Antidumping And Feed-in tAriFFs As good Buddies? modeling the eu-ChinA solAr pAnel dispute

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Patrice BougetteChristophe Charlier

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Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies?

Modeling the EU–China Solar Panel Dispute∗

Patrice Bougette † Christophe Charlier ‡

GREDEG Working Paper No. 2017–17

Revised version: November 2018

Abstract

The paper analyzes the interactions between trade and renewable energy policies based on

the EU–China solar panel dispute which is the most significant antidumping (AD) complaint

in Europe. We build a price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and

intra-industry trade in photovoltaic (PV) equipment. We show that an optimal antidumping

duty always increases with the feed-in tariff (FIT) program set in the home country. An

appropriate antidumping duty – nullifying the dumping margin – decreases with the FIT pro-

gram. We show that optimal FIT increases with the AD duty. Therefore, trade and renewable

energy optimal policies may complement one another. Lastly, we introduce R&D activities in

the PV sector, and international spillovers. We show that R&D makes the optimal FIT lower

and increases the dumping margin. These effects are reinforced by technological spillovers.

Keywords: Antidumping, FIT, Solar Panels, Renewable Energy, Trade disputes, EU, China.

JEL Codes: F18, L52, Q42, Q48, Q56.

∗The authors thank all participants at the ETSG Conference (Helsinki, September 2016), the AFED conference

(Paris, November 2016), the LEAD seminar (Toulon, February 2017), the ISEFI conference (Paris, May 2017),

the EAERE conference (Athens, July 2017), and the CREM seminar (Rennes, March 2018). Special thanks go to

Dorothee Brecard, Thomas Le Texier, Marie-Helene Hubert, and Rolf Golombek for their comments on an earlier

version of the text. We are indebted also to Editor Adonis Yatchew and two anonymous referees whose comments

have helped us to substantially improve the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.†Universite Cote d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France. Email: patrice.bougette@unice.fr.‡Corresponding author. Universite Cote d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France. Address: GREDEG CNRS, 250 rue

Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne, France. Email: christophe.charlier@unice.fr.

1 Introduction

The EU–China solar panel dispute opposes the largest photovoltaic (PV) market and the biggest

PV manufacturer. Following a complaint from EU solar manufacturers, the European Commission

(EC) established that solar cells and solar panels imported from China were being sold at a dumped

price that was harming EU solar manufacturers.1 The EC argued that “unfair trade in solar panels

does not help the environment and is not compatible with a healthy global solar industry.2” In

December 2013, a definitive anti-dumping (AD) duty was imposed on these products. The measure

took the form of an ad valorem duty ranging between 27.3 % and 64.9%.3 This was not an isolated

case: the US introduced the same type of trade protective measures during this period (Hughes

and Meckling, 2017; Lewis, 2014). Voituriez and Wang (2015) show that China’s support policies

were not detailed in the EC’s investigation, and highlights a series of measures such as corporate

tax rebates or loan offer facilities, suggesting implementation of a strategic trade policy. This

export-oriented aggressive strategy is well-documented and confirmed for the period before 2009 in

the study by Zhang (2018). With the US and the EU AD disputes, China changed the orientation

of its industrial policy in favor of its own domestic PV market.

The dispute must be replaced in the context of trade defense procedures carried out by the

EC. It turned into a wider political battle when several Member States confronted the EC over

its solutions to this dispute (Goron, 2018). In March 2017, following investigations and several

periods of partial interim reviews, and in a context of China being denied ‘market economy status’,

the EC decided to retain the AD measure.4 By September 2017, the EC had decided to lower the

minimum import prices for Chinese solar panels sold in Europe. These rates also provide the basis

for AD duties imposed on solar products imported from mainland China. The minimum import

price (MIP) is cut progressively every three months. The first reduction started October 2017 and

ends July 2018. Companies that sell solar products below the set minimum price are required to

pay import duties of up to 64.9%.5 Nevertheless, it appears that these AD actions were not enough

to avoid insolvency of the European lead solar manufacturer SolarWorld AG, announced in May

2017.6 In March 2018, the Group filed again for insolvency and blamed the planned phasing out

of AD measures by the EC and the further drop in the prices of PV modules.7

The solar panel case has been widely discussed for several reasons. “In terms of import value1According to European legislation “an anti-dumping (AD) duty may be applied to any dumped product whose

release for free circulation in the Community causes injury” European Commission (2009, art.1).2See European Commission, “EU imposes definitive measures on Chinese solar panels, confirms undertaking with

Chinese solar panel exporters.”, Press release, Brussels, December 2, 2013.3Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 of 2 December 2013 (OJ L 325, 5.12.2013).4European Commission (2017a).5European Commission (2017b).6See, e.g. “SolarPower Europe: SolarWorld bankruptcy marks ‘sad day for Europe’.”, PV Magazine, May 11,

2017. In August 2017, SolarWorld Industries acquired the German production and sales activities of the insolvent

SolarWorld AG.7See “SolarWorld files for insolvency – again.”, PV Magazine, March 28, 2018.

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affected, (this dispute) is the most significant anti-dumping complaint the European Commission

has received so far.8” Major trade players including China and the EU, consider the green en-

ergy production equipment industry to be a strategic emerging sector in which trade disputes are

inevitable (Lewis, 2014; Voituriez and Wang, 2015). Production of PV equipment experienced sub-

stantial growth during the 2000s, and this coincided with a reduction in the price of solar panels,

explained in part by the increasing penetration of lower cost Chinese PV producers (Pillai, 2015).

This growth in PV products was connected also to public policies.9 In both the EU and China, the

ascendancy of the PV sector has been fostered by green industry policies. However, these policies

are uncoordinated. Broadly,10 China chose to subsidize PV equipment manufacturers (Chen, 2015;

Groba and Cao, 2015) rather than consumers (i.e. renewable electricity producers), whereas the

EU chose to subsidize consumers11 rather than producers. As a consequence, in 2011 China was

exporting 90% of its solar panel production and experiencing very low domestic consumption. At

that time, the EU had the world’s largest installed solar generation capacity, constituted 80% of

Chinese products. It was the first export market for Chinese solar manufacturers (Chen, 2015)

and the market share of European PV manufacturers fell progressively.12 This led to European

PV manufacturers’ complaint against unfair competition, and to the EC’s AD (and anti-subsidy)

investigations.

