done by the UN and French troops was a direct result of people who were been fighting with Khadafy moving over to Sahel. Therefore, again, we can see both internal and external roots. Q - You did not mention neither the economy nor climate change. To which extent traditional quarrels between herders and agricultures fighting for the same piece of land, all the time more scarce due to the drought in the Sahel region, actually played a role in exacerbating conflicts?

We had the chance of speaking with well-known scholar and researcher Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, while he was in Brussels to attend several conferences. Never afraid to strongly express his opinions, our guest gave us his views about causes of conflict in Africa, the role of the European Union in addressing those conflicts and what his organisation is currently doing. Not everybody will agree with his positions but his thoughts are at least clear-cut and thought-provoking.


AA - I agree with you. It is a big problem but I guess we would see them as micro-level conflicts though these are some of the most serious conflicts in the Karamojong area, for example. IGAD has been trying to deal with them for a long time. In Sudan, in Abyei, you tend to have problems between the Messiria and the Dinka and also in other parts of the Sahel. I guess the desertification that has been happening in the Sahel, in particular the drought, does contribute to that because obviously it leads to conflicts between the groups, so that is certainly an important issue as well.

Q - What can be done to solve these conflicts and what role can the EU play on helping solve them?

AA – First of all it is important for the EU to be more consistent in governance because that's part of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which I don't think it is always consistently applied. You saw the military coup in Egypt in 2013 and the reaction from EU was silence. At least the AU, though Egypt was providing 15% of its operating funds, suspended the country from the organisation. Some of the support for autocrats in Northern Africa and elsewhere has been a major contributor to conflict. I am also very critical about the role of France, which a lot of people in Africa see as negative security-wise. Some people like to see it as positive as France plays a military role no one else wants to play, but I think that the fact that France, as former colonial power, supported dictators in countries like Chad and DRC makes me see it like a pyromaniac fireman. Removing regimes they didn't like,

keeping some in power. You can't delink what's happening in countries like CAR or DRC from that past support. France is intervening in areas where it has promoted bad governance in the past.

More positively, the EU has supported, to a large extent, security within the AU and, of course, deployed four missions, twice in DRC and in Chad and CAR. However, my argument is that it should not do this at the cost of undermining the UN which is primarily responsible for peace and security. It must strengthen rather than weakening the UN, indeed.

Q – Aren't those interventions the consequence of the fact that there is usually no agreement in the UN for peace-enforcing operations but only for peace-keeping?

AA – To some extent, yes, but if we look at what has happened in the DRC over the past decade it is actually peace-enforcement and in some of the missions like in Sierra Leone or Liberia, even if it was ECOWAS that took the lead and the UN followed, you have had peace-enforcement. What is happening in the Eastern DRC now is that SADC is basically doing the intervention. So there are innovative ways of doing that intervention, but I am not sure that the EU forces were

necessarily providing intervention in these cases. I mean they went in before a UN mission could be deployed in Bunya and I guess they acted as a deterrent to the militias there, so that was important. But in other Congo missions it was more keeping security before elections and then in Chad and CAR they were kind of, to some extent, also bolstering regimes because France intervened in 2006 and 2008 even as the EU was deploying to save Déby's regime.

Adekeye Adebajo during a roundtable on Africa at the German Marshall Fund during his visit to Brussels

"The EU has supported, to a large extent, security within the AU and, of course, deployed four missions, twice in DRC and in Chad and CAR"


Q – Don't you think that in the last few years the trend has been for the EU to support more African forces in order that they maintain stability rather than doing interventions, more focusing in providing expertise than boots in the ground?

AA – Well, that is happening to some extent. I think you have to complicate that more by noting that there are also Asians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indians doing the peace-keeping in the nine African missions, so 86% of the UN peace-keepers are deployed in Africa. The Asians and the Africans are doing a lot of the peace-keeping even under the UN. 12 of the 20 top contributors in the UN (in troops) are African countries. I think there is a feeling that Africans are being sent, to some extent, as cannon-fodder. In northern Mali, that is certainly the case. Six Burkinabe peace-keepers were killed there recently. But the better-equipped troops do not want to go to the most dangerous parts, so what you have sometimes is that African military that have the least logistical equipment and financing are the ones being sent to the dangerous areas. I think this is a dangerous pattern because it is burden-shedding rather than burden-sharing.

