L’image que la sociologie peint de l’homme en thborie contem- poraine a et6 l’objet de critiques qui se groupent autour des deux thPmes suivants: 1” les modeles actuels de l’univers social figent l’homme dans un moule, en en faisant le prisonnier de ses rBles afin d’expliquer ses comportements; 2” une th6orie explicite de la personnaliG est un indispensable elkment de toute th6orie sociologique valable, puisquc l’action individuelle est un passage obligatoire pour que se manifeste toute disposition commune au niveau de la collectiviti. L’auteur est d‘opinion que si, afin d’expliquer l’harmonie sociale, on appuie trop sur I’interiorisation des vdeurs collectives, on appauvrit la notion de personnalitk en plus de rabaisser, parmi les m6canismes qui produisent l’accord, ceux qui sont de caractere social plutBt que psychologique.

”Homo Sociologicus” and Personality Theory Harvey Rich University of Calgary

There are signs of growing dissatisfaction with the con- ception of man which dominates contemporary sociological litmature. An image of man as culture-bound and role- enslaved emerges as the product. of attempts to elaborate abstract categories which are to serve as the building- blocks of a science of society. But, in the process, the Hobhian problem - How is social order possible? - is “solved” by eliminating the problem. The internalization of values so that individuals come to want to do what is required of them, and the desire to win the apprwal of others through mmpliice with role expectations, have become the twin pillars of what D. H. Wrong has referred to as the ‘‘oversocialized man” in modern sociology.’

If socia2 order is no longer problematic, it becomes diffi- cult to conceive of men as active participants in the making of history. Marx’s cryptic comment - “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” - is superseded by a wciological determinism which leaves no scope for men to “make their own history,” even within limiting conditions.

The ideological impulse behind the current critical view of the conception of man in contemporary sociology is most directly evident in recent strictures advanced by R. Dahren- dorf, who takes issue with “homo sociologicus, that w e wnstnmh ‘on of man that emerges from modern socio1ogica.l theory, He is a role- playing animal, an alienated man whose actions and though& have become calculable cmqmces of social norms and institutions . . . In saciological theory, the human individual has died a theoretical death. He has evaporated as a being endowed with private and pemnal attitudes, emotions, interests and actions, and has been subsumed under abstract, alien categories.”Z

Here Dahrendorf is taking am ideological stance in arguing that the mnmption of man which emerges from

ID. H. Wrong, “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology,” American Sociological Review, XXVI (April, 1961), 183-193.

ZR. Dahrendorf, “Democracy without Liberty,” in S. M. Lipset and L. Zowenthal, ds., Culture and Social Character: The Work of David Riesman Reviewed (Glencoe, 1,961), 203. Bendix and Berger formulate a somewhat similar criticism of sociological theory which swallows up the individual in society, but their remarks are not made in as obvious an ideological con- text. They refer to the

‘sociological determinism’ characteristic of much contemporary sociological literature. Group membership and participation in the culture are used in the literature as explanatory principles

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modern sociological theory is similar to what is, in fact, man’s condition in a “democracy without liberty.” He fears that modern sociological theory contributes to a confusion between the analysis of a historically-conditioned but un- desirable trend in many contemporary societies and the elaboration of abstract categories which are presumed to possess a timeless and universal validity.

The conceptions of social character in the work of From and Riesman, which were elaborated within the context of social criticism, have been taken over by others who use the concept not to call attention to modern man’s renuncia- tion of freedom, but as a value-free social science concept. The link between changing social structures and varying modes of adaptation (for example, Riesman’s “other-dir- ected man” and F r o m ’ s “homo consumens”) is obscured and in its place is put an ahistorical conception of man as receiving his motives and being molded by the socialization process.

