THE
QUARTERLY JOURNALOF ECONOMICS
Vol CXVII February 2002 Issue 1
THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
SIMEON DJANKOV
RAFAEL LA PORTA
FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES
ANDREI SHLEIFER
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up rms in 85countries The data cover the number of procedures ofcial time and ofcial costthat a start-up must bear before it can operate legally The ofcial costs of entryare extremely high in most countries Countries with heavier regulation of entryhave higher corruption and larger unofcial economies but not better quality ofpublic or private goods Countries with more democratic and limited governmentshave lighter regulation of entry The evidence is inconsistent with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice view that entry regulationbenets politicians and bureaucrats
I INTRODUCTION
Countries differ signicantly in the way in which they regu-late the entry of new businesses To meet government require-ments for starting to operate a business in Mozambique anentrepreneur must complete 19 procedures taking at least 149business days and pay US$256 in fees To do the same anentrepreneur in Italy needs to follow 16 different procedures payUS$3946 in fees and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the
We thank Tatiana Nenova Ekaterina Trizlova and Lihong Wang for ableresearch assistance and three anonymous referees Abhijit Banerjee RichardCaves Edward Glaeser Roumeen Islam Simon Johnson Lawrence Katz DavidLaibson Guy Pfeffermann and seminar participants at George Mason Universityand the University of Maryland at College Park for helpful comments Thecollection of data for this paper was nanced by the World Bankrsquos ResearchAdvisory Group and the World Development Report 2002 Building Institutionsfor Markets An appendix describing country data is available from the authors onrequest
copy 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnologyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics February 2002
1
necessary permits In contrast an entrepreneur in Canada cannish the process in two days by paying US$280 in fees andcompleting only two procedures
In this paper we describe the required procedures governingentry regulation as well as the time and the cost of followingthese procedures in 85 countries We focus on legal requirementsthat need to be met before a business can ofcially open its doorsthe ofcial cost of meeting these requirements and the minimumtime it takes to meet them if the government does not delay theprocess We then use these data to evaluate economic theories ofregulation Our work owes a great deal to De Sotorsquos [1990] path-breaking study of entry regulation in Peru Unlike De Soto welook at the ofcial requirements ofcial cost and ofcial timemdashand do not measure corruption and bureaucratic delays thatfurther raise the cost of entry
Pigoursquos [1938] public interest theory of regulation holds thatunregulated markets exhibit frequent failures ranging from mo-nopoly power to externalities A government that pursues socialefciency counters these failures and protects the public throughregulation As applied to entry this view holds that the govern-ment screens new entrants to make sure that consumers buy highquality products from ldquodesirablerdquo sellers Such regulation reducesmarket failures such as low quality products from y-by-nightoperators and externalities such as pollution It is ldquodone to ensurethat new companies meet minimum standards to provide a goodor service By being registered new companies acquire a type ofofcial approval which makes them reputable enough to engagein transactions with the general public and other businessesrdquo[SRI 1999 p 14] The public interest theory predicts that stricterregulation of entry as measured by a higher number of proce-dures in particular should be associated with socially superioroutcomes
The public choice theory [Tullock 1967 Stigler 1971 Peltz-man 1976] sees the government as less benign and regulation associally inefcient It comes in two avors In Stiglerrsquos [1971]theory of regulatory capture ldquoregulation is acquired by the in-dustry and is designed and operated primarily for its benetrdquoIndustry incumbents are able to acquire regulations that createrents for themselves since they typically face lower informationand organization costs than do the dispersed consumers In thistheory the regulation of entry keeps out the competitors andraises incumbentsrsquo prots Because stricter regulation raises bar-
2 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
riers to entry it should lead to greater market power and protsrather than benets to consumers
A second strand of the public choice theory which we call thetollbooth view holds that regulation is pursued for the benet ofpoliticians and bureaucrats [McChesney 1987 De Soto 1990Shleifer and Vishny 1998] Politicians use regulation both tocreate rents and to extract them through campaign contributionsvotes and bribes ldquoAn important reason why many of these per-mits and regulations exist is probably to give ofcials the power todeny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the per-mitsrdquo [Shleifer and Vishny 1993 p 601] The capture and toll-booth theories are closely related in that they both address rentcreation and extraction through the political process The capturetheory emphasizes the benets to the industry while the toll-booth theory stresses those to the politicians even when theindustry is left worse off by regulation
In principle the collection of bribes in exchange for releasefrom regulation can be efcient In effect the government canbecome an equity holder in a regulated rm In practice howeverthe creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians throughregulation is often inefcient in part because the regulators aredisorganized and in part because the policies they pursue toincrease the rents from corruption are distortionary The analogyto tollbooths on a highway is useful Efcient regulation may callfor one toll for the use of a road or even no tolls if the operationof the road is most efciently nanced through general tax reve-nues In a political equilibrium however each town throughwhich the road passes might be able to erect its own tollboothToll collectors may also block alternative routes so as to force thetrafc onto the toll road For both of these reasons political tollcollection is inefcient
In the tollbooth theory the regulation of entry enables theregulators to collect bribes from the potential entrants and servesno social purpose ldquoWhen someone has nally made the decisionto invest he then is subjected to some of the worst treatmentimaginable In a few cases this treatment consists of outrightextortion presenting the investor with insurmountable delays orrepeated obstacles unless he makes a large payoff rdquo [WorldBank 1999 p 10] More extensive regulation should be associatedwith socially inferior outcomes particularly corruption
We assess the regulation of entry around the world from theperspective of these theories by addressing two broad sets of
3THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
questions First what are the consequences of the regulation ofentry and in particular who gets the rents If the regulation ofentry serves the public interest it should be associated withhigher quality of goods fewer damaging externalities andgreater competition Public choice theory in contrast predictsthat stricter regulation is most clearly associated with less com-petition and higher corruption
A second question we examine to distinguish the alternativetheories of regulation is which governments regulate entry Thepublic interest model predicts that governments whose interestsare more closely aligned with those of the consumers which wethink of as the more representative and more limited govern-ments should ceteris paribus regulate entry more strictly Incontrast the public choice model predicts that the governmentsleast subject to popular oversight should pursue the strictestregulations to benet themselves and possibly the incumbentrms Knowing who regulates thus helps to discriminate amongthe theories
Our analysis of exhaustive data on entry regulation in 85countries leads to the following conclusions The number of pro-cedures required to start up a rm varies from the low of 2 inCanada to the high of 21 in the Dominican Republic with theworld average of around 10 The minimum ofcial time for such astart-up varies from the low of 2 business days in Australia andCanada to the high of 152 in Madagascar assuming that thereare no delays by either the applicant or the regulators with theworld average of 47 business days The ofcial cost of followingthese procedures for a simple rm ranges from under 05 percentof per capita GDP in the United States to over 46 times per capitaGDP in the Dominican Republic with the worldwide average of47 percent of annual per capita income For an entrepreneurlegal entry is extremely cumbersome time-consuming and ex-pensive in most countries in the world
In a cross section of countries we do not nd that stricterregulation of entry is associated with higher quality productsbetter pollution records or health outcomes or keener competi-tion But stricter regulation of entry is associated with sharplyhigher levels of corruption and a greater relative size of theunofcial economy This evidence favors public choice over thepublic interest theories of regulation
In response a public interest theorist could perhaps arguethat heavy regulation in some countries is a reection of both
4 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
signicant market failures and the unavailability of alternativemechanisms of addressing them such as good courts or freepress In addition corruption and a large unofcial economy maybe inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation and hencecannot be used as evidence against the public interest view Suchinadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screen-ing out bad entrants [Banerjee 1997 Acemoglu and Verdier2000] or simply as a result of a well-intended but misguidedtransplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries Be-cause of this logic the question of which countries regulate entrymore heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish thealternative theories
We nd that the countries with more open access to politicalpower greater constraints on the executive and greater politicalrights have less burdensome regulation of entrymdasheven control-ling for per capita incomemdashthan do the countries with less rep-resentative less limited and less free governments The percapita income control is crucial for this analysis because it couldbe argued that richer countries have both better governments anda lower need for the regulation of entry perhaps because theyhave fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealingwith them The fact that better governments regulate entry lessalong with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence oncorruption and the unofcial economy point to the tollbooththeory entry is regulated because doing so benets theregulators
The next section describes the sample Section III presentsour basic results on the extent of entry regulation around theworld Section IV asks who gets the rents from regulation SectionV presents the main results on which governments regulateSection VI concludes
II DATA
A Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set which describes theregulation of entry by start-up companies in 85 countries in 1999We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneurneeds to carry out to begin legally operating a rm involved inindustrial or commercial activity Specically we record all pro-cedures that are ofcially required of an entrepreneur in order to
5THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
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40
0049
001
6930
600
Nor
way
40
01
12
180
0472
011
9232
880
Un
ited
Kin
gdom
50
01
13
40
0143
003
0322
640
Hon
gK
ong
50
00
14
150
0333
009
3323
520
Mon
goli
a5
00
10
422
003
310
1211
350
Fin
land
50
01
31
240
0116
010
7623
780
Isra
el5
00
21
232
021
320
3412
158
60Zi
mba
bwe
50
02
12
470
1289
031
6952
0S
wed
en6
00
11
413
002
560
0776
250
40Ja
mai
ca6
00
21
324
018
790
2839
233
0Za
mbi
a6
00
21
329
060
490
7209
320
Pan
ama
70
01
15
150
3074
036
743
070
Sw
itze
rlan
d7
00
21
416
017
240
2364
383
50S
inga
pore
70
01
24
220
1191
020
7129
610
Lat
via
70
02
14
230
4234
051
542
470
Mal
aysi
a7
00
11
542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
Lan
ka8
00
11
623
019
720
2892
820
Net
herl
ands
80
12
05
310
1841
030
8124
320
Bel
gium
80
01
25
330
0998
023
1824
510
Tai
wan
Ch
ina
80
01
25
370
0660
021
4013
248
Hun
gary
80
01
16
390
8587
101
474
650
Pak
ista
n8
00
21
550
034
960
5496
470
Per
u8
00
22
483
019
860
5306
239
0S
outh
Afr
ica
90
02
25
260
0844
018
843
160
Kyr
gyz
Rep
ubli
c9
00
11
732
025
320
3812
300
Tha
ilan
d9
00
32
435
006
390
2039
196
0N
iger
ia9
01
21
536
257
002
7140
310
Aus
tria
90
02
16
370
2728
042
0825
970
Tun
isia
90
00
27
410
1722
033
622
100
Slo
veni
a9
00
01
847
021
030
3983
989
0L
eban
on9
00
11
763
156
721
8192
370
0U
rugu
ay10
00
14
523
049
490
5869
590
0B
ulga
ria
100
02
08
270
1441
025
211
380
Chi
le10
00
32
528
013
080
2428
474
0G
erm
any
100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
Gh
ana
100
11
44
450
2175
039
7539
0L
ith
uani
a10
20
21
546
005
460
2386
262
0C
zech
Rep
ubli
c10
00
12
765
008
220
3422
506
0In
dia
100
03
34
770
5776
088
5645
0Ja
pan
110
02
27
260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
nda
112
02
16
290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
Ara
bR
ep
110
02
18
510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
ya11
00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
enia
110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
0P
olan
d11
20
31
558
025
460
4866
396
0S
pain
110
04
25
820
1730
050
1014
000
Indo
nes
ia11
00
21
812
80
5379
104
9958
0C
roat
ia12
10
23
638
045
030
6023
458
0K
azak
hsta
n12
00
13
842
047
470
6427
123
0P
ortu
gal
120
02
28
760
1844
048
8410
600
Slo
vak
Rep
ubl
ic12
00
23
789
014
520
5012
359
0C
hina
120
05
25
920
1417
050
9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
ronm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
ngT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P19
99
Kor
ea
Rep
13
00
24
727
016
270
2707
849
0T
anza
nia
131
05
25
293
3520
346
8024
0U
krai
ne13
00
23
830
025
690
3769
750
Tur
key
130
02
29
440
1932
036
922
900
Mal
awi
135
21
14
520
1886
039
6619
0M
oroc
co13
10
33
657
021
260
4406
120
0G
eorg
ia13
20
11
969
060
480
8808
620
Bur
kina
Fas
o14
00
32
933
318
833
3203
240
Phi
lipp
ines
140
05
18
460
1897
037
371
020
Arg
enti
na14
00
45
548
010
190
2939
760
0Jo
rdan
141
02
110
640
5369
079
291
500
Ven
ezu
ela
141
13
36
104
010
600
5220
367
0G
reec
e15
00
42
936
058
600
7300
117
70F
ranc
e15
00
31
1153
014
300
3550
234
80B
razi
l15
00
75
363
020
140
4534
442
0M
exic
o15
12
23
767
056
640
8344
440
0M
ali
161
03
210
5924
0It
aly
160
05
38
620
2002
044
8219
710
Sen
egal
160
03
211
691
2331
150
9151
0E
cuad
or16
20
24
872
062
230
9103
131
0R
oman
ia16
12
13
997
015
310
5411
152
0V
ietn
am16
01
15
911
21
3377
178
5737
0M
adag
asca
r17
00
73
715
20
4263
103
4325
0C
olom
bia
182
04
57
480
1480
034
002
250
Moz
ambi
que
194
01
311
149
111
461
7106
230
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
200
02
513
570
1979
042
592
270
Bol
ivia
200
12
710
882
6558
300
781
010
Dom
inic
anR
epub
lic
210
02
316
804
6309
495
0919
1S
amp
leav
erag
e10
48
034
014
204
194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
necessary permits In contrast an entrepreneur in Canada cannish the process in two days by paying US$280 in fees andcompleting only two procedures
In this paper we describe the required procedures governingentry regulation as well as the time and the cost of followingthese procedures in 85 countries We focus on legal requirementsthat need to be met before a business can ofcially open its doorsthe ofcial cost of meeting these requirements and the minimumtime it takes to meet them if the government does not delay theprocess We then use these data to evaluate economic theories ofregulation Our work owes a great deal to De Sotorsquos [1990] path-breaking study of entry regulation in Peru Unlike De Soto welook at the ofcial requirements ofcial cost and ofcial timemdashand do not measure corruption and bureaucratic delays thatfurther raise the cost of entry
Pigoursquos [1938] public interest theory of regulation holds thatunregulated markets exhibit frequent failures ranging from mo-nopoly power to externalities A government that pursues socialefciency counters these failures and protects the public throughregulation As applied to entry this view holds that the govern-ment screens new entrants to make sure that consumers buy highquality products from ldquodesirablerdquo sellers Such regulation reducesmarket failures such as low quality products from y-by-nightoperators and externalities such as pollution It is ldquodone to ensurethat new companies meet minimum standards to provide a goodor service By being registered new companies acquire a type ofofcial approval which makes them reputable enough to engagein transactions with the general public and other businessesrdquo[SRI 1999 p 14] The public interest theory predicts that stricterregulation of entry as measured by a higher number of proce-dures in particular should be associated with socially superioroutcomes
The public choice theory [Tullock 1967 Stigler 1971 Peltz-man 1976] sees the government as less benign and regulation associally inefcient It comes in two avors In Stiglerrsquos [1971]theory of regulatory capture ldquoregulation is acquired by the in-dustry and is designed and operated primarily for its benetrdquoIndustry incumbents are able to acquire regulations that createrents for themselves since they typically face lower informationand organization costs than do the dispersed consumers In thistheory the regulation of entry keeps out the competitors andraises incumbentsrsquo prots Because stricter regulation raises bar-
2 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
riers to entry it should lead to greater market power and protsrather than benets to consumers
A second strand of the public choice theory which we call thetollbooth view holds that regulation is pursued for the benet ofpoliticians and bureaucrats [McChesney 1987 De Soto 1990Shleifer and Vishny 1998] Politicians use regulation both tocreate rents and to extract them through campaign contributionsvotes and bribes ldquoAn important reason why many of these per-mits and regulations exist is probably to give ofcials the power todeny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the per-mitsrdquo [Shleifer and Vishny 1993 p 601] The capture and toll-booth theories are closely related in that they both address rentcreation and extraction through the political process The capturetheory emphasizes the benets to the industry while the toll-booth theory stresses those to the politicians even when theindustry is left worse off by regulation
In principle the collection of bribes in exchange for releasefrom regulation can be efcient In effect the government canbecome an equity holder in a regulated rm In practice howeverthe creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians throughregulation is often inefcient in part because the regulators aredisorganized and in part because the policies they pursue toincrease the rents from corruption are distortionary The analogyto tollbooths on a highway is useful Efcient regulation may callfor one toll for the use of a road or even no tolls if the operationof the road is most efciently nanced through general tax reve-nues In a political equilibrium however each town throughwhich the road passes might be able to erect its own tollboothToll collectors may also block alternative routes so as to force thetrafc onto the toll road For both of these reasons political tollcollection is inefcient
In the tollbooth theory the regulation of entry enables theregulators to collect bribes from the potential entrants and servesno social purpose ldquoWhen someone has nally made the decisionto invest he then is subjected to some of the worst treatmentimaginable In a few cases this treatment consists of outrightextortion presenting the investor with insurmountable delays orrepeated obstacles unless he makes a large payoff rdquo [WorldBank 1999 p 10] More extensive regulation should be associatedwith socially inferior outcomes particularly corruption
We assess the regulation of entry around the world from theperspective of these theories by addressing two broad sets of
3THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
questions First what are the consequences of the regulation ofentry and in particular who gets the rents If the regulation ofentry serves the public interest it should be associated withhigher quality of goods fewer damaging externalities andgreater competition Public choice theory in contrast predictsthat stricter regulation is most clearly associated with less com-petition and higher corruption
