Khalilzad 95

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Copyright 1995 The Center for Strategic and International Studiesand the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyThe Washington Quarterly

1995 Spring

SECTION !ET"IN#IN$ $!%N& ST!%TE$'( )ol* 1+, No* -( .g* +/

0EN$T" 11 52 3ords

"E%&0INE 0osing the Mo4ent The 6nited States and the World %fter the Cold War

7'0INE 8al4ay #halil ad

"I$"0I$"TIt is a truis4 that the 6nited States has lost its strategic :earings after the Cold War* %s

the follo3ing articles suggest, cooperati;e security has e4erged as a 4a tan>s to de;elop acoherent strategic 3orld;ie3* The ne?t t3o articles address 4ore specifically 6*S*4ilitary strategy, :oth nuclear and counterproliferation* The final article offers a

particularly thoughful :inational ;ie3 of 6*S*@Indian relations*

7O&'T"!EE 'E%!S %ATE! the collapse of the So;iet 6nion, the 6nited States is headingto3ard s=uandering a oncein@a@lifeti4e opportunity to shape the future of the 3orld

:ecause it still does not ha;e a :roadly agreed upon ;ision and a grand strategy for the

ne3 era* The 6nited States cannot succeed in shaping the post@cold 3ar 3orld unless it>no3s 3hat shape it 3ants the 3orld to ta>e, understands 3hat it ta>es to 4oldinternational relations in accordance 3ith that ;ision, and has the 3ill to see the tas>through* Without a strategy, the 6nited States 3ill tend to lose the initiati;e in 3orldaffairs and :e placed in a reacti;e 4ode*

The lac> of ;ision endangers the co4pletion of e;en 4odest tas>s* %n ad4inistration canneither e;aluate specific policy decisions ade=uately, nor reach an effecti;e consensus3ith respect to the4, 3ithout first constructing a fra4e3or> for guiding policy, setting

priorities, and deciding 3hat constitute ;ital 6*S* interests* %:sent such a fra4e3or> it3ill :e 4ore difficult to decide 3hat is i4portant and 3hat is not, to deter4ine 3hichthreats are 4ore serious than others, and to de;elop coherent approaches to respond tone3 challenges* .olicy on 4any issues 3ill :e a4:i;alent and uncertain and 3ill lac>staying po3er* Short@ter4 and parochial interests 3ill ta>e priority o;er longerter4,national interests*

Without a :roadly agreed architectural fra4e3or>, gaining 3idespread :ipartisan supportfor policy also :eco4es harder, as has :een e;ident in recent discussions of foreign andsecurity policy* Sustaining popular support and staying the course for particular policies


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:eco4e harder if the costs of i4ple4entation increase :ut the co44it4ent cannot :ee?plained in ter4s of a national interest and a strategy on 3hich :road agree4ent has

:een achie;ed* The Search for a Ne3 )ision

&espite efforts :y :oth the 7ush and Clinton ad4inistrations, three years after the end ofthe So;iet 6nion, no grand strategy has yet e@4inded

po3ers( and helping reduce the li>elihood of conflict :y reducing the sources of

insta:ility* n1 The !egional &efense Strategy did not ed*%lthough .resident $eorge 7ush appeared supporti;e of the concept as indicated in so4eof his state4ents, he did not try acti;ely to :uild political support for it* $i;en thedangers in;ol;ed in any syste4ic shift in po3er, .resident 7ush 4anaged thedisintegration of the So;iet 6nion e?tre4ely 3ell* 7ut :ecause of the deterioratingdo4estic econo4ic situation during the last year of his presidency, he did not push for a

:road political consensus on a ne3 grand strategy* 7esides, an election year 4ay not :ethe :est ti4e for generating such a consensus*

In Duly 199/, a year and a half after co4ing to po3er, the Clinton ad4inistration pu:lished its National Security Strategy of Engage4ent and Enlarge4ent* 0i>e the!egional &efense Strategy of the pre;ious ad4inistration, .resident 7ill ClintonBsdocu4ent proposes strengthening and adapting the alliances a4ong the 4ar>etde4ocracies* Si4ilarly, it e4phasi es regional threats* It goes further, ho3e;er, in itse4phasis on peace>eeping operations, in highlighting the i4portance of econo4ic issuesand the glo:al e?pansion of de4ocracy, and in its concern a:out en;iron4ental issues* Italso e4phasi es a readiness to participate in 4ultilateral efforts to :ro>er settle4ents ofinternal conflicts* Si4ilarly, it states that our forces 4ust prepare to participate in

peace>eeping, peace enforce4ent and other operations in support of these o:


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7esides the pro:le4s 3ith the content of 3hat has :een proposed and inade=uate effortsto :uild consensus on a ne3 grand strategy, t3o other :roader factors ha;e played a rolein the a:sence of :roadly agreed upon grand strategy* One is the fact that %4ericanculture is disinclined to3ard great strategic design* The tas> is 4ade e;en harder :y asecond reason an underlying and 3idely held :elief that the 3orld is 4ore uncertain no3

co4pared to the cold 3ar period @@ 4a>ing :oth the de;elop4ent and :road acceptance of a grand strategy 4ore difficult*

7ut this assu4ption of greater uncertainty is only partially and only retrospecti;elycorrect* The cold 3ar 3orld 3as not truly 4uch 4ore certain than the 3orld of today @@ atleast not to those 3ho 3ere players in the struggle* E;en though the ene4y 3as >no3n, it3as ne;er easy to predict So;iet :eha;ior and de;elop4ents around the 3orld*#re4linelegy 3as an al4ost 4ystical science, and as de;elop4ents sho3ed, 6*S*infor4ation and understanding of 3hat 3as really happening in the So;iet 6nion 3ereoften 3ell off the 4ar>* Nor 3as there al3ays a consensus o;er policy( there 3ere 4a, as its central strategico:ely to :e put inhar4Bs 3ay in places li>e 7osnia or Ira=, "aiti or So4alia* The reduction in defense