Sociologists have been exhorted to employ personality theory to avoid the Wkheimian fdacy of sociological de- terminism. Inkeles has advocated a strategy along these lines : “In sccidogy [a striving for ideological purity] expresses itself in the attempt to analyze social phenomena with a method which strictly excludes psychological theory and data . . . [But] all institutional arrangements are ulti- mately mediated through individual human action . . . M; main purpose is to stress that use of the theory and data of personality systems is essential to an understanding of the stable functioning or the change of mial ~ystems”.~

In what follows, I intend to focus on the hazards involved in constructing comprehensive theories which embrace both social and psychological processes. The concern over “homo Sociologicus” as an overdetermined, role-enslaved hmm may be pursued up a blind alley by turning to personality theory as a way of introducing “heedm.” Perhaps the best way to support this conclusion is to examine attempts to inte- grate propositions prtaining to the functioning of social and personality systems into a unified conceptual scheme.

which account for the conduct of individuals in society Such terms as culture-pattern, subculture, social role, reciprocal role- expectations, social class, status group, mores and folkways, communication, human relations and many, many others are employed in such a way that individuals appear to act as group influences dictate. Unwittingly perhaps, this vocabulary has often had the cumulative effect of suggesting that the individual merely does what is expected of him - in the literal sense in which the actor on the medieval stage reacts his text from the rolled script in his hands.

From R. Bendix and B. Berger, “Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology,” in L. Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theorg (Evanston, Ill., 1959), 96-97.

3A. Inkeles, “Personality and Social Structure,,’ in R. K. Merton, et al., eds., Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects (New York, 19591, 249-251.

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Attempts to Integrate Sociological and Psychological Propositions

A. Parsons’ Attempt at a Synthesis. Parsons’ work offers us a useful framework within which to consider these issues. For one thing, much of the criticism of the conception of man in contemporary sociology is a direct reaction to his

Three of the sociologists referred to above (includ- ing the notes), Dahrendorf, Bendix, and Wrong, have made allusions to his work in the context of such criticisms. Moreover, there has been a notable shift in Parsons’ work over time with respect to the importance of psychological theory, and this shift is particularly significant in terms of the issues being considered in this paper. As he has be- come mow and mom immersed in a detailed exploration of p.ychologicnl theoiy and, in particular, the Freudian theory of personality development, a basic alteration has taken place in his conception of the relation between institutional behaviour and the motivation underlying such behaviour.

In his earlier writings,5 Parsons refrained from any at- tempts to demonstrate a congruence between social con- straints and motivational patterns. On the contrary, he argued cogently that, for example, the strid division be- tween self-interested and altruistic behaviour in the motiva- tion of economic activities is misconceived. In comparing the activities of the businessman and the professional man, P m n s asserted that disinterested and self-interested ele- ments commingle in the motivational systems UnderIying institutionalized behaviour in both cases. He rejected the view that the typical motivation of the professional man is “altruistic” while that of the businessman is “egoistic.” It is essential, he argued, to focus on the institutional con- straints which structure the typical modes of activities in each cilse and which provide the basis for a successful career. A physician, then, who aspires to a successful pro- fessional career, and who pciissesses, in terms Olf the Freud- ian characterology, an “anal” character type, will be con- strained to devote his time and energies to his patients in accord with designated norms of professional conduct re- gardless of how much this may interfere with direct and immediate psychic gratification as defined in terms of personality needs. Similarly, the altruistic businessman who feels strongly motivated to perform “good works” and to co-operate with rather than compete against his fellow- men will be constrained to follow certain “rules of the game” if he is to succeed in business. of course, this does not mean that there is no relation between motivational patterns and institutionally affected behaviour. Obviously, the psychological burdens and opprtunities afforded by the

*Parsons’ work constitutes one of the most ambitious attempts to link sociological theory with personality theory. His “Theory of Action” deals at length with the relation between the social system and the personality of the individual.

51 am here referring particularly to “The Motivation of Economic Activities” and “The Professions and Social Structure” in Essays an Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied (Glencoe, 1949), 200-217 and 185199 respectively.

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different institutional structures vary greatly from person to person. This means that it may be more of an emotional strain for an individual with a particular personality type to comply with the social constraints of professio8nd be- haviour than it would be for another individual. But in these earlier writings Parsons concluded that a wide range of motivational patterns may wexist with a common out- come in t e r n of adherence to the institutional code de- fining the range of acceptable behaviour in an occupation, or for that matter, in a global society. At this point, there is none of the very detailed concern later shown for what he refers to as the interpenetration of the personality sys- tem and the social system. Nor is there any attempt to demonstrate an isomorphic relationship between the two systems. All this changes rather drastically in his later work in which a concern with the relation between person- ality and social system components becomes dominant.