A second question we examine to distinguish the alternativetheories of regulation is which governments regulate entry Thepublic interest model predicts that governments whose interestsare more closely aligned with those of the consumers which wethink of as the more representative and more limited govern-ments should ceteris paribus regulate entry more strictly Incontrast the public choice model predicts that the governmentsleast subject to popular oversight should pursue the strictestregulations to benet themselves and possibly the incumbentrms Knowing who regulates thus helps to discriminate amongthe theories
Our analysis of exhaustive data on entry regulation in 85countries leads to the following conclusions The number of pro-cedures required to start up a rm varies from the low of 2 inCanada to the high of 21 in the Dominican Republic with theworld average of around 10 The minimum ofcial time for such astart-up varies from the low of 2 business days in Australia andCanada to the high of 152 in Madagascar assuming that thereare no delays by either the applicant or the regulators with theworld average of 47 business days The ofcial cost of followingthese procedures for a simple rm ranges from under 05 percentof per capita GDP in the United States to over 46 times per capitaGDP in the Dominican Republic with the worldwide average of47 percent of annual per capita income For an entrepreneurlegal entry is extremely cumbersome time-consuming and ex-pensive in most countries in the world
In a cross section of countries we do not nd that stricterregulation of entry is associated with higher quality productsbetter pollution records or health outcomes or keener competi-tion But stricter regulation of entry is associated with sharplyhigher levels of corruption and a greater relative size of theunofcial economy This evidence favors public choice over thepublic interest theories of regulation
In response a public interest theorist could perhaps arguethat heavy regulation in some countries is a reection of both
4 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
signicant market failures and the unavailability of alternativemechanisms of addressing them such as good courts or freepress In addition corruption and a large unofcial economy maybe inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation and hencecannot be used as evidence against the public interest view Suchinadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screen-ing out bad entrants [Banerjee 1997 Acemoglu and Verdier2000] or simply as a result of a well-intended but misguidedtransplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries Be-cause of this logic the question of which countries regulate entrymore heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish thealternative theories
We nd that the countries with more open access to politicalpower greater constraints on the executive and greater politicalrights have less burdensome regulation of entrymdasheven control-ling for per capita incomemdashthan do the countries with less rep-resentative less limited and less free governments The percapita income control is crucial for this analysis because it couldbe argued that richer countries have both better governments anda lower need for the regulation of entry perhaps because theyhave fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealingwith them The fact that better governments regulate entry lessalong with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence oncorruption and the unofcial economy point to the tollbooththeory entry is regulated because doing so benets theregulators
The next section describes the sample Section III presentsour basic results on the extent of entry regulation around theworld Section IV asks who gets the rents from regulation SectionV presents the main results on which governments regulateSection VI concludes
II DATA
A Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set which describes theregulation of entry by start-up companies in 85 countries in 1999We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneurneeds to carry out to begin legally operating a rm involved inindustrial or commercial activity Specically we record all pro-cedures that are ofcially required of an entrepreneur in order to
5THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hin
orde
rto
obta
ina
regi
stra
tion
cert
ica
teth
atar
eno
tas
soci
ated
wit
hsa
fety
and
heal
this
sues
the
envi
ronm
ent
taxe
sor
labo
rS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
toob
tain
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
has
ve
busi
ness
days
and
am
onth
has
twen
ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
srsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Cos
tT
he
cost
ofob
tain
ing
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
iden
tia
ble
ofc
ial
expe
nses
(fee
sco
sts
ofpr
oced
ures
and
form
sph
otoc
opie
ss
cal
stam
psl
egal
and
nota
rych
arge
set
c)
The
com
pan
yis
assu
med
toh
ave
ast
art-
up
capi
tal
ofte
nti
mes
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99S
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ions
C
ost
1ti
me
Th
eco
stof
obta
inin
gle
gal
stat
usto
oper
ate
ar
mas
ash
are
ofpe
rca
pita
GD
Pin
1999
It
incl
ude
sal
lid
enti
abl
eof
cia
lex
pens
es(f
ees
cost
sof
proc
edur
esan
dfo
rms
phot
ocop
ies
sca
lst
amps
leg
alan
dno
tary
char
ges
etc
)as
wel
las
the
mon
etiz
edva
lue
ofth
een
trep
rene
urrsquo
sti
me
The
tim
eof
the
entr
epre
neu
ris
valu
edas
the
prod
uct
ofti
me
and
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99ex
pres
sed
inpe
rbu
sine
ssda
yte
rms
The
com
pan
yis
assu
med
toh
ave
ast
art-
upca
pita
lof
ten
tim
esth
eG
DP
per
capi
tale
vel
in19
99S
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sG
DP
PO
P1
999
Gro
ssdo
mes
tic
prod
uct
per
capi
tain
curr
ent
US
dol
lars
in19
99S
ourc
eW
orld
Ban
k[2
001]
Q
ual
ity
stan
dard
sN
umbe
rof
ISO
9000
cert
ica
tion
spe
rth
ousa
ndin
habi
tan
tsis
sued
byth
eIn
tern
atio
nal
Org
aniz
atio
nfo
rS
tand
ardi
zati
onas
of19
99to
each
cou
ntry
inth
esa
mpl
eldquoI
SO
stan
dard
sre
pres
ent
anin
tern
atio
nal
cons
ensu
son
the
stat
eof
the
art
inth
ete
chno
logy
conc
erne
d
IS
O90
00is
prim
aril
yco
nce
rned
wit
hqu
alit
ym
anag
emen
t
IS
Ode
velo
psvo
lunt
ary
tech
nica
lst
anda
rds
that
cont
ribu
teto
mak
ing
the
deve
lopm
ent
man
ufac
turi
ngan
dsu
pply
ofpr
odu
cts
and
serv
ices
mor
eef
cie
nt
safe
ran
dcl
eane
r
ISO
stan
dard
sal
sose
rve
tosa
fegu
ard
cons
umer
s
Whe
nan
orga
niz
atio
nh
asa
man
agem
ent
syst
emce
rti
edto
anIS
O90
00
th
ism
eans
that
the
proc
ess
inu
enci
ng
qual
ity
(IS
O90
00)
co
nfor
ms
toth
ere
leva
ntst
anda
rdrsquos
requ
irem
ents
rdquoS
ourc
eIn
tern
atio
nal
Org
aniz
atio
nfo
rS
tand
ardi
zati
on(w
ww
iso
ch
)W
ater
poll
utio
nE
mis
sion
sof
orga
nic
wat
erpo
llut
ants
(kil
ogra
ms
per
day
per
wor
ker)
for
1998
Mea
sure
din
term
sof
bioc
hem
ical
oxyg
ende
man
dw
hich
refe
rsto
the
amou
ntof
oxyg
enth
atba
cter
iain
wat
erw
ill
cons
ume
inbr
eaki
ng
dow
nw
aste
Em
issi
ons
per
wor
ker
are
tota
lem
issi
ons
divi
ded
byth
en
umbe
rof
indu
stri
alw
orke
rsS
ourc
eW
orld
Ban
k[2
001]
16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
ths
from
acci
dent
alpo
ison
ing
Log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
deat
hs
cau
sed
byac
cide
ntal
pois
onin
gs(i
nclu
din
gby
drug
sm
edic
atio
nsb
io-p
rodu
cts
soli
dan
dliq
uid
subs
tanc
es
gase
san
dva
pors
)pe
rm
illi
onin
habi
tan
tsA
vera
geof
the
year
s19
81th
roug
h19
94(t
hem
ost
rece
ntav
aila
ble
gur
e)
Sour
ceT
henu
mbe
rof
acci
dent
alde
aths
from
pois
onin
gis
take
nfr
omW
orld
Hea
lth
Org
aniz
atio
n[1
998]
P
opul
atio
ng
ures
are
take
nfr
omW
orld
Ban
k[2
001]
D
eath
sfr
omin
test
inal
infe
ctio
ns
Log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
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hs
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sed
byin
test
inal
infe
ctio
ns(i
nclu
din
gdi
gest
ive
diso
rder
s)pe
rm
illio
nin
habi
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tsA
vera
geof
the
year
s19
81th
roug
h19
94(t
hem
ost
rece
ntav
aila
ble
gu
re)
Sour
ceT
henu
mbe
rof
deat
hsfr
omin
test
inal
infe
ctio
nsis
take
nfr
omW
orld
Hea
lth
Org
aniz
atio
n[1
998]
P
opul
atio
n
gure
sar
eta
ken
from
Wor
ldB
ank
[200
1]
Siz
eof
the
uno
fci
alec
onom
yS
ize
ofth
esh
adow
econ
omy
asa
perc
enta
geof
GD
P(v
aryi
ngti
me
peri
ods)
Sou
rce
Aut
hor
srsquoow
nco
mpu
tati
ons
base
don
aver
agin
gov
eral
les
tim
ates
repo
rted
inS
chne
ider
and
Ens
te[2
000]
for
any
give
nco
unt
ryas
wel
las
San
anik
one
[199
6]fo
rB
urki
naF
aso
Ch
idze
ro[1
996]
for
Sen
egal
Tu
rnha
man
dS
chw
artz
[199
0]fo
rIn
don
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and
Pak
ista
na
ndK
asna
kogl
uan
dY
ayla
[200
0]fo
rT
urk
ey
Em
ploy
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tin
the
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fci
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eem
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edin
the
unof
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lec
onom
yin
the
capi
tal
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ofea
chco
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yas
ape
rcen
tof
the
ofc
ial
labo
rF
igur
esar
eba
sed
onsu
rvey
san
dfo
rso
me
coun
trie
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omet
ric
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mat
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eS
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ider
[200
0]an
dth
eG
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lU
rban
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cato
rsD
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ase
[200
0](w
ww
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anob
serv
ator
yor
gin
dic
ator
sda
taba
se)
Pro
duct
mar
ket
com
peti
tion
Sur
vey
mea
sure
ofth
eex
ten
tto
whi
chre
spon
dent
sag
ree
wit
hth
efo
llow
ing
stat
emen
tldquoC
ompe
titi
onin
the
loca
lm
arke
tis
inte
nse
and
mar
ket
shar
esu
ctua
teco
nsta
ntl
yrdquo
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urop
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[200
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Dat
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Ave
rage
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1972
thro
ugh
1998
Sou
rce
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001]
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egal
orig
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[199
8]
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1]
17THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
IT
HE
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TA
Pan
elA
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rts
the
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proc
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(5)
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sore
port
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eti
me
dire
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st(a
sa
frac
tion
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
)as
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ated
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men
tre
quir
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and
dire
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us
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edva
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urrsquos
tim
e(a
sa
frac
tion
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DP
per
capi
tain
1999
)as
wel
las
the
leve
lof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
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sin
1999
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ntr
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are
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edin
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onth
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me
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(3)
cost
P
anel
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eans
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eva
riab
les
byqu
arti
les
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
P
anel
Cpr
esen
tst-
stat
isti
csfo
rdi
ffer
ence
sin
mea
ns
acro
ssqu
arti
les
ofpe
rca
pita
GD
Pin
1999
T
able
IIde
scri
bes
the
vari
able
sin
deta
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Num
ber
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ime
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ata
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0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
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Net
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9659
116
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7230
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19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
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Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
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GD
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99
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Rep
13
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8024
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krai
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Tur
key
130
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135
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161
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160
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2002
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Sen
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160
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oman
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200
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inic
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210
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226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
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Ppe
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in19
99
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243
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ile
111
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1949
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Qua
rtil
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at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
riers to entry it should lead to greater market power and protsrather than benets to consumers
A second strand of the public choice theory which we call thetollbooth view holds that regulation is pursued for the benet ofpoliticians and bureaucrats [McChesney 1987 De Soto 1990Shleifer and Vishny 1998] Politicians use regulation both tocreate rents and to extract them through campaign contributionsvotes and bribes ldquoAn important reason why many of these per-mits and regulations exist is probably to give ofcials the power todeny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the per-mitsrdquo [Shleifer and Vishny 1993 p 601] The capture and toll-booth theories are closely related in that they both address rentcreation and extraction through the political process The capturetheory emphasizes the benets to the industry while the toll-booth theory stresses those to the politicians even when theindustry is left worse off by regulation
In principle the collection of bribes in exchange for releasefrom regulation can be efcient In effect the government canbecome an equity holder in a regulated rm In practice howeverthe creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians throughregulation is often inefcient in part because the regulators aredisorganized and in part because the policies they pursue toincrease the rents from corruption are distortionary The analogyto tollbooths on a highway is useful Efcient regulation may callfor one toll for the use of a road or even no tolls if the operationof the road is most efciently nanced through general tax reve-nues In a political equilibrium however each town throughwhich the road passes might be able to erect its own tollboothToll collectors may also block alternative routes so as to force thetrafc onto the toll road For both of these reasons political tollcollection is inefcient
In the tollbooth theory the regulation of entry enables theregulators to collect bribes from the potential entrants and servesno social purpose ldquoWhen someone has nally made the decisionto invest he then is subjected to some of the worst treatmentimaginable In a few cases this treatment consists of outrightextortion presenting the investor with insurmountable delays orrepeated obstacles unless he makes a large payoff rdquo [WorldBank 1999 p 10] More extensive regulation should be associatedwith socially inferior outcomes particularly corruption
We assess the regulation of entry around the world from theperspective of these theories by addressing two broad sets of
3THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
questions First what are the consequences of the regulation ofentry and in particular who gets the rents If the regulation ofentry serves the public interest it should be associated withhigher quality of goods fewer damaging externalities andgreater competition Public choice theory in contrast predictsthat stricter regulation is most clearly associated with less com-petition and higher corruption
A second question we examine to distinguish the alternativetheories of regulation is which governments regulate entry Thepublic interest model predicts that governments whose interestsare more closely aligned with those of the consumers which wethink of as the more representative and more limited govern-ments should ceteris paribus regulate entry more strictly Incontrast the public choice model predicts that the governmentsleast subject to popular oversight should pursue the strictestregulations to benet themselves and possibly the incumbentrms Knowing who regulates thus helps to discriminate amongthe theories
Our analysis of exhaustive data on entry regulation in 85countries leads to the following conclusions The number of pro-cedures required to start up a rm varies from the low of 2 inCanada to the high of 21 in the Dominican Republic with theworld average of around 10 The minimum ofcial time for such astart-up varies from the low of 2 business days in Australia andCanada to the high of 152 in Madagascar assuming that thereare no delays by either the applicant or the regulators with theworld average of 47 business days The ofcial cost of followingthese procedures for a simple rm ranges from under 05 percentof per capita GDP in the United States to over 46 times per capitaGDP in the Dominican Republic with the worldwide average of47 percent of annual per capita income For an entrepreneurlegal entry is extremely cumbersome time-consuming and ex-pensive in most countries in the world
In a cross section of countries we do not nd that stricterregulation of entry is associated with higher quality productsbetter pollution records or health outcomes or keener competi-tion But stricter regulation of entry is associated with sharplyhigher levels of corruption and a greater relative size of theunofcial economy This evidence favors public choice over thepublic interest theories of regulation
In response a public interest theorist could perhaps arguethat heavy regulation in some countries is a reection of both
4 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
signicant market failures and the unavailability of alternativemechanisms of addressing them such as good courts or freepress In addition corruption and a large unofcial economy maybe inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation and hencecannot be used as evidence against the public interest view Suchinadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screen-ing out bad entrants [Banerjee 1997 Acemoglu and Verdier2000] or simply as a result of a well-intended but misguidedtransplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries Be-cause of this logic the question of which countries regulate entrymore heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish thealternative theories
We nd that the countries with more open access to politicalpower greater constraints on the executive and greater politicalrights have less burdensome regulation of entrymdasheven control-ling for per capita incomemdashthan do the countries with less rep-resentative less limited and less free governments The percapita income control is crucial for this analysis because it couldbe argued that richer countries have both better governments anda lower need for the regulation of entry perhaps because theyhave fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealingwith them The fact that better governments regulate entry lessalong with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence oncorruption and the unofcial economy point to the tollbooththeory entry is regulated because doing so benets theregulators
The next section describes the sample Section III presentsour basic results on the extent of entry regulation around theworld Section IV asks who gets the rents from regulation SectionV presents the main results on which governments regulateSection VI concludes
II DATA
A Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set which describes theregulation of entry by start-up companies in 85 countries in 1999We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneurneeds to carry out to begin legally operating a rm involved inindustrial or commercial activity Specically we record all pro-cedures that are ofcially required of an entrepreneur in order to
5THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hin
orde
rto
obta
ina
regi
stra
tion
cert
ica
teth
atar
eno
tas
soci
ated
wit
hsa
fety
and
heal
this
sues
the
envi
ronm
ent
taxe
sor
labo
rS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ion
sT
ime
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2364
383
50S
inga
pore
70
01
24
220
1191
020
7129
610
Lat
via
70
02
14
230
4234
051
542
470
Mal
aysi
a7
00
11
542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
Lan
ka8
00
11
623
019
720
2892
820
Net
herl
ands
80
12
05
310
1841
030
8124
320
Bel
gium
80
01
25
330
0998
023
1824
510
Tai
wan
Ch
ina
80
01
25
370
0660
021
4013
248
Hun
gary
80
01
16
390
8587
101
474
650
Pak
ista
n8
00
21
550
034
960
5496
470
Per
u8
00
22
483
019
860
5306
239
0S
outh
Afr
ica
90
02
25
260
0844
018
843
160
Kyr
gyz
Rep
ubli
c9
00
11
732
025
320
3812
300
Tha
ilan
d9
00
32
435
006
390
2039
196
0N
iger
ia9
01
21
536
257
002
7140
310
Aus
tria
90
02
16
370
2728
042
0825
970
Tun
isia
90
00
27
410
1722
033
622
100
Slo
veni
a9
00
01
847
021
030
3983
989
0L
eban
on9
00
11
763
156
721
8192
370
0U
rugu
ay10
00
14
523
049
490
5869
590
0B
ulga
ria
100
02
08
270
1441
025
211
380
Chi
le10
00
32
528
013
080
2428
474
0G
erm
any
100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
Gh
ana
100
11
44
450
2175
039
7539
0L
ith
uani
a10
20
21
546
005
460
2386
262
0C
zech
Rep
ubli
c10
00
12
765
008
220
3422
506
0In
dia
100
03
34
770
5776
088
5645
0Ja
pan
110
02
27
260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
nda
112
02
16
290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
Ara
bR
ep
110
02
18
510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
ya11
00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
enia
110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
0P
olan
d11
20
31
558
025
460
4866
396
0S
pain
110
04
25
820
1730
050
1014
000
Indo
nes
ia11
00
21
812
80
5379
104
9958
0C
roat
ia12
10
23
638
045
030
6023
458
0K
azak
hsta
n12
00
13
842
047
470
6427
123
0P
ortu
gal
120
02
28
760
1844
048
8410
600
Slo
vak
Rep
ubl
ic12
00
23
789
014
520
5012
359
0C
hina
120
05
25
920
1417
050
9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
ronm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
ngT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P19
99
Kor
ea
Rep
13
00
24
727
016
270
2707
849
0T
anza
nia
131
05
25
293
3520
346
8024
0U
krai
ne13
00
23
830
025
690
3769
750
Tur
key
130
02
29
440
1932
036
922
900
Mal
awi
135
21
14
520
1886
039
6619
0M
oroc
co13
10
33
657
021
260
4406
120
0G
eorg
ia13
20
11
969
060
480
8808
620
Bur
kina
Fas
o14
00
32
933
318
833
3203
240
Phi
lipp
ines
140
05
18
460
1897
037
371
020
Arg
enti
na14
00
45
548
010
190
2939
760
0Jo
rdan
141
02
110
640
5369
079
291
500
Ven
ezu
ela
141
13
36
104
010
600
5220
367
0G
reec
e15
00
42
936
058
600
7300
117
70F
ranc
e15
00
31
1153
014
300
3550
234
80B
razi
l15
00
75
363
020
140
4534
442
0M
exic
o15
12
23
767
056
640
8344
440
0M
ali
161
03
210
5924
0It
aly
160
05
38
620
2002
044
8219
710
Sen
egal
160
03
211
691
2331
150
9151
0E
cuad
or16
20
24
872
062
230
9103
131
0R
oman
ia16
12
13
997
015
310
5411
152
0V
ietn
am16
01
15
911
21
3377
178
5737
0M
adag
asca
r17
00
73
715
20
4263
103
4325
0C
olom
bia
182
04
57
480
1480
034
002
250
Moz
ambi
que
194
01
311
149
111
461
7106
230
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
200
02
513
570
1979
042
592
270
Bol
ivia
200
12
710
882
6558
300
781
010
Dom
inic
anR
epub
lic
210
02
316
804
6309
495
0919
1S
amp
leav
erag
e10
48
034
014
204
194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
questions First what are the consequences of the regulation ofentry and in particular who gets the rents If the regulation ofentry serves the public interest it should be associated withhigher quality of goods fewer damaging externalities andgreater competition Public choice theory in contrast predictsthat stricter regulation is most clearly associated with less com-petition and higher corruption
A second question we examine to distinguish the alternativetheories of regulation is which governments regulate entry Thepublic interest model predicts that governments whose interestsare more closely aligned with those of the consumers which wethink of as the more representative and more limited govern-ments should ceteris paribus regulate entry more strictly Incontrast the public choice model predicts that the governmentsleast subject to popular oversight should pursue the strictestregulations to benet themselves and possibly the incumbentrms Knowing who regulates thus helps to discriminate amongthe theories
Our analysis of exhaustive data on entry regulation in 85countries leads to the following conclusions The number of pro-cedures required to start up a rm varies from the low of 2 inCanada to the high of 21 in the Dominican Republic with theworld average of around 10 The minimum ofcial time for such astart-up varies from the low of 2 business days in Australia andCanada to the high of 152 in Madagascar assuming that thereare no delays by either the applicant or the regulators with theworld average of 47 business days The ofcial cost of followingthese procedures for a simple rm ranges from under 05 percentof per capita GDP in the United States to over 46 times per capitaGDP in the Dominican Republic with the worldwide average of47 percent of annual per capita income For an entrepreneurlegal entry is extremely cumbersome time-consuming and ex-pensive in most countries in the world
In a cross section of countries we do not nd that stricterregulation of entry is associated with higher quality productsbetter pollution records or health outcomes or keener competi-tion But stricter regulation of entry is associated with sharplyhigher levels of corruption and a greater relative size of theunofcial economy This evidence favors public choice over thepublic interest theories of regulation
In response a public interest theorist could perhaps arguethat heavy regulation in some countries is a reection of both
4 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
signicant market failures and the unavailability of alternativemechanisms of addressing them such as good courts or freepress In addition corruption and a large unofcial economy maybe inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation and hencecannot be used as evidence against the public interest view Suchinadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screen-ing out bad entrants [Banerjee 1997 Acemoglu and Verdier2000] or simply as a result of a well-intended but misguidedtransplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries Be-cause of this logic the question of which countries regulate entrymore heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish thealternative theories
We nd that the countries with more open access to politicalpower greater constraints on the executive and greater politicalrights have less burdensome regulation of entrymdasheven control-ling for per capita incomemdashthan do the countries with less rep-resentative less limited and less free governments The percapita income control is crucial for this analysis because it couldbe argued that richer countries have both better governments anda lower need for the regulation of entry perhaps because theyhave fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealingwith them The fact that better governments regulate entry lessalong with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence oncorruption and the unofcial economy point to the tollbooththeory entry is regulated because doing so benets theregulators
The next section describes the sample Section III presentsour basic results on the extent of entry regulation around theworld Section IV asks who gets the rents from regulation SectionV presents the main results on which governments regulateSection VI concludes
II DATA
A Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set which describes theregulation of entry by start-up companies in 85 countries in 1999We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneurneeds to carry out to begin legally operating a rm involved inindustrial or commercial activity Specically we record all pro-cedures that are ofcially required of an entrepreneur in order to
5THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
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hin
orde
rto
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stra
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ica
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atar
eno
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ated
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hsa
fety
and
heal
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the
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ronm
ent
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sor
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rS
ourc
eA
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rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
toob
tain
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
has
ve
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ness
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am
onth
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twen
ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
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lcul
atio
ns
Cos
tT
he
cost
ofob
tain
ing
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
iden
tia
ble
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ial
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nses
(fee
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sts
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ures
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pan
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uth
orsrsquo
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ulat
ions
C
ost
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me
Th
eco
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gle
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usto
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rca
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GD
Pin
1999
It
incl
ude
sal
lid
enti
abl
eof
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lex
pens
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ees
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edur
esan
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phot
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lst
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alan
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edva
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rene
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me
The
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eof
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epre
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uct
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me
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rbu
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pan
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med
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eG
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99S
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eA
uth
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ula
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ual
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rS
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eof
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ym
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ater
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k[2
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16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
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Log
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hem
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omW
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lth
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998]
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Wor
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ank
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rce
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llow
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tldquoC
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lm
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ket
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99
Cor
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Th
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(1)
Fre
edom
Hou
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Tra
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)(2
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allu
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tern
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(GI)
(3)
the
Eco
nom
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Inte
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(4)
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Des
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pure
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[200
0]
Con
stra
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Ave
rage
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1945
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Sou
rce
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[200
1]
Eff
ecti
vene
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Inde
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rage
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17THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
IT
HE
DA
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Pan
elA
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rts
the
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tain
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anel
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stat
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mea
ns
acro
ssqu
arti
les
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rca
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GD
Pin
1999
T
able
IIde
scri
bes
the
vari
able
sin
deta
il
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvir
onm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scre
enin
gT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P1
999
Pan
elA
D
ata
Can
ada
20
01
01
20
0145
002
2519
320
Aus
tral
ia2
00
10
12
002
250
0305
200
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ewZe
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00
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23
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530
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ark
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2032
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Irel
and
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9719
160
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ited
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tes
40
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6930
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40
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180
0472
011
9232
880
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ited
Kin
gdom
50
01
13
40
0143
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0322
640
Hon
gK
ong
50
00
14
150
0333
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3323
520
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00
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310
1211
350
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50
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7623
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158
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50
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mai
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2839
233
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490
7209
320
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00
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416
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2364
383
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70
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1191
020
7129
610
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70
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4234
051
542
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Mal
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a7
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542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
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00
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623
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720
2892
820
Net
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80
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8124
320
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80
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330
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80
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248
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8587
101
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2039
196
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7140
310
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590
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1441
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211
380
Chi
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00
32
528
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080
2428
474
0G
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100
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420
1569
032
4925
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100
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2175
039
7539
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20
21
546
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2386
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5645
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110
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1161
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0132
230
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110
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510
9659
116
991
400
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00
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654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
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110
01
19
550
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034
6749
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6427
123
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760
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0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
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Saf
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8024
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135
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240
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140
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161
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2002
044
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Sen
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160
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20
24
872
062
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9103
131
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12
13
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103
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0C
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182
04
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1480
034
002
250
Moz
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194
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311
149
111
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7106
230
Rus
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200
02
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1979
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592
270
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200
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300
781
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inic
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210
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316
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6309
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0919
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amp
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48
034
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204
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604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
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sof
GD
Ppe
rca
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in19
99
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ile6
770
000
051
591
144
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243
722n
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ile
111
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142
