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P r o g r a m m e P a i x e t S c u r i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l e sNo 34 septembre-octobre 2008

Iraq: A Difficult Diagnosis

US operations in Iraq began in March 2003

when the US, and coalition, forces entered Iraq

to topple the Saddam Hussein regime when he

failed to provide sufficient proof of his non-

development of weapons of mass destruction

(WMDs)1 and his lack of ties to extremists.

After failing to locate evidence of WMDs, the

US shifted its rhetoric in claiming the invasion

and the deposition of Hussein was necessary

The 2008 presidential race has been in full swing for more than a year

and while much media attention focused on party nominations and

potential running mates, few have explored how US foreign policy could

dramatically shift in less than a years time. A key issue early in the

campaign, the future of US policy in Iraq, has taken a backseat to more

pressing economic issues in recent months. It is still worthwhile to

consider what policy changes may lay ahead for a key international engage-

ment of the US.

Most discussion of US operations in Iraq, starts with a blame game

about whether the war is legal/moral and ends without too much else

accomplished. At this point, regardless of the candidate sworn into office in

January 2009, it is clear any discussion of Iraq should start from the morereasonable position of what should the US do in the short and long term to

successfully transfer power to a stable, effective Iraqi government. Candidate

views are shaped by whether they see Iraq as a central element of the larger

war on terror/extremism (McCain) or as a civil conflict between sectarian factions (Obama). Candidate suggestions

have ranged from immediate withdrawal (aka cut and run by critics) to surging troops even further. Given the issues

sensitivity to the American public and the regions clear geopolitical importance, comparing the strategies proposed

by the candidates seems an appropriate challenge for this article.

Scurit mondiale 1

2008 US Presidential CandidatesForeign Policy Strategiesfor Iraq: A Comparison

Anessa L. Kimball

Professeure adjointeDpartement de science politiqueUniversit Laval, Qubec

to spread liberty to the Iraqi people. A key

aspect of the medias war coverage has focused

on casualties among American solders as a

metric of the costs of the war. As of August

2008 there have been 4,146 deaths of American

service personnel in Iraq and 30,324 people

1. J.J. Mearsheimer, and S. W. Walt, An Unnecessary War, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2003.

2. Found at http://icasualties.org/oif/ .

3. From Report # D-2007-049 Equipment Status of Deployed Forces within US Central Command by DOD Inspector Generaavailable at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/archives/D-2007-049.pdf.

have been wounded.2 Moreover, operationa

capacity has been hampered by a scarcity of

armored personnel carriers and other essentia

equipment. 3 Additionally, US forces face

serious communication and intelligence

gathering limitations due to a lack of Arab

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improve the situation. The development of a

monitoring plan and a strategy for disengage-

ment is a logical next step, however details

related to an actual timetable should be kept

private.8 Moreover, democratic transition

and institutionalization are painfully slow and

interdependent processes therefore; motivation

by strict deadlines is not the best strategy.

While the time period for any individual

states transition to full democracy may vary, itis clear that rebuilding the state, even from a

reasonably developed base, takes time. Some

scholars suggest as many as a half-dozen

electoral cycles judged as free and fair with

alternation between political parties are required

before a state can be considered an institution-

alized democracy (not to mention the demands

of citizen security).9 Nonetheless, the US should

approach its commitment in Iraq as long-term.

In considering the peaceful transfer of

power to an Iraqi government, any strategy

proposed should account for the multipledimensions upon which progress must be made

and the interdependencies among policies.

Any reasonable policy option must evaluate

the political, economic, security, and social

situations in tandem, as together these elements

create an environment where stable political

competition may take place. For example, if

security is increased by eliminating armed

insurgents then, we might believe a power

transfer to Iraq is imminent. However, if insur-

gents can still recruit individuals to defy the

political authority, even through civil meansby protest or the disruption of services, then

instability will continue to encourage third

parties to maintain an interest in, and perhaps

even try to influence or manage, the domestic

political environment because of geopolitical

concerns. Only when the base for recruitment is

substantially small can the insurgents be

effectively policed. Thus, policy proposal

should be aimed at rectifying the issues

motivating individuals to join the fight agains

the legitimate government. When the govern-

ment effectively provides for the safety and

security of its citizens, then those citizens wil

become difficult to mobilize in order to defy

the government.