The EU–China solar panel dispute has provoked considerable comment but few economic stud-

ies. The applied trade literature on the case has been developed primarily using an event study

approach. In this body of work, AD measures are considered an external shock whose conse-

quences are studied. Huang et al. (2016) study the effects of European AD law on the stock prices

of Chinese PV sector firms, and compare them to other AD shocks. They show that stock price

synchronization and co-movement (and therefore stock-market volatility) were impacted positively

by both EU and US AD legislation on solar panels. Crowley and Song (2015) examine the impact

of European AD legislation on the stock market performance of Chinese PV sector firms. They

find that it is the larger, export-oriented firms that have been the most affected, and that firms’

exposure depends on their ownership structure. The largest negative effect of European AD duty

is felt by privately owned firms, with state owned firms experiencing only limited adverse effects.8See EC, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar panel imports from China,” Press release, Brussels,

September 6, 2012. This complaint emerged in a context where widespread AD duties would seem to question the

real motivation for this policy (Blonigen and Prusa, 2016; Zanardi, 2006): A response to dumping practices or simply

another form of trade protection. For a critique of the way AD duties are used, see Konings and Vandenbussche

(2008) among others.9See Perez de Arce and Sauma (2016) for a theoretical presentation of the main common policies, and see Jenner

et al. (2012) for an empirical analysis of the determinants of FIT programs use in the EU.10The facts suggest a more nuanced picture. See e.g. Grau et al. (2012) for a comparison of China and Germany.11The policy takes the form of feed-in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity produced from solar panels, low

interest rate loans for solar panel installations, etc. FIT programs existed in China but were underdeveloped and

were not coordinated at the national level until 2011 (Chen, 2015).12See the data provided by the EC’s decision imposing provisional AD duties (European Commission, 2016).

3

Another way to investigate the effects of the dispute on Chinese firms in this literature is to con-

sider foreign direct investment (FDI). Curran et al. (2017) explore this issue using FDI data to see

whether the AD trade dispute on solar panels has enabled a “tariff jumping FDI strategy” for Chi-

nese solar panel producers. Their results highlight a concentration of Chinese FDI in Germany but

no FDI strategy that would guarantee access to the EU market for Chinese solar panel producers.

The solar panels case focuses mainly but not exclusively on strategic trade policies.13 The

renewable energy and environmental stakes are obvious since the fight against global warming,

and the promotion of energy transition were vulnerable to how the trade dispute was managed. A

side benefit of the EU being able to import cheap solar panels has been the adoption of renewable

energy equipment and a reduction in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Revealingly, in

2012 the EC felt the need during its AD investigation to argue against the claim that use of AD

duties would undermine EU green energy objectives.14 Very few economic works (see Section 2)

have investigated this issue. Investigating the energy and environmental stakes in this dispute is

especially important since as a trade policy (AD duties) could be seen as interfering with renewable

electricity support programs such as FIT.15 More precisely, an AD policy could be suspected of

counteracting the supportive effect of FIT programs. In other words, the interrelation between

FIT and AD policies should be questioned.

An important point raised by the EC when justifying its AD investigation was the idea that

dumping could “discourage EU producers from developing cutting edge technologies in the re-

newable energy sector.”16 In the area of renewable energies, innovation is indeed seen as strategic.

Global patent application trends for selected Climate Change and Mitigation Technologies (CCMT)

show that compared to other CCMTs, the PV sector has high volumes and rates of patenting ac-

tivity (WIPO, 2014). Regarding the geography of PV sector patenting, the same report includes

a somewhat contradictory observation. On the one hand, one third of the PV patent applications

come from China. On the other hand, this proportion of patent applications is smaller than what

is observed for other CCMTs. Furthermore, PV is the only CCMT in which no Chinese companies

appear in the top 10 technology owners. These observations might be an indication of strong

international competition in R&D. In such a context, the question whether AD can be considered

as benefiting the environment should be explored.

The novelty of the present paper is that it acknowledges the renewable energy and environmental

stakes in the EU–China solar panel trade dispute. This paper explores the interaction between

trade and environmental (renewable energy) policies in a second-best world.17 We consider a13See Curran (2015) for an analysis of this case in terms of political economy.14http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/september/tradoc_149903.pdf15FIT programs guarantee a price for renewable electricity that is higher than the gross market electricity price,

allowing green electricity producers to cope with higher fixed production costs. These subsidy programs also benefit

upstream firms (solar panels producers) through a ‘pass-through effect’ (Bougette and Charlier, 2015).16http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-501_en.htm17The second-best theory suggests that the elimination of one market failure in a world with many market failures,

may not be welfare enhancing (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). The need for a coordinated response in a second-best

4

price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and intra-industry trade in PV

equipment. We derive the conditions for unilateral dumping by the foreign firm. We assess the

environmental stakes of dumping and AD policies and evaluate the interrelation between FIT and

AD. We show that if the FIT rate and the AD duty to be implemented are calculated based on

welfare maximization, FIT and AD appear to be complementary policies: the optimal FIT rate

increases with the AD duty, and vice versa. Therefore, when setting AD duties in sectors related to

clean energy products, the other side, i.e. the extent to which renewable energy is subsidized, needs

to be considered. If AD duty is chosen to nullify the dumping margin rather than to maximize

domestic welfare, FIT and AD become substitutes.

Investigating the reaction of these two policies to dumping we show that an AD duty reacts

positively to higher levels of dumping, while for a given AD duty, the FIT rate decreases with

higher levels of dumping. Further, we show that when domestic firms’ competitiveness decreases

due to a rise in marginal costs, the optimal AD duty reacts strategically but is accompanied by

a higher FIT. Lastly, we introduce R&D activities in the PV sector, and international spillovers.

We show that R&D lessens FIT programs and raises the dumping margin, and that these effects

are reinforced by spillovers.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the relevant research literature.

Section 3 presents a unilateral dumping model. The properties of an AD duty and an optimal

FIT rate are presented in this case. Then, the section explores the interrelation between an FIT

program and AD duty. Section 4 extends the original model in order to consider foreign and

domestic R&D in the PV sector and technological spillovers. Section 5 concludes and discusses

some policy implications from the EU–China solar panel dispute.