142
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1949
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76
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Pan
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24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
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71a
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97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
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458
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087
21
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82a
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54b
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19a
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612
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172
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14a
2nd
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ile
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at10
perc
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21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
signicant market failures and the unavailability of alternativemechanisms of addressing them such as good courts or freepress In addition corruption and a large unofcial economy maybe inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation and hencecannot be used as evidence against the public interest view Suchinadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screen-ing out bad entrants [Banerjee 1997 Acemoglu and Verdier2000] or simply as a result of a well-intended but misguidedtransplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries Be-cause of this logic the question of which countries regulate entrymore heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish thealternative theories
We nd that the countries with more open access to politicalpower greater constraints on the executive and greater politicalrights have less burdensome regulation of entrymdasheven control-ling for per capita incomemdashthan do the countries with less rep-resentative less limited and less free governments The percapita income control is crucial for this analysis because it couldbe argued that richer countries have both better governments anda lower need for the regulation of entry perhaps because theyhave fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealingwith them The fact that better governments regulate entry lessalong with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence oncorruption and the unofcial economy point to the tollbooththeory entry is regulated because doing so benets theregulators
The next section describes the sample Section III presentsour basic results on the extent of entry regulation around theworld Section IV asks who gets the rents from regulation SectionV presents the main results on which governments regulateSection VI concludes
II DATA
A Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set which describes theregulation of entry by start-up companies in 85 countries in 1999We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneurneeds to carry out to begin legally operating a rm involved inindustrial or commercial activity Specically we record all pro-cedures that are ofcially required of an entrepreneur in order to
5THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
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t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hin
orde
rto
obta
ina
regi
stra
tion
cert
ica
teth
atar
eno
tas
soci
ated
wit
hsa
fety
and
heal
this
sues
the
envi
ronm
ent
taxe
sor
labo
rS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
toob
tain
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
has
ve
busi
ness
days
and
am
onth
has
twen
ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
srsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Cos
tT
he
cost
ofob
tain
ing
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
iden
tia
ble
ofc
ial
expe
nses
(fee
sco
sts
ofpr
oced
ures
and
form
sph
otoc
opie
ss
cal
stam
psl
egal
and
nota
rych
arge
set
c)
The
com
pan
yis
assu
med
toh
ave
ast
art-
up
capi
tal
ofte
nti
mes
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99S
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ions
C
ost
1ti
me
Th
eco
stof
obta
inin
gle
gal
stat
usto
oper
ate
ar
mas
ash
are
ofpe
rca
pita
GD
Pin
1999
It
incl
ude
sal
lid
enti
abl
eof
cia
lex
pens
es(f
ees
cost
sof
proc
edur
esan
dfo
rms
phot
ocop
ies
sca
lst
amps
leg
alan
dno
tary
char
ges
etc
)as
wel
las
the
mon
etiz
edva
lue
ofth
een
trep
rene
urrsquo
sti
me
The
tim
eof
the
entr
epre
neu
ris
valu
edas
the
prod
uct
ofti
me
and
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99ex
pres
sed
inpe
rbu
sine
ssda
yte
rms
The
com
pan
yis
assu
med
toh
ave
ast
art-
upca
pita
lof
ten
tim
esth
eG
DP
per
capi
tale
vel
in19
99S
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sG
DP
PO
P1
999
Gro
ssdo
mes
tic
prod
uct
per
capi
tain
curr
ent
US
dol
lars
in19
99S
ourc
eW
orld
Ban
k[2
001]
Q
ual
ity
stan
dard
sN
umbe
rof
ISO
9000
cert
ica
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rth
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ndin
habi
tan
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sued
byth
eIn
tern
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nal
Org
aniz
atio
nfo
rS
tand
ardi
zati
onas
of19
99to
each
cou
ntry
inth
esa
mpl
eldquoI
SO
stan
dard
sre
pres
ent
anin
tern
atio
nal
cons
ensu
son
the
stat
eof
the
art
inth
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chno
logy
conc
erne
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IS
O90
00is
prim
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nce
rned
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hqu
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ym
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emen
t
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Ode
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ribu
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ing
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cts
and
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ices
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r
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dard
sal
sose
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tosa
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ard
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umer
s
Whe
nan
orga
niz
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nh
asa
man
agem
ent
syst
emce
rti
edto
anIS
O90
00
th
ism
eans
that
the
proc
ess
inu
enci
ng
qual
ity
(IS
O90
00)
co
nfor
ms
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ere
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ntst
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requ
irem
ents
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eIn
tern
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nal
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aniz
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rS
tand
ardi
zati
on(w
ww
iso
ch
)W
ater
poll
utio
nE
mis
sion
sof
orga
nic
wat
erpo
llut
ants
(kil
ogra
ms
per
day
per
wor
ker)
for
1998
Mea
sure
din
term
sof
bioc
hem
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oxyg
ende
man
dw
hich
refe
rsto
the
amou
ntof
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cter
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cons
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ng
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aste
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ker
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ded
byth
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umbe
rof
indu
stri
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orke
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ourc
eW
orld
Ban
k[2
001]
16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
ths
from
acci
dent
alpo
ison
ing
Log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
deat
hs
cau
sed
byac
cide
ntal
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onin
gs(i
nclu
din
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drug
sm
edic
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rodu
cts
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uid
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tanc
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rm
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geof
the
year
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h19
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hem
ost
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ntav
aila
ble
gur
e)
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ceT
henu
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rof
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dent
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from
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omW
orld
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lth
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n[1
998]
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opul
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omW
orld
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001]
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eath
sfr
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ctio
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ofth
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sed
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test
inal
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ctio
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17THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
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194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and le with all requi-site authorities We also calculate the ofcial costs and timenecessary for the completion of each procedure under normalcircumstances The study assumes that the information is readilyavailable and that all governmental bodies function efcientlyand without corruption
We collect data on entry regulation using all available writ-ten information on start-up procedures from government publi-cations reports of development agencies such as the World Bankand USAID and government web pages on the Internet We thencontact the relevant government agencies to check the accuracy ofthe data Finally for each country we commission at least oneindependent report on entry regulation from a local law rm andwork with that rm and government ofcials to eliminate dis-agreements among them
We use ofcial sources for the number of procedures timeand cost If ofcial sources are conicting or the laws are ambigu-ous we follow the most authoritative source In the absence ofexpress legal denitions we take the government ofcialrsquos reportas the source If several ofcial sources have different estimatesof time and cost we take the median Absent ofcial estimates oftime and cost we take the estimates of local incorporation law-yers If several unofcial (eg a private lawyer) sources havedifferent estimates we again take the median
Our countries span a wide range of income levels and politi-cal systems The sample includes fourteen African countries nineEast Asian countries including China and Vietnam three SouthAsian countries (India Pakistan and Sri Lanka) all Central andEastern European countries except for Albania and some of theformer Yugoslav republics eight former Soviet Union republicsand Mongolia ten Latin American countries two Caribbeancountries (Dominican Republic and Jamaica) six Middle Easterncountries (Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco and Tunisia)and all major developed countries
We record the procedures related to obtaining all the neces-sary permits and licenses and completing all the required in-scriptions verications and notications for the company to belegally in operation When there are multiple ways to beginoperating legally we choose the fastest in terms of time In somecountries entrepreneurs may not bother to follow ofcial proce-dures or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services ofldquofacilitatorsrdquo An entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company
6 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hin
orde
rto
obta
ina
regi
stra
tion
cert
ica
teth
atar
eno
tas
soci
ated
wit
hsa
fety
and
heal
this
sues
the
envi
ronm
ent
taxe
sor
labo
rS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
toob
tain
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
has
ve
busi
ness
days
and
am
onth
has
twen
ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
srsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Cos
tT
he
cost
ofob
tain
ing
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
iden
tia
ble
ofc
ial
expe
nses
(fee
sco
sts
ofpr
oced
ures
and
form
sph
otoc
opie
ss
cal
stam
psl
egal
and
nota
rych
arge
set
c)
The
com
pan
yis
assu
med
toh
ave
ast
art-
up
capi
tal
ofte
nti
mes
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99S
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ions
C
ost
1ti
me
Th
eco
stof
obta
inin
gle
gal
stat
usto
oper
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01
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536
257
002
7140
310
Aus
tria
90
02
16
370
2728
042
0825
970
Tun
isia
90
00
27
410
1722
033
622
100
Slo
veni
a9
00
01
847
021
030
3983
989
0L
eban
on9
00
11
763
156
721
8192
370
0U
rugu
ay10
00
14
523
049
490
5869
590
0B
ulga
ria
100
02
08
270
1441
025
211
380
Chi
le10
00
32
528
013
080
2428
474
0G
erm
any
100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
Gh
ana
100
11
44
450
2175
039
7539
0L
ith
uani
a10
20
21
546
005
460
2386
262
0C
zech
Rep
ubli
c10
00
12
765
008
220
3422
506
0In
dia
100
03
34
770
5776
088
5645
0Ja
pan
110
02
27
260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
nda
112
02
16
290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
Ara
bR
ep
110
02
18
510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
ya11
00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
enia
110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
0P
olan
d11
20
31
558
025
460
4866
396
0S
pain
110
04
25
820
1730
050
1014
000
Indo
nes
ia11
00
21
812
80
5379
104
9958
0C
roat
ia12
10
23
638
045
030
6023
458
0K
azak
hsta
n12
00
13
842
047
470
6427
123
0P
ortu
gal
120
02
28
760
1844
048
8410
600
Slo
vak
Rep
ubl
ic12
00
23
789
014
520
5012
359
0C
hina
120
05
25
920
1417
050
9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
ronm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
ngT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P19
99
Kor
ea
Rep
13
00
24
727
016
270
2707
849
0T
anza
nia
131
05
25
293
3520
346
8024
0U
krai
ne13
00
23
830
025
690
3769
750
Tur
key
130
02
29
440
1932
036
922
900
Mal
awi
135
21
14
520
1886
039
6619
0M
oroc
co13
10
33
657
021
260
4406
120
0G
eorg
ia13
20
11
969
060
480
8808
620
Bur
kina
Fas
o14
00
32
933
318
833
3203
240
Phi
lipp
ines
140
05
18
460
1897
037
371
020
Arg
enti
na14
00
45
548
010
190
2939
760
0Jo
rdan
141
02
110
640
5369
079
291
500
Ven
ezu
ela
141
13
36
104
010
600
5220
367
0G
reec
e15
00
42
936
058
600
7300
117
70F
ranc
e15
00
31
1153
014
300
3550
234
80B
razi
l15
00
75
363
020
140
4534
442
0M
exic
o15
12
23
767
056
640
8344
440
0M
ali
161
03
210
5924
0It
aly
160
05
38
620
2002
044
8219
710
Sen
egal
160
03
211
691
2331
150
9151
0E
cuad
or16
20
24
872
062
230
9103
131
0R
oman
ia16
12
13
997
015
310
5411
152
0V
ietn
am16
01
15
911
21
3377
178
5737
0M
adag
asca
r17
00
73
715
20
4263
103
4325
0C
olom
bia
182
04
57
480
1480
034
002
250
Moz
ambi
que
194
01
311
149
111
461
7106
230
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
200
02
513
570
1979
042
592
270
Bol
ivia
200
12
710
882
6558
300
781
010
Dom
inic
anR
epub
lic
210
02
316
804
6309
495
0919
1S
amp
leav
erag
e10
48
034
014
204
194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
after going through 13 procedures in 69 business days and paying$375 in fees Alternatively he may hire a legal advisory rm thatcompletes the start-up process for $610 in three business days Inthe analysis we use the rst set of numbers We do so because weare primarily interested in understanding the structure of ofcialregulation
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions withina country across industries and across rm sizes For concrete-ness we focus on a ldquostandardizedrdquo rm which has the followingcharacteristics it performs general industrial or commercial ac-tivities it operates in the largest city1 (by population) it is ex-empt from industry-specic requirements (including environmen-tal ones) it does not participate in foreign trade and does nottrade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (eg liquor to-bacco gas) it is a domestically owned limited liability company2
its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and isthe higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) theminimum capital requirement for the particular type of businessentity it rents (ie does not own) land and business premises ithas between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commence-ment of operations all of whom are nationals it has turnover of upto 10 times its start-up capital and it does not qualify for invest-ment incentives Although different legal forms are used in dif-ferent countries to set up the simplest rm to make comparisonswe need to look at the same form
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complex-ity of entry3 Start-up procedures in the provinces are oftenslower than in the capital Industry-specic requirements addprocedures Foreign ownership frequently involves additionalverications and procedures Contributions in kind often requireassessment of value a complex procedure that depends on thequality of property registries Finally purchasing land can bequite difcult and even impossible in some of the countries of thesample (for example in the Kyrgyz Republic)
1 In practice the largest city coincides with the capital city except in Aus-tralia (Melbourne) Brazil (Sao Paulo) Canada (Toronto) Germany (Frankfurt)Kazakhstan (Almaty) the Netherlands (Amsterdam) South Africa (Johannes-burg) Turkey (Istanbul) and the United States (New York)
2 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned businessform with limited liability we choose the more popular business form amongsmall companies in the country
3 The World Economic Forum [2001] surveys business people on how impor-tant administrative regulations are as an obstacle to new business Our threemeasures are strongly positively correlated with these subjective assessments
7THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
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(3)
cost
P
anel
Bpr
esen
tsm
eans
ofth
eva
riab
les
byqu
arti
les
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
P
anel
Cpr
esen
tst-
stat
isti
csfo
rdi
ffer
ence
sin
mea
ns
acro
ssqu
arti
les
ofpe
rca
pita
GD
Pin
1999
T
able
IIde
scri
bes
the
vari
able
sin
deta
il
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvir
onm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scre
enin
gT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P1
999
Pan
elA
D
ata
Can
ada
20
01
01
20
0145
002
2519
320
Aus
tral
ia2
00
10
12
002
250
0305
200
50N
ewZe
alan
d3
00
10
23
000
530
0173
137
80D
enm
ark
30
01
02
30
1000
011
2032
030
Irel
and
30
01
02
160
1157
017
9719
160
Un
ited
Sta
tes
40
01
12
40
0049
001
6930
600
Nor
way
40
01
12
180
0472
011
9232
880
Un
ited
Kin
gdom
50
01
13
40
0143
003
0322
640
Hon
gK
ong
50
00
14
150
0333
009
3323
520
Mon
goli
a5
00
10
422
003
310
1211
350
Fin
land
50
01
31
240
0116
010
7623
780
Isra
el5
00
21
232
021
320
3412
158
60Zi
mba
bwe
50
02
12
470
1289
031
6952
0S
wed
en6
00
11
413
002
560
0776
250
40Ja
mai
ca6
00
21
324
018
790
2839
233
0Za
mbi
a6
00
21
329
060
490
7209
320
Pan
ama
70
01
15
150
3074
036
743
070
Sw
itze
rlan
d7
00
21
416
017
240
2364
383
50S
inga
pore
70
01
24
220
1191
020
7129
610
Lat
via
70
02
14
230
4234
051
542
470
Mal
aysi
a7
00
11
542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
Lan
ka8
00
11
623
019
720
2892
820
Net
herl
ands
80
12
05
310
1841
030
8124
320
Bel
gium
80
01
25
330
0998
023
1824
510
Tai
wan
Ch
ina
80
01
25
370
0660
021
4013
248
Hun
gary
80
01
16
390
8587
101
474
650
Pak
ista
n8
00
21
550
034
960
5496
470
Per
u8
00
22
483
019
860
5306
239
0S
outh
Afr
ica
90
02
25
260
0844
018
843
160
Kyr
gyz
Rep
ubli
c9
00
11
732
025
320
3812
300
Tha
ilan
d9
00
32
435
006
390
2039
196
0N
iger
ia9
01
21
536
257
002
7140
310
Aus
tria
90
02
16
370
2728
042
0825
970
Tun
isia
90
00
27
410
1722
033
622
100
Slo
veni
a9
00
01
847
021
030
3983
989
0L
eban
on9
00
11
763
156
721
8192
370
0U
rugu
ay10
00
14
523
049
490
5869
590
0B
ulga
ria
100
02
08
270
1441
025
211
380
Chi
le10
00
32
528
013
080
2428
474
0G
erm
any
100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
Gh
ana
100
11
44
450
2175
039
7539
0L
ith
uani
a10
20
21
546
005
460
2386
262
0C
zech
Rep
ubli
c10
00
12
765
008
220
3422
506
0In
dia
100
03
34
770
5776
088
5645
0Ja
pan
110
02
27
260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
nda
112
02
16
290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
Ara
bR
ep
110
02
18
510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
ya11
00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
enia
110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
0P
olan
d11
20
31
558
025
460
4866
396
0S
pain
110