:urden could help deal 3ith the :udget deficit and i4pro;e 6*S* econo4icco4petiti;eness, especially :ecause, at the sa4e ti4e, 4any foreign co4petitors 3ould


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ha;e to increase their defense e?penditures* Ignoring foreign issues 3ould ena:le the6nited States to concentrate on and sol;e its 4any do4estic pro:le4s 4ore effecti;ely*

Aurther4ore, in 4any cases, allies to 3hose defense the 6nited States has :eenco44itted no longer need it e*g*, the So;iet threat to Western Europe has disappeared

and the current threats to Europe are 4uch s4aller :y co4parisonF and should :e a:le to4anage on their o3n e*g*, South #orea has o;er t3ice the population and 4any ti4esthe gross national product G$N.H of North #oreaF* The co44it4ent of the 6nited Statesto the defense of an ally li>e South #orea 4ay only ser;e to ena:le its go;ern4ent tospend less on defense and focus 4ore on strengthening its econo4y*

!ealistically and o;er the longer ter4, ho3e;er, a neo@isolationist approach 4ight 3ellincrease the danger of 4a 3ea>ening the institutions and solidarity of the3orldBs co44unity of de4ocratic po3ers and so esta:lishing fa;ora:le conditions for the

spread of disorder and a possi:le return to conditions si4ilar to those of the first half ofthe t3entieth century*

In the 19- s and 192 s, 6*S* isolationis4 had disastrous conse=uences for 3orld peace*%t that ti4e, the 6nited States 3as :ut one of se;eral 4a of a 6*S* 3ithdra3al could :e e;engreater*

What 4ight happen to the 3orld if the 6nited States turned in3ard Without the 6nitedStates and the North %tlantic Treaty Organi ation N%TOF, rather than cooperating 3itheach other, the West European nations 4ight co4pete 3ith each other for do4ination ofEast@Central Europe and the Middle East* In Western and Central Europe, $er4any @@especially since unification @@ 3ould :e the natural leading po3er*

Either in cooperation or co4petition 3ith !ussia, $er4any 4ight see> influence o;er theterritories located :et3een the4* $er4an efforts are li>ely to :e ai4ed at filling the;acuu4, sta:ili ing the region, and precluding its do4ination :y ri;al po3ers* 7ritainand Arance fear such a de;elop4ent* $i;en the strength of de4ocracy in $er4any and its

preoccupation 3ith a:sor:ing the for4er East $er4any, European concerns a:out$er4any appear e?aggerated* 7ut it 3ould :e a 4ista>e to assu4e that 6*S* 3ithdra3alcould not, in the long run, result in the renationali ation of $er4anyBs security policy*

The sa4e is also true of Dapan* $i;en a 6*S* 3ithdra3al fro4 the 3orld, Dapan 3ouldha;e to loo> after its o3n security and :uild up its 4ilitary capa:ilities* China, #orea,and the nations of Southeast %sia already fear Dapanese hege4ony* Without 6*S*

protection, Dapan is li>ely to increase its 4ilitary capa:ility dra4atically @@ to :alance thegro3ing Chinese forces and still@significant !ussian forces* This could result in ar4sraces, including the possi:le ac=uisition :y Dapan of nuclear 3eapons* $i;en Dapanesetechnological pro3ess, to say nothing of the plutoniu4 stoc>pile Dapan has ac=uired inthe de;elop4ent of its nuclear po3er industry, it could o:;iously :eco4e a nuclear


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3eapon state relati;ely =uic>ly, if it should so decide* It could also :uild long@range4issiles and carrier tas> forces*

With the shifting :alance of po3er a4ong Dapan, China, !ussia, and potential ne3regional po3ers such as India, Indonesia, and a united #orea could co4e significant ris>s

of pre;enti;e or proerupti;e 3ar* Si4ilarly, European co4petition for regionaldo4inance could lead to 4aely prospect @@ Europe or East %sia could :eco4e do4inated

:y a hostile po3er* Such a de;elop4ent 3ould threaten 6*S* interests* % po3er thatachie;ed such do4inance 3ould see> to e?clude the 6nited States fro4 the area andthreaten its interests@econo4ic and political @@ in the region* 7esides, 3ith the do4inationof Europe or East %sia, such a po3er 4ight see> glo:al hege4ony and the 6nited States3ould face another glo:al Cold War and the ris> of a 3orld 3ar e;en 4ore catastrophicthan the last*

In the .ersian $ulf, 6*S* 3ithdra3al is li>ely to lead to an intensified struggle for

regional do4ination* Iran and Ira= ha;e, in the past, :oth sought regional hege4ony*Without 6*S* protection, the 3ea> oil@rich states of the $ulf Cooperation Council $CCF3ould :e unli>ely to retain their independence* To preclude this de;elop4ent, the Saudis4ight see> to ac=uire, perhaps :y purchase, their o3n nuclear 3eapons* If either Ira= orIran controlled the region that do4inates the 3orld supply of oil, it could gain asignificant capa:ility to da4age the 6*S* and 3orld econo4ies* %ny country that gainedhege4ony 3ould ha;e ;ast econo4ic resources at its disposal that could :e used to :uild4ilitary capa:ility as 3ell as gain le;erage o;er the 6nited States and other oili4portingnations* "ege4ony o;er the .ersian $ulf :y either Iran or Ira= 3ould :ring the rest of the%ra: Middle East under its influence and do4ination :ecause of the shift in the :alanceof po3er* Israeli security pro:le4s 3ould 4ultiply and the peace process 3ould :efunda4entally under4ined, increasing the ris> of 3ar :et3een the %ra:s and the Israelis*

The e?tension of insta:ility, conflict, and hostile hege4ony in East %sia, Europe, and the.ersian $ulf 3ould har4 the econo4y of the 6nited States e;en in the unli>ely e;ent thatit 3as a:le to a;oid in;ol;e4ent in 4a