2 Related Literature

Exploring the interaction between AD duties (understood as a trade policy) and a FIT program

(understood as a supportive policy for renewable energy), this paper is at the crossroads of different

fields of economics. First, it adds to the literature on AD. Dumping and AD duties have been

studied extensively in both the theoretical and empirical literatures (see e.g. Blonigen and Prusa

(2016)’s survey). These works stress several effects of AD actions such as protection effects (Veugel-

ers and Vandenbussche, 1999), collusive effects (Collie and Le, 2010), and substitutes for tariffs

(Dinlersoz and Dogan, 2010) or R&D (Gao and Miyagiwa, 2005). Questions related to dumping

measures and its determination, and therefore, which type of AD duty to choose are debated in

the literature (Sykes, 1996; Blonigen and Prusa, 2016). To our knowledge, there are no theoretical

works on the interactions between AD duties and renewable energy support programs. Therefore,

we provide a novel exploration of the question of adequate AD duties. Analyzing this important

world can often serve as an economic justification for the use of multiple policy instruments (see, Bennear et al.

(2007) for a discussion of using multiple instruments in a second-best world).

5

issue is interesting from an academic perspective because of the interaction between policies and

market failures but is also highly relevant from a policy point of view.

Second, this work adds to the growing literature on trade disputes triggered by renewable en-

ergy support policies (Bougette and Charlier, 2015; Charnovitz and Fischer, 2015; Shadikhodjaev,

2015). These studies were conducted in the wake of the Canada – Renewable energy dispute which

questioned the possibility to subsidize renewable energy development. This thematic resonates

with a major focus: the use of a green industrial policy to ensure development of a renewable

energy sector (Rodrik, 2014).18 Subsidizing the PV sector can be seen as a means to manage the

positive knowledge externalities from a new technology developed by an infant industry (Jaffe et al.,

2005). Together with the positive spillovers from renewable energy technologies, the quasi-absence

of policies to tackle the negative externalities of fossil fueled energy is an argument also in favor of

the need for such supportive schemes. These two well-recognized reasons do not rule out the pos-

sibility of green industrial policy being used for strategic trade-distortive reasons. AD actions on

solar panels decided by the EU and the US are upheld by the claim that Chinese products are sold

at an “unfair” price achievable because of Chinese State Aid. Employing a framework where three

countries develop clean technologies in their electricity sectors, and two produce renewable energy

equipment and compete, Fischer (2017) studies the case where both upstream and downstream

subsidies can be decided by governments attaching importance to lobby groups. These subsidies

may be strategic thanks to their effect on the terms of trade. In a situation of multiple market

failures, Fischer (2017) shows in particular, that “strategic partners may underprovide production

subsidies”. Depending on the importance of the environmental externality and the political dis-

tortions at stake, the author finds rationales for both developing and constraining green industrial

policy.

The literature attaches importance to the forms of supportive schemes, and to possible overlaps

between these policies and environmental instruments. On the first point, Fischer et al. (2018)

show, e.g., that introducing upstream or downstream subsidies in a two-region model does not

matter in a global context. Strategic subsidies chosen non-cooperatively can be optimal from a

global perspective, if both regions value their emissions at their global carbon costs. However,

if the regions sufficiently undervalue global emissions, restricting the use of upstream subsidies

may enhance welfare. On the second point, the possible overlapping of different policies giving

incentives for developing renewable energy has received particular attention. For example, a policy

such as an emissions trading scheme (ETS), can be designed to curb carbon emissions, and would

interact with a scheme that supports renewable energy. Fischer and Preonas (2010) and Lehmann

and Gawel (2013) investigate this, and question the necessity for multiple policy levers and their18In Europe, the effects of this policy need to be qualified. See e.g. Jaraite et al. (2017)’s study which its long-term

and short-run effects on economic growth and employment. The authors find that renewable energy support policies

(PV and wind turbines) promote growth and / or employment in the short run but do not stimulate economic

growth in the long run.

6

possible countervailing effects. This literature complements theoretical and empirical work probing

the adequate FIT rate in the energy economics field (Drechsler et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2016;

Farrell et al., 2017).

The EU–China solar panel dispute could be considered as one more example of the interference

between trade and energy policies. However, we think that the dispute presents an original problem

of interaction between a trade (AD) policy and energy (FIT) policies which has not been explored

in the economic literature. Our paper addresses this novel issue and extends the literature reviewed

in this section.

3 An Antidumping Model with Feed-in Tariffs

3.1 Assumptions

We assume that there are two countries, a domestic (European) country and a foreign country

(China) denoted respectively h and f . Markets are segmented. In each country, a representative

firm i produces a differentiated product (as in e.g. Anderson et al. (1995), Clarke and Collie (2003),

and Collie and Le (2010)); the domestic firm is labeled Firm 1 and the foreign firm Firm 2. Firm 2

is assumed to be in a monopolist position in its own market, and a competitor a la Bertrand with

Firm 1 in its (the domestic firm’s) market. The quantities produced by Firm 1 and the price it

sets on the domestic market are denoted x1h and p1h. In the jth market (j = h, f), the price set

by Firm 2 is denoted p2j , and the quantity it produces is x2j .

The two firms have constant marginal costs ci (i = 1, 2). Firm 2’s marginal cost c2 may be

reduced by the effect of a foreign public policy (e.g. subsidy, easier access to credit, etc.), so that

we consider a situation where the foreign firm has a cost advantage (c2 < c1). The foreign country

has an intrinsic comparative advantage in producing the differentiated product, as in Bernhofen

(1995). In such a context, the foreign public policy may allow Firm 2 to dump its product in the

domestic market. This situation emerges when p2f > p2h at the equilibrium (see infra).

In reaction to the foreign dumping, the domestic country can impose an AD duty denoted τ .

The AD duty raises Firm 2’s overall marginal cost, i.e. c2 + τ . Therefore, the AD law is seen as

creating a barrier to trade of τ per unit exchanged as in Bernhofen (1995). The objective of such

a policy is to compensate for the negative effects of the foreign Firm 2’s dumping policy on Firm

1’s domestic profit.

In each market, there is a representative consumer with quasilinear preferences described by

a quadratic utility function. The utility functions of two representative consumers – one in each

market – are

Uh = (αh + g)x1h + αhx2h −12β(x2

1h + 2φhx1hx2h + x22h)

+ zh , (1)

Uf = αfx2f −12βx

22f + zf , (2)

7

where zj represents the composite good, and αj , β, and φh are positive parameters. The two

markets j = h, f differ in terms of market size (i.e. αi, βi). We assume that αh > αf , so that

the domestic market offers significant prospects for the foreign firm. Consumers do not necessarily

consider the two goods as perfect substitutes: 0 ≤ φh < 1. The higher the value of φh, the more

the two products are substitutes for domestic consumers.