04
25
820
1730
050
1014
000
Indo
nes
ia11
00
21
812
80
5379
104
9958
0C
roat
ia12
10
23
638
045
030
6023
458
0K
azak
hsta
n12
00
13
842
047
470
6427
123
0P
ortu
gal
120
02
28
760
1844
048
8410
600
Slo
vak
Rep
ubl
ic12
00
23
789
014
520
5012
359
0C
hina
120
05
25
920
1417
050
9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
ronm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
ngT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P19
99
Kor
ea
Rep
13
00
24
727
016
270
2707
849
0T
anza
nia
131
05
25
293
3520
346
8024
0U
krai
ne13
00
23
830
025
690
3769
750
Tur
key
130
02
29
440
1932
036
922
900
Mal
awi
135
21
14
520
1886
039
6619
0M
oroc
co13
10
33
657
021
260
4406
120
0G
eorg
ia13
20
11
969
060
480
8808
620
Bur
kina
Fas
o14
00
32
933
318
833
3203
240
Phi
lipp
ines
140
05
18
460
1897
037
371
020
Arg
enti
na14
00
45
548
010
190
2939
760
0Jo
rdan
141
02
110
640
5369
079
291
500
Ven
ezu
ela
141
13
36
104
010
600
5220
367
0G
reec
e15
00
42
936
058
600
7300
117
70F
ranc
e15
00
31
1153
014
300
3550
234
80B
razi
l15
00
75
363
020
140
4534
442
0M
exic
o15
12
23
767
056
640
8344
440
0M
ali
161
03
210
5924
0It
aly
160
05
38
620
2002
044
8219
710
Sen
egal
160
03
211
691
2331
150
9151
0E
cuad
or16
20
24
872
062
230
9103
131
0R
oman
ia16
12
13
997
015
310
5411
152
0V
ietn
am16
01
15
911
21
3377
178
5737
0M
adag
asca
r17
00
73
715
20
4263
103
4325
0C
olom
bia
182
04
57
480
1480
034
002
250
Moz
ambi
que
194
01
311
149
111
461
7106
230
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
200
02
513
570
1979
042
592
270
Bol
ivia
200
12
710
882
6558
300
781
010
Dom
inic
anR
epub
lic
210
02
316
804
6309
495
0919
1S
amp
leav
erag
e10
48
034
014
204
194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
B Denitions of Variables
We use three measures of entry regulation the number ofprocedures that rms must go through the ofcial time requiredto complete the process and its ofcial cost In the public interesttheory a more thorough screening process requires more proce-dures and demands more time In the public choice theory moreprocedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollboothview) or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (cap-ture view)
Theoretical predictions regarding our measure of cost areambiguous A benevolent social planner who wants to spendsignicant resources on screening new entrants may choose tonance such activity with broad taxes rather than with the directfees that we measure leading to low costs as we measure them Acorrupt regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raisehis own bribe income if for example fees are veriable andcannot be expropriated by the regulator4 In contrast higher feesare unambiguously desirable as a tool to deter entry under thecapture theory Because of these ambiguities we present statis-tics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regula-tion and not to discriminate among theories
We keep track of all the procedures required by law to starta business A separate activity in the start-up process is a ldquopro-cedurerdquo only if it requires the entrepreneur to interact with out-side entities state and local government ofces lawyers audi-tors company seal manufacturers notaries etc For example alllimited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting ofshareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and BylawsSince this activity involves only the entrepreneurs we do notcount it as a procedure Similarly most companies hire a lawyerto draft their Articles of Association However we do not countthat as a procedure unless the law requires that a lawyer beinvolved In the same vein we ignore procedures that the entre-preneur can avoid altogether (eg reserving exclusive rights overa proposed company name until registration is completed) or thatcan be performed after business commences5 Finally when ob-
4 Shleifer and Vishny [1993] distinguish corruption with theft from corrup-tion without theft In the latter case the regulator must remit the ofcial fee tothe Treasury and therefore has no interest in that fee being high
5 In several countries our consultants advised us that certain procedureswhile not required are highly recommended because failure to follow them mayresult in signicant delays and additional costs We collected data on these
8 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
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ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
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art
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atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
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ale
gal
enti
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ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
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rof
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eren
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eps
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upha
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ply
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rto
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stra
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ica
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ated
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fety
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heal
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ronm
ent
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rS
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eA
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rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
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tain
lega
lst
atus
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erat
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rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
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ve
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ness
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am
onth
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ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
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lcul
atio
ns
Cos
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cost
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tain
ing
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lst
atus
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erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
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in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
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tia
ble
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ial
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sts
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uth
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ulat
ions
C
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Th
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GD
Pin
1999
It
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ude
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enti
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eof
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lex
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ees
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edur
esan
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phot
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alan
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The
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ual
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ater
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orld
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k[2
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16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
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from
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Log
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mbe
rof
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hem
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tldquoC
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Cor
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Th
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(1)
Fre
edom
Hou
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Tra
nsit
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)(2
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allu
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tern
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(GI)
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the
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Inte
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(4)
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pure
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the
year
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ceJ
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arsh
all
[200
0]
Pol
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ghts
Inde
xof
polit
ical
righ
tsH
ighe
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ting
sin
dica
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untr
ies
that
com
ecl
oser
toth
eid
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sugg
este
dby
the
chec
klis
tqu
esti
ons
of(1
)fr
eean
dfa
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(2)
thos
eel
ecte
dru
le(
3)th
ere
are
com
peti
tive
part
ies
orot
her
com
peti
tive
polit
ical
grou
ping
s(4
)th
eop
posi
tion
has
anim
port
ant
role
and
pow
era
nd(5
)th
een
titi
esha
vese
lf-de
term
inat
ion
oran
extr
emel
yhi
ghde
gree
ofau
tono
my
Ave
rage
ofth
eye
ars
1972
thro
ugh
1998
Sou
rce
Fre
edom
Hou
se[2
001]
L
egal
orig
inId
enti
es
the
lega
lor
igin
ofea
chC
ompa
nyL
awor
Com
mer
cial
Cod
eof
each
coun
try
Th
ere
are
ve
poss
ible
orig
ins
(1)
Eng
lish
Com
mon
Law
(2
)F
ren
chC
omm
erci
alC
ode
(3)
Ger
man
Com
mer
cial
Cod
e(4
)Sc
andi
navi
anC
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ode
and
(5)
Soc
iali
stC
omm
unis
tla
ws
Sou
rce
La
Por
taet
al
[199
8]
Rey
nold
san
dF
lore
s[1
989]
CIA
Wor
ldF
actb
ook
[200
1]
17THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
IT
HE
DA
TA
Pan
elA
repo
rts
the
tota
lnu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
and
thei
rbr
eaku
pin
the
foll
owin
gv
eca
tego
ries
(1
)sa
fety
and
heal
th
(2)
envi
ronm
ent
(3)
taxe
s(4
)la
bor
and
(5)
scre
enin
gT
he
tabl
eal
sore
port
sth
eti
me
dire
ctco
st(a
sa
frac
tion
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
)as
soci
ated
wit
hm
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nggo
vern
men
tre
quir
emen
ts
and
dire
ctco
stpl
us
the
mon
etiz
edva
lue
ofth
een
trep
rene
urrsquos
tim
e(a
sa
frac
tion
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
)as
wel
las
the
leve
lof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
indo
llar
sin
1999
Cou
ntr
ies
are
sort
edin
asce
ndin
gor
der
onth
eba
sis
of(1
)th
eto
tal
num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
(2
)ti
me
and
(3)
cost
P
anel
Bpr
esen
tsm
eans
ofth
eva
riab
les
byqu
arti
les
ofG
DP
per
capi
tain
1999
P
anel
Cpr
esen
tst-
stat
isti
csfo
rdi
ffer
ence
sin
mea
ns
acro
ssqu
arti
les
ofpe
rca
pita
GD
Pin
1999
T
able
IIde
scri
bes
the
vari
able
sin
deta
il
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvir
onm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scre
enin
gT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P1
999
Pan
elA
D
ata
Can
ada
20
01
01
20
0145
002
2519
320
Aus
tral
ia2
00
10
12
002
250
0305
200
50N
ewZe
alan
d3
00
10
23
000
530
0173
137
80D
enm
ark
30
01
02
30
1000
011
2032
030
Irel
and
30
01
02
160
1157
017
9719
160
Un
ited
Sta
tes
40
01
12
40
0049
001
6930
600
Nor
way
40
01
12
180
0472
011
9232
880
Un
ited
Kin
gdom
50
01
13
40
0143
003
0322
640
Hon
gK
ong
50
00
14
150
0333
009
3323
520
Mon
goli
a5
00
10
422
003
310
1211
350
Fin
land
50
01
31
240
0116
010
7623
780
Isra
el5
00
21
232
021
320
3412
158
60Zi
mba
bwe
50
02
12
470
1289
031
6952
0S
wed
en6
00
11
413
002
560
0776
250
40Ja
mai
ca6
00
21
324
018
790
2839
233
0Za
mbi
a6
00
21
329
060
490
7209
320
Pan
ama
70
01
15
150
3074
036
743
070
Sw
itze
rlan
d7
00
21
416
017
240
2364
383
50S
inga
pore
70
01
24
220
1191
020
7129
610
Lat
via
70
02
14
230
4234
051
542
470
Mal
aysi
a7
00
11
542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
Lan
ka8
00
11
623
019
720
2892
820
Net
herl
ands
80
12
05
310
1841
030
8124
320
Bel
gium
80
01
25
330
0998
023
1824
510
Tai
wan
Ch
ina
80
01
25
370
0660
021
4013
248
Hun
gary
80
01
16
390
8587
101
474
650
Pak
ista
n8
00
21
550
034
960
5496
470
Per
u8
00
22
483
019
860
5306
239
0S
outh
Afr
ica
90
02
25
260
0844
018
843
160
Kyr
gyz
Rep
ubli
c9
00
11
732
025
320
3812
300
Tha
ilan
d9
00
32
435
006
390
2039
196
0N
iger
ia9
01
21
536
257
002
7140
310
Aus
tria
90
02
16
370
2728
042
0825
970
Tun
isia
90
00
27
410
1722
033
622
100
Slo
veni
a9
00
01
847
021
030
3983
989
0L
eban
on9
00
11
763
156
721
8192
370
0U
rugu
ay10
00
14
523
049
490
5869
590
0B
ulga
ria
100
02
08
270
1441
025
211
380
Chi
le10
00
32
528
013
080
2428
474
0G
erm
any
100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
Gh
ana
100
11
44
450
2175
039
7539
0L
ith
uani
a10
20
21
546
005
460
2386
262
0C
zech
Rep
ubli
c10
00
12
765
008
220
3422
506
0In
dia
100
03
34
770
5776
088
5645
0Ja
pan
110
02
27
260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
nda
112
02
16
290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
Ara
bR
ep
110
02
18
510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
ya11
00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
enia
110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
0P
olan
d11
20
31
558
025
460
4866
396
0S
pain
110
04
25
820
1730
050
1014
000
Indo
nes
ia11
00
21
812
80
5379
104
9958
0C
roat
ia12
10
23
638
045
030
6023
458
0K
azak
hsta
n12
00
13
842
047
470
6427
123
0P
ortu
gal
120
02
28
760
1844
048
8410
600
Slo
vak
Rep
ubl
ic12
00
23
789
014
520
5012
359
0C
hina
120
05
25
920
1417
050
9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
ofpr
oced
ures
Saf
ety
ampH
ealt
hE
nvi
ronm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scr
eeni
ngT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P19
99
Kor
ea
Rep
13
00
24
727
016
270
2707
849
0T
anza
nia
131
05
25
293
3520
346
8024
0U
krai
ne13
00
23
830
025
690
3769
750
Tur
key
130
02
29
440
1932
036
922
900
Mal
awi
135
21
14
520
1886
039
6619
0M
oroc
co13
10
33
657
021
260
4406
120
0G
eorg
ia13
20
11
969
060
480
8808
620
Bur
kina
Fas
o14
00
32
933
318
833
3203
240
Phi
lipp
ines
140
05
18
460
1897
037
371
020
Arg
enti
na14
00
45
548
010
190
2939
760
0Jo
rdan
141
02
110
640
5369
079
291
500
Ven
ezu
ela
141
13
36
104
010
600
5220
367
0G
reec
e15
00
42
936
058
600
7300
117
70F
ranc
e15
00
31
1153
014
300
3550
234
80B
razi
l15
00
75
363
020
140
4534
442
0M
exic
o15
12
23
767
056
640
8344
440
0M
ali
161
03
210
5924
0It
aly
160
05
38
620
2002
044
8219
710
Sen
egal
160
03
211
691
2331
150
9151
0E
cuad
or16
20
24
872
062
230
9103
131
0R
oman
ia16
12
13
997
015
310
5411
152
0V
ietn
am16
01
15
911
21
3377
178
5737
0M
adag
asca
r17
00
73
715
20
4263
103
4325
0C
olom
bia
182
04
57
480
1480
034
002
250
Moz
ambi
que
194
01
311
149
111
461
7106
230
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion
200
02
513
570
1979
042
592
270
Bol
ivia
200
12
710
882
6558
300
781
010
Dom
inic
anR
epub
lic
210
02
316
804
6309
495
0919
1S
amp
leav
erag
e10
48
034
014
204
194
604
474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
uar
tile
sof
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
in19
99
1stQ
uart
ile6
770
000
051
591
144
0024
50
010
020
243
722n
dQ
uart
ile
111
00
240
142
142
386
1949
29
033
053
584
73rd
Qua
rtil
e12
33
052
014
219
233
714
531
00
410
621
568
4thQ
uar
tile
119
00
620
242
241
956
9063
76
108
134
349
Pan
elC
Tes
tof
mea
ns
(t-s
tati
stic
s)
1stvs
2n
dQ
uar
tile
24
20a
22
07b
20
872
135
23
64a
23
34a
23
71a
23
03a
23
97a
120
3a
1stvs
3rd
Qu
arti
le2
458
a2
302
a2
087
21
64b
22
82a
24
07a
24
21a
22
54b
23
19a
163
5a
1stvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e2
404
a2
208
a2
155
21
612
243
b2
318
a2
409
a2
353
a2
406
a17
31a
2nd
vs
3rdQ
uar
tile
21
172
134
000
20
110
102
151
20
542
052
20
596
14a
2nd
vs
4thQ
uart
ile
20
722
117
20
612
021
110
20
892
146
22
54b
22
73a
805
a
3rdvs
4th
Qua
rtil
e0
332
027
20
612
011
082
026
21
062
217
b2
227
b8
53a
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
taining a document requires several separate procedures involv-ing different ofcials we count each as a procedure For examplea Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certicatefrom the Company Registry in Soa and then has to pay theassociated fee at an ofcially designated bank Even though bothactivities are related to ldquoobtaining the registration certicaterdquothey count as two separate procedures in the data
To measure time we collect information on the sequence inwhich procedures are to be completed and rely on ofcial guresas to how many business days it takes to complete each proce-dure We ignore the time spent to gather information and as-sume that all procedures are known from the very beginning Wealso assume that procedures are taken simultaneously wheneverpossible for maximum efciency Since entrepreneurs may havetrouble visiting several different institutions within the same day(especially if they come from out-of-town) we set the minimumtime required to visit an institution to be one day6 Anotherjustication for this approach is that the relevant ofces some-times open for business only briey both the Ministry of Econ-omy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business onlybetween 11 am and 2 pm
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identi-able ofcial expenses fees costs of procedures and forms pho-tocopies scal stamps legal and notary charges etc All costgures are ofcial and do not include bribes which De Soto [1990]has shown to be signicant for registration Setup fees often varywith the level of start-up capital As indicated we report the costsassociated with starting to operate legally a rm with capitalequivalent to the larger of (i) ten times per capita GDP in 1999 or(ii) the minimum capital requirement stipulated in the law Wehave experimented with other capital levels and found our resultsto be robust
Theoretical predictions for the cost of entry regulation areambiguous As an alternative measure we consider only the
procedures but did not include them in the variables presented here because wewanted to stick to the mandatory criterion We have rerun the regressions dis-cussed below including these highly recommended procedures The inclusion doesnot have a material impact on the results
6 In the calculation of time when two procedures can be completed on thesame day in the same building we count that as one day rather than two(following the urgings of ofcials in several countries where several ofces arelocated in the same building) Our results are not affected by this particular wayof computing time
9THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
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ata
star
t-up
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toco
mpl
yw
ith
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art
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atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
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hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
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ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
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rof
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eren
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eps
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upha
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ply
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rto
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ica
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eno
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ated
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ronm
ent
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rS
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eA
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rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ion
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ime
Th
eti
me
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kes
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tain
lega
lst
atus
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erat
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in
busi
ness
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Aw
eek
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ve
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ness
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am
onth
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ty-t
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Sou
rce
Au
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atio
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Cos
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cost
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tain
ing
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lst
atus