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%t present, 4ainstrea4 senti4ent in the t3o 4a, either $er4any 3ould ha;e to su:stantiallyincrease its 4ilitary po3er or the E6 3ould ha;e to strengthen its internal unity and

:eco4e a >ind of superstate* The 6nited States 3ould continue to ha;e a ;ital interest in pre;enting the do4ination of Europe @@ including !ussia @@ :y a single po3er* So, if the$er4ans decided to :uild up 4ilitarily to a force that appeared to threaten the rest ofEurope, the 6nited States could play its part :y for4ing alliances 3ith any Europeancountry or countries that sought to pre;ent $er4an hege4ony and :y 4aintainingade=uate forces in the 6nited States and perhaps in $reat 7ritain* .ro:le4s unrelated toany atte4pt to esta:lish hege4ony o;er Europe, ho3e;er, such as insta:ility in the7al>ans, East@Central Europe, or North %frica, 3ould :e the responsi:ility of the


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Europeans alone and the 6nited States 3ould not get 4ilitarily in;ol;ed in conflicts inthese regions*

Si4ilarly, the 6nited States 3ould :e unli>ely to get in;ol;ed 4ilitarily on the territoryof the for4er So;iet 6nion( in general, it 3ould accept a !ussian sphere of influence

there* The other European great po3ers and perhaps also the 6nited StatesF 3ould not3ant !ussia to reincorporate 6>raine, ho3e;er, :ecause, co4:ined, !ussia and 6>raine3ould ha;e a 4ilitary potential so 4uch greater than any European state as to threaten todestroy the possi:ility of achie;ing a :alance of po3er* Western Europe and !ussia3ould :oth ha;e interests in East@Central Europe and 3ould ha;e to try to 3or> out rulesfor regulating their interactions*

In East %sia, the 6nited States 3ould si4ilarly :eco4e a :alancer against either China ora Dapan that had :uilt up its 4ilitary capa:ility* In the e;ent of a serious i4:alance

:et3een Dapan and China, the 6nited States could play a :alancing role 3ith forces :asedin the 6nited States or possi:ly in so4e of the s4aller states in the region* %s in the case

of Europe, the 6nited States 3ould see> to pre;ent the e4ergence of regional hege4ony :y shifting alliances( it 3ould cooperate 3ith other po3ers to protect co44on interestsand :e prepared to protect specific interests in the region, such as the li;es and propertyof 6*S* citi ens*

In the .ersian $ulf, in this fra4e3or>, the 6nited States and other 4a


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the 6nited States fro4 other po3er centers, it 4ight :e a:le to 4i4ic the for4er 7ritishrole of an offshore :alancer* %s in the nineteenth century, the 6nited States and othergreat po3ers 3ould co4pete and cooperate to a;oid hege4ony and glo:al 3ars* Eachgreat po3er 3ould protect its o3n specific interests and protect co44on interestscooperati;ely* If necessary, the 6nited States 3ould inter;ene 4ilitarily to pre;ent the

e4ergence of a preponderant po3er*

7ut there are also se;eral serious pro:le4s 3ith this approach* Airst, there is a real=uestion 3hether the 4a* Aor e?a4ple, 3ould the West European po3ers respondappropriately to a resurgent !ussian threat, or 3ould they :eha;e as the Europeande4ocracies did in the 192 s The logic of a :alance of po3er syste4 4ight 3ell re=uirethe 6nited States to support a non@de4ocratic state against a de4ocratic one, or to 3or>3ith one undesira:le state against another* Aor e?a4ple, to contain the po3er of anincreasingly po3erful Iran, the 6nited States 3ould ha;e to strengthen Ira=* The 6nitedStates 4ay, ho3e;er, :e politically una:le to :eha;e in this fashion* Aor e?a4ple, after

the Ira=i ;ictory against Iran in 19++, :alance of po3er logic indicated that the 6nitedStates should strengthen Iran* "o3e;er, :ecause of ongoing ani4osity in 6*S*Iranianrelations, the nature of IranBs regi4e, and 4oral concerns, the 6nited States could noti4ple4ent such a strategy* There are 4any other e?a4ples* To e?pect such action istherefore pro:a:ly unrealistic*

Second, this syste4 i4plies that the 4aa:le :ut legiti4ate* n5 Each 3ill pursue its o3n econo4icinterest 4uch 4ore ;igorously, there:y 3ea>ening such 4ultilateral econo4icinstitutions as the $eneral %gree4ent on Tariffs and Trade $%TTF and the li:eral 3orldtrading order in general* This 3ould increase the li>elihood of 4aely to face 4ore co4petition fro4 other 4a, as $er4any did in WorldWar I, to reach anti@6*S* alliances 3ith 0atin %4erican nations* Si4ilarly, as noteda:o;e, another great po3er 4ight decide to support a potential hege4on in the .ersian$ulf*

Ainally, and 4ost i4portant, there is no guarantee that the syste4 3ill succeed in its o3nter4s* Its operation re=uires su:tle calculations and indications of intentions in order to4aintain the :alance 3hile a;oiding 3ar( nations 4ust >no3 ho3 to signal their depth ofco44it4ent on a gi;en issue 3ithout ta>ing irre;oca:le steps to3ard 3ar* This :alancingact pro;ed i4possi:le e;en for the culturally si4ilar and aristocratically go;erned statesof the nineteenth@century European :alance of po3er syste4s* It 3ill :e infinitely 4oredifficult 3hen the syste4 is glo:al, the participants differ culturally, and the go;ern4entsof 4any of the states, influenced :y pu:lic opinion, are una:le to :e as fle?i:le orcynicalF as the rules of the syste4 re=uire* Thus, 4iscalculations 4ight :e 4ade a:out the


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state of the :alance that could lead to 3ars that the 6nited States 4ight :e una:le to stayout of* The :alance of po3er syste4 failed in the past, producing World War I and other4a any :etter in the future @@ and 3ar a4ong 4aely to :e 4ore de;astating*