We assume that g denotes the difference between the guaranteed price from the FIT and the

market price for a kw/h. We assume that the higher price for green electricity raises renewable

electricity producers’ willingness-to-pay for solar panels by an amount exactly equal to the differ-

ence g. We define a ‘unit of solar panels’ so that 1 unit produces exactly 1 kw/h. Therefore, an

easy way to introduce FIT in solar panels market is to consider that it increases the parameter αh.

3.2 Market equilibrium

The representative consumers’ budgets in country j are written as Rh = x1hp1h +x2hp2h + zh and

Rf = x2fp2f + zf . If the respective utilities are maximized subject to the budget constraints, the

demand functions in the jth market are:

x1h = (αh + g)(1− φh)− 2p1h + 2φhp2h

β (1− φ2h) , (3)

x2h = (αh + g)(1− φh)− 2p2h + 2φhp1h

β (1− φ2h) , (4)

x2f = αf − 2p2f

β. (5)

The profit functions for each firm i in country j are:

π1 = (p1h − c1)x1h , (6)

π2 = (p2h − (c2 + τ))x2h + (p2f − c2)x2f (7)

The first order conditions lead to the equilibrium characteristics: prices (p?1h, p?2h, and p?2f ),

quantities (x?1h, x?2h, and x?2f ), and profits (π?1h, π?2h, and π?2f ). All equilibrium characteristics and

the domestic and foreign consumer surpluses are provided in the online Mathematical Appendix.

To ensure that firms are active at the equilibrium, requires the assumption that

2c2 < αf , c1 > c2 + τ , αh + g > 2c1 , and φh < Φ(τ, g) , (8)

where the Φ(τ, g) value is reported in the online Mathematical Appendix. These conditions estab-

lish a minimum market size for both markets, a maximum value for the AD rate, and a maximum

degree of product substitutability.

To integrate the environmental dimension, we next assume that electricity produced from fossil

fuel is replaced by renewable electricity, and that the environment is improved by the development

of solar panel sales. To ascertain this result in a situation where an ETS scheme is implemented

together with a renewable energy support scheme such as a FIT program, requires the assumption

8

that the emissions cap is reduced appropriately following the development of renewable electricity,

or that other environmental costs of fossil fueled electricity exist together with GHG (Lehmann and

Gawel, 2013).19 Therefore, following for instance Fischer (2017), the production of solar panels

is responsible for global external benefits denoted E, which for simplicity, are defined with an

additive form E = x1h+x2h+x2f . This improvement to the environment concerns both countries.

γE is the external benefit related to the environment (γ > 0).

Note that AD duties generate tax revenue (τ x2h) which should be integrated into the domestic

welfare expression. In addition, since FIT programs are financed by public money, it is necessary

to introduce the social cost of public funding (λ > 0) in the welfare computation. The cost of FIT

programs can be written as g (1 + λ) (x1h + x2h). Therefore, from the perspective of a domestic

social planner, welfare is

Wh = CSh + π1 + γE + τ x2h − g (1 + λ) (x1h + x2h) . (9)

At the duopoly equilibrium, the foreign firm dumps its product in the domestic market when

p?2f > p?2h. In other words, the domestic consumer has to pay less than the foreign consumer for

the same product 2. When this inequality is resolved, we obtain the following unilateral dumping

condition which applies throughout the rest of the paper.

αf > 4c1 − 2c2 and φh< φh < φh . (10)

This condition imposes a minimum foreign market size. The lower bound depends on the difference

in both firms’ marginal costs. The degree of domestic product substitutability has a floor and a

ceiling value.

Now we can analyze the effects of the foreign firm’s dumping policy on the equilibrium market

characteristics. The foreign dumping policy has the following effects: i) a reduction in domestic

demand for Product 1 and an increase in domestic demand for the dumped product; ii) an increase

in the positive environmental externality from an increase in the production of solar panels; iii)

an increase in the domestic consumers’ surplus; iii) a decrease in Firm 1’s profit and an increase

in the foreign firm’s profits, i.e. on both the domestic and foreign markets. These results show

that the foreign country’s strategic policy achieves its objective. Firm 2’s total profit increases at

the expense of the domestic firm’s situation. However, the dumping policy increases the external

benefit related to the environment and the domestic consumers’ surplus.

We next study the impact of an AD action introduced by the domestic country to counteract

the foreign dumping policy. Under conditions of duopoly and dumping, AD duties as expected,19When a binding cap for GHG emissions is implemented through the ETS, the literature acknowledges that

additional policies on renewable energy will not contribute to further abatement but will push down the emissions

price. A fall in the emissions price benefits the ETS regulated polluters but raises the overall cost of compliance

with the binding cap since the abatement takes place when the marginal cost of abatement is not at its minimum.

Taking account of this effect requires modeling the ETS in order to link the increase in the overall compliance cost

to the expenditure on renewable energy. This is beyond the scope of the present paper.

9

reverse the effects of dumping on the equilibrium characteristics. In other words, the introduction

of an AD policy always harms the domestic consumer surplus and the external benefit related to

the environment.

3.3 The appropriate level of antidumping duties to impose

In the context of dumping and AD investigations, an important issue is the “appropriate level” of

AD to choose given the observed dumping. In this article, two different scenarios are explored. In

the first scenario, the regulator chooses the “adequate AD duty”, τa, in order to equalize prices p2h

and p2f observed in the domestic and foreign markets for the foreign good. In the second scenario,

the regulator chooses the AD duty τ∗ maximizing domestic welfare. In the first scenario, attention

is paid only to producers; in the second scenario, the consequences of AD on consumers and on

the environment also are considered.

Proposition 1 There exists a unique adequate AD duty τa nullifying the difference in the prices

of the foreign good observed on the domestic and foreign markets, and a unique optimal AD duty

τ? that maximizes domestic welfare. They exhibit the following characteristics:

1. The optimal AD duty τ? is positive if the marginal environmental benefit γ due to the devel-

opment of solar panels is sufficiently small.

2. The optimal AD duty τ? is decreasing with γ.

3. Both adequate AD duty τa and optimal AD duty τ? are increasing with dumping.

4. The optimal AD duty τ? (respectively the adequate AD duty τa) is increasing (respectively

decreasing) with the domestic producer’s marginal cost c1.