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erat
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rm
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eof
per
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taG
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in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
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tia
ble
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ial
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nses
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sts
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ulat
ions
C
ost
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Th
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1999
It
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ude
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lex
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ees
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edur
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alan
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rene
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me
The
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eof
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me
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ater
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k[2
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16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
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Log
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rof
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hem
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ank
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ket
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Cor
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Hou
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allu
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Con
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Ave
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rce
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[200
1]
Eff
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Inde
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Sou
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Dat
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17THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
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Pan
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T
able
IIde
scri
bes
the
vari
able
sin
deta
il
Num
ber
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oced
ures
Saf
ety
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hE
nvir
onm
ent
Tax
esL
abor
Scre
enin
gT
ime
Cos
tC
ost
1ti
me
GD
P
PO
P1
999
Pan
elA
D
ata
Can
ada
20
01
01
20
0145
002
2519
320
Aus
tral
ia2
00
10
12
002
250
0305
200
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ewZe
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d3
00
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23
000
530
0173
137
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enm
ark
30
01
02
30
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011
2032
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Irel
and
30
01
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160
1157
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9719
160
Un
ited
Sta
tes
40
01
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40
0049
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6930
600
Nor
way
40
01
12
180
0472
011
9232
880
Un
ited
Kin
gdom
50
01
13
40
0143
003
0322
640
Hon
gK
ong
50
00
14
150
0333
009
3323
520
Mon
goli
a5
00
10
422
003
310
1211
350
Fin
land
50
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31
240
0116
010
7623
780
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00
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232
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320
3412
158
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50
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250
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mai
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21
324
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2839
233
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329
060
490
7209
320
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00
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416
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2364
383
50S
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70
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1191
020
7129
610
Lat
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70
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4234
051
542
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Mal
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a7
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11
542
026
450
4325
340
0
18 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Sri
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00
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623
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720
2892
820
Net
herl
ands
80
12
05
310
1841
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8124
320
Bel
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80
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330
0998
023
1824
510
Tai
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Ch
ina
80
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370
0660
021
4013
248
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16
390
8587
101
474
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320
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2039
196
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01
21
536
257
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7140
310
Aus
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2728
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90
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721
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523
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490
5869
590
0B
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270
1441
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211
380
Chi
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00
32
528
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080
2428
474
0G
erm
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100
01
27
420
1569
032
4925
350
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100
11
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450
2175
039
7539
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20
21
546
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2386
262
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Rep
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765
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220
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506
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770
5776
088
5645
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110
02
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260
1161
022
0132
230
Uga
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112
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290
3040
042
0032
0E
gypt
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ep
110
02
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510
9659
116
991
400
Ken
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00
23
654
050
700
7230
360
Arm
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110
01
19
550
1267
034
6749
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20
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4866
396
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104
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10
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6427
123
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760
1844
048
8410
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ic12
00
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789
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1417
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9778
0
19THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
I(C
ON
TIN
UE
D)
Num
ber
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Saf
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8024
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135
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120
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3203
240
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140
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1897
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Arg
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440
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161
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2002
044
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Sen
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160
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20
24
872
062
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9103
131
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oman
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12
13
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4263
103
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0C
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182
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034
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194
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7106
230
Rus
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200
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1979
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592
270
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200
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781
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inic
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210
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0919
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amp
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48
034
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204
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474
00
4708
065
988
226
20 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pan
elB
M
eans
byQ
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Ppe
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99
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770
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243
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ile
111
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Pan
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20a
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07b
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135
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64a
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97a
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3a
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Qu
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458
a2
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82a
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54b
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19a
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612
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ile
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at10
perc
ent
21THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
reported in Panel C) Rich countries also have fewer safety andhealth tax and labor start-up procedures than the rest of thesample Similarly meeting government requirements takes ap-proximately 245 business days in rich countries statisticallysignicantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 554 days Incontrast countries in the other three quartiles of per capitaincome are not statistically different from each other in the num-ber of procedures and the time it takes to complete them
To summarize the regulation of entry varies enormouslyacross countries It often takes the form of screening proceduresRich countries (ie those in the top quartile of per capita GDP)regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries Inprinciple these ndings are consistent with both the public choiceand public interest theories Market failures might be more per-vasive in countries with incomes just below the rst quartile ofGDP per capita generating a greater demand for benign regula-tion in these countries Alternatively income levels may proxy forcharacteristics of political systems that allow politicians or in-cumbent rms to capture the regulatory process for their ownbenet In the next two sections we relate these patterns in thedata to the theories of regulation
IV WHO GETS THE RENTS FROM REGULATION
Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to whogets its benets The public interest theory predicts that stricterentry regulation is associated with higher measured consumerwelfare In contrast the public choice theory sees regulation as atool to create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent rms Stricterregulation should then be associated with higher corruption andless competition
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difcult especiallyacross countries In this section we present some measures thatwe have been able to nd that bearmdashalbeit quite imperfectlymdashonthe relevant theories To begin consider some variables bearingon the public interest theory These variables reect the activitiesof all rms in the country and not just the entrants The rst isa measure of a countryrsquos compliance with international qualitystandards It is a natural variable to focus on if the goal ofregulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output ofinferior quality Second we consider the level of water pollutionwhich should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities
22 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and does so successfully8 Third we consider two measures ofhealth outcomes that publicly interested entry regulation wouldguard against the number of deaths from accidental poisoningand from intestinal infections9 In addition we include two mea-sures of the size of the unofcial economy based on estimates ofunofcial output and employment respectively Since rms op-erating unofcially avoid nearly all regulations a large size of theunofcial economy in countries with more regulations under-mines the prediction of the public interest theory that regulationeffectively protects consumers10 Finally we use a survey mea-sure of ldquoproduct market competitionrdquo Stiffer entry regulationshould be associated with greater competition in the public inter-est theory and lacking competition in the public choice theoryespecially in its regulatory capture version
Table IV presents the results on these seven measures ofconsequences of regulation using the number of procedures asdependent variables For two reasons we run each regressionwith and without the log of per capita GDP First the number ofprocedures is correlated with income per capita and we want tomake sure that we are not picking up the general effects of goodgovernance associated with higher income Second we use GDPper capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of market failures ina country Including per capita income as a control is a crude wayto keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant whichallows us to focus on the consequences (and later causes) ofregulation separately from the need
The results in Table IV show that compliance with interna-tional quality standards declines as the number of proceduresrises Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels The twomeasures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries withmore regulations (if anything the opposite seems to be true evencontrolling for per capita income) More regulation is associatedwith a larger unofcial economy and statistically signicantly soif we use the unofcial employment variable Competition incountries with more regulation is perceived to be less intense
8 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results9 Due to reporting practices in poor countries the second variable might
better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries according tothe World Health Organization [1998]
10 There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive rms intothe unofcial economy where they can avoid some or all of these regulations Seefor example Johnson Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman JohnsonKaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [2000]
23THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TABLE IVEVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the followingseven dependent variables (1) Quality standards as proxied by the numberof ISO 9000 certications (2) Water pollution (3) Deaths from accidentalpoisoning (4) Deaths from intestinal infection (5) Size of the unofcialeconomy as a fraction of GDP (6) Employment in the unofcial economyand (7) Product market competition The independent variables are the logof the number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in1999 Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standard errors areshown below the coefcients
Dependent variableNumber ofprocedures
LnGDPPOP1999 Constant
R2
N
Quality standards (ISOCertications)
2 02781a 07649a 03311(00496) (01268) 85
2 01595a 00771a 2 01140 05384(00443) (00131) (01484) 85
Water pollution 00127b 01557a 00247(00084) (00174) 76
2 00037 2 00131a 02984a 02310(00076) (00027) (00314) 76
Deaths from accidentalpoisoning 06588a 16357a 01179
(02057) (04381) 5700637 2 04525a 68347a 04109
(01958) (00933) (10929) 57
Deaths from intestinal infection 23049a 2 22697a 03451(03081) (06778) 6110501a 2 08717a 78494a 06259
(02971) (01012) (13048) 61
Size of the unofcial economyd 147553a 2 37982 02482(25698) (52139) 7364849b 2 61908a 671030a 05187
(25385) (10834) (137059) 73
Employment in the unofcialeconomy
194438a 2 41103 03132(25756) (59160) 46138512a 2 44585a 415133b 04477
2 36056 (13918) (176836) 46
Product market competition 2 04012a 57571a 01405(01213) (02511) 54
2 01418 02108a 33579a 03087(01202) (00680) (07749) 54
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percentd The regression on the size of the unofcial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus
unofcial economy income (ie GDP per capita (1 1 unofcial economy)) and not just by GDP per capita asall other regressions on the table do
24 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
although this result is only statistically signicant without theincome control We have also run all regressions using cost andtime as independent variables and obtained qualitatively similarresults While the data are noisy none of the results support thepredictions of the public interest theory11
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted withcaution First some of our measures of public goods such asdeaths from accidental poisoning are probably more relevant forpoor countries and in particular are unlikely to be inuenced byentry regulation for rich countries Accordingly it might be moreappropriate to perform the analysis separately for countries atdifferent income levels To this end we divide the sample at themedian per capita income and rerun the regressions in Table IVfor each subsample The data do not support the proposition thatin the subsample of poorer countries heavier regulation of entryis associated with better social outcomes or more competition
Second an even deeper concern with the results in Table IVis that despite our control for per capita income there is impor-tant unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated withregulation which accounts for the results For example supposethat some countries have particularly egregious market failuresbut also especially poor alternative mechanisms for dealing withthem such as the press and the courts Regulation for examplemight be less infected by corruption than either the press or thejudiciary A publicly interested regulator in such countries wouldchoose to use more regulatory procedures because the alternativemethods of dealing with market failure are even worse but stillend up with inferior outcomes
We cannot dismiss this concern with the results of Table IValthough our later ndings cast doubt on its validity We run theregressions in Table IV using information on the freedom of thepress from Djankov McLiesh Nenova and Shleifer [2001] andnd that holding constant various measures of freedom of thepress and per capita income the number of procedures is still notassociated with superior social outcomes We also run the regres-sions in Table IV using a number of measures of citizen access to
11 Using data for publicly traded rms we have found no evidence thatcountries with heavier entry regulation have more protable rms as measuredby the return on assets These protability numbers however are very crude Wealso measured protability using the return on World-Bank-nanced projectsfrom the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department These data also yieldno evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns
25THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