$lo:al 0eadership 6nder the third option, the 6nited States 3ould see> to retain glo:al leadership and to

preclude the rise of a glo:al ri;al or a return to 4ultipolarity for the indefinite future* On :alance, this is the :est long@ter4 guiding principle and ;ision* Such a ;ision is desira:lenot as an end in itself, :ut :ecause a 3orld in 3hich the 6nited States e?ercisesleadership 3ould ha;e tre4endous ad;antages* Airst, the glo:al en;iron4ent 3ould :e4ore open and 4ore recepti;e to %4erican ;alues @@ de4ocracy, free 4ar>ets, and therule of la3* Second, such a 3orld 3ould ha;e a :etter chance of dealing cooperati;ely3ith the 3orldBs 4a* It is a good pris4 for identifying threats, setting prioritiesfor 6*S* policy to3ard ;arious regions and states, and assessing needs for 4ilitarycapa:ilities and 4oderni ation*

To succeed in the long ter4 in reali ing this ;ision, the 6nited States should adhere to thefollo3ing principles as guidelines for its policies* It 4ustJ 4aintain and strengthen the one of peace n and incre4entally e?tend it(J preclude hostile hege4ony o;er critical regions(J hedge against rei4periali ation :y !ussia and e?pansion :y China 3hile pro4otingcooperation 3ith :oth countries(J preser;e 6*S* 4ilitary pree4inence( 4aintain 6*S* econo4ic strength and an openinternational econo4ic syste4(J :e


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than ets* War a4ong these nations :eca4eunthin>a:le* This co44onality of interests 3as e?pressed in the creation of organi ationssuch as N%TO and the $roup of Se;en $@KF, and in :ilateral treaties such as that

:et3een the 6nited States and Dapan* 6nder 6*S* leadership, this group of nations

pursued a policy of containing the So;iet 6nion until its collapse( in the post@cold 3arera, it is clear that, gi;en continued unity, these nations 3ill :e strong enough too;erpo3er any threat fro4 outside their ran>s* Thus, this co44unity of nations 4ay :ecalled the one of peace* Maintaining, strengthening, and e?tending the one of peaceshould :e the central feature of 6*S* post@cold 3ar grand strategy*

Maintaining the one of peace re=uires, first and fore4ost, a;oiding conditions that canlead to renationali ation of security policies in >ey allied countries such as Dapan and$er4any* The 4e4:ers of the one of peace are in :asic agree4ent and prefer not toco4pete 3ith each other in realpoliti> ter4s* 7ut this general agree4ent still re=uires6*S* leadership* %t present there is greater ner;ousness in Dapan than in $er4any a:out

future ties 3ith Washington, :ut 6*S* credi:ility re4ains strong in :oth countries* Thecredi:ility of 6*S* alliances can :e under4ined if >ey allies such as $er4any and Dapan :elie;e that the current arrange4ents do not deal ade=uately 3ith threats to their security*It could also :e under4ined if, o;er an e?tended period, the 6nited States is percei;ed aseither lac>ing the 3ill or the capa:ility to lead in protecting their interests*

In Europe, :esides dealing 3ith :alancing !ussian 4ilitary potential and hedging againsta possi:le !ussian rei4periali ation, the near@ter4 security threat to $er4any co4esfro4 insta:ility in East@Central Europe and to a lesser degree fro4 the 7al>ans* AorArance and Italy, the threats co4e fro4 conflicts in the 7al>ans, Isla4ic e?tre4is4, andthe spread of WM& and :allistic and cruise 4issiles to North %frica and the Middle East*Aor e?a4ple, at present the $er4ans fear that conflicts and insta:ility in EastCentralEurope 4ight spill out or spill in* Such crises could set the stage for a :igger conflictandLor send 4illions of refugees to $er4any* The $er4ans are di;ided on ho3 to deal3ith the threat fro4 the east* Aor no3, ho3e;er, they are focused on integrating thefor4er East $er4any and fa;or a 6*S*@led alliance strategy rather than filling the ;acuu4the4sel;es, as indicated in their su:stantial defense cuts* This is in part :ecause of theirconfidence in the 6nited States and the co44on ;alues and interests they percei;ea4ong the allies, and in part :ecause an alliance@:ased policy is cheaper for $er4anythan a unilateral approach* 7ut should the $er4ans co4e to :elie;e that the alliance 3illnot or cannot deal 3ith threats to their interests, they 4ight 3ell consider other options*

In East %sia, too, Dapan fa;ors alliance 3ith the 6nited States to deal 3ith uncertaintya:out !ussia, future Chinese 4ilitary capa:ility, including po3er pro 3ith the 6nited States* 7ut the loss of 6*S*credi:ility could also change DapanBs calculations( the test 3ill :e ho3 3ell the 6nitedStates deals 3ith North #oreaBs nuclear progra4*


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%s long as 6*S*@led allied actions protect their ;ital interests, these nations are less li>elyto loo> to unilateral 4eans* This i4plies that the 6nited States needs a 4ilitary capa:ilitythat is larger than 4ight :e re=uired :ased on a definition of 6*S* interests :ased onisolationis4 or the :alance of po3er*

6*S* po3er and 3illingness to lead in protecting ;ital against South #orea* The6nited States and its %sian allies should e?plore the possi:ility of esta:lishing4ultilateral security arrange4ents that can pro4ote sta:ility :y increasing 4utual trustand pro;iding for effecti;e :urden sharing*

Within these constraints, it is in the 6*S* interest and the interests of the other 4e4:ers of the one of peace that the one ulti4ately enco4pass the 3hole 3orld* 6nfortunately,this is not a near@ter4 proposition* Many regions and states are not ready* The 6nitedStates should see> to e?pand the one selecti;ely and help others prepare for4e4:ership*