Proposition 1 compares two types of AD policies and offers a normative perspective to debate

over the appropriate AD duty to choose.20 First, it shows that as soon as the marginal environ-

mental benefit is sufficiently small AD is not welfare-damaging. Above a certain threshold, the

reduction in the production of solar panels following AD pushes down the domestic welfare. In

this situation, τ? should be zero. Note that as expected, the optimal AD decreases with γ. In

contrast (and by definition), τa is always positive under the dumping condition (and therefore can

be welfare-decreasing). Second, Proposition 1 shows that the strength of the AD action clearly

is linked to the magnitude of the dumping, irrespective of the scenario explored. When the gap

between c1 and c2 increases because of a reduction in c2, both τ? and τa increase since the foreign

dumping is stronger. Third, if this gap is wider due to an increase in c1 rather than because of

more dumping, τ? also increases while τa decreases. In this last case, the rise in optimal AD duty

is purely strategic, revealing a protectionist AD at the expense of the amount of renewable energy20The proofs of Propositions are available in the online Mathematical Appendix.

10

produced. The adequate AD duty behaves differently and takes into consideration that the loss in

domestic competitiveness obviates the need for AD protection.

Furthermore, we can demonstrate that τa and τ? are affected differently by domestic and

foreign solar panel substitutability: τa always increases in φh, while τ? may decrease in the same

variable. The consequences for the amount of renewable energy produced and for the environment

are straightforward: An increase in the degree of product substitutability is always detrimental to

the environment when the AD duty τa is applied but this is does not apply necessarily to τ?.

The intuition from the above result is as follows. When the level of product substitutability

φh increases, the dumping condition is relaxed since the lower bound for αf decreases with the

parameter φh. This makes dumping easier, and favors the environment. At the same time, an

increase in φh systematically increases the AD duty τa which is not environmentally-friendly. The

impact on τ? is ambiguous. Ultimately, the net effect of an increase in φh is negative for the

environment when τa is applied, and is ambiguous with τ?. In the latter case, the net effect

depends especially on γ, as shown by the numerical simulations presented in Figures 1 and 2 in the

Appendix. Furthermore, these figures show that to achieve the highest impact on the environment

when developing solar panels, it is necessary to consider using the adequate AD duty if the marginal

environmental benefit γ is relatively low (Figure 1) and the optimal AD duty if γ is relatively high

(Figure 2).

3.4 Feed-in tariffs and antidumping duties as complements or substi-

tutes?

The analysis focuses on the interrelations between trade (AD) policy and renewable energy policy

(FIT). In particular, we investigate the impact of FIT programs, and whether they can be used

as complements or substitutes for AD duties. As shown in the previous section, AD duties have a

direct impact on the amount of solar technologies bought on the domestic market, and thus, may

slow production of renewable energy. One way to prevent this negative effect on the environment

would be to subsidize the production of renewable energy through a FIT program. Environment

and welfare are the key elements analyzed.

We consider the realistic case where separate agencies decide the levels of the FIT and AD

duty. First, all the characteristics at the equilibrium are computed. For a given AD duty, we

can show the previously discussed positive effects of FIT on the demand for solar panels, on the

domestic consumers’ surplus, on the domestic solar panel producers’ profits, and on the marginal

environmental benefit. The two types of AD discussed earlier are considered: τ∗ maximizing the

domestic welfare, and τa nullifying the dumping margin. Under conditions (10) the following new

Propositions hold.

Proposition 2 For a given AD duty, τ , there exists a unique FIT rate g∗(τ) which maximizes

domestic welfare.

11

1. The optimal FIT rate is increasing in the AD duty.

2. The optimal FIT rate is increasing in the marginal environmental benefit γ, and in the two

firms’ marginal costs c1 and c2.

Proposition 3 FIT and AD policies are complementary (resp. substitutes) when the optimal

(resp. adequate) AD duty is used.

Proposition 2 explores the sensitivity of the optimal FIT rate computed for a given AD duty

for the same variables, and in each case shows a positive link. When the degradation of the

domestic country’s competitiveness is due to a rise in the domestic firm’s marginal cost c1, the

optimal FIT increases with the optimal AD duty τ? but in contrast to τa. When this reduction in

competitiveness is due to a decrease in the foreign marginal cost c2, the domestic country should

weaken its FIT policy (which is less important in this context), and should ease its AD policy,

whatever the AD duty level chosen τ∗ or τa (see Proposition 1).

By definition, the AD duty τa is not affected by the marginal environmental benefit γ in contrast

to τ? and g?. As expected, g? is increasing in γ while τ? is decreasing in γ (see Proposition 1).

Proposition 3 shows the clear link between the AD trade policy on the one hand, and the FIT

energy policy on the other. The two policies can be considered complementary if τ? is chosen. In

this case, a generous FIT allows the imposition of a higher AD duty. Alternatively, it might be

considered that a high AD duty should be compensated by a high FIT to counter the negative

effect of the former on the environment, and on the domestic welfare more generally. However, if τa

is chosen, the complementarity disappears and the two policies should be considered substitutes:

a high FIT rate (raising p∗2h) lowers the adequate AD duty.

Finally, note that were AD and FIT to be decided jointly by a single agency or two agencies

operating in a network, an optimal AD and FIT pair that maximized domestic welfare would

exist. This result is interesting in substance since it shows that since FIT and AD on solar panels

interact, they should be decided jointly (see Figure 3 in the Appendix for a numerical illustration).

However, its practical implication is limited since in practice, two different agencies are involved

in determining the FIT rate and the AD duty.

4 An Extension to R&D in the PV Sector

Solar energy is considered a second-generation energy requiring “substantial R&D investments,

as well as deployment support, to gain market learning” (IAE, 2016). In such a context AD can

be seen as securing R&D results and may benefit the environment. This issue is explored in the

present section along with the introduction of R&D efforts and an international spillovers effect.

The economic literature includes only a few theoretical works analyzing the links between AD

policies and R&D activities. For instance, Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) model the impact of AD

12

policies on the amount of the cost-reducing R&D of the protected firm and the constrained firm.

They find that a unilateral AD policy decreases (resp. increases) the cost-reducing R&D of the

protected (resp. constrained) firm. Under the assumption of bilateral AD actions, Kao and Peng

(2016) show that where there is no tolerable dumping margin, the two firms will increase their

product R&D investments. However, their result is reversed if the tolerable dumping margins are

set at the free trade level.

To introduce the extended R&D into the current model setting, let ri be the amount of research

undertaken by Firm i in technologies to reduce its production costs. In line with d’Aspremont and

Jacquemin (1988), we add a possible research externality (i.e. spillover) denoted ρ according to

which part of the R&D effort of one firm may flow (spillover) to its rival (0 ≤ ρ < 1).

