Report+ASR AF1247 19 dec...

CONT ENTSA

PAPI H

Texte surligné

PAPI H

Texte surligné

CO N T E X T O F T H I S R E G U L A T O R Y R E P O R T (& ASR)B

SU M M A R Y O F T H E R E P O R T - D I G E S TC

L I S T O F T H E 14 SU G G E S T I O N S

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

D

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

RE G U L A T O R Y AS P E C T

��

�� ! �

"� �� #�� $�� $�#�� $�� $��

1

�� %�� &�� $�� '��

�� (� �� '��

�� )�� *�� !��

"� � �� &��

A318/19/20/21Air FranceOA.NA

01 - Généralités avion20 - DONNEES GENERALES

MSS 01.20.00Page 06

28 JUL 2011

2 VERSION DEGRADEE D’EXPLOITATIONVERSION PNC REGLEMENTAIRES NOMBRE DE PASSAGERS (1)

A318 / A319 2 PNC 100 passagersA320 3 PNC 150 passagers

2 PNC 100 passagersA321 4 PNC 200 passagers

(1) Nombre de passagers de deux ans et plus.

��

��

�� )+, ��-��

�� !

"� � �� !

-� �� ! ��

.� �� $��

� � ��

��

�� &��$ � � )+, ��-��

&� �� '�� )+, ��//�� $��

�� )+, ��//�� %�� '�� # �� $��

�� &�� '�� ! ��

"� � �� 0�� ! ��

-� �� #�� 1�� 1��! ��

.� �� ! ��

�� #��

%�� )+, ��//��

�� 2�� "�� '�� #�� )+, ��//��

�� &�� '�� ! ��

"� ��

✓

✓

✓

✓

SE C U R I T Y A N D SA F E T Y AS P E C T S2

DUMARK#99999999.9986998#02#ID_INDEX_99999999.9986998_0#02

___##___##___##___ __###__###__###__

CABIN CHECKS

– The cabin crew makes sure that:• Emergency exits and aisles are unobstructed.

• Lavatories are unoccupied and all compartments are closed and secured.

• Passengers are seated with their seat belts secured (including passengers on stretcher).

• Seat backs are in the full upright position and armrests are lowered.

• Footrests are stowed.

• Folding trays are raised.

• Individual video screens are stowed.

• Cellphones and electronic devices are switched off.

• Hand luggage and the objects which can present a risk are stowed.

• Lap held infants are restrained by the designated accompanying adult or occupy an approved device (car seat) which is correctly installed and restrained by aircraft passenger seat belt.

• Galley materials are cleared and stowed securely.

• Galley compartments are closed and locked.

• Class separation bulkheads and all the curtains are maintained in open position.

• A majority of windows shades close to the doors are raised.

• Overhead compartments are closed, stowage compartments safeties are in place.

– When all of these checks are completed, the regulatory CA returns to his station and monitors the cabin.

Prendre conscience que la simple application des règlements ne suffit pas toujours à répondre aux enjeux de la sécurité des vols8

Pourquoi ce message est important ?• Notre cadre de travail est de plus en plus normé. Mais paradoxalement, les différentes pressions (règlementaire,

économique, temporelle) font que nous nous alignons parfois sur la norme la moins contraignante. Il est impératif de prendre conscience à tous les niveaux de l’entreprise qu’une norme est un niveau MINIMUM et donc s’assurer en toute circonstances qu’elle satisfait aux objectifs élevés de la Compagnie en matière de sécurité des vols.

A terme, à quel résultat veut-on arriver ?• Trajectoire veut amener Air France à réfléchir aux normes qui sont imposées, et ne pas les appliquer a minima

avant analyse complète.

• Ces normes ont elles un impact sur la sécurité des vols ?

• Si oui, ces normes correspondent-elles à notre vision, sont-elles suffisantes, sont-elles applicables en l'état, en tenant compte de nos spécificités techniques et culturelles ?

Passengers seated in an exit row adjacent to the overwing exits may be called upon toassist in an evacuation. Passengers are likely to make the first attempts to open over-wing hatches because cabin crew are not physically located near the overwing exits.Upon crew command or personal assessment of danger, these passengers must decideif their exit is safe to use and then open their exit hatch for use during an evacuation.These passengers must be ready to act quickly in an emergency. However, unlike thecrew, these passengers receive no formal training on performing these tasks.

Passengers seated in the mid-section of the passenger cabin thought it strange that theywere not helped by crew at the overwing exits. Their perception and feeling was thatthey were left abandoned. This is explained by the fact that no cabin crew is seatednear the overwing emergency exits.

Several passengers seated in the vicinity of the overwing emergency exits reported hav-ing received assistance from a fellow passenger, a male of approximately 50 years ofage. This passenger had been very helpful in calming them down down and in assist-ing in the evacuation, both inside and outside the aircraft. This undetermined person(reportedly a pilot from a Spanish commercial airline) used both Spanish and Englishinstructions.

Several cabin attendants stated that if they had been alone in the galley area (withoutother colleague cabin attendant in the event of a flight with minimum cabin crew) theycould have opened only one door, and if that door cannot be opened under certain sit-uations, it would be very hard to reach the other door if the galley is already jammedby passengers in panic.

From a safety viewpoint it may be desirable to maintain a passenger-crew ratio that isas low as practical as in the event of a serious accident. The performance and num-ber of cabin crewmembers may significantly influence evacuation rates and passengerbehavior.

It is assumed that the crew plays a vital role in managing the evacuation of passengers.This role includes guiding passengers to their exits as well as speeding their passagethrough the exit. The more (well-trained and active) crew is available to direct the pas-sengers, the more likely passengers are of utilizing their optimal exit.