The 4ost i4portant step that the 6nited States and the other prosperous de4ocracies canta>e is to assist others in adopting the econo4ic strategies that ha;e 3or>ed in North%4erica, Western Europe, and East %sia and are :eing successfully i4ple4ented in partsof 0atin %4erica and else3here in %sia* Econo4ic de;elop4ent and education are the4ost effecti;e instru4ents for sol;ing the pro:le4s of the nations outside the one of

peace*


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.reclude "ostile "ege4ony o;er Critical !egions % glo:al ri;al could e4erge if a hostile po3er or coalition gained hege4ony o;er acritical region, defined as one that contains econo4ic, technical, and hu4an resourcessuch that a po3er that controlled it 3ould possess a 4ilitary potential roughly e=ual to, or

greater than, that of the 6nited States* It is, therefore, a ;ital 6*S* interest i*e*, one thatthe 6nited States should :e 3illing to use force to protectF to a;oid such a de;elop4ent*%lthough this could change in the future, t3o regions no3 4eet this criterion East %siaand Europe* The .ersian $ulf is critically i4portant for a different reason @@ its oilresources are ;ital for the 3orld econo4y*

In the long ter4, the relati;e i4portance of ;arious regions can change* % region that iscritical to 6*S* interests no3 4ight :eco4e less i4portant, 3hile so4e other region 4ightgain in i4portance* Aor e?a4ple, Southeast %sia appears to :e a region 3hose relati;ei4portance is li>ely to increase if the regional econo4ies continue to gro3 asi4pressi;ely as they ha;e done in the past se;eral years* The $ulf 4ight decline if the

resources of the region :eca4e less i4portant for 3orld prosperity :ecause technologicalde;elop4ents pro;ided econo4ically feasi:le alternati;e sources of energy*

%t present, the ris>s of regional hege4ony in Europe and East %sia are ;ery s4all* This isdue in large part to the alliance of the >ey states of these regions 3ith the 6nited States,3hich endorses the presence of 6*S* forces and the credi:ility of 6*S* co44it4ents* It isthus ;ital that 6*S* alliances in Europe and East %sia :e 4aintained :ut adapted to 4eetthe challenges of the ne3 era* &uring the Cold War, the 6*S* role in these t3o regions notonly deterred threats fro4 the So;iet 6nion :ut also contained ri;alries* In Europe, it isnot in the 6*S* interest for the E6 either to :eco4e a superstate or to disintegrate* Thefor4er could ulti4ately pose a glo:al challenge @@ Western EuropeBs econo4y is :iggerthan the 6*S* econo4y* The latter could encourage 4utual suspicion and contri:ute torenationali ation and a possi:le repeat of the first half of the t3entieth century*

%t this point, the 6nited States is the preponderant outside po3er in the .ersian $ulf* Its position there helps to discourage the rise of a ri;al and 3ill put it in a strong position toco4pete should one arise* 6*S* preponderance ser;es the interests of the 4e4:ers of theone of peace :ecause it helps di4inish the threat of interruption of oil supplies fro4 theregion* 7ut the threat of hostile regional hege4ony re4ains* The 6nited States, 3ithsupport fro4 its allies, needs to 4aintain ade=uate 4ilitary capa:ility to deter and defeatthe threat of regional hege4ony fro4 Ira= or Iran* The 6nited States should see> greatercontri:utions fro4 its N%TO allies and Dapan in 4eeting the security challenges in thisregion* Washington and its allies 4ust also encourage regional cooperation a4ong the$CC states and help the4 cope 3ith the contradictory pressures @@ li:eral andfunda4entalist @@ for do4estic change that :eset the4* $i;en the recent progress in the%ra:Israeli conflict, 6*S* security ties 3ith Israel can help in dealing 3ith threats fro4Iran or Ira= in the $ulf* "edge against !ei4periali ation in !ussia


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4uch faster trac> @@ perhaps at once @@ than 3ould :e the case other3ise, and possi:ly to4aterial support to a 6>rainian resistance 4o;e4ent and !ussian isolation fro4 theWest* Without such preparations no3, there is danger that, in the face of a possi:le!ussian ta>eo;er of 6>raine, N%TO e?pansion to EastCentral Europe 3ould not :e

politically supported :ecause it 3ould appear to :e too pro;ocati;e* 6nfortunately, at

ti4es in the past the 6nited States has appreciated its sta>e in a situation too late toe?press its intentions clearly enough to deter an aggressor* % clear and strong Western posture no3 should also strengthen those !ussians 3ho do not consider rei4periali ationto :e in their countryBs interests*

7ut this is not only a 4ilitary 4atter* The >ey for 6>raine and others is to carry outecono4ic and political refor4s to increase internal sta:ility and reduce their ;ulnera:ilityto !ussian interference and do4ination* The 6nited States, the E6 countries, and Dapanha;e a sta>e in helping 6>raine and others adopt significant econo4ic refor4s* Toencourage such a de;elop4ent, the $@K states should :e 3illing to 4eet so4e of the costsof the transition to a 4ar>et@oriented syste4*

&iscourage Chinese E?pansionis4 China is another 4a gi;es an e;en higher esti4ate -*2 trillion* Militarily,China has :een increasing its po3er proness, not e?cluding a possi:le ci;il 3ar that could disrupt econo4ic prosperity andcreate refugee flo3s, 4ay cause significant pro:le4s for its neigh:ors and the 3orldco44unity*

%ssu4ing these difficulties can :e a;oided, the 3orld 3ill ha;e to deal 3ith the fact thatChina is not a satisfied po3er* %4ong the 4a


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China Sea generally, and the Sen>a>u Islands :et3een China and Dapan* %lthough Chinahas a:andoned co44unis4 as a glo:al ideology and see4s to ha;e accepted theecono4ic i4perati;e of the glo:al econo4y, it is still see>ing its rightful place in the3orld geopolitically* "o3 3ill China define its role as its po3er gro3s :eyond itsterritorial interests China appears to :e see>ing e;entual regional predo4inance, a

prospect opposed :y Dapan, !ussia, and se;eral other rising regional po3ers such asIndonesia and India*