justice and of efciency of the judiciary from Djankov et al[2001b] Again we nd that holding constant these measuresand per capita income the number of procedures is associated ifanything with inferior social outcomes
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that cor-ruption levels and the intensity of entry regulation are positivelycorrelated In fact since in many countries in our sample politi-cians run businesses the regulation of entry produces the doublebenet of corruption revenues and reduced competition for theincumbent businesses already afliated with the politicians Fig-ure III presents the relationship between corruption and thenumber of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP12
Panel A of Table V shows statistically that consistent with thetollbooth theory more regulation is associated with worse corrup-tion scores The coefcients are statistically signicant (with andwithout controlling for income) and large in economic terms Theestimated coefcients imply that controlling for per capita GDPreducing the number of procedures by ten is associated with a
12 We have tried a number of measures of corruption all yielding similarresults We have made sure that our results do not depend on ldquored taperdquo being partof the measure of corruption
FIGURE IIICorruption and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the corruption index against the (log)number of procedures for the 78 countries in our sample with nonmissing data oncorruption
26 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
reduction in corruption of 8 of a standard deviation roughly thedifference between France and Italy The results using the costand the time of meeting the entry regulations as independent
TABLE VEVIDENCE ON THE TOLLBOOTH THEORY
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as thedependent variable The independent variables are (1) the log of the numberof procedures (2) the log of time (3) the log of cost and the log of per capitaGDP in dollars in 1999 Panel A presents results for the 78 observationswith available corruption data Panel B reports results separately for thesubsample of countries with GDP per capita in 1999 above and below thesample median Table II describes all variables in detail Robust standarderrors are shown in parentheses below the coefcients
Panel A Results for the whole sample
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 31811a 2 18654a
(02986) (02131)Time 2 17566a 2 08854a
(01488) (01377)Cost 2 12129a 2 04978a
(01206) (01285)Ln GDPPOP1999 09966a 09765a 09960a
(00864) (01014) (01118)Constant 118741a 11345 110694a 00677 27520a 2 40893a
(07380) (09299) (05932) (11176) (02414) (07867)R2 04656 08125 04387 07662 04256 07306N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B Results for countries above and below the world median GDP per capita
Countries abovemedian GDPPOP1999
Countries belowmedian GDPPOP1999
Independentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number ofprocedures
2 18729a 2 07841b
(02971) (03304)Time 2 08135a 2 00923
(01762) (02850)Cost 2 05327a 2 03408a
(01894) (01021)Ln GDPPOP1999 14811a 15871a 17621a 03993b 03680c 02117
(02265) (02789) (02913) (01735) (01802) (01718)Constant 2 36970 2 59027c 2 113736a 23246c 10098 13125
(24628) (29942) (25773) (12849) (18813) (11136)R2 07820 07155 06728 02362 01324 02830N 40 40 40 38 38 38
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
27THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
variables are also statistically signicant pointing further to therobustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory
One way to reconcile the ndings in Table V with the publicinterest theory is to argue that regulation has unintended conse-quences Thus benign politicians in emerging markets imitatethe regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind butare stymied by corruption and other enforcement failures Thistheory is not entirely consistent with our earlier nding thatpoorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than richcountries do A further implication of this theory is that regula-tions should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer coun-tries Panel B of Table V addresses this hypothesis by examiningseparately the relationship between entry regulations and cor-ruption in countries with above and below world median incomeThe results show that regulations actually have a stronger effecton corruption in the subsample of richer countries
On the second version of the unintended consequences argu-ment it may be impossible for a benevolent government to screenbad entrants without facilitating corruption [Banerjee 1997 Ace-moglu and Verdier 2000] In countries whose markets are fraughtwith failures it might be better to have corrupt regulators thannone at all Corruption may be the price to pay for addressingmarket failures We turn next to the evidence regarding thepolitical attributes of countries that regulate entry to disentanglethe competing theories of regulation
V WHO REGULATES ENTRY
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countriesthat regulate entry These attributes are intimately related to thecompeting hypotheses about regulation In the public interesttheory regulation remedies market failures The implication isthat countries whose political systems are characterized byhigher congruence between policy outcomes and social prefer-ences should regulate entry more strictly In the empirical analy-sis that follows we identify such countries with more represen-tative and limited governments
In the public choice theory despotic regimes are more likelyto be captured by incumbents and to have regulatory systemsaimed at maximizing the bribes and prots of a few cronies ratherthan address market failures [Olson 1991 De Long and Shleifer1993] Such dictators need the political support of various inter-
28 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
est groups and use distortionary policies to favor their friendsand to abuse their opponents The dictatorrsquos choice of distortion-ary policies is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces noelections When the public is less able to assert its preferencesthen we expect more distortionary policy choices Specically weexpect more representative and limited government to be associ-ated with lighter regulation of entry
One might argue in contrast that dictators should pursueefcient economic policies including light regulation of entry ifthey are politically secure and can ldquotaxrdquo the fruits of entry andgrowth One response discussed by Olson [1991] and De Longand Shleifer [1993] is that while a few dictators are politicallysecure and pursue enlightened policies most are not Insecuredictators extract what they can from the economy as fast as theycan both to prolong their tenure and to enrich themselves andtheir supporters while still in power Democracy might notlengthen the horizons of politicians but it does limit theiropportunities
We collect data on a variety of characteristics of politicalsystems partly because we want to be exible regarding themeaning of ldquogood governmentrdquo Where possible we use variablesfrom different sources to check the robustness of our results Ourpolitical variables fall into four broad groups The rst includesthe de facto independence of the executive and an index of con-straints on the executive The second group includes an index ofthe effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of competitionin the legislaturersquos nominating process The third group includesa measure of autocracy and one of political rights
An additional variable that we focus on used in the earlierwork by La Porta et al [1998 1999] is legal origin We classifycountries based on the origin of their commercial laws into vebroad groups English French German Scandinavian and So-cialist Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy for the govern-mentrsquos proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance ofthe law toward the security of property rights in a country [LaPorta et al 1999]
Correlations among the political variables are presented inTable VI Political variables tend to be strongly correlated withinblocks For example the measure of constraints on the executivepower is highly correlated with de facto independence of theexecutive (09761) and with the effectiveness of the legislature(09078) Yet we report results on all three variables as each
29THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
comes from a different source Similarly blocks of variables tendto be correlated with each other In particular democracy tends tobe positively associated with competitive and limited executiveand legislative branches Legal origin in contrast is insigni-cantly correlated with other political variables (the exception isSocialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democ-racy and limited government)13 Income levels are positively as-
13 Consistent with this nding La Porta et al [2001] nd that common lawlegal origin is associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom such
TABLE VICORRELATION TABLE FOR POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and thevariables used in Table VII All variables are dened in Table II Signicancelevels are Bonferroni-adjusted
Exec defacto
independence
Constraintson executive
powerEffectiveness
legislatureCompetitionnominating Autocracy
Politicalrights
FrenchLO
Exec de factoindependence 10000
Constraints onexec power 09761a 10000
Effectivenesslegislature 09210a 09078a 10000
Competitionnominating 08243a 08069a 08484a 10000
Autocracy 2 09085a 2 08844a 2 08514a 2 07819a 10000
Political rights 08440a 08448a 08485a 07191a 2 08564a 10000French legal
origin 2 01814 2 01814 2 01901 2 01985 2 00258 00565 10000Socialist legal
origin 2 03321 2 02927 2 03236 2 03240 05475a 2 04572a 2 04169a
German legalorigin 02101 02008 02023 01281 2 01920 02444 2 02141
Scandinavianlegal origin 03391 03274 03378 02522 2 02978 03109 2 01727
English legalorigin 02259 01998 01462 02412 2 02324 00778 2 04874a
LnGDPPOP1999 06900a 06703a 07483a 06123a 2 06389a 07519a 2 00767b
Ln(Number ofprocedures) 2 05518a 2 05234a 2 05848a 2 04435b 04662a 2 04412a 04863a
Ln(Time) 2 05420a 2 05204a 2 05635a 2 04360b 04770a 2 04921a 03976b
Ln(Cost) 2 05070a 2 04937a 2 05656a 2 04177b 04075b 2 04588a 03472Ln(Cost 1
time) 2 05700a 2 05478a 2 06267a 2 04745a 04713a 2 05085a 03870b
a Signicant at 1 percent b signicant at 5 percent c signicant at 10 percent
30 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sociated with democracy as well as with competitive and limitedexecutive and legislative branches but not with the legal originThe fact that countries with severe market failures have moreabusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness ofthe Pigouvian model
In Table VII we present the results of regressing the number
as the independence of the judiciary and the accountability of the government tothe law These constitutional guarantees of freedom are strongly associated witheconomic freedoms but less so with political freedoms
TABLE VI(CONTINUED)
SocialistLO
GermanLO
ScandinavianLO
EnglishLO
LnGDP
POP1999
Ln(Number ofprocedures)
Ln(Time)
Ln(Cost)
Ln(Cost 1
time)
10000
2 01479 10000
2 01192 2 00612 10000
2 03365 2 01729 2 00139 10000
2 01995 03409 03133 2 00742 10000
01538b 00030b 2 03413b 2 05069a 2 04745a 10000
01869 2 00640 2 02914 2 04291b 2 05014a 08263a 10000
00319 2 00727 2 03007 2 02172 2 05953a 06354a 06147a 10000
00851 2 00933 2 02786 2 03094 2 06244a 07434a 07793a 09605 10000
31THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EV
IIE
VID
EN
CE
ON
RE
GU
LA
TIO
NA
ND
PO
LIT
ICA
LA
TT
RIB
UT
ES
The
tabl
epr
esen
tsth
ere
sult
sof
runn
ing
regr
essi
ons
for
the
log
ofth
enu
mbe
rof
proc
edur
esas
the
depe
nde
nt
vari
able
W
eru
nse
ven
regr
essi
ons
usin
gva
riou
spo
liti
cal
indi
cato
rsde
scri
bed
inT
able
IIan
d(l
og)
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
R
obus
tst
anda
rder
rors
are
show
nin
pare
nth
eses
belo
wth
eco
efc
ient
s
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
le(1
)(2
)(3
)(4
)(5
)(6
)(7
)
Exe
cuti
vede
fact
oin
depe
nden
ce2
012
49a
(00
322)
Con
stra
ints
onex
ecut
ive
pow
er2
010
48a
(00
352)
Eff
ecti
vene
ssof
legi
slat
ure
20
3301
a
(00
778)
Com
peti
tion
nom
inat
ing
20
2763
b
(00
999)
Aut
ocra
cy0
0545
b
(00
178)
Pol
itic
alri
ghts
20
3470
(02
185)
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
072
45a
(00
916)
Soc
iali
stle
gal
orig
in0
4904
a
(01
071)
Ger
man
lega
lor
igin
072
76a
(01
363)
Sca
ndin
avia
nle
gal
orig
in2
000
85(0
173
3)L
nG
DP
PO
P19
99
20
0491
20
0634
c2
000
872
009
02b
20
0867
a2
009
39b
20
1434
a
(00
331)
(00
352)
(00
401)
(00
358)
(00
321)
(00
386)
(00
270)
Con
stan
t3
1782
a3
2040
a2
8709
a3
3540
a2
7457
a3
1850
a2
9492
a
(02
334)
(02
408)
(02
586)
(02
641)
(02
888)
(02
599)
(01
955)
R2
031
780
2872
034
240
2475
026
400
2350
062
56N
8484
7373
8484
85
aS
igni
can
tat
1pe
rcen
tb
sign
ica
ntat
5pe
rcen
tc
sign
ica
nt
at10
perc
ent
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of procedures on a constant and each of the political variablestaken one at a time and the log of per capita income In inter-preting these regressions we take the broad political measures oflimited and representative government as being exogenous toentry regulation It is possible of course that both the politicaland the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined bysome deeper historical factors Even so it is interesting to knowwhat the correlation is Does the history that produces goodgovernment also produce many or few regulations of entry Thecontrol for the level of development is crucial (and in fact ourresults without this control are signicantly stronger) Marketfailures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poorcountries than in rich ones Moreover our measures of goodgovernment are uniformly higher in richer countries Withoutincome controls our political variables may just proxy for incomelevels Imagine for example that the consumers in poor countriesare exposed to a larger risk from bad rms entering their marketsand selling goods of inferior quality The Pigouvian plannerwould then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorercountries
Holding per capita income constant countries with morelimited and representative governments have statistically sig-nicantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using ve out ofsix measures of better government14 These results show thatcountries with more limited governments governments moreopen to competition and greater political rights have lighterregulation of entry even holding per capita income constantFigure IV plots the number of procedures against the autocracyscore and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy Reg-ulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam andMozambique and light in democratic countries such as AustraliaCanada New Zealand and the United States
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressionssignicantly The interpretation of this result is clouded bothbecause there are problems of multicollinearity with the politicalvariables and because the direction of causation is unclear In thepublic choice theory burdensome regulation reects transfers
14 Results are signicant in all six regressions when we use time ratherthan number of procedures as the dependent variable In contrast results areinsignicant in three regressions (competition in the legislaturersquos nominatingprocess autocracy and political rights) when using cost as the dependentvariable
33THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
from entrepreneurs or consumers which are likely to be distor-tionary and hence associated with lower levels of income Coun-tries may be poor because regulation is hostile to new businessformation
Holding per capita income constant countries of FrenchGerman and Socialist legal origin have more regulations thanEnglish legal origin countries while countries of Scandinavianlegal origin have about the same The result that civil law coun-tries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entrymore heavily supports the view that the legal origin proxies forthe statersquos proclivity to intervene in economic life [La Porta et al1999] However note that in itself this evidence does not discrimi-nate among the alternative theories in the same way as theevidence on democracy does French origin countries mightmerely be more prepared to deal with market failures than com-mon law countries
These results are broadly consistent with the public choicetheory that sees regulation as a mechanism to create rents forpoliticians and the rms they support The public choice theorypredicts that such rent extraction should be moderated by bettergovernment to the extent that outcomes in such regimes come
FIGURE IVAutocracy and Number of Procedures
The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against theautocracy score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries inour sample with nonmissing data for the autocracy score
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
closer to representing the preferences of the public In contrastthese results are more difcult to reconcile with public interestunless one identies it with political systems of countries such asBolivia Mozambique or Vietnam where corruption is wide-spread governments are unlimited and property rights insecureOf course it is possible that autocratic countries would performeven worse in the absence of heavy regulation because marketfailures are larger and alternative mechanisms of social controlare inferior Such a possibility strikes us as remote especiallysince we hold the level of development constant
VI CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries showsthat even aside from the costs associated with corruption andbureaucratic delay business entry is extremely expensive espe-cially in the countries outside the top quartile of the incomedistribution We nd that heavier regulation of entry is generallyassociated with greater corruption and a larger unofcial econ-omy but not with better quality of private or public goods Wealso nd that the countries with less limited less democratic andmore interventionist governments regulate entry more heavilyeven controlling for the level of economic development
This evidence is difcult to reconcile with public interesttheories of regulation but supports the public choice approachespecially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction bypoliticians [McChesney 1987 Shleifer and Vishny 1993] Entry isregulated more heavily by less democratic governments and suchregulation does not yield visible social benets The principalbeneciaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucratsthemselves
WORLD BANK
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT YALE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY
REFERENCES
Acemoglu Daron and Thierry Verdier ldquoThe Choice between Market Failures andCorruptionrdquo American Economic Review XC (2000) 194ndash211
Banerjee Abhijit ldquoA Theory of Misgovernancerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsCXII (1997) 1289ndash1332
35THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
Central Intelligence Agency CIA World Factbook (2001) published online httpwwwciagovciapublicationsfactbook
Chidzero Anne-Marie ldquoSenegalrdquo in The Informal Sector and Micronance Insti-tutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (Washington DCThe World Bank 1996)
De Long J Bradford and Andrei Shleifer ldquoPrinces and Merchants European CityGrowth before the Industrial Revolutionrdquo Journal of Law and EconomicsXXXVI (1993) 671ndash702
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoThe Regulation of Laborrdquo Harvard University manuscript in prepara-tion 2001a
Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlei-fer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo Harvard University 2001b
Djankov Simeon Caralee McLiesh Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer ldquoWhoOwns the Mediardquo NBER Working Paper No 8288 2001
De Soto Hernando The Other Path (New York NY Harper and Row 1990)Freedom House Freedom of the World (New York NY Freedom House 2001)Friedman Eric Simon Johnson Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton
ldquoDodging the Grabbing Hand The Determinants of Unofcial Activity in 69Countriesrdquo Journal of Public Economics LXXVI (2000) 459ndash 494
Henisz Witold Jerzy ldquoThe Institutional Environment for Economic GrowthrdquoEconomics and Politics XII (2000) 1ndash31
Institute for International Management Development World CompetitivenessReport (Lausanne Switzerland IMD 2001)
Jaggers Keith and Monty G Marshall ldquoPolity IV Projectrdquo Center for Inter-national Development and Conict Management University of Maryland2000
Johnson Simon Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer ldquoThe Unofcial Econ-omy in Transitionrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1997)159ndash239
Kasnakoglu Zehra and Munur Yayla ldquoUnrecorded Economy in Turkey A Mone-tary Approachrdquo (1999) in Informal Sector in Turkey Volume I Tuncer Bu-lutay ed (Ankara Turkey SIS forthcoming)
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279
La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Cristian Pop-Eleches and AndreiShleifer ldquoGuarantees of Freedomrdquo manuscript Harvard University 2001