Q – This creates a dilemma in the sense that if the African troops are not prepared and are basically cannon-fodder the only way to solve the conflicts is by having foreign troops, the ones you would not like to come in first place. How do you solve this contradiction?

AA – I think Africans have to be pragmatic. I am from the generation of the Rwandan genocide and I did my PhD research on the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. Therefore, I am a strong believer in strengthening regional bodies, not just the AU but sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS or SADC, but not as an alternative to the UN. Romano Prodi wrote a very good report in 2008 on UN peace-keeping commissioned

by the UN where he called for the international community to support African troops for the first six months of deployment because they are near the theatre of operations and can deploy quicker and then to be taken over. That's what I would propose, meaning that even if you have a core of African troops that can get there quicker and stop massacres then it comes under the UN umbrella that takes care of the logistics, the funding, and provides legitimacy because neighbours intervening in each other's problems can also raise political problems.

Q – How do you see that in the context of AU promoting a scheme like ACIRC that is not based in regional organisations, rather appears more like a coalition of the willing, putting together national armies?

AA – I think the African Stand-by Force (ASF) would have made sense where you have five sub-regional brigades and a 75.000 force that you

could deploy. ACIRC is a kind of reaction to the French intervention in Mali that leaders like Jacob Zuma found embarrassing. As long as ACIRC, which is meant to have 5.000 troops, including a 1.500 rapid-reaction force, actually becomes a reality (ASF should have been there in 2010 and then postponed to 2015 and it still not operational) and it is used when a deployment happens, it is not a bad idea (when deployment happens a SADC brigade is an ad-hoc coalition rather than troops that have been specifically trained, a little bit like the SHIRBRIG in the 1990's. They will be trained and then when a conflict happens they would basically refuse to go). If ACIRC did not exist, something like it would need to be created. That does not mean you cannot have sub-regional forces which are trained and ready to be deployed and you can have something like inter-

"What you have sometimes is that African military that have the least logistical equipment and financing are the ones being sent to the dangerous areas"

"If you have a core of African troops that can get there quicker and stop massacres then it comes under the UN umbrella that takes care of the logistics, the funding, and provides legitimacy"


The EEAS also took the opportunity to gather a few colleagues to discuss with Adekeye relations between Europe and Africa.

regional co-operation because, say, it is too difficult to deploy troops from West Africa in a West African case, so you bring them from East Africa, for example. In any case, ACIRC is an important initiative if countries can develop a political will to actually make it a reality.

Q – Let's move to the Centre for Conflict Resolution. Can you explain what you do, what are your objectives, how successful you have been in fulfilling those objectives?

AA – The Centre is based in Cape Town. We were created in 1968, so we are quite well-established. Currently, we have two pillars. The first one is capacity-building and training where we train military from places like Burundi, DRC or Uganda, some of whom will be deployed in peace-keeping missions, in conflict-resolution, gender, HIV/AIDS and similar issues. We also have a gender and peace-building project where we train institutions, NGOs, media, military, and police, on how they can mainstream gender into their institutions and into their work in order that they can implement Security Council Resolution 1325. We also work on human rights where we train national human rights institutions which tend to be quite weak in Africa as well as NGOs which are working in human rights issues. We focus on the nexus between conflict-resolution and human rights which isn't always looked at. We have more long-term interventions in Swaziland, Lesotho and South Sudan where we work with governments and civil society groups in conflict-managing training.

The other pillar is policy development and research. Here we convene meetings with policy-makers, academics, civil society. For instance, SADC Security Organ asked us to convene a meeting on DRC to help them think through how they might intervene in the DRC at the time they had set-up an office there in 2010. The Mediation Support

Unit of the UN, when Ibrahim Gambari was head of Political Affairs, asked us to organise a meeting of 30 high-level, mostly African, mediators to help generate some ideas on how such a unit might work. We also worked with ECOWAS, AU and SADC at the highest levels to help them kind of generate ideas how to strengthen their security mechanisms.

We produce books and research too because African voices have been stifled in

international debate. So, you need to produce books that are not just published in Africa, because universities are starved of strong African voices on important issues. We publish with western editors like Ohio, Oxford University Press and Lynne Rienner, so that it can be part of the mainstream debate in both academia and policy-making in the West.