E;en 3ithout regional do4ination, China 4ight :eco4e interested in :eco4ing theleader of an anti@6*S* coalition :ased on a reistani and Iranian nuclear progra4s* It is also clear that China is not asopposed to the North #orean nuclear progra4 as the 6nited States is* So4e Chinese3riting on strategy and international security e?presses hostility to 6*S* preponderanceand i4plies the need to :alance it* 7ut China recogni es the i4portance of the 6nitedStates @@ as a 4ar>et for Chinese goods and as a source for technical training and

technology* Without 6*S* help China is less li>ely to achie;e its econo4ic and 4ilitaryo:ely to influence thetype of foreign policy it pursues* In particular, its degree of de4ocrati ation is li>ely todeter4ine ho3 4uch 4oney and effort China is 3illing to de;ote to i4pro;ing itsinternational standing in the light of its i44ense de;elop4ent tas>s at ho4e* This

pro;ides the 6nited States 3ith a4ple strategic 3arning* Aor the near ter4, econo4icconsiderations are li>ely to :e do4inant in Chinese calculations* Ne;ertheless, China :yitself or as the leader of a coalition of renegade states could co4plicate 6*S*@led efforts todeal 3ith issues such as proliferation and sta:ility in the .ersian $ulf and Northeast %sia*Chinese econo4ic success confronts the 6nited States 3ith a dile44a* On the one hand,it increases Chinese potential to :eco4e a glo:al ri;al* On the other, it 4ight producede4ocrati ation, decentrali ation, and a cooperati;e China*

The 6nited States should continue to pursue econo4ic relations 3ith China andencourage its integration in glo:al econo4ic and security regi4es* It should also use thele;erage of econo4ic relations, 3hich are ;ery i4portant to China, to continue toencourage Chinese cooperation in restraining nuclear and 4issile proliferation in placesli>e #orea and Iran* 7ut Chinese cooperation is li>ely to re4ain li4ited* While the6nited States continues to cooperate 3ith China, it should :e cautious in transferring to ittechnologies that ha;e i4portant 4ilitary i4plications* It should also ensure that ChinaBsneigh:ors, such as Tai3an and the 4e4:er states of the %ssociation of Southeast %sian

Nations, ha;e the 4eans to defend the4sel;es* Wor>ing 3ith other po3ers, especiallyDapan, #orea after unification, and Indonesia, the 6nited States should preclude Chineseregional hege4ony :y 4aintaining ade=uate forces in the region* Without a 6*S* presencein the region, as Chinese po3er gro3s, so4e states in the region are li>ely to appeaseChina and 4o;e closer to it, 3hile others such as Indonesia, Dapan, and )ietna4 3ouldsee> to :alance it*


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4ilitary in;ol;e4ent* The 6nited States 4ight also consider participating 3ith allies inso4e 0!Cs :ecause of a desire either to e?tend the one of peace or to pre;ent chaosfro4 spreading to a critical region and there:y threatening the security of 4e4:ers of theone of peace*

%t present, 0!Cs are treated as lesser included cases of 4ae totreat 0!Cs the sa4e 3ay no3, especially :ecause in the future 6*S* forces 3ill :e 4uchs4aller than in the past and 3ill pro;ide a s4aller 4argin for error* E;en s4all 0!Cs cani4pose su:stantial and disproportionate de4ands on the support ele4ents of 6*S* forces@@ such as air:orne 3arning and control syste4s %W%CSF, SE%& suppression of ene4yair defensesF, airlift, and co44unications* To :e prepared for its M!C co44it4ents andto ha;e so4e increased 0!C capa:ilities, the 6nited States needs 4ore airlift andchanges in the M!C@dri;en training and organi ation of 6*S* forces*

Third, it is essential to retain a 4o:ili ation :ase to reconstitute additional 4ilitarycapa:ility in a ti4ely fashion if things go :adly in any 4aely to :e a:le to ta>e pro4pt action, gi;en the a4ountof strategic 3arning it is li>ely to recei;e*

To discourage the rise of another glo:al ri;al or to :e in a strong position to deal 3ith the pro:le4 should one arise, focusing 6*S* 4ilitary planning for the future on #orea and the.ersian $ulf, plus increased a:ility for 0!C operations, is inade=uate* O;er ti4e,although the threat fro4 North #orea 3ill pro:a:ly disappear, other larger threats coulde4erge* %s an alternati;e, the 6nited States should consider 4o;ing to3ard si ing itsforces largely :y adopting the re=uire4ent that they :e capa:le of si4ultaneouslydefeating the 4ost plausi:le 4ilitary challenges to critical 6*S* interests that 4ight :ecreated :y the t3o ne?t 4ost po3erful 4ilitary forces in the 3orld that are not allied 3iththe 6nited States* Such a force should allo3 the 6nited States to protect its interests in%sia, Europe, and the .ersian $ulf* Such a force@si ing principle does not 4ean that 6*S*forces ha;e to :e nu4erically as large as the co4:ined forces of these t3o po3ers* It4eans that they should :e capa:le of defeating the4 gi;en relati;ely specificnearsi4ultaneous scenarios of great i4portance to the 6nited States @@ a $ulf and %siascenario( a Europe and %sia scenario( or %sian and $ulf scenarios nearly si4ultaneously*Such an approach 3ould gi;e the 6nited States a fle?i:le glo:al capa:ility for su:stantialoperations*

6*S* superiority in ne3 3eapons and their use 3ould :e critical* 6*S* planners shouldtherefore gi;e higher priority to research on ne3 technologies, ne3 concepts of operation,and changes in organi ation, 3ith the ai4 of 6*S* do4inance in the 4ilitarytechnicalre;olution that 4ay :e e4erging* They should also focus on ho3 to pro