Republic Party Nominee:

John McCains Strategy for Iraq

With more than a quarter of a century o

political experience and an impressive foreign

policy resume, John

McCain possesses con

siderable credential

and contacts in the for

eign policy realm. As a

former military service

member and prisoner o

war during the VietnamWar, McCain has been

outspoken about the

centrality of resolving

the Iraq issue for enhancing US security and

encouraging peace in the Middle East

McCains long-standing position supporting

US military efforts in Iraq has been re-enforced

by his proposals to surge the number of US

troops in Iraq in order to provide the force

necessary to end sectarian violence. Ad

ditionally, he has suggested a change in the

counterinsurgency strategy employed by the

US whereby US forces not only clear areas of

insurgents but continue to occupy and secure

them for the remainder of the conflict (as

opposed to the earlier strategy of clean-up and

retreat to safety). Moreover, the additiona

forces would be used to train Iraqi police and

speakers in the military.4 Those constraints

are compounded by an increasingly violent

sectarian religious conflict. While religious lines

are drawn across Iraq, the nascent government

and civilian authorities lack proper financial

and security resources to obtain autonomous

political control. Currently, the Iraqi government

relies on substantial US support at all levels and

a pull-out of American forces would result in

a power vacuum and subsequent state-failure.5

Proposals: Demands and Limits

While proposed troop withdrawals scenar-

ios fall along a continuum from slow to rapid6,

the rationality of any withdrawal plan will be

questioned if implemented before the Iraqi state

is sufficiently capable of supporting itself.

Moreover, the incentives and capacities differ

among the major US actors. That tension arises

from the structure of the American political sys-

tem where Congress controls the federal budget

but has more limited powers with respect toconstraining the Presidents individual capacity

to shape foreign policy. The Congress can call

for hearings and require White House officials

to testify but these events delay the decision

making process and signal Congressional

disapproval of existing policies rather than insert

its influence into future policies.7

Some hoped the Democratic Partys

takeover of the legislature after the 2006

mid-term elections would encourage a swift

conclusion to US operations in Iraq but even

among Party members there are conflicting pro-

posals. As such, the result has been more

evaluations of what the problem is and who to

blame rather than suggestions as to how to

2 Scurit mondiale

4. The RAND Final report on Counterinsurgency (Gompert et al. 2008) underlines some of these weaknesses and makes anumber of policy recommendations that the authors claim would enhance the governments capacity to fight insurgents. D.CGompert, J. Gordon IV, A. Grissom, D. R. Frelinger, S.G. Jones,M.C. Libicki, E. OConnell, B.K. Stearns and R. E. HunterWar by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. RAND CounterinsurgencStudy-Final Report, 2008.

5. Even in the short to medium term Iraq will meet several criteria for failed-state status suggesting the duration of Westerengagement in stabilizing the country will be substantial on many dimensions.

6. See CRS Report for Congress #89927 authored by Amy Belasco available athttp://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/89927.pdf

7. US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus, Commander of US military forces in Iraq, as recentlas April 2008 testified in front of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees of the House and Senaterespectively.

8. Publicizing a withdrawal deadline will encourage insurgents to temporarily cease operation only to resume operations aftethe US exit. Even those with a rudimentary knowledge of iterated game theory would know actors have strong incentives todefect before the known final round of play.

9. For those interested in further understanding the links between electoral participation and political performance see PowelG. Bingham. 1982. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence. Harvard University Press.

Source:

www.wikipedia.org

Source:www.house.gov

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army members so national forces can provide

security in Iraq. McCain also calls for engag-

ing Syria and Iran diplomatically (with some

conditions) in order to ensure Iraqs regional

security. The provision of security is a necessary

condition in order to move the state towards

the political and economic development

required for stability. Yet, McCains biggest

challenge is packaging his strategy so that it

does not resemble the current strategy, as theAmerican public is more critical than

ever of the stay the course rhetoric, or worse

be perceived as an escalation.