We assume that the cost of research has a quadratic specification in ri. The profit expressions

for Firm i (6) are modified as follows:

π1 =(p1h −

(c1 − (r1 + ρ r2)

))x1h −

12r

21 , (11)

π2 = p2hx2h + p2fx2f −(c2 + τ − (r2 + ρ r1)

)(x2h + x2f

)− 1

2r22 . (12)

We solve the model following the same steps as in Section 3. We can show that the previous results

for dumping and AD, and Proposition 3 hold to the introduction of r1, r2, and ρ.

We next turn to analysis of the two instruments, AD and FIT, with respect to the three new

R&D-related parameters.

Proposition 4 Introducing the R&D dimension leads to the following effects:

1. The investment in R&D by the domestic firm or the foreign firm makes the optimal FIT

lower and increases the dumping margin;

2. The spillover effect has a negative (resp. positive) impact on the optimal FIT (resp. the

dumping margin).

Proposition 4 clearly shows that R&D on solar panels, whatever their origin (domestic or

foreign), systematically decreases the optimal FIT and raises the dumping margin.21 Regarding

the FIT, a more efficient industry needs less public support. The origin of this efficiency can be

found abroad and passes through to the domestic country via the spillover effect. The stronger this

effect, the lower the FIT. Both R&D expenses p1h and p2h and p2f diminish since the marginal costs

fall. p2h is affected more by a decrease in c2 than p2f due to the difference in market structures.

As a consequence, the dumping margin defined as (p2f −p2h) always rises. This result is reinforced

by the spillover effect.

Therefore, Proposition 4 raises a dilemma from the domestic regulator’s perspective. Inciting

domestic firms to invest in R&D activities can be encouraged since a lower FIT is required but

this is at the expense of a higher dumping margin which would harm domestic producers. If21No clear result regarding the impact of R&D activities on the optimal AD duty has been found.

13

the regulator considers the environment in his choice, this contradiction disappears since a higher

dumping margin benefits development of solar panel production. From a welfare perspective, the

simulations in Figures 4 and 5 show that depending on the parameter values increasing the FIT

rate or encouraging domestic R&D may be welfare-increasing and pro-environmental.

5 Discussion

Should we inflict AD duties on pollution abatement technologies while ignoring their environmental

dimension? This issue is addressed here by modeling the EU–China solar panels dispute. The

present study shows that one of the main features of this case is that both dumping and AD

duties affect the environment and the development of green energy, i.e. the path to a successful

energy transition. However, in order to decide the level of AD, the EC’s investigation as expected,

focused on the dumping practices and evaluated the normal price for solar panels while ignoring

the environmental consequences of dumping and AD duties. The EC’s press release “Why the

EU’s investigation into solar panel imports from China does not harm European climate goals”22

acknowledges this shortcoming. Our results show that the negative effects of AD duties should

not be disregarded. In other words, the rise in the price of solar panels which such a trade policy

implies could hamper development of solar energy production in Europe.

More interesting in the static context chosen for the model, we explore the issue of the inter-

relation between energy and trade policies. In its March 2017 decision to maintain AD duty on

solar panels, the EC pointed out that “there has been a boom in solar installation demand in the

years 2010 to 2013 driven, in certain Members States, by a mismatch between FIT set at a level

of a fair module price and the overall level of prices driven by unfairly dumped Chinese modules”

(European Commission, 2017a). This “mismatch” clearly expresses the interference that Chinese

dumping might impose on setting the FIT. Therefore, once the AD duty is decided, how FIT and

AD duty interact also should be investigated too. We explore this by addressing two related points:

the debated issue of the appropriate AD duty (see e.g. Sykes (1996)), and the original issue of the

links between AD duty and FIT programs).

On the first point, Proposition 1 provides two types of relevant AD duties. The first removes

the dumping margin by equalizing the foreign firm’s prices on the domestic and foreign markets.

We describe it as the appropriate AD duty. The second maximizes domestic social welfare, i.e.

the optimal AD duty. Both types of AD behave in the same way if foreign dumping increases.

However, in the case of reduced domestic competitiveness, only the optimal AD reacts strategically

in response to the associated negative consequences for the environment.

On the second point, Proposition 1 shows that both AD duty variants considered react in

opposite directions to a rise in the FIT: the optimal AD duty also rises while the appropriate AD

duty decreases. Therefore, depending on the type of AD duty chosen, environmental policy (i.e.22http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/september/tradoc_149903.pdf

14

the FIT) and trade policy (i.e. the AD duty) can be seen as a complement or a substitute. If

these policies are complementary, they have contradictory effects on renewable energy production

and on the environment: a rise in the FIT benefits the environment but an accompanying increase

in AD duty is detrimental to the environment. This contradictory effect disappears if the AD

duty chosen is appropriate. The indirect effect of FIT leads to a rise in the price of foreign solar

panels in the domestic market, and thus, automatically diminishes dumping and the need for an

appropriate AD duty.

We also propose an optimal FIT rate that takes account of a given AD duty (Proposition 2).

The FIT rate increases with an AD duty revealing complementarity between the two policies. The

results of this work clearly question the relevance of setting one policy independently of the other.

From a more practical point of view, if the EC wants to use AD duties as an instrument of trade

protection against Chinese products, both DG TRADE and the energy regulatory bodies should

interact, and should set AD duty levels as a function of the range of European FIT rates. This

paper is an attempt to prompt discussion of this issue, and to provide some theoretical propositions.

Furthermore, by introducing R&D and spillovers in the PV sector, we show that an innovation

dimension enriches substantially the discussion related to the interaction of environmental and

trade policies. Public policies aiming at fostering domestic research activities may replace FIT

programs since a more efficient industry needs fewer subsidies for renewable electricity producers.

Provided some adjustments are made to the assumptions about the asymmetry of cost struc-

tures or market sizes, the model setting can be a useful baseline from which to investigate other

renewable energy related disputes. Clearly, the model can be applied to similar international AD

disputes related to solar panels or equipment. For instance, the model could be applied to the

US–China solar panel case. Model extensions would require, for instance, vertical product differ-

entiation through R&D or the integration of some dynamics – but at the expense of the number

of parameters considered. The stylized model presented here offers a useful tool for analyzing the

interactions of different public policies.

On the above basis, use of a single environmental instrument (e.g. the FIT program) may

be affected by the level of AD duties or the volume of R&D activities. The evidence suggests

that environmental policy alone does not create sufficient incentives to overcome the different

market failures completely (Jaffe et al., 2005). Combining environmental policy with trade policy

to promote the deployment of renewable energy and innovation may enhance welfare. The theory

of the second-best suggests that coordination is required and that some combination of these

instruments is likely to be optimal.