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The .ersian $ulf War ga;e a gli4pse of the li>ely future* The character of 3arfare 3illchange :ecause of ad;ances in 4ilitary technology, 3here the 6nited States has the lead,and in corresponding concepts of operation and organi ational structure* The challenge isto sustain this lead in the face of the co4placency that the current 6*S* lead in 4ilitary

po3er is li>ely to engender* Those 3ho are see>ing to :e ri;als to the 6nited States are

li>ely to :e ;ery 4oti;ated to e?plore ne3 technologies and ho3 to use the4 against it* %deter4ined nation 4a>ing the right choices, e;en though it possessed a 4uch s4allerecono4y, could pose an enor4ous challenge :y e?ploiting :rea>throughs that 4ade 4oretraditional 6*S* 4ilitary 4ethods less effecti;e :y co4parison*

Aor e?a4ple, $er4any, :y 4a>ing the right technical choices and adopting inno;ati;econcepts for their use in the 19- s and 192 s, 3as a:le to 4a>e a serious :id for 3orlddo4ination* %t the sa4e ti4e, Dapan, 3ith a relati;ely s4all $N. co4pared to the other4a else3here and do things differently to free upresources for the4* The 6nited States still has too 4any :ases* The country does not ha;ethe 4ost effecti;e process for 4a>ing infor4ed decisions for allocating resources for;arious types of force ele4ents @@ that is, those forces that are re=uired for current andfuture o:ey areas and capa:ilities that are not as rele;ant no3 as they3ere :efore* This is especially true in the 4aintenance and support area* Aor e?a4ple, thena;y, the air force, and industry all pro;ide 4aintenance for 4ilitary aircraft engines*$reater centrali ation here could sa;e significant resources* The &efense &epart4ent isstill :eing forced to :uy 3eapon syste4s that it says it does not need and 3ill not :eneeded under the proposed strategy* The current ac=uisition syste4 is ;ery costly and cansa;e resources if strea4lined* .reser;e 6*S* Econo4ic Strength The 6nited States is unli>ely to preser;e its 4ilitary and technological do4inance if the6*S* econo4y declines seriously* In such an en;iron4ent, the do4estic econo4ic and

political :ase for glo:al leadership 3ould di4inish and the 6nited States 3ould pro:a:lyincre4entally 3ithdra3 fro4 the 3orld, :eco4e in3ard@loo>ing, and a:andon 4ore and4ore of its e?ternal interests* %s the 6nited States 3ea>ened, others 3ould try to fill the)acuu4*


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To sustain and i4pro;e its econo4ic strength, the 6nited States 4ust 4aintain itstechnological lead in the econo4ic real4* Its success 3ill depend on the choices it 4a>es*In the past, de;elop4ents such as the agricultural and industrial re;olutions producedfunda4ental changes positi;ely affecting the relati;e position of those 3ho 3ere a:le tota>e ad;antage of the4 and negati;ely affecting those 3ho did not* So4e argue that the

3orld 4ay :e at the :eginning of another such transfor4ation, 3hich 3ill shift thesources of 3ealth and the relati;e position of classes and nations* If the 6nited Statesfails to recogni e the change and adapt its institutions, its relati;e position 3illnecessarily 3orsen*

To re4ain the preponderant 3orld po3er, 6*S* econo4ic strength 4ust :e enhanced :yfurther i4pro;e4ents in producti;ity, thus increasing real per capita inco4e( :ystrengthening education and training( and :y generating and using superior science andtechnology* In the long run the econo4ic future of the 6nited States 3ill also :e affected

:y t3o other factors* One is the i4:alance :et3een go;ern4ent re;enues andgo;ern4ent e?penditure* %s a society the 6nited States has to decide 3hat part of the

$N. it 3ishes the go;ern4ent to control and adey factor affecting the glo:al standing of the 6nited States is its current socialcrisis the high rate of ;iolence in cities, the unsatisfactory state of race relations, and the

:rea>do3n of fa4ilies* %lthough it faces no glo:al ideological ri;al, and although4o;e4ents such as Isla4ic funda4entalis4 and East %sian neo@Confucianauthoritarianis4 are li4ited in their appeal, the social pro:le4s of the 6nited States areli4iting its attracti;eness as a 4odel* If the social crisis 3orsens, it is li>ely that, o;er thelong ter4, a ne3 organi ing principle 3ith greater uni;ersal appeal 3ill e4erge and :eadopted :y states 3ith the po3er and the desire to challenge the erst3hile leader* 6se Aorce Dudiciously( %;oid O;ere?tension( Share the 7urden 3ith %llies O;ere?tension is a 4ista>e that so4e of the :ig po3ers ha;e 4ade in the past* Such ade;elop4ent can occur if the 6nited States is not


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When it co4es to lesser interests the 6nited States should rely on non4ilitary options,especially if the sta>es in;ol;ed do not 3arrant the 4ilitary costs* It has 4any optionsar4ing and training the ;icti4s of aggression( pro;iding technical assistance and logisticsupport for peace>eeping :y the 6nited Nations, regional organi ations, or other po3ers(

and econo4ic instru4ents such as sanctions and positi;e incenti;es* The effecti;eness ofthese non@4ilitary options can :e enhanced :y s>illful diplo4acy*

The 4e4:ers of the one of peace ha;e a co44on interest in the sta:ility of Europe, North %4erica, East %sia, and the .ersian $ulf* Dapan, for e?a4ple, i4ports oil fro4 the$ulf and e?ports to and in;ests in the other critical regions* The sa4e is true of Europe*The 6*S* glo:al role :enefits these other 4e4:ers as 3ell as the 6nited States* 7ut thereis a danger >no3n as the free rider pro:le4F that the other 4e4:ers of the one of

peace 3ill not do their fair share* This 3as a pro:le4 during the Cold War and it isunli>ely to go a3ay* It is a potentially i4portant political issue in the 6nited States,3hich does face a dile44a %s long as the 6nited States is a:le and 3illing to protect

co44on interests, other countries 4ay :e happy to rely on it, there:y >eeping their political opposition under control, accepting no ris> for their youth, and continuing tofocus on their econo4ies* 7ut on the other hand, the 6nited States 3ould not 3ant$er4any and Dapan to :e a:le to conduct e?peditionary 3ars* The 6nited States 3ill

pro:a:ly therefore :e 3illing to :ear a hea;ier 4ilitary :urden than its allies, :ut fairnessand long@ter4 pu:lic support re=uire that this disproportion not :e e?cessi;e*