I think some of the work has been successful, some more than others. I mentioned the work with SADC which has been very important while one of the most relevant things that we did was working with the Namibian Ministry of Defence between 2004 and 2006 when they were chairing the SADC Security Organ and they asked us to help develop a policy on HIV/AIDS and the military. We brought military and experts together from Southern Africa, wrote a policy which we gave them and saw them push it through the SADC structures. That's a concrete examples of the kind of results that we had.


Farewell interview with Nick Westcott

Q – How hard was it for you to move from the national diplomacy to work within a European one that the EEAS is supposed to epitomize?

NW – Actually, it was quite easy for two reasons: I had been in Brussels before and knew the way the EU works and secondly we were starting an all-new organisation with a team which had not previously worked together as a group - and an organisation that hadn't previously existed – which enabled us to define what we wanted to do and how we wanted to do it with rather more freedom than you would normally have. So, that enabled the staff and me to learn at the same time how to do our jobs and led to a very good "esprit de corps" amongst the Africa Department. It also enabled me to find how the EEAS should operate at the same time as the rest of it was doing so under the sure guidance of Pierre Vimont and David O'Sullivan and the leadership of Cathy Ashton. In fact, it was an interesting voyage of discovery for all of us together.

Q – Still, there are differences, no?

NW – Yes. What is interesting about working here is the multi-faceted ways you need to co-ordinate your work with others: the EEAS with other EU institutions,

particularly the Commission, but also the Parliament and then the EEAS with the Member States and trying to get everybody to agree. I have enjoyed that aspect of work.

Q – And were you successful? Which means what do you consider to be your best achievements during these four years?

NW – I think we have been successful in three things. One was defining what our role should be. Secondly, making a difference in some specific areas where without the EEAS and the Africa Department the European effort would not have been as clearly defined and as

Nick Westcott ran the Africa Department of the EEAS practically since the Service started. Before his mandate was over and he moved to the Middle East and North Africa Department as the new MD, we went to see him and talked about his experience, his achievements and regrets and his legacy. We also tried to uncover the man beneath the professional; we were only mildly successful. The interview is below.

"The EU-Africa Summit which I think in itself sets the seal on a good relationship, pointed the way forward and established an atmosphere which would not have been easy to establish before, a genuinely collaborative partnership"


effective, particularly in the Horn of Africa and Somalia and in Sahel and Mali; probably, also in relation with Central African Republic and the Great Lakes. These are all areas where I feel we have successfully given greater direction, purpose and therefore greater impact to what the EU as whole has been doing and the MD Africa has been central to achieving that. The third achievement is the EU-Africa Summit which I think in itself sets the seal on a good relationship, pointed the way forward and established an atmosphere which would not have been easy to establish before, a genuinely collaborative partnership.

Q – Any regrets? Things you were unable to do?

NW – My biggest regret is not having been able to reform the way we work, to streamline it. A lot of people spend a lot of time doing a lot of work, which we could probably have reduced in volume if we had a better information management and had been able to change our internal working habits and procedures. We didn't reform the way we work as drastically as we could.

Q – Why it did not happen?

NW – It didn't happen because the EEAS was busy building itself as an organisation. Now that it is firmly established it is time to look at its working processes. I think we got by with the procedures we adopted but we had, to be honest, adapted a lot of those that we have inherited from the Commission which were of a longer term nature and not necessarily compatible with the immediate dynamic of interactional foreign policy. In another words we had to get a lot quicker in our work.

Another regret I would like to mention is that I did not get around to every single African country. I apologise to the Heads of

Delegation in those countries I have not managed to visit but it was largely because they were successful in keeping them peaceful.

Q – The high-level political dialogue with Africa was seen by African partners as below their expectations. How much did this situation affect our relationship with the Continent?

NW – I think there is a perception problem here, a gap between aspirations and capabilities. From our side I think we are willing to engage at high level but it is physically difficult to organise meetings. For example, our annual Strategic Partnership Summits with South Africa were very hard to schedule due to their agenda as much as our agenda. It is not that we are not committed to our partnership, it is that it is hard to get key people together. The same applies to some extent to the ministerial-level dialogue and therefore there is a risk that we commit to a regularity of processes that we can't actually deliver because people simply are unavailable to do it. But that's not to say we don't need to demonstrate our commitment (and they also their commitment) to the partnership

by making time

available. It is easier to do where there is an issue that needs to be tackled. I would say

that although

maybe the regular political dialogue has not happened at the level and the frequency people would like, when it comes to specific issues, whether it is the Conferences we had on Somalia and Mali, the Round table on Guinea-Bissau, or the Bêkou Trust Fund Conference on CAR, when there is an issue, we are there at the top level, we arrange a specific meeting,