There has been much criticism of Parsons’ contribution to personality theory and the conception of man Which is implicit in this contribution. Wrong is severely critical of Parsons’ distortion of Freudian theory in his endeavour to secure a motivational basis for conformity with social sys- tem requirements. This distortion is brought out mast clearly in “The Superego and the Theory of Social Sys- tems.”& Here Parsons elaborates Freud’s theory of the internationalization d moral values via the mechanism of the superego. He does this in a way which radically alters Freud’s interpretation of the relation between the in&- vidual and society.7 Not only is the internal conflict between id impulses and superego controls obscured, but in addition, the failure to distinguish between the internalization of a norm and overt behaviour which may or may not con- form to that norm leads to an overdetermined view of man.

In a critical analysis of the psychological aspects of Parsons’ theory, Baldwin concludes that it results in an over-simplified and impoverished personality. He attributes this result to Parsom’ insistence on an isomorphism between personality and social systems. He argues that the lack of differentiation in Parsons’ use of psychological mechanisms results in a very narrow scope for genuine imdividd dif- ferences. 8; Contrary to the Freudian schema, Parsons is

Tl‘. Parsons, R. F Bales, and E A. Shils, working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, l%8), 13-28.

?As stated, inter alia, in Civilization and its Discontents, trans- lated by J. Riviere, (Garden City, N.Y., n.d.)

SA. L. Baldwin, “The Parsonian Theory of Personality”, in M. Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood CliRs, N.J., 1961), 153-190.

9In view of this judgment by Baldwin it is strange that Devereux finds scope in Parsons’ theory of personality for the latter’s volun- tarist assumptions: “There remains at least some small area of autonomy or freedom, perhaps now in the form of the divine spark.” From E. C. Dwereux, Jr., “Parsons’ Sociological Theory,” in M. Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, 33.

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so intent on maximizing the importance of psychological mechanisms for the functioning of the social system, that deviance can only be viewed as institutionalized deviance. Parsons resolves the Hobbesian problem of order by in- corporating elements of the social system into the person- ality 90 that people come to desire to act in a way which is in fact expected of them. By harnessing what he refers to as the “deeper” l a y m of motivation for the fulfillment of roleexpectatiom, Parsons is arguing that institutional- ized behaviour is based on the integration uf a set of com- mon value patterns with the internalized need-disposi- tion structure of the interacting personalities. And this is precisely what b thers Baldwin, Wrong, and others in their critical comments on Parsans’ work. Baldwin pints out that Parsons comes very close to picturing a social system that does not need external controls at all because they are all part of the individual’s motivation. This suggests a “Utopian” condition contradicted by the facts of life.l0

What is crucial is the extent to which Parsons focusses on those processes whereby individuals come to be moti- vated to conform to normative standards. The conclusion that there is a close fit between the individual’s psychic structure and collective behaviour patterns fails to give adequate attention to the solcial mechanisms underlying compliant behaviour, and to the variety d ways in which people cope with the external pressures to confom.

The implications of this discussion for the problem pre- sented at the beginning of this paper, the distorted image of man in contemporary sociology, should by now be clear. Although he claims to have built upon a voluntaristic foun- dation, Parsons has placed such heavy demands upon the personality system that its supposed “independence” be- comes something of an empty shell. Moreover, by attribut- ing to psychological disposition what is, in varying degrees, a response to economic pressure, political power, and his- t o r i d legacies, he makes it difficult to give adequate weight to these latter factors as explanatory variables in accounting for either relatively stable social structures or the often rapid “adjustment” by large segments of the population to social change.” B. “Culture and Personality’’ Attempts at a Symthesis. For reasons which will soon k m n e clear, consideration of the “culture and personality” field is germane to this discussion. With referemce to the preceding analysis of personality t h e o ~ y in Parswns’ work, it is notemrthy that there are signs that this field rmay be moving from a @tion similar to that presently espoiused by Parsons to a position some- what closer to the om he took in his earlier papers.

loglack, The Social Theories of Takott Parsons, 161.