McChesney Fred S ldquoRent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoryof Regulationrdquo Journal of Legal Studies XVI (1987) 101ndash118
Olson Mancur ldquoAutocracy Democracy and Prosperityrdquo in Richard Zeckhausered Strategy of Choice (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991)
Peltzman Sam ldquoToward a More General Theory of Regulationrdquo Journal of Lawand Economics XIX (1976) 211ndash240
Pigou Arthur C The Economics of Welfare 4th ed (London Macmillan and Co1938)
Reynolds Thomas H and Arturo A Flores Foreign Law Current Sources ofCodes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World (Littleton CO F BRothman 1989)
Sananikone Ousa ldquoBurkina Fasordquo in The Informal Sector and MicronanceInstitutions in West Africa Leila Webster and Peter Fidler eds (WashingtonDC The World Bank 1996)
Schneider Friedrich ldquoThe Value Added of Underground Activities Size andMeasurement of Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force Allover the Worldrdquo mimeo 2000
Schneider Friedrich and Dominik H Enste ldquoShadow Economies Size Causesand Consequencesrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 77ndash114
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny ldquoCorruptionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics CVIII (1993) 599ndash617
36 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Shleifer Andrei and Robert W Vishny The Grabbing Hand Government Pa-thologies and their Cures (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1998)
SRI International International Practices and Experiences in Business StartupProcedures (Arlington VA SRI 1999)
Stigler George J ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo Bell Journal of Econom-ics and Management Science II (1971) 3ndash21
Tullock Gordon ldquoThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopoly and Theftrdquo WesternEconomic Journal V (1967) 224ndash232
Turnham David Bernard Salome and Antoine Schwartz The Informal SectorRevisited (Paris OECD 1990)
World Bank ldquoAdministrative Barriers to Investment in Africa The Red TapeAnalysisrdquo FIAS Washington DC 1999
mdashmdash World Development Indicators (Washington DC The World Bank 2001)World Economic Forum The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 Klaus Schwab
et al eds (New York NY Oxford University Press 2001)World Health Organization Causes of Death and Life Birth Statistics (Geneva
Switzerland World Health Organization 1998)
37THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
component of the cost that goes to the government which in thesample averages about half the total cost The results for this costvariable are generally weaker than for the total out-of-pocketcost but go in the same direction Our basic cost estimates alsoignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurrsquos time and theforgone prots associated with bureaucratic delay To addressthis concern we calculate a ldquofull costrdquo measure which adds up theofcial expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepre-neurrsquos time valuing his time at the countryrsquos per capita incomeper working day We report this number below and have repli-cated the analysis using it as a measure of cost The resultsobtained using this cost measure are very similar to those usingthe raw data on time and cost and hence are not presented
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up arm in our sample The procedures are further divided by theirfunction screening (a residual category which generally aims tokeep out ldquounattractiverdquo projects or entrepreneurs) health andsafety labor taxes and environment The basic procedure instarting up a business present everywhere is registering withthe Companiesrsquo Registry This can take more than one proceduresometimes there is a ldquopreliminary licenserdquo and a ldquonalrdquo licenseCombined with that procedure or as a separate procedure is thecheck for uniqueness of the proposed company name Add-onprocedures comprise the requirements to notarize the CompanyDeeds to open a bank account and deposit of start-up capital andto publish a notication of the companyrsquos establishment in anofcial or business paper Additional screening procedures thatinclude obtaining different certicates and ling with agenciesother than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays as is thecase in Madagascar Another set of basic screening procedurespresent in almost every country in the data set covers certainmandatory municipal procedures registrations with statisticalofces and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respec-tive Ministries) In the Dominican Republic these procedures takeseven procedures and fourteen days There is large cross-countryvariation in terms of the number time and cost of screeningprocedures as the Company Registry performs many of thesetasks automatically in the most efcient countries but the entre-preneur does much of the legwork in the less efcient ones
Additional procedures appear in four areas The rst coverstax-related procedures which require seven procedures andtwenty days in Madagascar The second is labor regulations
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE ILIST OF PROCEDURES FOR STARTING UP A COMPANY
This table provides a list of common procedures required to start up acompany in the 85 countries of the sample
1 Screening procedures- Certify business competence- Certify a clean criminal record- Certify marital status- Check the name for uniqueness- Notarize company deeds- Notarize registration certicate- File with the Statistical Bureau- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry of the Economy or the
respective ministries by line of business- Notify municipality of start-up date- Obtain certicate of compliance with the company law- Obtain business license (operations permit)- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)- Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital- Perform an ofcial audit at start-up- Publish notice of company foundation- Register at the Companies Registry- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association2 Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employeesrsquo income tax from the company payrollfunds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes- File with the Ministry of Finance- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities- Register for corporate income tax- Register for VAT- Register for state taxes- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities- Seal validate rubricate accounting books
3 Laborsocial security-related requirements- File with the Ministry of Labor- Issue employment declarations for all employees- Notarize the labor contract- Pass inspections by social security ofcials- Register for accident and labor risk insurance- Register for health and medical insurance- Register with pension funds- Register for Social Security- Register for unemployment insurance- Register with the housing fund
4 Safety and health requirements- Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the
Health Ministry- Pass inspections and obtain certicates related to work safety building re
sanitation and hygiene5 Environment-related requirements
- Issue environmental declaration- Obtain environment certicate- Obtain sewer approval- Obtain zoning approval- Pass inspections from environmental ofcials- Register with the water management and water discharge authorities
11THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
which require seven procedures and 21 days in Bolivia The thirdarea is health and safety regulations which demand ve proce-dures and 21 business days in Malawi The nal area coverscompliance with environmental regulations which take two pro-cedures and ten days in Malawi if all goes well
Figures I and II describe the number time and cost of theprocedures needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand andFrance respectively New Zealandrsquos streamlined start-up processtakes only three procedures and three days The entrepreneurmust rst obtain approval for the company name from the web-site of the Registrar of Companies and then apply online forregistration with both the Registrar of Companies and the taxauthorities
In contrast the process in France takes 15 procedures and 53days To begin the founder needs to check the chosen companyname for uniqueness at the Institut National de la ProprieteIndustrielle (INPI) He then needs the mayorrsquos permit to use hishome as an ofce (If the ofce is to be rented the founder mustsecure a notarized lease agreement) The following documentsmust then be obtained each from a different authority proof of a
FIGURE IStart-up Procedures in New Zealand
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita (GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
12 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
clean criminal record an original extract of the entrepreneurrsquoscerticate of marital status from the City Hall and a power ofattorney The start-up capital is then deposited with a notarybank or Caisse des Depots and is blocked there until proof ofregistration is provided Notarization of the Articles of Associa-tion follows A notice stating the location of the headquartersofce is published in a journal approved for legal announcementsand evidence of the publication is obtained Next the founderregisters four copies of the articles of association at the local taxcollection ofce He then les a request for registration with theCentre de Formalites des Entreprises (CFE) which handles dec-larations of existence and other registration-related formalitiesThe CFE must process the documents or return them in case therequest is incomplete The CFE automatically enters the com-pany information in the Registre Nationale des Entreprises(RNE) and obtains from the RNE identication numbers numeroSIRENE (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoire des Entre-prises) numero SIRET (Systeme Informatique pour le Repertoiredes Etablissements) and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activi-tees Francaises) The SIRET is used by among others the tax
FIGURE IIStart-up Procedures in France
Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in thetext box The time required to complete each procedure is described by the heightof the bar and measured against the left scale Cumulative costs (as a percentageof per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale
13THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
authorities The RNE also publishes a notice of the companyformation in the ofcial bulletin of civil and commercial an-nouncements The rm then obtains a proof of registration formldquoK-bisrdquo which is effectively its identity card To start legal opera-tions the entrepreneur completes ve additional procedures in-form the post ofce of the new enterprise designate a bondsmanor guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit unblock thecompanyrsquos capital by ling with the bank a proof of registration(K-bis) have the rmrsquos ledgers and registers initialed and le forsocial security The magazine LrsquoEntreprise comments ldquoTo be surethat the le for the Company Registry is complete many promot-ers check it with a counselorrsquos service which costs FF200 in Paris(about US$30) But therersquos always something missing and mostentrepreneurs end up using a lawyer to complete the procedurerdquo
III BASIC RESULTS
Table II describes all the variables used in this study TableIII presents the basic information from our sample Countries areranked in ascending order rst by the total number of entryprocedures then by the time it takes to complete them andnally by the cost of entry We classify each procedure as one ofve types safety and health environmental tax labor and aresidual category which we label ldquoscreeningrdquo whose purpose un-der the public interest theory is to weed out the undesirableentrepreneurs We then compute and report the total number ofprocedures and their breakdown into our ve categories for eachcountry We also report the minimum number of business daysthat are ofcially required to comply with entry regulations thecosts arising from the ofcial fees and the total costs whichimpute the entrepreneurrsquos time (as a fraction of GDP per capita)Finally we take averages by income level and report t-testscomparing the regulation of entry across income groups
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation acrosscountries The total number of procedures ranges from 2 in Can-ada to 21 in the Dominican Republic and averages 1048 for thewhole sample Very few entry regulations cover tax and laborissues The worldwide average number of labor and tax proce-dures are 194 and 202 respectively Procedures involving envi-ronmental issues and safety and health matters are even rarer(014 and 034 procedures on average respectively) Insteadmuch of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
category of screening procedures The worldwide average numberof such procedures facing a new entrant is 604
The number of procedures is highly correlated with both thetime and cost variables (see Table VI) The correlation of the (log)number of procedures with (log) time is 083 and with (log) cost is064 Translated into economic terms this means that entrepre-neurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and delays in countriesthat make intense use of ex ante screening For example com-pleting 19 procedures demands 149 business days and 1115percent of GDP per capita in Mozambique In Italy the completionof 16 procedures takes up 62 business days and 20 percent of GDPper capita The Dominican Republic is in a class of its owncompleting its 21 procedures requires 80 business days and feesof at least 463 times per capita GDP These gures are admit-tedly extreme within the sample yet meeting the ofcial entryrequirements in the average sample country requires roughly 47days and fees of 47 percent of GDP per capita
When we aggregate time and out-of-pocket costs into anaggregate cost measure the results for some countries becomeeven more extreme The world average full cost measure rises to66 percent of per capita GDP but varies from 17 percent of percapita GDP for New Zealand to 495 times per capita GDP in theDominican Republic
Panel B of Table III reports averages of the total number ofprocedures and its components time and cost by quartiles of percapita GDP in 1999 Two patterns emerge First the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita Theaverage cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the topquartile of per capita GDP (ldquorich countriesrdquo) is 10 percent andrises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of percapita GDP This pattern merely reects the fact that the incomeelasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 02 Second countries inthe top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures andtheir entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal busi-ness than those in the remaining countries7 The total number ofprocedures in an average rich country is 68 which is signicantlylower than the rest-of-sample average of 118 (t-statistics are
7 One objection to this nding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries mightface more postentry regulations than they do in poor countries We have data onone aspect of postentry regulation namely the regulation of labor markets (seeDjankov et al [2001a]) The numbers of entry and of labor market regulations arepositively correlated across countries contrary to this objection
15THE REGULATION OF ENTRY
TA
BL
EII
TH
EV
AR
IAB
LE
S
Thi
sta
ble
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
les
coll
ecte
dfo
rth
e85
cou
ntri
esin
clud
edin
our
stud
yT
her
stco
lum
ngi
ves
the
nam
eof
the
vari
able
The
seco
nd
colu
mn
desc
ribe
sth
eva
riab
lean
dpr
ovid
esth
eso
urce
sfr
omw
hic
hit
was
coll
ecte
d
Var
iabl
eD
escr
ipti
on
Nu
mbe
rof
proc
edu
res
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
inor
der
toob
tain
ale
gal
stat
usi
e
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ula
tion
sS
afet
yamp
Hea
lth
The
num
ber
ofdi
ffere
ntsa
fety
and
heal
thpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
lent
ity
Sour
ceA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
E
nvir
onm
ent
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
ten
viro
nm
enta
lpr
oced
ure
sth
ata
star
t-up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
uth
orsrsquo
own
calc
ulat
ion
sT
axes
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tta
xpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
wit
hto
star
top
erat
ing
asa
lega
len
tity
So
urce
Aut
hors
rsquoow
nca
lcul
atio
ns
Lab
orT
he
num
ber
ofdi
ffer
ent
labo
rpr
oced
ures
that
ast
art-
up
has
toco
mpl
yw
ith
tost
art
oper
atin
gas
ale
gal
enti
tyS
ourc
eA
utho
rsrsquoo
wn
calc
ulat
ions
S
cree
ning
Th
enu
mbe
rof
diff
eren
tst
eps
that
ast
art-
upha
sto
com
ply
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orde
rto
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stra
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ica
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atar
eno
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ated
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hsa
fety
and
heal
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the
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ronm
ent
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sor
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rS
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eA
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rsrsquoo
wn
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ulat
ion
sT
ime
Th
eti
me
itta
kes
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tain
lega
lst
atus
toop
erat
ea
rm
in
busi
ness
days
Aw
eek
has
ve
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ness
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am
onth
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twen
ty-t
wo
Sou
rce
Au
thor
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lcul
atio
ns
Cos
tT
he
cost
ofob
tain
ing
lega
lst
atus
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erat
ea
rm
asa
shar
eof
per
capi
taG
DP
in19
99I
tin
clu
des
all
iden
tia
ble
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ial
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nses
(fee
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sts
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pan
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uth
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ulat
ions
C
ost
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Th
eco
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rca
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GD
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1999
It
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ude
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enti
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eof
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lex
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ees
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edur
esan
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phot
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alan
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rene
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The
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eof
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me
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pan
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eG
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99S
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eA
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ula
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ual
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ater
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k[2
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16 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Dea
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hem
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ank
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tldquoC
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ket
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Cor
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Fre
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Hou
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allu
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the
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nom
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Inte
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(4)
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Des
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pure
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98S
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[200
0]
Con
stra
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don
the
num
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Ave
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1945
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Sou
rce
Hen
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[200
1]
Eff
ecti
vene
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Inde
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