% :alance needs to :e struc> and a for4ula has to :e found to :alance each countryBscontri:ution of :lood and treasure* In the $ulf 3ar a su:stantial degree of :urdensharing 3as reali ed* 7ut the allies can do 4ore* Aor the long ter4, one possi:le solutionis to institutionali e :urden sharing a4ong the $@K nations for the security of criticalregions, including sharing the financial costs of 4ilitary operations* Questions of out@of@area responsi:ility are i4portant in peaceti4e, :oth on a day@to@day :asis and in ti4es ofcrisis and 3ar* 7urden@sharing steps 3ould not o:;iate a significant and perhapsdisproportionate 6*S* 4ilitary role in 4a


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indeed not 3ithout costs* The cost of sustaining 6*S* leadership is, ho3e;er, afforda:le*%t present the :urden i4posed :y 6*S* defense efforts, appro?i4ately / percent of $N!is lighter than at any ti4e since :efore the #orean War* The :urden 3ill shrin> further asthe econo4y e?pands, and the costs of leadership can :e >ept at a sustaina:le le;el :ya;oiding o;ere?tension and :y 4ore effecti;e :urden sharing a4ong the 4e4:ers of the

one of peace*

Moreo;er, a glo:al leadership role ser;es the econo4ic interests of the 6nited States* Aor e?a4ple, it can facilitate 6*S* e?ports, as recently seen in 6*S* contracts 3ith Saudi%ra:ia for the sale of aircraft and the 4oderni ation of Saudi teleco44unicationsyste4s* %s discussed earlier, the costs of alternati;e approaches to 6*S* glo:alleadership can ulti4ately :e higher* !ather than under4ining do4estic prosperity, such arole can in fact facilitate it* The econo4ic :enefits of 6*S* leadership ha;e not :eenfocused on either analytically or in the state4ents 4ade to the pu:lic*

$lo:al leadership and :uilding a 4ore de4ocratic and peaceful 3orld should also appeal

to %4erican idealis4, a defining %4erican characteristic* Aor sustaining do4estic political support, this appeal 4ight 3ell :e as i4portant as appeals to 4ore selfish and4aterial %4erican interests* In fact, ha;ing such a lofty goal can :e a spur to the >inds ofsocial and educational refor4s that are necessary, rather than :eing an alternati;e tothe4* Conclusion %s a nation, the 6nited States is in a position of unprecedented 4ilitary and political

po3er and ene a co4pelling case for6*S* leadership and to see> to shape pu:lic attitudes* Without a ;ision, a strategy, and

:ipartisan support, he 3ill fail to 3in pu:lic appro;al for 6*S* glo:al leadership, and hiscountry 3ill fail to sei e this historic 4o4ent* This article is dra3n fro4 a larger !%N& study, Aro4 Contain4ent to $lo:al0eadership %4erica and the World %fter the Cold War* The author 3ould li>e to than>Cheryl 7enard, %:e Shuls>y, %ndre3 Marshall, &a;id Chu, .aul &a;is, 7rent 7radley,#e;in 0e3is, Scooter 0i::y, Chuc> Miller, Craig Moore, Chris 7o3ie, &an &re ner, and#en Wat4an for their co44ents on the earlier drafts*

Notes


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n1* &ic> Cheney, &efense Strategy for the 199 s The !egional &efense StrategyWashington, &*C* &epart4ent of &efense, 1992F*n-* Willia4 D* Clinton, % National Strategy of Engage4ent and Enlarge4entWashington, &*C* The White "ouse, Duly 199/F*n2* %4ong the =uestions that 3ould ha;e to :e addressed are Would the defense of the

6nited States include the defense of North %4erica or the %4ericas generally "o3 farinto the %tlantic and .acific Oceans 3ould the defensi;e peri4eter e?tend Would the6nited States need a ro:ust anti@:allistic 4issile defensen/* "enry #issinger, &iplo4aty Ne3 'or>, N*'* Si4on Schuster, 199/F, p* + 9*n5* It is, ho3e;er, an interesting =uestion 3hether the go;ern4ents of 4odern industrialde4ocracies 3ould :e a:le to con;ince their populations to support preparations for letalone, actually fightF 4a ter4s, or3hether ideological or nationalist 4oti;es 3ould ha;e to :e adduced*n * The concept of a de4ocratic one of peace 3as used in 6*S* &efense &epart4entdocu4ents in 199-* See &ic> Cheney, The !egional &efense Strategy Washington, &*C*&epart4ent of &efense, Danuary 1992F* The concept 3as also used :y Ma? Singer and

%aron Wilda;s>y in their 1992 :oo>, The !eal World Order 8ones of .eaceL8ones ofTur4oil Chatha4, N*D* Chatha4 "ouse .u:lishers, 1992F*nK* Econo4ist, Octo:er 1, 199/, p* K * %ccording to the Econo4ist, if current trends hold

:y the year - - the Chinese econo4y 4ight 3ell :e / percent larger than the 6*S*econo4y*n+* #eyin 0e3is, The &iscipline $ap and Other !easons for "u4ility and !ealis4 in&efense .lanning, in .aul &a;is, ed*, Ne3 Challenges for &efense .lanning SantaMonica, Calif* !%N&, 199/F, p* 1 2*n9* Ti4es Mirror Center for .eople and the .ress, The .eople, the .ress and .oliticsWashington, &*C*, Septe4:er -1, 199/F, p* 2K*

$!%."IC .icture, no caption, :y Ed Soy>a

0O%&@&%TE March -/, 1995

&ocu4ent 1 of 1*

Ter4s and Conditions P .ri;acy

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Khalilzad 95

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