11This is a significant aspect of the criticism of Parsons’ theory of the social system in D. Lockwood, “Some Remarks on ’The Social System,” British Journal of Sociology, VII (June, 19561, 134-146.

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Until recently, the salient problem for scholars in the field was generally thought to be the stipulation, in detail, of the relevance of pemonality processes for the functioning of the social system. This was spelled out in a paper which was widely hailed at the time as offering a comprehensive and brilliant conceptual framework for “culture and person- ality” studies. Inkeles and Levinson, the authors of this paper, summed up their pasition as follows: “In so f a r as the relevant traits of character are modany present in the population of any society, the chances are increased that culturally and structurally important goals will be aspired toward and implemented by the wcinty’s members, thus in significant degree ensuring <he continued effective functioning of the social system.”l2 It is clear, then, that in these studies, the dominant view has been to demonstrate the way in which personality processes become crucial variables in the functioning of social systems. The “fit” between personality characteristics and social system requirements is not accidental but is regarded as resulting from the systematic socialization of individuals so that the dominant value orientations of the p u p are internalized and thus tramformed into individual motiva- tions.

However, there is an “agonizing reappraisal“ underway which is clearly evident in Kaplan’s writing, first in rather general terms in a paper published in 1957,13 and, more recently, as the editor of a volume of contributions from thirty of the most active contributors in this field.l*

In the earlier article, Kaplan raises an issue which is meia l to this discussion. He is critical of the way in which the concept of internalization has been broad- ened to include the entire cultural system. Acquiescence, he argues, is not necessarily derived from the internaliza- tion of values.

Wnkeles, A., and Levinson, D. J., “National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems,’’ in G. Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I1 (Cambridge, 1954), 1006. One of the main problems in this area has been the diffi- culty of clearly distinguishing between “culture” and “personal- ity.” Thus, it has been argued that some of the work has been tautological. Cultural elements are attributed to the personality in the form of “character structure” and the latter is then used to account for the same elements in the culture. For a penetrating critique of “culture and personality” studies which focusses on this issue, see R. Bendix, “Compliant Behaviour and Individual Person- ality,” T h e American Journal of Sociology, LVIII (1952), 292-303. In a different context, this problem is also explored in some detail by R. ‘Gutman and D. H. Wrong, “David Riesman’s Typology of Character“ in S. M. Lipset and L. Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Character, 295-315.

13B. Kaplan, “Personality and Social Structure”, in J. ‘B. Gittler, ed., Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade (New York, 1957), 87-126.

14“Editm’s Epilogue: A Final Word,” in B. Kaplan, ed., Studying Personality Cross-Culturally (Evanston, Ill., 1961).

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“The learning of cognitive and evaluative orientations may involve the development of representations or maps of the cultural state of affairs. These are not tendencies to action but simply guides to the nature of the world in which one lives that one may or may not act in terms of. What is learned is not, for example, the value itself but simply that the value exists and that it is deemed important by respec- tive members of the p u p to which one belongs”.15 The extent of the internalization of values in this view is a matter for empirical investigatiom. And the fact that in- ternalization daes occur does not n d l y mean that the mtirt. (wltural pattern is internalized. But, if the individual ;s able to orient his behaviour on the basis of a cognitive awareness of conventional expectations, then he may also develop strategies to bring about a change in the normative order in accord with an alternative set of values. Norms, then, are not merely “acted out,” they may also be chal- lenged and altered.I6

Thk. it will be r e d & , is the issue which was set out in some detail at the beginning of this paper - the concern over a culturebound and role-enslaved image of man. Kap lan points to the growing belief of students in, the “culture and personality” field that social roles do not require any particular kind of motivational support. He concedes that the idea #at social and personality systems are not is@ morphically structured is not new, but contends, neverthe- less, that this position is incompatible with modal person- ality themy, a conclusion which certainly has revolutionary consequences for the field. Instead of studying the entire personality and developing sophisticated techniques for classifying personality types, the objective now shifts to identifying a generalized and diffused disposition towards conformity with social requirements. It is noteworthy that Kaplan is here conceding the crux of the criticism advanced by Bendixl7 and others that compliant behaviour may be accompanied by a variety of psychological reactions such