Democratic Party Candidate:

Barack Obamas Strategy for Iraq

While many critics point to Obamas lim-

ited foreign policy credentials relative to

his opponent, he has made his opinion about

the Iraq war clear from the start. In actively

campaigning against the war in 2003-4, Obama

has maintained his stance against what he hascalled a rash war in Iraq, and has worried

about, an occupation of undetermined length,

with undetermined costs, and undetermined

consequences10. With the price-tag for this

conflict running over a trillion dollars, Obama

laments thats money not spent on homeland

security and counter-terrorism health care

a world-class education. Moreover, aside from

the direct domestic costs he cites intangible

diplomatic and reputational costs suffered by

the US. Obamas ini-

tial strategy for Iraq is

to begin an immediate

withdrawal as he feels

there is no military

solution for Iraq and

the US is trapped fight-

ing an Iraqi civil war.

He proposes immedi-

ate talks for a draw-

down of troops with

Iraqi leaders followed by a steady but sensible

removal of American forces within 16 months.

In recent months, he has admitted such a rapid

timetable may not be feasible. Moreover, he

pledges not to leave a permanent US presence

in the region preferring to transfer responsibil-

ity for peace and stability to Iraq. Obama

contends that Iraqi people should decide

the future not American leaders and calls on

the UN and Iraqs neighbors to engage in a

dialogue aimed at providing agreements to bol-

ster the security of an independent Iraq in a

troubled region. Resolving the US commitment

in Iraq will allow the US to return its focus to

the war in Afghanistan and finish its commit-

ment there. However, the biggest challenge to

Obamas strategy is to package it so as to not

sound like the US is cutting and running out

on its commitment and responsibility to Iraq.

A Comparison of the Two

Approaches

The positions of the presidential candidatesthough clearly opposed do contain some

elements of commonality. Both candidates

point out the need to bolster Iraqi national capa-

bilities in order to create a firm base for politi-

cal and economic development, though they

disagree about the best method for doing

so. Additionally, both men believe regional

actors will play a key role in ensuring the

geopolitical stability of the region as they sug-

gest the necessity of engaging Iran and Syria

in any discussion about a future Iraqi state,

though they differ over whether to implementconditions on those negotiations.

While there is a distinct simplicity in

Obamas proposed strategy, the notion thatresponsible disengagement can happen within

16 months of a Democratic presidential take-

over is perhaps too idealistic. However, Obamas

strategy has received unexpected support from

the current Iraqi Prime Minister whose

domestic constituents favor US withdrawal. In

contrast, McCains strategy ends up at the other

extreme by increasing resource commitments

without a foreseeable limit in sight. McCains

strategy risks not only continued costly engage-

ment (and possibly escalation) but without

a system for monitoring progress towards return-

ing political autonomy to the Iraqi people.

Yet, any competent proposed strategy must

be based upon an evaluation of each dimension

(i.e. political, economic, security, and social)

made by an appropriate team to 1) determine

where and what progress has been made, 2)

identify reasonable goals for the short and long

Scurit mondiale 3

term, and 3) develop a multi-pronged plan to

meet those goals. Additionally, reasonable and

common indicators of progress based on objec

tive criteria should be tracked so that possibil

ities for policy flexibility/amendment can be

introduced as necessary. The policy actions

developed should encourage interdependencie

across the dimensions. For example, the

creation of stable property rights regime wil

affect the economic, social and political dimensions but have a limited effect on security

In contrast, the voluntary disarmament of insur

gent forces and retraining of those individuals to

integrate effectively into civil society will affec

all dimensions. Short term plans should develop

synergies between dimensions but also

be capable of implementation a difficul

trade-off to be evaluated by policymakers. Long

term plans should create equilibrium between

flexibility and progress. Finally, the US

government should clarify the extent it is

willing to allocate further resources (militaryfinancial, personnel) to continue this foreign

policy action. If the position of the governmen

is to engage itself as long as necessary to ensure

a peaceful turnover of power to a consolidated

Iraq government, then the US government i

working with an entirely different time horizon

than if it is engaging itself until the Iraq

government develops some desired level o

administrative and security capacity. Both can

didates have failed to present, in my view

a coherent strategy for Iraq and, unfortunately

the real cost to the American public may be

another Presidential administration who drops

the ball.