"My approach to management is to delegate as much as I can but where there are issues that require top level of attention or precise formulations, I do tend to get stuck in"

and we move the agenda forward. I think that probably has more impact than just regular meetings with carefully prepared agendas and senior officials meetings preparing it all. And even where we do meet regularly, the annual PSC to PSC talks, the joint visit we undertook to Mali, all are big steps forward, enabling European and African sides to work together on common problems. It doesn't always work. See South Sudan - very frustrating. We haven't been able to have the kind of impact there that we have in Somalia or Mali, but we keep trying, we keep working with regional organisations. So, there are frustrations but I would not underestimate the extent of which we now have a presumption that we can work together on big issues.

Q – So, in your view Africa still sees Europe as its closest partner?

NW – Yes, I think that's true. Most regular, most reliable and physically closest partner in many ways. Not to deny that partnerships with the USA have a greater military content in some cases, partnerships with China have big commercial elements but the partnership with the EU covers everything.

Q – Let's move from Africa to you. Starting from your management style, some people

say that you micro-manage too much and you don't delegate enough. Is this a fair assessment?

NW – My approach to management is to delegate as much as I can but where there are issues that require top level of attention or precise formulations I do tend to get stuck in. Anyway I'm interested in everything; this is a drawback. So, I do selectively pay a lot of attention to particular issues but there are a range of situations where I only get involved very

occasionally. Fortunately, we have excellent people working at high level as well as all the excellent people working at desk level. For example on the Great Lakes, the fact that Koen [Director, Deputy Managing Director Koen Vervaeke] has been around following the file has made a tremendous difference, personally as well as through the team supporting him. On the Horn of Africa, EUSR Alex Rondos has done an outstanding job and has been able to get around and make contacts that I couldn't have done myself, with support from our political team here. Events like the Somalia Conference were a very good example of the two working effectively

together along with DEVCO that in many cases is an integral part of the Africa team to deliver this kind of solutions without forgetting our delegations on the spot. A very much collective effort.

A critical thing about the job is spending as much time as possible in the field in Africa, meeting Africans and working with our delegations. Delegations are the people on the frontline. They are the ones who do a huge amount of delivering of what we are trying to achieve. I have appreciated every


"All delegations were well plugged in, organised brilliant programmes and allowed me to interact directly with the governments, and see the impact of what we were able to do"

opportunity to go out and meet delegations, the Heads and the rest of the teams out there. It has always been very rewarding. All delegations were well plugged in, organised brilliant programmes and allowed me to interact directly with the governments, and see the impact of what we were able to do. This is a very important part of the job to getting out onto the ground in Africa. I would like to pay a warm tribute to everything that our delegations have been able to achieve.

Q – Now, the man beneath the professional. We know very little about you, don't know your hobbies, about what you read, if you go to the cinema… What makes you tick (apart from Africa of course)?

NW – Well, you weren't there the first day I arrived to the EEAS when I explained where I came from, or what was my personal engagement to Africa. There are relatively few people left from that first day, a cold, freezing January day back in 2011 when I first met the Africa team at the old building in Rue de la Science. I suffered something of a dilemma because my family is still living in London, so a lot of my social and family life takes place there, meaning when I am in Brussels I tend to focus on work. Very unhealthy! Fortunately some friends do their best to distract me, but even so I probably spend too much time in the office.

Even that doesn't clear the immense inflow of emails as those waiting from replies from me probably know. Notwithstanding, I very much enjoy living here because I particularly like the multinational character of the city. I really enjoy that, I find very stimulating to see people from all across Europe, and in our case from all across Africa, coming by and working with us on a daily basis. I find that variety very enjoyable. But I do watch movies… on aeroplanes!

Q – What was the last one?

NW – I saw two very good films. One (actually watched here in Brussels) is called Timbuktu which I recommend for everybody to see, a very good portrait of what life is like living under Islamic fundamentalists. The other was a film called Boyhood which I saw on an aeroplane - very engaging. Everybody who has a family will find echoes in this film.

Q – Any message for your successor?