*5B. Kaplan, “Personality and Social Structure,” 105. A related point of view, that motivational unity is neither necessary nor desirable for social integration but that certain common cognitive processes underlie the cultural organization of groups, is developed in considerable detail by A. F. C. Wallace, “The Psychic Unity of Groups,” in Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, 129-163.

b6A detailed statement of this perspective is presented in R. Bendix and B. Berger, “Images of Society and ’Problems of Con- cept Formation in Sociology.”

If the “social roles” of individuals provide opportunities for action as well as limit the available alternatives, it follows that in many societies the individual is able to engage in more or less continual attempts to redefine his roles . . . It is misleading to characterize the “status and role” of an individual or group in static terms because each is engaged in some strategy of argument and action designed to define their respective roles in a manner that appears advantageous to themselves (p. 107).

17R. Bendix, “Compliant Behaviour and Individual Personality.”

For example,

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Conclusion

as fear, apathy, or enthusiasm. But, if this is so, then those concerned over the conception of man in contemporary sociology may te misguided in turning to personality theory in order to secure an image of man as free and autonomous. Inkeles argues that personality theory is essential fm sound sociological theory because “all imtitutiollal arrangements are ultimately mediated through individual human ac- tion.”l* The statement is obviously true, but Meles’ infer- ence that “personality theory” is called for needs closer examination.

In another article, Inkeles refers to personality theory in a way which suggests that he may be using the term in a somewhat special sense. He stresses the great variation in those aspects of behaviour which are either emphasized or omitted in defining “personality” and recognizes three dis- tinct levels:

(1) Statements about personality “in depth” which entail characterological analysis such as the ‘‘anal character” in psychoanalysis.

(2) An intermediate level of statement about personality which has to do with the general orientation of the person- ality towards itself and towards cultural phenomena such as authority figures.

( 3 ) Idea systems of individuals which “are composed of the concrete, specific, and interrelated beliefs, attitudes, values, and sentiments which individuals directly express in speech and related behavio~r” .~~ Inkeles goes on to assert that the relation between the more “superficial” level (3) and the “core” of the personality (1) may vary widely. He concludes from this that individu- als need not m m i t their total personality in conforming to given role requirements. Thus a wide range of person- ality types may co-exist in any given scyciety. The degree d conpence or the range of diversity is an empirical ques- tion and, without doubt, would vary widely from case to C-.

One way to distinguish between personality at the level of character structure and the level more relevant for sociolo- gical analysis is demonstrated by Oscar Lewis in his distinc- tion between the “private personality” and the “public persondlity.” The former would be similar to the psycho- analytic conception of personality, while the latter would refer to that psychological dimension of behaviour reflect- ing the demands which conventional behaviour patterns in a particular culture make upon the emotions of the indi- viduaL20

18A. Inkela, “Personality and Social Structure”, 251.

19A. Inkeles, ‘‘Sxiological Observations on Culture and Personal- ity Studies,” in C . Kluckholh and H. A. Murray, eds., Personal- i t y in Nature, Society, and Culture (New York, 19531, 583-584.

aLife in a Mexican Village: Tepoztldn Restudied (Urbana, 1951), 422426. ,My source for this citation is R. Bendix, “Cumpliant

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Similar responses to social conventions do not necesard ‘ Y (or even typically) entail an identical motivational base in the psychic structure. The utilization of “depth” person- ality theory to account for compliant behaviour in complex societies both detracts attention from the distribution of power and other resouzy3es which may be employed to secure compliance and also tends toward an oversimplified concep tion of individual psychology.

Behaviour and Individual Personality,” 301. George Devereux has made a related distinction by contrasting the actual motiva- tions that occur in individuals in a particular group from the socially relevant motives which are imputed to individuals in the c o m e of complying with social expectations. “Two of Modal Personality Models,” in B. Kaplan, ed., Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, 227-241.

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