The AASK database shows that, particularly on small narrow body aircraft, if the rela-tionship between EE and cabin crew numbers can be generalized, the loss of even a sin-gle cabin crewmember may have serious implications for passenger safety(3). When thereis a small number of crew available to control the evacuation, passengers tend not tomake use of their optimal exits, but tend to travel significantly further than necessary inorder to evacuate.

During their interviews the cabin crewmembers stated that they were bolstered in theirconfidence and ability to cope specifically because they were not alone. If a single CAmust redirect passengers from an unusable exit and then pass passengers to openanother exit, the question arises if this is possible.

Finally, also the presence of smoke or fire may play a role in passenger exit selection.This would have been particularly relevant if extra time was spent in egress, which couldhave compromised the survival chances of the passengers. This was not the case in thisaccident.

For an MAPSC of 147 passenger seats on this aircraft and the 4 cabin attendants sched-uled, the theoretical maximum passenger-to-crew ratio was: 36.75 to 1.

Around the world the accepted crewing level varies from around 36:1 to 50:1 passen-gers per cabin crew member. The number of additional cabin attendants scheduleddepends on the flight destination, the flight duration and the service schedule on board.

Operational cabin crew is defined as those crew members who were uninjured or whosustained only minor injuries and were therefore able to actually take an active part inmanaging the evacuation.

During the evacuation all 4 cabin attendants remained operational. Hence, for the 140passengers on board at the time of the accident and the 4 operational cabin attendants,the actual passenger-to-crew ratio was: 35 to 1.

Conformément aux engagements pris par l’entreprisesuite à l’accord de sortie de crise du 23 juillet 2011, 30tronçons de vol d’essai ont été réalisés.L’objectif de ces vols était de définir en accord avecles Organisations syndicales, la faisabilité de nosservices sur A319 en composition équipage à 3 PNC.

PRODUCTIVITE :POURQUOI L’A319 À 3 ?Sur la base de Marseille, l’A319 est exploité à 3 PNC depuis le 1er octobre 2011. Pour les PNC basés en région parisienne, le passage à 3 PNC a été rendu effectif à compter du 1er décembre 2011, à l’exception de certaines liaisons sur l’Europe et en France :

Quelles sont ces exceptions ?

les vols les plus courts, afi n de ne pas compromettre la réalisation du service,

les vols les plus longs, compte tenu en particulier de la taille des cabines Premium et du service réalisé.

Ce projet a été initié à l’automne 2009 afi n d’améliorer la

compétitivité du réseau moyen-courrier. En effet, la comparaison avec les autres compagnies européennes utilisant des A319 montre qu’elles exploitent déjà cet avion avec 3 PNC. Il est impératif de maîtriser au mieux notre différentiel de coûts avec nos concurrents afi n que nos opérations restent rentables, car nos clients n’acceptent de voler avec nous que si nos tarifs restent à des niveaux similaires à ceux de la concurrence.

Cette contribution à l’amélioration de l’économie du réseau moyen-courrier s’inscrivait dans le cadre du projet NEO avec une simplifi cation du service à bord, mise en œuvre depuis l’été 2010.

La sécurité des vols de la compagnie est l’affaire de tous,l’ambition de Trajectoire est de la hisser

au plus haut niveau

S’assurer, à tous les niveaux, que le douteprofite à la sécuritéRemettre en cause sans tabous nos pratiques et modes de fonctionnement, à tous les niveaux

• Retrouver la confiance en nos processus exige une remise en cause totale sans préjugés d'aucune sorte.

• Il s'agit de reconsidérer tous les modèles et schémas, y compris ceux qui paraissent les plus appropriés, en tâchant de ne pas masquer leurs défauts et effets pervers.

• Trajectoire veut amener Air France à réfléchir aux normes qui sont imposées, et ne pas les appliquer a minima avant analyse complète.

• Ces normes ont elles un impact sur la sécurité des vols ?

• Si oui, ces normes correspondent-elles à notre vision, sont-elles suffisantes, sont-elles applicables en l'état, en tenant compte de nos spécificités techniques et culturelles ?

OT H E R V I S I O N S3

( SPR = SCP : ABP ratio )

SPRSPRLim

RISK

PASSAGER A MOBILITE REDUITE (PMR)Les PMR qui n'ont pu évacuer seuls ou avec l'aide d'un assistant sécurité, sont évacués par le PNC aprèsles autres passagers.

NOTE Les passagers sur civière sont évacués par leur assistant sécurité avec l'aide du PNC après les autrespassagers.

Category on stretchers

children (up to 7y)

infants (up to 2y)

extremely overweight

PD (paralysed

lower limbs)

children (up to 12y)

PD (aided

walking)

mental deficient

PD (low

mobility) Risk to

Themselves

Category (continued)

expectant mothers blind small adults

PD (upper limbs)

tall deaf inadmissible in custody / deportees mute

Risk to Themselves

Summarised risk to the SCPs themselves per special category of passengers sorted by risk in descending order

(b) aircraft carrying more than 36 but not more than 216 passengers shall carry at least 1 cabin attendant for each unit of 36 passengers or part thereof;

(c) aircraft carrying more than 216 passengers shall carry the number of cabin attendants as prescribed by CASA which shall not be less than 1 cabin attendant for each floor level exit in any cabin with 2 aisles;

705.104 (1) Subject to subsection (3), no air operator shall operate an aircraft with passengers on board unless the crew includesat least the following number of flight attendants:

(a) 1 to 40 passengers on board, one attendant;

(b) 41 to 80 passengers on board, two attendants; and

(c) 81 or more passengers on board, one attendant for each unit of 40 passengers or portion thereof.

CONC LUS I ONE

GLOSSARYF

B IB L I OGRAPHY

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

G

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

∎

Report+ASR AF1247 19 dec...

Documents

Transcript of Report+ASR AF1247 19 dec...