15

Figure 1: The evolution of the environment as a function of domestic product substitutability

(Red: Adequate AD; Green: Optimal AD; Blue: No AD)(αh = 67, αf = 35/43, β = 84, c1 = 1/4, c2 = 22/405, γ = 10)

��� ��� ��� ��� ���ϕ�

���

���

���

���

���

�

16

Figure 2: The evolution of the environment as a function of domestic product substitutability

(Red: Adequate AD; Green: Optimal AD; Blue: No AD)(αh = 67, αf = 35/43, β = 84, c1 = 1/4, c2 = 22/405, γ = 100)

��� ��� ��� ��� ���ϕ�

���

���

���

���

���

���

���

���

�

17

Figure 3: The evolution of the domestic welfare as a function of the FIT rate and the AD duty(αh = 84, αf = 202/3, β = 29, c1 = 139/6, c2 = 67/3, λ = 1.2, and γ = 100)

18

Figure 4: The evolution of domestic welfare as a function of the FIT rate and domestic R&D(αh = 3, αf = 2, β = 1, c1 = 1.1, c2 = 1, λ = 0.2, γ = 20, φh = 0.7, r2 = 1, ρ = 1, and τ = 0.15)

Figure 5: The evolution of the environment as a function of the FIT rate and domestic R&D(αh = 3, αf = 2, β = 1, c1 = 1.1, c2 = 1, λ = 0.2, γ = 20, φh = 0.7, r2 = 1, ρ = 1, and τ = 0.15 (blue) / τ = 2

(orange))

19

Mathematical appendix

The optimal and Nash solutions are solved in Mathematica and the results are reported here. The

notebook file with proofs is available from the authors upon request.

The detailed equilibrium characteristics

The first order conditions from profit maximization of (6) give rise to the following three prices at

the equilibrium.

p?1h = 2(αh + g + 2c1)− φh(αh + g − 2(c2 + τ))− φ2h(αh + g)

2(4− φ2h)

p?2h = 2(αh + g + 2(c2 + τ))− φh(αh + g − 2c1)− φ2h(αh + g)

2(4− φ2h)

p?2f = 14(αf − 2c2)

We can deduce Firm 1’s and Firm 2’s demands at the equilibrium.

x?1h = (αh + g)(2− φh) + 2φh(c2 + τ)− φ2h(αh + g − 2c1) + 4c1

β(φ4h − 5φ2 + 4

x?2h = 2(αh + g − 2τ)− φh(αh + g − 2c1)− φ2h(αh + g − 2(c2 + τ)) + 4c2

β(φ4h − 5φ2 + 4

x?2f = αf − 2c2

2β

The value of the upper bound Φ for φ in expression (8) has the following form:

Φ(g, τ) = 12

(2(c2 + τ)− (αh + g))

α+ g − 2c1+√

9(αh + g)2 − 4c2(αh + g − 2τ)− 4τ(αh + g − τ)− 32c1(αh + g − c1) + 4c22

(αh + g − 2c1)2

)It can be shown that the upper bound Φ is increasing in the size of the domestic market (∂Φ/∂αh >

0), and in the foreign firm’s marginal cost (∂Φ/∂c2 > 0), and is decreasing in the domestic firm’s

marginal cost (∂Φ/∂c1 < 0).

We can compute the equilibrium profits as:

π?1h =((αh + g)(2− φh) + 2φh(c2 + τ)− φ2

h(αh + g − 2c1)− 4c1))2

2β(4− φ2h)2(1− φ2

h) ,

π?2h =(2(αh + g − 2τ)− φh(αh + g − 2c1)− φ2

h(αh + g − 2(c2 + τ))− 4c2)2

2β(4− φ2h)2(1− φ2

h) ,

π?2f = (αf − 2c2)2

8β .

Domestic and foreign consumer surpluses at the equilibrium have the following form:

CS?h = (αh + g)(αh + g − c1 − c2 − τ)β(2− φh)(1 + φh) ,

CS?f = αf (αf − 2c2)4β .

20

E?, the environmental externality at equilibrium, can be written as:

E? = 4(αh + g) + 4αfτ(2− φh)(1 + φh)− 2c2(φ2h − φh − 4)− 4c1

2β(2− φh)(1 + φh)

The effects of dumping

The lower and upper values of φh related to the dumping condition (10) are:

φh

=2c1 − (αh + g)

2(αh + g − c2)− αf+

12(αh + g − c2)− αf

√4c1(c1 − (αh + g)) + (3(αh + g)− 2αf )2 + 8τ(2(αh + g)− αf )− 8c2(αh + g − αf + 2τ)

φh =αg + g − 2(c2 + τ)2(2c1 − (αh + g))

+

12(2c1 − (αh + g))2 +

√32c1(c1 − (αh + g)) + 9(αh + g)2 − 4c2(αh + g − 2τ)− 4τ(αh + g − τ) + 4c2

2

Remember that reducing c2 allows foreign Firm 2 to dump its product in the domestic market.

The following derivatives of the different equilibrium characteristics with respect to c2 and their

respective signs computed under the unilateral foreign dumping constraint (10) demonstrate the

different effects of dumping.

∂x?1h∂c2

> 0 , ∂π?1h∂c2

> 0 , ∂x?2h∂c2

< 0 , ∂E?

∂c2< 0 , ∂CS?h

∂c2< 0 , ∂π?2h

∂c2< 0 ,

∂π?2f∂c2

< 0 .

The effects of antidumping duties

The following derivations of different equilibrium characteristics with respect to the AD duty τ

and their respective signs (computed under the unilateral dumping constraint) demonstrate the

different effects.

∂x?1h∂τ

> 0 , ∂x?2h∂τ

< 0 , ∂π?1h∂τ

> 0 , ∂π?2h∂τ

< 0 ,∂π?2f∂τ

> 0, ∂π?2∂τ

< 0,

∂E?

∂τ< 0 , and ∂CS?h

∂τ< 0 .

Proof of Proposition 1

Under the foreign dumping condition (10), the adequate AD duty that equalizes p2h and p2f is

given by the expression

τa = 18

(φ2h

(2(αh + g)− 2c2 − αf

)+ 2φh(αh + g − 2c1)− 4(αh + g − αf )

). (13)

τa is positive if by definition the dumping condition holds. The optimal AD duty requires us to

know the domestic welfare at equilibrium (9). Let us find the τ? that maximizes the domestic

welfare. The maximization program is maxτ{W ?d }. The FOC gives the following optimal τ?.