* Les opinions exprimes dans cet articlesont celles de lauteur et ne sauraient treattribues au Programme Paix et ScuritInternationales, de lInstitut Qubcoisdes Hautes tudes internationales ou auxpersonnes responsables de la publicationde Scurit Mondiale.

The opinions expressed in this paperbelong solely to the author and are notto be attributed to the ProgrammePaix et Scurit Internationales, the InstitutQubcois des Hautes tudes internationalesor the persons in charge of the ScuritMondiale publication.

10. Excerpt from a speech given in Clinton, Iowa on September 12, 2007.

Long term plans

should create equilibrium

between flexibility

and progress.

Source:barackobama.com

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Jeudi

16 octobre

Vendredi

17 octobre2008

Colloque

Prsent par CDAS, Universit McGill; HEI, Universit Laval;CERIUM, Universit de Montral; IFRAMOND, Universit Jean

Moulin, Lyon.

Quel rle pour la Francophonie en 2008?

9h 16h30

Le Grand Salon du Pavillon Pollack

Rdacteur: Professeur Olivier Delas Assistante de rdaction : Oana Tranca

Publie par:Le Programme Paix et scurit internationales

Grard Hervouet, Directeur

Institut qubcois des hautes tudes internationales (HEI), Universit Laval

Supervision ditoriale: Claude Basset

Conception et ralisation graphique:Alphatek

Le bulletin Scurit mondiale est accessible sur Internet ladresse suivante:

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Pour informations: 418 656-7771

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2 octobre2008

Mercredi

8 octobre2008

Pour plus dinformations sur ces activits contactez le Programme Paix et scurit

internationales ladresse suivante: psi@hei.ulaval.ca

Confrence

Prsente par Centre danalyse des politiques publiques(CAPP)

Grgoire Rota-Graziosi

Centre dtude et de recherche sur le dveloppementinternational (CERDI), Facult dconomie et de gestion,

Universit dAuvergne

Leadership et hgmonie dans la fourniture de biens publics

mondiaux: une perspective de la thorie des jeux

12h 13h15

Salle 3470, Pavillon Charles-de Koninck

Confrence

Prsente par la Chaire dtudes maghrbines Rabah-Bitat

Mahi Tabet-Aoul

Professeur et chercheur au Centre national de recherche enanthropologie sociale et culturelle (CRASC) et au Laboratoiredes systmes dinformation en Sant (LAB SIS), lUniversit

dOran.Les enjeux du dveloppement durable au Maghreb: tendancessocio-conomiques et dmographiques

11h30 12h30

Salle 2413, Pavillon Charles-de Koninck

Pour en savoir plus

About the candidates:

www.johnmccain.com;

www.barackobama.com

About Iraq war casualty counts:

http://icasualties.org/oif/. About the debate:

Goldstein, J. 2004. The Real Price of War:

How You Pay for the War on Terror. New

York: NYU Press.

Mearsheimer, J.J. and S. W. Walt. 2003.

An Unnecessary War Foreign Policy,

Jan/Feb.

Schofield, J and Zenko, M. 2004.

Designing a Secure Iraq: A US PolicyPrescription. Third World Quarterly. 25(4):

677-687.Vaitheeswaren, V.V. 2003. Pipe Dreams in

Iraq Foreign Policy, Sept./Oct.

Saviez-vous que?

The current costs for the war in Iraq are

estimated to be above $1 trillon dollars.

Number of years of US Senate Experience:

John McCain 22; Barak Obama 4

Relevant Senate Committee Assignments:

John McCain: Senate Committee on ArmedServices (since 1986, Ranking Minority

Member since 2006); Barak Obama:

Foreign Relations Committee & HomelandSecurity and Governmental Affairs (since

2006)

The next president will be either the

oldest ever inaugurated (70) or the first

African-American President in American

history

The next President will be left-handed; only

7 other US Presidents (16%) have beenleft-handed.