NW – It is a fantastic team the Africa team, and given a chance they will do a fantastic job for you.


Africa Department on the move

Taking advantage of the presence of our Heads of Delegation in Brussels for their usual September meeting, the Africa Department organised an informal gathering of those serving in Africa with their African counterparts in the Belgian capital for some good-spirited exchanges. We have images of the Africa plenary session, a regional sub-session (Southern Africa) and of course of the party the day before. Plus, we also bring you some images of the Senior Officials Meeting preparing the incoming Valletta Summit on Migration which has been very much in the limelight within the Department.


Logo of the Delegation in Mauritania

Due to some technical mishap we did not include in our previous issue, together with the contribution of our Delegation in Nouakchott, the logo of the Delegation, whose author is our colleague José Javier Legarra. Since we like it a lot, we thought it would be good if we shared it with you.


Mobility, end of contracts, new opportunities, return to original services, posting in Delegations, all are reasons why some of our colleagues leave the Africa Department. Before they left, we thought it would be interesting to capture the gist of their experience amongst us. Therefore, we asked four of them to share their thoughts about how they saw their working life here, what they have liked and what did not meet their expectations. The result in this page and in the next ones.

Departing colleagues

Claudia Fischer After five years in EEAS Headquarters (UN and South Africa) I started in September a new professional adventure as Head of the Political, Press and Information Section at the EU Delegation to Namibia.

I return to a country which I first visited in 1983. In the framework of a 3 months programme organised by the South Africa Foundation I worked 2 months at the University of the then Kwa Zulu homeland and afterwards toured Namibia with friends. My professor at the University of Kwa Zulu sent me to small villages in the deep Zulu country to make research on the family situation of women: very interesting as it showed me, the young European, a completely different culture concerning marriage and the start of a family. I stayed in a bush hospital and got in touch with the local population which was not so usual and easy during those apartheid times. We were invited to Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party1 youth congress. Apart from discussions this also involved fantastic dancing and singing at any possible moment while waiting for speakers or after lunch and dinner. I have since returned to both countries as a tourist and on mission.

It is naturally a completely different experience to actually live for some years in a country. The daily life and work makes you understand so much better how diverse and multifaceted most countries are when seen from insight. It puts in question some of our behaviour and thinking and makes you grateful for things which are usually taken for granted in Europe. In the best case it opens the mind and the heart and is extremely rewarding which helps to overcome some of the 'challenges' that will without doubt come up from time to time.

I am very excited about the professional dimension of the posting. In a small Delegation without a Deputy I will hopefully have the chance to cover the whole range of issues such a Delegation deals with. My past experience in the EU Delegations in Egypt and Ukraine will certainly be helpful in this respect. But contrary to my previous Delegation experience, which

Claudia Fischer works since 1988 for the European Union: first for the Court of Justice, then the Council, the Commission and now the EEAS. Before joining the EEAS she served in the operational sections of the EU Delegations in Egypt and Ukraine. In the EEAS she worked three years on UN issues and then 2 years on South Africa before leaving as Head of the Political, Press and Information section to the EU Delegation in Namibia.


was related to project work, I will this time cover the political aspects of our relationship with the host country – a new angle of the foreign policy work in third countries.

Personally I find the professional life in Delegations more rewarding than work in Headquarters with its huge hierarchies and absence of mission budgets.

Nevertheless, I had five extremely interesting years in HQ. I learned a lot on the United Nations, especially on big UN negotiations such as the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) and its follow up, the Post-2015 intergovernmental negotiations, which will replace the Millennium Development Goals by Sustainable Development Goals. Together with the colleagues in New York we worked on the establishment of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and the upgrading of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), inter alia by establishing universal membership in UNEP's Governing Council.

And - even more important for my new posting - I gained a good insight into the EU's relations with South Africa, our only Strategic Partner on the African continent, a very important player in Southern Africa and last but not least Namibia's powerful neighbour that ruled the country for 75 years.

On a private note I am looking forward to being back in a country with a desert and with a wonderful neighbourhood that I can explore more in depth: from the wineries around Cape Town to the game parks of Botswana, from the Victoria Falls to the splendid waters of the Mozambican islands. 1 The Inkatha Freedom Party is the fourth largest party in the National Assembly of South Africa (10 seats, 2.4%), having lost almost half its seats and votes in the 2014 general election.

Per Brixen After more than three years in the EEAS West Africa Division it is time to say farewell for Per Brixen, current Desk Officer for Ghana and Togo, who will leave to take up his new post as deputy at the Danish Embassy in Prague. He looks back at three interesting years with lots of different challenges, success stories, and some frustrations. Overall he returns to the Danish Foreign Service with a valuable European experience.

After 6 years in Brussels and more than 3 in the EEAS West Africa Division the next post is calling: The Danish Embassy in Prague. It is a good time to make status over my experience in the EEAS Africa Department where I have been responsible for EU's relations with Ghana as well as, at different times, relations with Nigeria, Benin, Sierra Leone and Togo.

When I joined the EEAS in July 2012 it was still a service under construction. The EEAS had just moved into its new building at the Schuman roundabout in the heart of the European district in Brussels. The new building marked an important step in integrating the many Commission and Council Secretariat departments that had been merged into the newly created EEAS, but had up to this point been spread all over Brussels. I think it is fair to say that this was a key moment in the history of the EEAS. But the building alone wouldn't do. The next challenge was to make sure that the staff originating from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member State Diplomatic Services would integrate and work together as one. Suspicion between the different groups was there. Would members of the other staff groups be taking the best posts? Would they be promoted faster? Were the other groups being given preferential treatment? It is a latent conflict inherent in the structure of the EEAS. In the end, the daily tasks of the desk officers were the same irrespective of institutional background. It helped. At least to avoid grudges being directed at individuals.


Being a good colleague after all didn't depend on your institutional background but on your ability to deliver and help colleagues.

The cultural diversity is part of what makes working in the EEAS an enriching experience. It gives you insight and ideas about different ways of doing things. And although we as Europeans have much in common we do organise ourselves differently. What is a short lunch break for instance? For a Dane a normal lunch break is around 30 minutes, so a short lunch break can surely not be more than 20 minutes. Not necessarily so. Don't be surprised if you are still at lunch after 40 minutes when going for a short lunch with a Spanish colleague. And when is it usual to leave the office? For a Dane it would also be perfectly normal to leave the office at around 5 p.m. Taking this praxis to the West Africa Division would, however, make you the first to leave every day and would make you absent from several meetings. Maybe not the best way to integrate. In the end you have to be flexible and adjust. The good news is that the EEAS has a tool that allows you to combine your preferences with the 40 hours working week: flexitime. It cannot always prevent long working days and sometimes there is no choice but to work late hours, but at least you have the chance to leave early or meet late other days.

Apart from the first-hand experience with the cultural diversity, a post in the EEAS is an excellent opportunity for a Member State Diplomat to get an inside insight into the workings of the EU institutions, including the coordination between different Commission Services. The processes and acronyms are many – Inter-Service Consultations (CIS), Common Foreign Security Policy

(CFSP), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), Country Team Meetings (CTM), Quality Support Group (QSG), National Indicative Programmes (NIP/PIN) just to name a few. It takes a while to learn and you will still meet new acronyms and processes when you have been in the institution for years. However, this is not a peculiarity for the EU. All institutions I have worked for have had their fair share of acronyms and processes that it took time to learn. Do the EU institutions have more? It depends who you compare it to. Sometimes you wonder if things could be done in a simpler way. However, the system needs to accommodate many stakeholders. At the same time, Foreign Policy, Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Trade are handled by 4 different services in Brussels. In Denmark they all fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It makes a difference when a coherent policy needs to be coordinated.

Although the EEAS focus on foreign policy while the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also is responsible for trade and aid, the EEAS is a much larger organisation with more than 1,500 employees in Brussels (and 3,600 globally) than the Danish Foreign Service, which has around 850 employees in Copenhagen. It is very visible if you compare the Africa set-up. In the EEAS you had one Managing Director for Africa, two Directors and five Divisions each with their Head of Division and a Deputy. In Denmark you have one Head of Department with a deputy. The size of the Danish Africa Department corresponds to the size of one of the five Africa divisions in the EEAS. It means that in the EEAS there is longer to the top and that the top management is less visible to you. There are many more layers to go through. The good thing is that the institution still has an informal and friendly tone among colleagues also at different hierarchical levels.

After finishing a Masters in Political Science in the University of Aarhus, Per entered the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Humani-tarian Assistance in 2002. After a 4 years spell with UNDP in Kenya he came back to the Ministry, this time serving at the Departments for Develop-ment Policy and European Affairs. He was posted in Brussels in the Danish Permanent Representation from 2009 to 2012 before joining the West Africa Division of the EEAS in charge of the countries he mentioned in his text.


One of the benefits of being a desk officer in the EEAS, compared to being a desk officer in a relatively small Member State, is the opportunity you have to focus. It has been a privilege to be able to focus on only two countries. This allows you time to follow developments and analyse the countries in much more depth than would have been the case in my national foreign service. It makes sense. The EU is a central actor represented in almost all countries. Member States expect that the EEAS is present, has the knowledge, can make the necessary analysis and propose actions in relation to third countries. And Member States not represented in a particular country to a large extent relies on the information and analysis provided by the EEAS.

And what are some of the key events and issues that I have been able to focus on during my time in the EEAS? One of the highlights was definitely the EU-Africa summit in Brussels in April 2014. It brought together more than 60 EU and African Heads of State and Government, and a total of over 80 delegations, to discuss the future of EU- Africa relations and reinforce links between the two continents. I was assigned as the liaison officer for the delegation of Ghana headed by President Mahama. A lot of preparations went into the summit both on substance to prepare the bilateral margin meetings but also on the logistics. At the summit itself, the main task was more to make sure that all the logistics went smoothly for the President. It was another side of the job! It went well and it gave a unique opportunity to create contacts to people close to the President. As a token of appreciation I was so lucky as to get a signed version of the President's book about his experience growing up in post-independence Africa.

Some of the other key political events that I have covered include presidential and legislative elections in Ghana in 2012, the presidential election in Togo in 2015, the ministerial dialogue with Nigeria in 2013. The challenge and work load obviously varies according to the developments in the countries one is responsible for. When a crisis evolves, the EU is often a central player in developing a response. The Ebola outbreak and the Boko Haram insurgency were two of the crises that I have been involved in developing the EU responses to. Taking part in the formulation and approval of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-20 for Ghana has been another important task.

In June 2015, at the end of my term, I had the opportunity to visit Ghana once more to assist in the political dialogue between Ghana and the EU, co-chaired by President Mahama and the EU Head of Delegation. The relationship between the EU and Ghana had been negatively affected by the non-disbursement of EU budget support since end 2013 because of macro-economic imbalances and weak public financial management (PFM) systems, but with an IMF programme in place and a government action plan to address payroll irregularities, sufficient commitment had been shown by the Ghanaian government to allow for the resumption of EU budget support payments. So the meeting took place on a positive background and in a way signalled a revitalisation of the relationship. It is easier to say goodbye when things are going well!

And this leads to August 2015. The end of my term. The European experience is an asset for me. And I hope that it will also prove to be an asset for the national Foreign Service that I'm returning to. Going from the Headquarters of the EEAS in Brussels to the Danish Embassy in Prague will be a big change. But one thing will remain the same: I'll be in the centre of Europe – because that is where Prague is located!


Muriel Sorin Impressions d'une Ex-Pan Africaine

J'ai eu la chance de travailler quasi 4 ans dans l'unité Pan-Africaine. Ces 4 années sont passées à la vitesse de l'éclair!

Du point de vue humain, on peut s'estimer chanceux, tant l'atmosphère de travail si importante à nos yeux, y était bonne. En effet, on fait réellement partie d'une famille dans cette unité. Une petite famille cela dit, car il s'agit d'une petite unité. Les collègues, de toutes nationalités et background, y étaient fort sympathiques.

Au point de vue du travail, j'ai eu également la possibilité de travailler sur plusieurs projets. En effet, de par la nature de l'unité, le job était très diversifié. On touche à tout, on travaille sur plusieurs fronts. Je n'ai pas eu le temps de m'ennuyer! Chaque jour, j'ai pu voir que le dialogue, les droits de l'homme, la liberté d'expression, la gouvernance démocratique étaient de réels chevaux de batailles de mes collègues, en partenariat avec l'unité-sœur à DEVCO.

Un des aspects agréable était également les nombreux contacts avec "l'extérieur": la délégation de l'Union africaine, DEVCO, l'Ambassade, le COAFR, les Etats-membres, le groupe ACP etc.

De plus, j'ai eu l'opportunité de travailler à l'organisation du Sommet EU-Afrique 2014. Ce sommet a tout de même rassemblé plus de 80 délégations, la majorité au niveau de chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement européens et africains! Ce projet, d'une ampleur énorme nous en a fait voir de toutes les couleurs et aller dans toutes les directions, aussi bien en terme de réunions annulées en dernière minute, d'interprètes à mobiliser la nuit au dernier moment, d'un lunch à organiser pour 150 personnes pour 2 heures plus tard, de faire des impressions de documents à 22h00 sur plusieurs étages du bâtiment de l'EEAS en même temps, que de se retrouver dans une salle de réunion pleine à craquer au Charlemagne à minuit avec la lumière et toute l'électricité qui s'éteint! Quel plaisir de participer à ce projet titanesque, d'établir les contacts avec toutes les ambassades, les délégations, le Protocole, d'être en contact permanent avec le Conseil! Mon seul regret a été qu'en tant qu'assistante je n'ai pas pu assister directement au sommet, tant la demande de participants était grande et la sécurité importante! Ce projet m'a permis de mieux comprendre l'Afrique et sa problématique, de m'adapter à tout type de comportements, mais également de jongler avec les deadlines très serrés, de trouver des solutions, le tout, en essayant de toujours garder le sourire. Une autre grande difficulté a été de faire accepter des procédures très peu

adaptées au mode de faire et de pensée africain. Après avoir travaillé sur ce type de projet, on est capable de tout faire, croyez-moi!

Bien évidemment, ce n'était pas le seul gros événement organisé par cette unité, que ce soit à Bruxelles ou à Addis-Abeba, siège de l'Union africaine.

J'ai quitté cette unité, triste de laisser cette équipe et ce job intéressant, mais riche de ces nouveaux enseignements et ces différentes expériences Pan-Africaines!

Diplômée en économie et marketing, Muriel a commencé sa carrière professionnelle dans le secteur privé avant de choisir l'option européenne. Elle a travaillé dans diverses Directions générales de la Commission européenne et est entrée au SEAE en 2012 au sein de la division Pan Africaine comme assistante administrative. Elle travaille maintenant dans la Division Asie Centrale après avoir passé son examen EPSO.


Pauline Torehäll Our colleague Pauline Torehäll was supposed to also produce some thoughts about her presence in the Department before flying to Abuja to become Head of the Political and Press Section at the EU Delegation. The constraints of the move, alas, didn't give her enough time to deliver her prose, which we fully understand. Notwithstanding, since we had such a nice photo of her, we wanted to share it with all of you. We will catch up with Pauline's ideas for sure very soon.

Correction

In our last number we have inadvertently promoted Jérôme Rivière to the position of Head of the Political Section of our Delegation in Manila. Our excuses. He will be there as Political Counsellor and we wish him a very fruitful and happy post.

Editor: José Costa Pereira

Conceptual layout: Siw Gustafsson

Photographs: ©Siw Gustafsson, except the photos in the text on p. 5: ©Brennan Gilmore, p. 6: ©Erminia Notarangelo, p. 8: ©Flé Doumbia, p. 12,13,14: ©EU Delegation to the AU,

p. 16: ©Jeremy Lester, p. 17,18,19: ©ECDPM, p. 21,22: ©General Secretariat of the Council,

p. 25: ©Kristin de Peyron, p. 27: ©Gwen Van De Meerssche, p. 32 bottom: ©EEAS

Contact: Siw Gustafsson, [email protected], +32 2 584 6697

Opinions expressed in this newsletter are personal and do not bind the EEAS.

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Glossary

ACIRC African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises

AQMI Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique

CAR Central African Republic

CEDEAO Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale

COMESA Marché Commun de l'Afrique Orientale et Australe

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EUPOL European Union Police Mission

EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission

EUSR European Union Special Representative

FED Fond européen de développement

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IMF International Monetary Fund

M23 The March 23 Movement (French: Mouvement du 23-Mars), often abbreviated as M23 and also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army

PIB Produit intérieur brut

PME Petites et moyennes entreprises

PMI Petites et moyennes industries

PSC (EU) Political and Security Committee

PSC (AU) Political and Security Council

RDC République Démocratique du Congo

REC Regional Economic Communities

SADC Southern African Development Community

SHIRBRIG Multinational Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations

SIS Système d'information Schengen

UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

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