τ? = 12(φ4

h − 7φ2h + 8)

(φh

(4γ − αh(φ2

h + φh − 2) + φh(φhc1 − γ(φ2

h + φh − 6)))

−g(φ2h + φh − 2

)(λ(4− φ2

h) + φh(1− φh) + 4)− c2(φ4

h − 8φ2h + 8)− 8γ

)

21

The SOC is satisfied, ensuring that τ? corresponds to a maximum

∂2W ?d

∂τ2 =4(φ4h − 7φ2

h + 8)

β (1− φ2h) (4− φ2

h)2 < 0 .

1. The non-negativity constraint (τ? > 0) leads to the upper bound parameter γ as follows:

γ = φh(φ2hc1 − (αh + g)(φ2

h + φh − 2))− (c2 + τ)(φ4h − 8φ2

h + 8)(φh + 2)(φ2

h − 3φh + 2) .

2. The derivation ∂τ?

∂γ is always positive under the dumping conditions, showing that optimal

anti-dumping duty τ? is always decreasing with the environmental benefit.

3. To show that the higher the level of foreign dumping the higher must be the optimal AD

duty, requires computation of the derivation of τ? with respect to Firm 2’s marginal cost c2,

which yields:

∂τ?

∂c2= 1

2

(φ2h

φ4h − 7φ2

h + 8 − 1)< 0 .

By definition, the product differentiation parameter φh varies between 0 and 1. Therefore,

the ratio φ2h

φ4h

−7φ2h

+8 is between 0 and 1 which imposes a negative sign on the whole derivation.

In other words, when c2 decreases (i.e. the foreign firm dumps), the optimal AD duty must

increase.

To show that the adequate anti-dumping duty τa is also increasing with the dumping, the

derivation of τa with respect to c2 is always negative (∂τa

∂c2= −φ

2h

4 < 0).

4. With respect to c1, the following derivations can be computed with their respective signs.

∂τ?

∂c1= φ3

h

2(φ4h − 7φ2

h + 8) > 0 and ∂τa

∂c1= −φh2 < 0 .

Proof of Proposition 2

1. We now solve the following program maxg{W ?d }. Second order conditions are satisfied. Thus,

the optimal FIT rate for a given AD has the following form:

g?(τ) = 1(φh + 2)(4λ(φh − 2) + φh − 3) ×(

φ2h(αh + 2(γ + τ) + c1(2λ− 1) + 2λ(αh + c2 + τ) + c2)

−2(−4αhλ+ αh + 4(γ + λ(c1 + τ) + τ) + c2(4λ+ 2)) + φh(αh − 2c2 − 2τ))

2. The signs of the following derivations are not ambiguous under the activity and dumping

constraints:

∂g?

∂γ> 0 , ∂g?

∂c1> 0 , and ∂g?

∂c2> 0 .

22

Proof of Proposition 3

To do this, we first compute derivation of the adequate AD duty with respect to the FIT rate g.

∂τa

∂g= 1

4(φ2h + φh − 2

)< 0 .

The higher the FIT rate, the lower the adequate AD duty. We then compute the derivation of τ∗

given in (14) with respect to αh

∂τ∗

∂αh=φh(−φ2

h − φh + 2)

2 (φ4h − 7φ2

h + 8) > 0 .

The higher the FIT rate, the higher the optimal AD duty.

Proof of Proposition 4

New profit functions are expressions (11). We compute domestic welfare in function of r1, r2, and

ρ. We then solve the following program maxg{W ?d (r1, r2, ρ)}. Second order conditions are satisfied.

We compute derivatives of g?(r1, r2, ρ) with respect to the three R&D parameters. Without any

ambiguity, we show that

∂g?

∂r1< 0 , ∂g?

∂r2< 0 , and ∂g?

∂ρ> 0 .

With new equilibrium characteristics, the dumping margin DM? = p?2f − p?2h takes the following

form

DM? = 14(4− φ2

h)

(2(αh + g − 2φh(c1 − r1 − 2r2ρ)

)− φ2

h

(αf + 2c2 − 2(αh + g) + 2(r2 + 2r1ρ)

)−4(αg + g − αf + 2τ)

)We then compute the following derivatives of the dumping margin at the equilibrium with respect

to r1, r2, and ρ and demonstrate their unambiguous sign.

∂DM?

∂r1> 0 , ∂DM?

∂r2> 0 , and ∂DM?

∂ρ> 0 .

23

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Documents De travail GreDeG parus en 2017GREDEG Working Papers Released in 2017

2017-01 Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games2017-02 Cilem Selin Hazir, Flora Bellone & Cyrielle Gaglio Local Product Space and Firm Level Churning in Exported Products2017-03 Nicolas Brisset What Do We Learn from Market Design?2017-04 Lise Arena, Nathalie Oriol & Iryna Veryzhenko Exploring Stock Markets Crashes as Socio-Technical Failures2017-05 Iryna Veryzhenko, Etienne Harb, Waël Louhichi & Nathalie Oriol The Impact of the French Financial Transaction Tax on HFT Activities and Market Quality2017-06 Frédéric Marty La régulation du secteur des jeux entre Charybde et Scylla2017-07 Alexandru Monahov & Thomas Jobert Case Study of the Moldovan Bank Fraud: Is Early Intervention the Best Central Bank Strategy to Avoid Financial Crises?2017-08 Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama, Yukihiko Funaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa Diversity in Cognitive Ability Enlarges Mispricing in Experimental Asset Markets2017-09 Thierry Blayac & Patrice Bougette Should I Go by Bus? The Liberalization of the Long-Distance Bus Industry in France2017-10 Aymeric Lardon On the Coalitional Stability of Monopoly Power in Differentiated Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies2017-11 Ismaël Rafaï & Mira Toumi Pay Attention or Be Paid for Attention? Impact of Incentives on Allocation of Attention2017-12 Gérard Mondello Un modèle d’accident unilatéral: incertitude non-radicale et estimations différenciées2017-13 Gérard Mondello Lenders and Risky Activities: Strict Liability or Negligence Rule?2017-14 Frédéric Marty Économie des algorithmes et ordre concurrentiel : réflexions sur les abus d’exploitation et les collusions fondés sur des algorithmes de prix2017-15 Agnès Festré, Pierre Garrouste, Ankinée Kirakozian & Mira Toumi The Pen is Mightier than the Sword: How Third-party Advice or Sanction Impacts on Pro-environmental Behavior2017-16 Edward Lorenz & Sophie Pommet Innovation, Credit Constraints and National Banking Systems: A Comparison of Developing Nations2017-17 Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute