Journal of Ethnophilosophical Questions and Global Ethics · Journal of Ethnophilosophical...

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Journal of Ethnophilosophical

Questions and Global Ethics

VOL 1, ISSUE 2 (2017)

Open access peer review journal

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Imprint

Chief Editor: Timo Schmitz

Co-editor: Iulian Mitran

Reviewers: Timo Schmitz, Iulian Mitran, Nikolay Kuznetsov

Contact:

Timo Schmitz c/o Papyrus Autoren-Club, R.O.M. Logicware GmbH Pettenkoferstr. 16-18 10247 Berlin GERMANY E-Mail: [email protected]

Publisher/ Issuer: Journal of Ethnophilosophical Questions and Global Ethics Timo Schmitz Trier, Germany Website: www.ethnophilosophical-journal.de

This magazine is published under CC-BY-ND 3.0 license.

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/deed.en

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Table of Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................................................. 4

NATALIA SCHELCHKOVA: The participation of Russian Orthodox Church in public and social life of the

Russian Federation .................................................................................................................................. 5

YANNICK ESSENGUE: « Emplois et réemplois de la philosophie » : la philosophie africaine en

question(s)/ « Use and re-use of philosophy » : African philosophy questioned ................................. 17

NIKOLAY KUZNETSOV: «Christ Was a Jew-Baiter». Religious Beliefs of William Dudley Pelley and Rev.

Charles Edward Coughlin as Part of Their Political Ideologies .............................................................. 36

IULIAN MITRAN: Dabbling with Ethics: How moral values impact of our immediate social environment?

............................................................................................................................................................... 44

TIMO SCHMITZ: The Juche philosophy of North Korea – Philosophical Content and Practical Failure 52

LAVA MELLA: Über Toleranz und Extremismus im Islam/ On Tolerance and Extremism in Islam ....... 58

TIMO SCHMITZ: Imereti – In between Georgian centralism and local identity in language ................ 63

IULIAN MITRAN: Exploring Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy’s Exotic Brand of Christianity. What makes Christian

Science unique in the religious landscape of Christian America? ......................................................... 66

ALEXANDRU DRĂGULIN: James Heartfield, The European Union and the End of Politics, Manchester

(UK)/ Washington (USA): Zero Books, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-78099-950-0 ............................................... 72

SANDRA HERNANDEZ: Artwork: "Ensemble" ....................................................................................... 75

Bibliography for the study of Gagauzian Turks (Balkan Turkic Peoples) ............................................... 76

Contributors .......................................................................................................................................... 78

Journal of Ethnophilosophical Questions and Global Ethics – Vol. 1 (2), 2017 __________________________________________________________________________________

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Foreword

Timo Schmitz Chief Editor

Dear readers,

We are sure that you are overly busy in buying gifts for your beloved ones for Christmas, preparing

your holidays and rushing right to the New Year. It was a long way for us to set up this journal and we

are very happy that we managed to publish already two issues this year. We received a lot of

interesting articles and in this issue we mainly brought together religious and socio-ethical topics,

including one article about ethnophilosophy in the Tempelsian tradition and Eboussi stance on it,

written by Yannick Essengue . In addition, this issue includes an artwork by Sandra Hernandez and a

review by Alexandru Drăgulin, the latter one focusses on the European Union. We hope that all of you

will enjoy the end of this year, that all your wishes may come true and hope that we can count on you

in the following year with new, fresh ambitions.

Sincerely yours,

Timo Schmitz, 12 December 2017

Leif Lieser,

Bestëmmt sidd dir zur Zait vill domader beschäftëgt Ierch fir Famille a Frënn Chrëschtkadoen ze kaafen,

Vakanz firzebereden an durch dkommen Joer ze zeihen. Et waar fir eis ee laangen Wéi dat heiten

Journal opzebauen an mir sinn zefridden dass mir schon zwee Exemplarer rausbruecht hunn. Mir hunn

vill interessant Artikelen ragereecht krut an hunn an dësem Exemplar eng fuerweg Mëschung vu relieis,

wéi och sozi-ethësch Sujeen zesummengestaalt, inkusiv en Atikel iwwer d’Ethnophilosphie no Tempels

vun der Perspektiv vun Eboussi, geschriwwen vu Yannick Essengue. Zousetzlech befend sech dorin

nach ee Konschtwierk vun Sandra Hernandez an eng Rezensioun zu engem Buch iwer d Europäesch

Unioun vun Alexandru Dragulin. Mir hoffen das dir de Rescht vum Joer nach geneiss, dass är Wënsch

wouer ginn an dass mir och néischt Joer mat neien Ambitiounen an Zieler op Ierch Zielen kënnen.

Vill leift Gréisser

Timo Schmitz, 12 Dezember 2017


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The participation of Russian Orthodox Church in

public and social life of the Russian Federation

Natalia Alekandrovna Schelchkova

Until 1917, Russia was considered as a country with an Orthodox tradition. Orthodoxy was the

dominant confession, but not the only one. With time, the role of the church in the political life of the

country had been constantly changing, but the church had always been taking a direct part in it. After

1917 atheism began playing the dominant role in the country - in fact, it became the new Soviet religion.

Nowadays, when Russia has begun to return to its origins, against this background, the Orthodox

Church yielded to temptation of power. This is a very strong thirst, which is extremely difficult to resist,

because the main political figures of the country are trying to popularize Orthodoxy, and the leading

television channels show their visits to church services. In essence, visiting a temple by any person is

his own business, this should not be a cause for PR for politicians or the Church. If Russia is a secular

state, the conditions should be the same for all.

«The Russian Orthodox Church does not fundamentally interfere with political agenda, but actively

cooperates with the state in social and educational issues». (Jucan, 2017: 2) Such a statement in an

interview with Romanian magazine «Q Magazine» was made by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia

Kirill. «Our Church stands on the basis of principled non-interference directly in politics. As a general

rule, the clergy are prohibited from participating in political campaigns, being nominated as candidates

for public office during elections, and participating in election campaigning. This is the core for our

independence and freedom and at the same time is a boon for the state and society » (Jucan, 2017: 3),

– edition cites the Patriarch Kirill in the run-up to his visit to Romania.

The Patriarch reminded that the Church in Russia is separated from the state by law, as in Ukraine, in

Belarus, in the states of Central Asia and other regions of the pastoral responsibility of the ROC. It is

impossible for the Orthodox hierarchy and clergymen to participate in the activities of political

organizations, in pre-election processes such as public support for political organizations or individual

candidates participating in elections, agitation etc.

There are many cases of church-wide support for various political doctrines, views, organizations and

personalities in the history of the ROC. In some cases, such support was associated with the need to

uphold the vital interests of the Church in the conditions of anti-religious persecution, destructive and


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restrictive actions of heterodox authorities. In other instances, such support was a consequence of the

pressure of the state or political structures and usually led to divisions and contradictions within the

Church, to the departure of some people infirming in their faith.

In the twentieth century clergymen and hierarchs of the ROC were members of some representative

bodies of power, in particular, the State Duma of the Russian Empire, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet

Union and of the Russian Federation, a number of local councils and legislative assemblies. In some

cases, the participation of clergymen in the activities of the authorities brought benefits to the Church

and society, but often such participation generated disorganization and division. This was particularly

the case when the membership of clergymen was allowed only in certain parliamentary fractions. At

the same time, history shows: the decision on the participation or non-participation of clergymen in

political activities was and should be made, proceeding from the needs of each particular epoch, taking

into account the internal state of the church organism and its position in the state. However, from the

canonical point of view, the question of whether a clergyman serving a public office should work on a

professional basis is decided unambiguously negatively.

On October 8, 1919, prelate Tikhon addressed to the clergy of the Russian Church with a message

urging the clergy not to interfere in the political struggle, in particular, to point out that the ministers

of the Church «at their desire to be out of any political interest, must remember the canonical rules of

the Holy Church, by which it preclude their servants from interfering in the political life of the country,

let alone make liturgical rites and sacred acts an instrument of political demonstrations ».(Department

of External Church Relations)

On the eve of the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, on December 27, 1988, the Holy Synod

decreed «to bless the representatives of our Church, in case of their nomination and election by

people's deputies, this activity, while expressing our confidence that it will serve the good of believers

and our entire society» (Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2000). In addition

to electing people's deputies of the USSR, a number of bishops and clerics took deputy seats in the

republican, provincial and local councils. The new conditions of political life prompted the Bishops'

Council of the ROC in October 1989 to pay much attention to the discussion of two issues: «firstly, how

far can the Church go in the path of taking responsibility for political decisions without questioning its

pastoral authority, and secondly, is it permissible for the Church to refuse to participate in lawmaking

and on the possibility of having a moral impact on the political process, when the fate of a country

depends on the decision making process» (The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox

Church, 2000). As a result, the Council of Bishops recognized the definition of the Holy Synod of

December 27, 1988, relevant only to the past elections. For the future, the order was adopted,

according to which the question of the expediency of participation of representatives of the clergy in


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the election campaign should be decided in advance in each specific case by the hierarchy. Some

representatives of the clergy, not having received the proper blessing, nevertheless took part in the

elections. On March 20, 1990, the Holy Synod declared that «the Russian Orthodox Church removes

moral and religious responsibility for the participation of these persons in elected bodies of power»

(The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2000).

Showing leniency, the Synod refrained from applying the relying sanctions to the violators of discipline,

«stating that such behavior lays on their conscience». On October 8, 1993, because of the

establishment of a professional parliament in Russia, it was decided at an enlarged meeting of the Holy

Synod to instruct clergymen to refrain from participating in the Russian parliamentary elections as

candidates for deputies. The corresponding Synodal definition established that the clergy that violated

it were subject to an eruption from dignity. The Bishops' Council of the ROC of 1994 approved this

definition of the Holy Synod as «timely and wise», and extended its action «to the participation in the

future of the clergy of the ROC in the election of any representative bodies of the CIS and Baltic

countries, both at the national and local levels» (The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian

Orthodox Church, 2000).

The Council of Bishops that happened in 1997 developed the principles of relationship between the

Church and political organizations and reinforced one of decisions of the previous Council, by not

blessing the priests to be political organizations’ members. The Council «On the relationship with the

government and the secular society» says: «To welcome a dialogue and contacts between the Church

and political organizations only provided these contacts don’t any have political supporting

background or motive. To consider the cooperation with these organizations valid or permissible in

case it brings goodness to the Church and nation, except interpreting this cooperation as political

support. To consider invalid a participation of bishops and priests in any pre-election agitation and

their membership in political associations, regulations of which assume their candidates to have

elective government posts of any level» (The definition of the Bishops' Council of 1997 «On the

relationship with the state and secular society», 2008).

Needless to say, that non-participation of the religious majority in the parties’ activities and in pre-

elections does not mean its total denial to express its opinion about issues concerning the society,

denial to represent its position in front of authorities of any countries on any level. The position is

represented by cathedrals, the hierarchy and its members. Anyway, the right to express its viewpoints

cannot be given to governmental establishments, political and secular organizations.


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Despite the denial to participate in government activity, the actions of ROC for a very long time are

interpreted ambiguously and cause negative attitudes among the majority of people in Russian

Federation. And some groups show extremely negative attitude to its actions.

The staff members of private research organization «Levada-center» published the results of their

latest survey (2016), according to which about 66% of the people in Russia think that ROC mustn’t

interfere in the affairs of the country and somehow influence the final decisions on the governmental

level. Moreover, about 57% of participants pointed, that the government mustn’t follow any religious

or antireligious beliefs. Taking the statistics into account, it is obvious that ROC sometimes expands

the spectrum of its functions and goes beyond its powers, not even being afraid to be caught by law

In 2007 Russian scientists sent a letter to the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, where they expressed

their concern about «rising clericalization of the Russian community» and «interference of the Russian

Orthodox Church into all sides of public life». Ten scientists, with the Nobel laureates (Zhores Alferov)

and Andrey Vorobyov, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and corresponding member

of the RAS Michael Sadovsky among them, signed an appeal. In the appeal the academics criticized the

resolutions of the XI World Russian People's Council. Indignation of the academicians was caused by

the ROC’s call to the government to make a new subject «Fundamentals of Orthodox culture»

compulsory in all schools.

The Alexy II’s circular, addressed to «all eparchial bishops», states, that «we won’t solve moral

education issues concerning future generations without drawing attention to the public education

system». The final part of the document says: «if there would be issues in teaching of «Basics of the

Orthodox faith», rename the course into «Fundamentals of Orthodox culture», and this won’t cause

any objections among teachers and principals in secular educational facilities, raised on the atheistic

basis». According to this text, while wearing the mask of «Fundamentals of Orthodox culture» they try

to insert (and again avoiding the Constitution) the «Law of God».

«The Council thinks that studying «Fundamentals of Orthodox culture» is essential in our state, where

the absolute majority of population is orthodox. Is it really good to treat other confessions so

contemptuously? – say the academicians. – isn’t it similar to orthodox chauvinism?» (1999) In addition

to that, scientists also are perplexed about ROC’s suggestion to make «theology» a scientific specialty:

«On what basis a theology – a set of religious dogmas – should be referred to scientific disciplines? –

say the authors of the message. – Science must operate its facts, logics, evidence, but far not by the

faith» (2007). Academicians think, that «making the church a government agency – is an obvious

contravention of the Constitution of the country», which proclaims the separation of church and public

education system.


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In order to support academicians’ letter, the representatives of the Muslim society stated their concern

about the current process of clericalization. The head of the Public Chamber Commission on the

matters of regional development and provincial government, Vyacheslav Glazychev, supported them,

too. During the debate of the annual «Status of civil society in RF» report, he took the initiative to

discuss «the intense meddling of Church into government affairs». «I respect the Church, but in our

country, it is separated from the government. This intense meddling of Church into all government

affairs, instead of doing its own parish job, - is undue», - stated V. Glazychev, encouraging to resist the

«creeping clericalism» (2007).

The indignation of the Head of the Commission is particularly caused by «assertive injection of the

Word of God in schools». «If there were Sunday schools, it would be normal, but we are talking about

public schools. The insertion of this subject in schools is a clear invasion in the state, and the

community keeps staying silent, but those who try to resist suffer from ostracism», - he noticed.

According to V. Glazychev, nowadays in Russian community «the mix of devilry, nonsense -

obscurantist divinations, ghosts, UFOs – and an undue influence of Church is common and ordinary».

«I think it’s time to stand for the principles of normal, tolerant, but secular state» – claimed the Head

of the Public chamber Commission.

In response to the letter of ten academicians, ROC announced, that «Russian Orthodox Church

accepted and esteemed science in the past, as today it accepts and esteems it» (Kozitskij, 2007). But

in February 2015 the Head of ROC, the Patriarch Kirill offered The Ministry of education to expand the

school course «Basics of religious cultures and secular ethics», which is introduced since 2012, and to

teach students from the 2nd to the 9th grade. In the current school program «Basics of religious

cultures and secular ethics» is studied in the 4th grade of the secondary school. Students and parents

have a right to choose a certain module: «Basics of orthodox culture», «Basics of Islamic culture»,

«Basics of Jewish culture», «and Basics of Buddhist culture», «Basics of worldwide religious cultures»

or «Basics of secular ethics». Since 2015 «Basics of moral culture of nations of Russia», has been added

to the school program, which has been planned to become the next level of «Basics of religious cultures

and secular ethics».

Attempts to interfere into the sphere of education – is a contravention of the principal of secular

education. But, as we can see, ROC since the early 2000s shows an apparent neglect of Russian

legislation.

Thus, the resolution #349-pg on the assignment of the rank of» honorary citizen of Leningrad region»

to the «Holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Alexy II» for «enhancement of civil peace and revival

of moral traditions on the territory of the Leningrad region»(2001).


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However, the statement above, in our opinion, contradicts current legislation and reality for the

following reasons:

1. According to paragraph 1 of article 6 of the Constitution «Citizenship Of The Russian Federation…,

is uniform…» and up to paragraph 1 of article 1 Russia – is a federal (nor confederal) state. Thus, there

cannot be any «citizen» of Leningrad region and «honorary citizen» of Leningrad region.

2. The Civil War on the territory of Leningrad region was over even until 1920, and no civil disturbances

happened since then, therefore, Alexy II couldn’t «enhance civil peace» in the absence of civil tension,

and this deed, attributed to Alexy II, does not conform to a reality.

3. «Revival of moral traditions» by the «Holy Patriarch» is nothing else like revival of church (religious)

traditions. According to article 14 of Constitution, «Russia – is a secular state» and «religious

associations are separated from the state», that is why religious activity cannot be qualified as a credit

to the state, which Leningrad region is the subject of.

4. By the mentioned resolution, the governor of Leningrad region, V.P. Serdyukov, seized his position

for the forming of laudatory attitude towards religion, which violates paragraph 4 of article 4 of Federal

law «On the freedom of conscience and religious associations».

5. Any document that has personal reference must identify a physical person by surname, name and

patronymic in accordance to the document of the established sample, certifying an identity, but not

by pseudonym, nickname, number etc. The identification of a physical person in mentioned resolution

as «Alexy II» makes the resolution legally insignificant and void and not enforceable.

A big commotion in the society is caused by the events connected to the accepting of the Federal law

№ 327-F3, dating back to November 30, 2010 «On the handover of property of religious use, previously

being state or municipal, to religious organizations». On the October 19, 2017 the meeting of the state

Duma Committee on the civil society development and issues concerning public and religious

assignments happened again. There was a speech of Deputy Head of Federal agency on management

of state property, Igor Babushkin, on the realization of the Federal law «On the handover of property

of religious use, previously being state or municipal, to religious organizations». The representative of

the Ministry points out that the process of the handover moved to a completely new level. By the data

of The Federal property management Agency, 482 objects were absolutely legally handed over to

religious organizations during the last 4 years (Federal Agency of the State Property Management).

Also, in the development of legislation on monuments of history and culture, along with the Ministry

of culture and the Ministry of economic development of Russian Federation, requirements regarding

documental structure were optimized, requirements on provision of security service were excluded,


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which made possible to shorten the procedure of application consideration and to avoid unjustified

refusals.

To summarize the meeting, Chairman of the Committee, Sergey Gavrilov, noticed that practice showed

the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal law «On the handover of property of religious use,

previously being state or municipal, to religious organizations», which in full measure protects the

rights of religious organizations as well as state organizations, occupying the property, and at this stage

there are no significant changes needed. Nevertheless, prior events say the opposite.

In the beginning of August 2000, it’s became known that the cultural Center in the name of Dzerzhinsky

of the city of Penza, being previously the property of Open joint-stock company «RZD», was handed

over to ROC. 400 children studied in that building. From 1884 to 1917 there was a Bogoyavlenskaya

church at the site of the cultural Center, and this fact served as ground for handing the building over

to the Church. In 1923 the Bolsheviks made the church a railway property, administration of which

established a club for its employee and their children.

Similar story happened to the museum of cosmonautics of the city of Orenburg with an attendance of

more than 3000 people a year. A special honor of this museum – is personal belongings and gear of

soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, who graduated from local flight school. But long before Yuri Gagarin

was born, and cosmonautics was founded, here was an Orthodox Seminary – and more than one

hundred years later exactly this reason gives local representatives of ROC the right to claim the area.

After the collapse of the USSR a part of the building was given back to local diocese – now it wants to

take the whole building. The Museum staff is sure that museum exposition is impossible to be moved,

and it would be destroyed, because it «was made to last». Now city authorities are looking for a new

space for a Museum – the issue of handing the building to the diocese, to say, is already solved, but,

unless a suitable building for the Museum is found, there will be no icons and candles in the place of

Yuri Gagarin’s spacesuit.

In Novocherkassk, in the Rostov region, the battle between local diocese and Cossacks is occurred.

Today, there is an administration of the Cossack stanitsa «Srednyaya» on the Kirpichnaya St., 72 ROC

claims that the building had belonged to Mikhailovsky church earlier, though the church owned it just

for 5 years, and after, there was an elementary school there. Now, atamans of Cossack troops regularly

gather there. On the June 17, 2017, they sent a letter to the Patriarch of all Russia and to the President

or Russia with a request to moderate local diocese’s appetites. For many years now, diocese is planning

to open a school there. Cossacks say that they are ready to give an area with 120 seats in the

administration building. But church representatives weren’t satisfied by the deal – they insist on


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change of ownership. As the Cossacks say, this year the city administration supported eparchy and

unilaterally terminated the rental agreement due to handing the building over to ROC.

In January 2015 the authorities of Kaliningrad suggested to erect a 10-metres high monument to Knyaz

Vladimir near the Pobeda square. For the embodiment of the idea the authorities decided to hand over

the area next to the square for free use to the ROC. As city officials said later, the cost of the area –

was 5 015 358 rubles. The suggestion was supported by 20 deputies of the city’s council, two of them

abstained. The monument is supposed to be erected this year, though the sculptor, Vladimir Surovtsev,

on the January, 19 (before the vote) told «Komsomolskaya Pravda» that authorities are suggesting that

he finds money for the monument himself. By sculptor’s estimations, he needs 16-20 million rubles to

erect the monument. In 2016 the city administration allowed the Kaliningrad ROC eparchy to build an

orthodox Spiritual and Enlightenment Center with total area of 5,6 thousand square meters.

At the end of July 2017, the Saint Petersburg administration property relations Committee handed

over 4,7 thousand square meters of land in the Komarovo village to the ROC for free use. The cost of

the land is estimated at 30 million rubles. According to the Land code, the ROC has the right to get the

territory only if there is a real estate belonging to ROC. Actually, there is «Church» realty – Saint

Petersburg and Ladoga Metropolitan Varsonophiy’s summer cottage is situated there. In accordance

to 2005 data, there is a house of 212 square meters and a house for the maid of 144 square meters.

What has become known recently, the ROC is planning to take a parking lot in Komarovo – now a

chapel construction is coming to an end there, though there isn’t any permissive documentation for

the construction. «Novaya gazeta» of Saint Petersburg says that the church officials expect to legalize

the construction in hindsight and are certain that the governor «will make a politic decision».

In the Vysha Township of the Ryazan region Svyato-Uspensk monastery not only encroaches municipal

buildings or municipal land, but private property of residents. In 1917 the monastery was closed and

all its property, including buildings and land, was given to the state. In 1930s a mental hospital was

founded, and in 1970s the employees were given apartments in buildings within the territory of the

hospital. In 1990s residents privatized their apartments, and later, the hospital relocated. The

government decided then to hand over several buildings that had earlier belonged to the monastery

to ROC. In 2011, as a result of clandestine land surveying all privatized buildings became a part of

federal property – people were called «invaders» of monastery’s land and their gardens and backyards

– illegal. They demolished even the outside WC – and the court suggested the family, that had owned

WC, to «go to the forest, it’s nearby». In fact, the residents were ready to move out from the monastery

space – but they weren’t given any other home, and possible monetary compensation is so small that

you can’t even purchase new housing. 23 families suffered from the pressure of the monastery - there

is even a woman among them, who was once a prisoner of a concentration camp.


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In July there were protests in defense of territory of the Proletarsky Park from the claims of the ROC

in Bryansk – diocese of Bryansk intends to build another church. As city’s activists say, a new religious

edifice is going to take up to 3,5 thousand square meters of the town’s park, and the construction itself

will require to cut 80 chestnut trees. A few trees had already been cut only in order to conduct

geological research – after the research it will become clear whether it is possible to build a church

there or not. The part of the park area was handed over to Bryansk eparchy for free, and now it has

already designed a project of the Church «in honor of the Holy Royal Martyrs» (after the executed

family of an Emperor Nikolay II Romanov). Local authorities assure their neutrality in the matters of

conflict, although citizens are indignant because they were not even invited to public hearings on the

fate of the park. Eventually, in spite of trees cut down, the architectural Board of Bryansk declared the

park to be a perfect place for the church.

According to the Federal law of 30.11.2010 «On the handover of property of religious use, previously

being state or municipal, to religious organizations», the ROC has the right to rent property and

possessions, received from the state, and to carry on business. Generally, this is what the ROC does.

As a rule, the Church sets quite simple and straightforward goals: to gain property, to rent it and to

make a profit or to place its own facilities. As it would be said in Soviet times, narrow departmental

interests dominate over the wider social objectives…

It is impossible not to mention interference of the ROC in socio-cultural life of the community. In 2005

the Syktyvkar and Vorkuta’s eparchy opposed the Imperial Russian ballet «Rasputin» in Komi Republic.

Priests are sure that the use of the Tsar-Martyr (Nikolay II) – is sacrilegious and is an insult to the

memory of canonized monarch. Despite all these claims, the ballet took place. But, unfortunately, with

the requests of the diocese, plays on the works of Nikolai Gogol «Pannochka» and «Gorgeous Solokha»

were cancelled. In 2006 to the centenary of the day of birth of D. Shostakovich there was a new ballet

performance «Tale about priest and his worker Balda», based on the Shostakovich’s opera. The ballet

faced strong criticism from the Syktyvkar and Vorkuta’s eparchy, which tried to cancel the

«blasphemous performance». At the end of the day, the eparchy contacted The Ministry of culture

and national policy of the republic. After the regulation of the Minister, N. Bobrova, the play

production stopped.

In 2007 the Abbot of one of Saint Petersburg’s temples, referring to the opinion of the Moscow

patriarchy, made demands to Russian ballerina, Anastasia Volochkova, to cancel her shows in Smolniy

cathedral, threatening to excommunicate and suggested the idea that she notifies arrangers about her

falling ill. Anastasia Volochkova stated:» someone is willing to disrupt my concerts in my beloved city,

where I haven’t performed for so long. I was just shocked by the suggestion to cheat to my audience,

which came from a cleric».


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The diocese of Pskov banned the show of rock-opera «Jesus Christ - superstar», which had to take

place on May, 5 in 2009 in Pskov. Music critic, Artemy Troitskiy, commented this decision: «Our ROC

has been trying for a long time already to attribute the functions that were carried out by the

Department of ideology and propaganda of the CPSU Central Committee in the Soviet times» (2009).

On May 5, 2008 Archbishop of Ufa and Sterlitamak, Nikon (Vayukov), protested the «Worldwide run

of friendship» – an Olympic-styled international transcontinental relay race. An ideologist and a head

of the event for more than 20 years now – is Sri Chinmoy, an Indian «spiritual master» and philosopher,

who immigrated to the USA in 1964. According to the organizers, the race promotes a healthy lifestyle,

contributes to physical education, to the development of mass sport and to the development of

cultural and friendly relations between people. Archbishop stated that in Russia the race is a «demonic

craft» and that «in its definition the «Worldwide run of friendship» is a wicked promotion and a new

neoinduist sect of Sri Chinmoy’s recruitment. We request local authorities not to support a new

destructive sect of Sri Chinmoy at all, except providing security to its participants, and not to organize

any meetings, press-conferences and official greetings»(2008).

It is worth emphasizing that current Russian legislation forbids authorities to show their sympathy or

loyalty or discriminate the rights of any religious movements in any manner.

The paragraph 1 of article 4 of Federal law «On the freedom of conscience and religious associations»

states: «Officials of state authorities, other government bodies and local government bodies and

servicemen are not entitled to use their official status in order to shape certain attitude towards the

religion». Besides, in the paragraph you can find this: «Activity of government bodies and local

government bodies is not followed by any public rites or ceremonies». Seems like, it also means that

the officials don’t have a right to attend any religious activities, even more so, to participate in them.

There can’t be any religious lections or preaching in government institution, led by religious

organizations. This applies to secular educational institutions as well. In our opinion, there must be no

sign of protection of religion in any educational program, educational standard of public schools and

universities. Religious publications in government media should be combined with scientifically-

wealthy commentaries. Church constructions and the activity of the Church clergy in military units and

prisons, perhaps, should be banned too.

For about twenty years in Russia, one can observe church services, for example, at the May 9 events

held by local governments. So now officials are already openly speaking in churches, thus «forming»

their «attitude» to the Church. It has long been required to assess the compliance of the article 14 of

the Constitutional with the official statements of government officials, including Russian presidents,

governors of the Leningrad region and St. Petersburg in relation to religious confessions. And their


15 | P a g e

participation in religious events (for example the official participation on June 17, 2000 of the President

of the country, the two governors, the commander of the military district and the Minister of Railway

Transport in the opening of the monument at the Finnish Railway Station of St. Petersburg - the

Wayside cross in honor of the 2000th anniversary of Christianity).

As mentioned earlier, the illegal activities of the ROC are not only not suppressed by the state, but it

also finds support, therefore, since the beginning of the new millennium, we have seen the following

results of church intervention: the creation and functioning of state bodies for interaction with

religious organizations, and renaming in St. Petersburg the State Museum of the History of Religion

and Atheism in the Museum of the History of Religion. As well, the facts of the construction of churches

and their functioning in the military units and prisons of our country, the facts of gratuitous return

without the relevant laws on the restitution of the former property of religious associations that are

state property, etc. are appeared. Thus, we can ascertain that often in violation of the Constitution in

Russia, state policy is not based on secular character. Perhaps, it’s because in any document,

accidentally or intentionally, the essence of the term «secularity» is not revealed for some reason. Or

because the overwhelming majority of citizens of our country, and even the state and municipal

employees themselves do not know what are the specifics of secular behavior.

Although it is clear that incompatibility with religion is common to the concept of «secularism», a legal

problem arises: the law calls for the fulfillment of what is not sufficiently defined. From the experience

of history, we know that in such a situation there are always unscrupulous performers who, in the

atmosphere of general ignorance, interpret such uncertainty in their favor with the benefit for

themselves and with the damage to society.

It is generally believed that one of the most important conditions of democracy is ensuring freedom of

religion and freedom of conscience, and therefore, the rights of citizens without any fears of being

atheists or believing in God. At the same time, the state remains secular, i.e any religious organizations

are completely separate from the state. The Constitution of the Russian Federation formally meets

these requirements, but in practice they, unfortunately, are not observed. There had been increasing

cases of acts of desecularization, which contradict with the Constitution: sermons are read on state

television, various religious programs are being broadcast. Priests appeared in the army, buildings;

military facilities (including - nuclear submarines, space rockets) are «consecrated», «Holy» water is

sprinkled at various official events.

Although the fundamental principles of secularism have been known for a long time, they are not

studied in school institutions for some reason. Nobody explains the very concept of secularism, which

presupposes the freedom of conscience and rationality of consciousness with the equality of the right


16 | P a g e

to belong to any religion, and to reject it in favor of enlightened atheism, the possibility of scientific

knowledge of the world. Therefore, on the basis of this understanding, the right of everyone to master

the tools of critical attitude to any dogmatic or totalitarian systems, including religious and sectarian,

looks quite legitimate. Primary, secondary and higher schools should be guarantors of freedom of

opinion and mastery of such approaches. That is why the organization of «public, free and secular

education,» all kinds of support, including material, scientific atheistic movements and organizations,

and not religious clergy, is the constitutional duty of any secular state, and therefore its first persons -

leaders, all officials and state employees.

Literature:

1. Department of External Church Relations, Russian Orthodox Church, «CHURCH AND POLITICS»,

[«CERKOV I POLITICA»], available at: https://mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts/v

(retrieved on 24 November 2017)

2. Federal Agency of the State Property Management, «ROC», [«RPС»] available at:

https://rosim.ru/search?context=%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%86&x=0&y=0 (retrieved on 29

November 2017)

3. Jucan, F. (2017), «Patriarch KIRILL face to face with Floriana Jucan», [«Patriarhul KIRILL fata catre

fata cu Floriana Jucan»], Q MAGAZINE (ROMANIA), № 212, pp. 2-3.

4. Kozickij, I.(2007), «ROC answered academicians», [RPC otvetila akademikam], Komsomolskaja

Pravda, № 536, p. 1

5. The official website of the Moscow Patriarchate [a], «Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian

Orthodox Church», [«Osnovy socialnoj koncepcii Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi»](2000), available

at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/419128.html (retrieved on 28 November 2017)

6. The official website of the Moscow Patriarchate [b], «The definition of the Bishops' Council of

1997 «About the relationship with the state and secular society»», [«Opredelenie Arhierejskogo

Sobora 1997 g. «O vzaimootnoshenijah s gosudarstvom i svetskim obshhestvom»] (2008),

available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/418221.html (retrieved on 26 November 2017)

https://mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts/v

https://rosim.ru/search?context=%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%86&x=0&y=0

http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/419128.html

http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/418221.html


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« Emplois et réemplois de la philosophie » : la

philosophie africaine en question(s)/ « Use and re-

use of philosophy » : African philosophy

questioned

Yannick Essengue

L’ethnophilosophie ne représente pas ce qu’il conviendrait d’appeler ici la philosophie africaine. Telle

est aussi la clarification que tente d’apporter Marcien Towa, lorsque réagissant à la publication par

Placide Tempels de La philosophie bantoue, il la caractérise de manière péjorative comme étant de

l’ethno-philosophie, une double trahison et de l’ethnologie et de la philosophie. La même critique est

tout aussi retentissante chez Fabien Eboussi, qui (se) propose de préciser les conditions d’un « emplois

et réemplois de la philosophie ». Nous voulons ici, dans un horizon herméneutique, proposer l’envers et

les revers d’une expression (celle de l’ethnophilosophie) encore porteuse aujourd’hui de malentendus.

Mots-clés : Ethnophilosophie, philosophie africaine, pensée critique, Muntu, abstraction,

herméneutique

Ethnophilosophy does not represent what should be called here African philosophy. Such is the

clarification which Marcian Towa attempts, when he reacts after the publication Bantou philosophy by

Placide Tempels. He characterizes such philosophy in a pejorative way as being ethno-philosophy, a

double treason of both ethnology and philosophy. The same criticism is equally resounding in Fabien

Eboussi, who proposes to clarify the conditions of a "use and re-use of philosophy". Here we would like

to suggest through the hermenetics perspective, the contrary and the reverse side of an expression

(ethnophilosophy) that still bears until today, misunderstandings.

Key-words : Ethnophilosophy, african philosophy, critical thinking, Muntu, abstraction, hermeneutics

« The philosophical critique of ethnophilosophy is not the reverse of Tempels and

Kagame's school. It is a policy discourse on philosophy aimed at examining

methods and requirements for practicing philosophy in Africa (...) As such, the

critique of ethnophilosophy can be understood as subsuming two main genres: on

the one hand, a reflection on the methodological limits of Tempels and Kagame's


18 | P a g e

school and, on the other hand (at the other pole of what ethnophilosophical

exercises represent), African practices and works bearing on Western subjects and

topics in the most classical tradition of philosophy », (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 154).

INTRODUCTION

La réflexion philosophique en rapport à l’Afrique si elle ne fait aucun doute quant à ce qui est de sa

réalité, reste toutefois problématique quand il faut conceptualiser une telle approche ou la déterminer

par une expression. Le vocable de philosophie africaine, évocateur pour certains, non-sens pour

d’autres, ne cesse d’alimenter négations et dénégations, justifications et brandissements. Dans un

contexte plus global de réflexion sur la pensée philosophique africaine, il nous est demandé une

« critique de l’ethnophilosophie ». En lieu et place d’une « critique », nous voulons partir de la

relecture qu’en fait un des principaux critiques du courant ethnophilosophique, à savoir Fabien Eboussi

Boulaga. Nous nous proposons alors d’examiner le troisième chapitre de la troisième partie de La crise

du Muntu intitulé « Emplois et réemplois de la philosophie ». Il s’agira pour nous de suivre l’auteur

dans sa proposition de fonder un discours philosophique caractéristique de la tendance critique à

laquelle il appartient, celui de la « critique sans complaisance ». En effet, après avoir traité de façon

générale de la tradition, Fabien Eboussi s’attaque plus spécifiquement à l’ethnologie. Il ne s’agit plus

pour lui de ne constater que la mort de l’ethnologie comme instrument de domination de l’Occident

par l’Ethnie, mais de contribuer à la rendre effective. Son souci principal est de nous aider à sortir d’une

attitude réactionnaire par laquelle l’ethnophilosophie a tenté de « brandir » la « philosophicité » du

discours africain en se fondant sur l’héritage culturel. En réaction contre La philosophie Bantoue1 du

missionnaire belge Tempels, Eboussi après son article de 1968 « Le bantou problématique », poursuit

trois ans plus tard dans son ouvrage majeur, une définition de la philosophie par les attendes qu’il

faudrait avoir de celle-ci. Il tente pour ce faire de montrer en quoi elle pourrait être utile à la libération

de l’Africain. Une telle problématique posée, Eboussi va préciser comment il se propose de réaliser un

tel idéal. Trois points de repère se présentent dès lors à lui : la liberté, la conception de la philosophie

comme progrès vers la lucidité et l’authenticité, enfin la fonction critique de la philosophie. Un tel

projet ne saurait se comprendre sans avoir d’abord en esprit les affirmations de Tempels et de ses

épigones au sujet de la force vitale, et sans comprendre l’ultime aboutissement de la pensée d’Eboussi

dans sa dialectique de l’authenticité. De tels préalables établis, une relecture critique de

l’ethnophilosophie peut alors se faire en terme de « dépassement ».

1 Tout premier ouvrage publié par Alioune Diop, fondateur des éditions Présence Africaine.


19 | P a g e

I. LA QUESTION DE LA FORCE VITALE EN QUESTION

« Je fais un avec la force, la force est avec moi », (Chirrut, in « Rogue One », Saga

Star Wars, 2016).

C’est autour de la notion de force vitale que s’instaure le discours ethnophilosophique. Il nous semble

de grande importance, avant d’entrer dans la démarche que propose Eboussi, de nous situer dans la

problématique de la force vitale2, pour mieux cerner en quoi sa critique voudrait prendre distance par

rapport à ce qui sera désigné par « ethnophilosophie ».

1. De la force vitale comme détermination de l’être chez Tempels

L’idée d’une philosophie « bantoue » du fait de son adjectif qualificatif, fait de prime abord penser à

une compréhension d’un groupe donné, celui précisément des Bantou. Or, Placide Tempels, s’il part

du principe de l’existence d’une ontologie pratiquement inconsciente et qu’il convient de révéler au

« nègre » ou au « primitif », arrive à la conclusion qu’il est possible de la généraliser à tous les peuples

semblables au Muntu, car la philosophie du Bantou est peut-être « la philosophie commune de tous

les primitifs, de tous les peuples claniques » (Tempels, 1949, p. 25). « La conception de la vie chez les

Bantous. Elle est centrée sur une seule valeur : la force vitale ». C’est ainsi que Tempels formule la

section de son ouvrage qui traite de la force vitale. Il s’agit pour lui, d’une espèce de détermination de

tous les êtres de l’univers suivant les genres: animal, végétal, inanimé, mais surtout humain. Ce qui est

premier ici, c’est la force vitale de l’homme, qui peut être renforcée par l’énergie vitale des autres

genres. C’est ainsi qu’il peut écrire que la « force vitale est la réalité invisible mais suprême dans

l’homme. Et l’homme peut renforcer sa force vitale par la force des autres êtres de la création »

(Tempels, 1949, p. 32). Il s’agit de la suprême valeur, la suprême aspiration de l’homme qui habite

toutes les dimensions de la personne et de la société, c’est-à-dire le langage, la pensée, la ritualité

contenus dans les pratiques magico-religieuses et toute la gestualité en général. L’objectif de la force

vitale, est selon Tempels, de renforcer la vie et de garantir sa transmission d’une génération à une

autre. Etant ainsi entendue, la force vitale dépasse la simple sphère de la corporéité, pour être

« totalement humaine », car logée dans notre « être entier » et désigne finalement « "l’intégrité" de

l’être » en relation avec ses semblables et avec les ancêtres dans une hiérarchie des forces. C’est

pourquoi pour les Bantou3, le bonheur parfait est le signe d’une force vitale consistante, tandis que

l’échec, la maladie, la mort et toutes les autres sortes de dépréciations sont la conséquence d’une

diminution de cette force vitale. Au-delà de la conception anthropologique de la force vitale, disons

2 Voir Y. ESSENGUE, « La force vitale ou l’échec de la métaphysique dans la philosophie africaine de l’école.

Un bilan de la philosophie ? », in Raison Ardente, N° 84, mai 2010, pp. 50-63. 3 Pluriel de Muntu.


20 | P a g e

qu’il y a chez Tempels une complicité entre force vitale et ontologie, puisque selon lui, la force vitale

peut être ramenée à l’être, à « l’essence des choses »4. Il n’y a donc pas pour lui de distance entre la

métaphysique, comprise comme « discipline méthodique », et la sagesse humaine comprise comme

« conception du monde ». Tempels est convaincu que la sagesse humaine tout comme la

métaphysique orientent leurs vues vers des réalités comme « l’origine, le devenir, le changement, la

croissance active et passive, et plus particulièrement la nature de l’être en soi vecteur essentiel de ces

phénomènes ou modes universels » (Tempels, 1949, p. 33-34). C’est précisément pourquoi la force

vitale sera au fondement de toute explication scientifique, juridique et axiologique. C’est justement de

cette conclusion que naîtront les critiques de toutes sortes à l’endroit de cette conception vitaliste de

l’être comme force. Porteuse d’un tel renversement, la pensée de Tempels implique contre les idées

dominantes de son époque que : le Noir est un homme à part entière et non entièrement à part ; le

Noir a une philosophie, centrée sur la notion de force vitale. Ainsi, fonde-il le courant qui sera dit

ethnophilosophique.

2. L’ethnophilosophie en question (s)5

Commençons par faire une précision : l’ethnophilosophie est un des courants de la pensée

philosophique africaine, et pas « LA » philosophie africaine. Ce concept a fini par (re)devenir ( ?) le

malaise d’une dénomination philosophique en Afrique et ailleurs, en mal d’exotisme ? En quête

d’originalité ? En manque de sensationnel ? Toujours est-il qu’il faut distinguer l’ethnophilosophie de

la philosophie africaine, même si à une certaine époque, ici ou ailleurs, et en d’autres lieux encore

aujourd’hui, l’un en appelait sans grincement à l’autre et inversement. Placide Templels, Alexis Kagame,

Basile Juléat Fouda en sont les principaux représentants. Ces penseurs ne se sont pas dit

« ethnophilosophes », mais ont été ainsi caractérisés dans une perspective critique, car ils affirment

qu’il existe une philosophie africaine, cette dernière est présente dans les proverbes, les mythes, les

légendes, les épopées africains, issus donc de l’ethnologie.

Le concept « ethnophilosophie » en lui-même, est forgé par Marcien Towa, philosophe camerounais

de regrettée mémoire, dans sa proximité dans les idées avec le philosophe béninois Paulin Joachim

Hountondji. Towa « caractérise » grossièrement une manière de penser la réalité africaine héritée des

affirmations de Placide Tempels, victime de son propre succès. Temples dans sa célèbre Philosophie

bantoue, a pour les siens ayant en partage la « leucodermiophilie », affirmé qu’il y a une « ontologie

4 Sa conviction est que « l’être est ce qui possède la force », mieux encore, « l’être EST force », mais pour éviter

toute confusion à un occidental, TEMPELS ajoute que « pour la bantou l’être est la chose qui est force ». C’est

donc dans cette relation de réversibilité symétrique que TEMPELS comprend l’ontologie bantoue, car pour lui

l’être est force et la force est être. 5 Les réflexions qui suivent ont été publiées dans https://nama.live/2017/11/17/philoaf1/, consulté le 09/12/2017.


21 | P a g e

bantu », et pour les siens par alliance en mélanine et en quête du Ciel, a affirmé une philosophie

africaine, qui se trouverait dans ce que Nkombe Oleko6 appelle les parémies, et que Jeki Kinyongo (un

autre à lui semblable par la nation et les convictions intellectuelles) désignera par « éléments de

discursivité ».

L’ethnophilosophie se propose de donner un contenu philosophique au vécu africain en partant des

éléments de la culture africaine. C’est donc un mode de pensée qui s’inscrit dans la ligne droite des

pensées de la promotion de l’africanité (Afrocentricité, panafricanisme, Négritude). Elle affirme une

manière africaine d’être d’agir et de penser. Un des arguments en sa faveur, est celui de proposer une

« réponse » au pessimisme anthropologique, qui défend un Nègre comme degré zéro de l’histoire à

laquelle il n’aurait rien donné. La position de l’ethnophilosophie se veut avant tout une défense, celle

de l’humanité du Noir qui a hérité d’une certaine représentation. Perpétuel esclave (Montesquieu,

« De l'esclavage des Nègres », De l'Esprit des Lois, 1748) ; primitif à conscience infantile et en dehors

de l’histoire (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel), un sous-homme intermédiaire entre le singe et l’homme

Blanc/Jaune (Joseph Arthur comte de Gobineau) à mentalité prélogique et mystique (Lévy-Bruhl).

L’ethnophilosophie se pose de ce fait en s’opposant. Une véritable négation de la négation à travers

l’affirmation d’une identité philosophique de l’Africain. Tempels est donc l’ancêtre reconnu des

ethnophilosophes, disons un mot sur le contenu de sa pensée.

Le point de départ de Tempels, est une quête de l’idéal suprême du Muntu, terme qui désigne

l’« Homme » chez les Luba, peuple de l’actuelle République Démocratique du Congo, et qui a la même

racine dans l’essentiel des langues bantu. Il développe donc, à cette période, une sorte de plaidoyer

pour la reconnaissance de l’humanité des Bantu. La première révolution tempelsinnes par rapport aux

idées de son temps, est d’abord d’affirmer que l’Africain est un homme à part entière, qu’il a un

système de pensée, donc une philosophie. « Aussi, nos Bantu sont des hommes ; ils ont donc leurs

idées, leurs conceptions, leurs doctrines, leur ontologie, leur théodicée. » (Tempels, 1949, p. 116). Ce

qui découle de l’étude de Tempels sur l’Africain, c’est donc tout d’abord ces trois idées :

« la vie, la vie intense, la vie pleine, la vie forte, la vie totale, l’intensité dans l’être »

« la fécondité, la paternité et la maternité, une fécondité grande, intense, totale, non

seulement physique »

« l’union vitale avec les autres êtres : l’isolement nous tue ».

Ce qui va donc revenir, c’est la notion de « force vitale ». Pour Tempels, l’être est force :

6 Philosophe zaïrois permettez la nostalgie d’une dénomination à la mode au moment où il connaissait ses heures

de gloire.


22 | P a g e

Toute force peut se renforcer ou s’affaiblir. C’est-à-dire tout être peut devenir plus fort ou plus

faible.

Les forces sont en interaction ; c’est-à-dire qu’un être peut influencer un autre.

Les forces sont hiérarchisées. Le rang de la vie et la primogéniture.

La création est centrée sur l’homme, et l’homme vivant ici sur terre est le centre de toute

l’humanité, y compris celle du monde des défunts.

Les lois générales de l’influence de la vie (ou causalité).

Tout le système philosophique africain, reposera pour Tempels sur ces préalables. Ne nous réjouissons

pas trop vite et n’allons pas tout de suite célébrer Tempels comme le fit Alioune Diop qui inaugura sa

« Présence africaine » justement par la publication de La philosophie bantoue… Le terme

« ethnophilosophie » (il faut bien le noter), est d’abord employé pour faire une critique (acerbe et sans

appel) de la pensée de Placide Temples, affirmant que la philosophie bantu reposerait sur la notion de

force vitale. L’Africain aurait donc (n’oublions pas que nous sommes autour de 1948) des principes

philosophiques de base, un système ontologique relativement simple et primitif, mais logiquement

cohérent… Cette philosophie africaine (ontologie bantou) existe : « elle pénètre et informe toute la

mentalité des primitifs, elle domine et oriente tout leur comportement ». Il se trouve cependant que

l’Africain, n’est pas lui-même conscient de sa « philosophicité ». Conséquence : il appartient ainsi au

Leucoderme, Leucoïde ou Blanc si vous préférez, de la lui révéler. C’est tout le sens de la « mission

civilisatrice » pour laquelle Tempels prend faits et causes dès les premières lignes de son livre.

L’Africain a une philosophie, mais il ne peut pas en faire un exposé systématique, il faut la lui révéler…

Tel sera le point de départ de la fin du discours ethnophilosophique, quoique pas tout à fait mort.

Le mérite que nous voulons encore reconnaître à l’ouvrage de Tempels, est au moins celui d’avoir

marqué l’envol d’une réelle philosophie académique sur le continent, après bien entendu les différents

moments à signaler dans ce sens par Théophile Obenga, qui distingue quatre grands moments de la

philosophie africaine : l’époque pharaonique, l’époque patristique, l’époque musulmane et l’époque

négro africaine contemporaine7. Ce qui est généralement reproché à l’ethnophilosophie, c’est son

caractère passif et sa logique du donné-construit, lieu d’instauration d’un mode de pensée dit

complexe, mais « primitif ». Voyons à présent, comment Eboussi traduit sa marche vers l’authenticité

philosophique, en passant par la liberté, la lucidité et la critique.

7 J.-M. VAN PARYS, Une approche simple de la philosophie africaine, Ed. Loyola, Publications Canisius, 1993,

p. 164-165. T. OBENGA, « La philosophie pharaonique », Présence Africaine, N° 37-138, 1er et 2e Trimestre 1986,

p.p. 3-4. Commenté par G. MPAY KEMBOLY dans un article de la Revue « Raison Ardente », N° 41, avril 1994,

p.p. 14-15.


23 | P a g e

II. REEMPLOI COMME LIBERTE, LUCIDITE AUTHENTIQUE ET FONCTION CRITIQUE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE

« La philosophie ne commence qu'avec la décision de soumettre l'héritage

philosophique et culturel à une critique sans complaisance. Pour le philosophe

aucune donnée, aucune idée si vénérable soit-elle, n'est recevable avant d'être

passée au crible de la pensée critique. En fait la philosophie est essentiellement

sacrilège en ceci qu'elle se veut l'instance normative suprême ayant seule droit de

fixer ce qui doit ou non être tenu pour sacré, et de ce fait abolit le sacré pour

autant qu'il veut s'imposer à l'homme du dehors », (Towa, 1971, p. 30).

Après avoir vu avec les affirmations de Tempels au sujet de la force vitale et de son impact sur le

devenir de la pensée africaine, notons que nous sommes encore dans ce qu’Eboussi a voulu désigner

par « emplois ». Le pas que nous voulons à présent faire, est de chercher ce que notre auteur entend

par « réemplois », pour signifier une certaine « récupération » par la philosophie, de ce qui lui est

propre et qui aurait été bradé au marché de l’« humanisation » du Muntu.

1. Liberté et lucidité comme voies vers la philosophie authentique

Le premier paradigme que signale Eboussi dans sa tentative de « purifier » la philosophie des usages

mal-à-propos, est une exigence de saisie de ce qu’il appelle le « degré zéro de la liberté dans la

démarche qui assume l’institution philosophique et tâche de s’y ajuster » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 175). En

effet, dans la première partie de son texte « Jeu des opérations de l’esprit », Eboussi part de la place

de l’imaginaire et du rêve, éléments fondamentaux qui stimulent et donnent d’accomplir. Ils supposent

de fait « un espace de jeu » dans lequel notre auteur affirme que « la liberté ne commence que si elle

peut "prévoir" les conditions de son effectuation, l’agencement ou la succession de ses "moments". »

(Eboussi, 1977, p. 176). Ce qui semble motiver notre auteur, c’est de faire une sévère critique non

seulement de l’« ethnophilosophie », mais aussi de la Négritude, qu’il considère comme deux attitudes

de répétition de la condition de négation de soi par l’Occident. Il convient cependant d’y voir aussi un

procédé stylistique par lequel Eboussi, lecteur d’Eric Weil, utilise une forme de raisonnement

comparable à des critiques de critiques.

La découverte de soi comme jeu, est la première critique qu’Eboussi semble adresser à une pratique

philosophique « myope » et « stérile ». La virtuosité, dont il parle, désigne avant tout la qualité d’une

grande habileté dans l’exécution artistique en général. Eboussi semble lui donner une connotation

péjorative, d’abord en parlant de « le virtuose », il substantifie cette qualité pour désigner celui qui est


24 | P a g e

habile dans le jeu, c’est-à-dire dans la « négativité » ou « l’anéantissement ascétique de soi »8 dans

une discipline mal appropriée. La critique que fait Eboussi ici, est celle d’un Muntu passif, qui se nie

lui-même pour éclore dans une sorte de désir mimétique : L’intériorisation qu’il peut faire de cette

sorte de négation de soi, pourtant sa destinée, ce qu’il est appelé à devenir. Comment se fait-il alors

que cette destinée devienne une manifestation de lui-même comme rien ? Une des pistes de solution

est alors pour le Muntu de se « déprendre de tout lui-même », d’où la difficulté à le situer, à le définir

comme un « ceci » ou un « cela ». Le drame du Muntu qui se comporte ainsi, est qu’il s’agit d’une

manifestation de lui-même, « comme jeu, pouvoir de jeu. Il est capable de tout mimer, de tout assumer,

et même d’assumer ce qui le détruit, d’adhérer à ce qui est sa négation » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 178). La

critique d’Eboussi dans cette section, est donc adressée aux ethnologues.

Après l’ethnophilosophie, la critique d’Eboussi semble aussi être adressée à la Négritude : Tous deux,

prennent chacun sur lui sa non-réalité, son néant substantialisé :

On proclame le Nègre pré-logique, pure émotion, capable simplement de danser,

d’avoir des images au lieu de concepts. Qu’à cela ne tienne. Ce sont là les "valeurs

de la négritude". On réalise ainsi la négation dont on est victime, on revit comme

venant de soi, comme jugement "favorable" sur soi ce que les ethnologues ont écrit

pour marquer la distance infranchissable qui situait le Nègre aux confins de

l’humanité, dans la proximité de la nature, en ce lieu de transition où l’on passe de

la nature à la culture (Eboussi, 1977, p. 178).

La liberté dont parle Eboussi, peut en définitive être comprise comme le point d’aboutissement de

l’aspect de l’homme comme volonté, en tant qu’être de désir, la philosophie devrait aussi aboutir à

une « métaphysique de la liberté », ceci à travers ce qu’il va désigner par une analyse rationnelle du

choix et de l’obligation.

Pour ce qui est de la lucidité authentique de la philosophie, elle touche en plein cœur l’usage et la

pratique de la philosophie. Dans le contexte de la pensée africaine, Eboussi voudrait exorciser quelques

attitudes que nous dirions non-philosophiques. Bien de malentendus se font souvent sur la définition

même de la philosophie : « La philosophie, dira-t-on, est un savoir : elle fait partie du bagage

intellectuel de l’homme cultivé. Du reste, elle est universelle par essence ; occidentale, chinoise,

indienne ou africaine par accident » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 173). Le problème de la liberté conduit

8 Il distingue à la page 181 la discipline médiatisante, située dans un mouvement de sortie, et la discipline

médiatisée, qui s’inscrit dans la trajectoire de du retour à soi.


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nécessairement à une réflexion sur les savoirs en général, pour voir comment ils peuvent s’appliquer

à la philosophie. C’est pourquoi une enquête sur les les disciplines médiatisantes et les disciplines

médiatisées est nécessaire pour ne pas confondre les sphères de représentation d’un discours qui tend

à envelopper tous les savoirs et à se les soumettre. De cette épistémologie du regard englobant, nous

pouvons penser un discours philosophique africain fondé sur la liberté de penser, une liberté qui

s’enracine dans le pouvoir créateur de la volonté de l’Homme Africain.

Par disciplines médiatisantes, Eboussi entend les disciplines de l’en-soi. Ce qui les caractérise, c’est

avant tout la simple appréhension de l’expérience, par laquelle des données sont portées à la

connaissance de l’esprit qui se distingue d’elles. Le deuxième niveau, est celui de la compréhension, et

est une sorte d’herméneutique qui situe les concepts dans leur contexte historique en vue de

rechercher l’intention de l’auteur. Il s’agit d’une certaine façon ici de l’herméneutique romantique

développée par Schleiermacher, mais qui sera remise en question par Gadamer, en montrant qu’une

fois la compréhension est assurée, besoin n’est plus de chercher à entrer dans l’intention de l’auteur.

Le troisième pas que fait Eboussi, est celui du jugement. Ayant pour faculté l’entendement, il se fonde

sur la variabilité des systèmes et qui permet de voir comment les idées et les concepts sont des parties

d’un même ensemble. Le dernier niveau dans la compréhension des disciplines médiatisantes, est le

raisonnement dont la discipline formelle est la logique et a pour rôle d’assurer la rectitude de la pensée.

Pour appréhender donc son expérience concrète, la compréhension du discours, le jugement porté sur

les ordres du savoir sont indispensables pour un meilleur raisonnement, condition de toute pensée

critique, donc philosophique.

Les disciplines médiatisées ou du pour-soi, sont celles qui, réflexives et formelles, postulent également

quatre niveaux de compréhension, et qui sont à comprendre en parallèle avec celles que nous venons

d’énoncer à propos de l’en-soi. Elles sont dans un rapport de correspondance que nous disons « à

rebours », puisqu’Eboussi les fait correspondre les premières par les dernières. Ainsi, nous aurons

comme corolaire au raisonnement le statut d’une réalité en soi et qui peut être nommée. C’est le cas

de Dieu, de l’Etre, de la liberté, du concept ou de l’idée. Puis nous avons comme correspondance au

jugement, un discours positif caractérisé par une cohérence rigoureuse. Puis nous avons comme vis-à-

vis à la compréhension la clarification ou « mise au clair » du système dans lequel s’inscrit le discours.

Enfin, face à l’appréhension de l’expérience, nous avons le retour à l’immédiat, considéré comme une

vérification ou « projection dans le concret ». Essayons de le schématiser :

Appréhension de l’expérience Statut d’une réalité en soi

Compréhension Discours positif

Jugement Clarification

Raisonnement Retour à l’immédiat


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Nous voyons donc que la conception que donne Eboussi de la philosophie, est assez proche d’une

lecture pragmatico-réflexive. Il semble s’agir pour lui, d’une tentative d’allier à la fois une philosophie

ontologique avec une philosophie en quête de sens pratique. L’emploi qui doit se faire de la

philosophie aspire ici à se faire une théorie pas seulement de la connaissance, mais une insertion dans

un contexte. Le sens à donner au discours philosophique ne saurait pas ici faire abstraction d’un donné

qui donne à penser et qui se donne comme pensée pure, actualisation d’un-être-au-monde comme

relation, passage d’un discours constitué à un discours construit par le moyen d’une pensée critique.

Voyons comment cela se réalise-t-il dans son approche critique.

2. De la philosophie critique comme soubassement a une dialectique de l’authenticité9

Eboussi ne semble pas avoir explicitement dit qu’il traite ici de la philosophie critique, mais, puisqu’il

l’a annoncé en dernier dans le plan de ce chapitre, nous pouvons supposer que c’est ici qu’il en parle.

Si nous comprenons la critique comme une méthode, alors notre hypothèse se justifie dans les propos

même de l’auteur, quand il écrit pour conclure son premier chapitre, qu’ « une méthode est affaire de

déplacement, de transfert du sujet de la "psychologie rationnelle" au sujet de l’histoire empirique (…)

ou de la libération humaine » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 185).

La philosophie critique dont il est question ici, réagit comme nous le savons déjà, contre Tempels et

ses épigones. Le projet qui semble émerger par la suite, est qu’Eboussi voudrait dans cette réflexion

répondre aux critiques qu’il a faites à La philosophie bantoue au début de son ouvrage. Ayant

abusivement employé le mot philosophie, Eboussi voudrait justement par sa critique, arriver à un

« réemploi » de ce dernier, qui est « une relecture en situation ». A la question :

comment lire la philosophie sans en faire un moyen de fuir notre condition, d’éluder

les questions que pose notre situation ? Que signifie pour nous faire de l’ontologie ?

Adopter les philosophies de la réflexion ou celles de l’existence ? En quoi se

métamorphose-t-elles, quelles fonctions idéologiques jouent-elles, c’est-à-dire

comment forment-elles un écran qui déforme les choses ou interdit leur accès ?

(Eboussi, 1977, p. 185).

Eboussi répond en montrant que c’est en prenant une perspective éthique, que cette philosophie

admet comme premier présupposé qu’

9 Sur la question de la dialectique de l’authenticité de Fabien Eboussi, se référer à l’analyse qui en est faite par

Essengue, Y., « Culture africaine entre identité philosophique et philosophie identitaire. Horizon d’une

responsabilité discursive », in Tounkara, S., Lolo, C, Mavoungou-Pemba, P-N., 2015, pp. 96-99.


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une philosophie n’est pas seulement une série d’énoncés qui n’appellent que le

jugement sur leur fausseté ou leur vérité, sur leur cohérence ou leur incohérence.

En l’abordant, on y décèlerait plusieurs manières de parler, plusieurs actes de la

parole, plusieurs de ses effets. En plus d’être une signification intelligible, un

discours philosophique est une "force pragmatique", qui en fait une prise de

position, une attitude, un jugement. (Eboussi, 1977, p. 185).

Si la philosophie est donc pour Eboussi « un genre de vie », elle ouvre alors sur des « modalités d’être

soi », qui portent sur le parler, l’être, le sentir et l’agir.

Le parler ne fait pas de cette philosophie critique une philosophie du langage, mais selon Eboussi, il est

révélateur d’une dimension fondamentale de l’homme. Heidegger disait que « la vie des mortels est

déterminée et supportée par la parole. » (Heidegger, 1966, p. 58), puisqu’elle est « la maison de

l’être » (Heidegger, 1976, p. 255). Eboussi pour sa part, va dire que c’est par « l’accomplissement de la

parole, qu’on devient homme véritable, membre de la vraie communauté des hommes, mis à l’écart

ou hors de l’impureté de l’homme de la parole primitive, grossière et tombée » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 189).

Plus loin, il poursuit en allant dans le même sens que Heidegger, en affirmant que ce

qu’il importait de dire ici, c’est que l’essence des choses, l’être de l’être, c’est la

parole : monde, en sa genèse, en sa structure et cohésion, communauté des

hommes avec ses us et coutumes, son organisation, ses finalités, tout reçoit son

sens et sa consistance de la parole. Il fallait ajouter comment cette approche

élargissait et approfondissait la conception de l’Etre comme parole et permettait

de surmonter, jusqu’à un certain point le désarroi né de la rencontre des dieux, de

l’échec de tributs, des traditions primordiales et des paroles originaires ou

ancestrales (Eboussi, 1977, p. 190).

Pour ce faire, la parole devient un véritable révélation de l’être même des choses, c’est-à-dire de ce

qui est, mais bien plus en profondeur, révélation de ce qui fonde ce qui est et qui donne sens à

l’existence. Ce qui fait donc « la phase ontologique » du langage, c’est sa forme visible dans les

différents codes et les différentes codifications. Au lieu donc de dire que l’être est force comme c’est

le cas pour les défenseurs de l’ethnophilosophie, l’être est plutôt parole. « Plusieurs facteurs

convergent pour faire passer le Muntu de la conception du langage comme épiphanie de l’être,

sacrement de l’Être-Vrai à sa considération comme activité de l’homme » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 193).


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Pour ce qui est de l’être, ce qui vient d’être dit à propos du langage vaut également pour lui, précise

Eboussi. Il ajoute cependant que l’objectif qui est visé dans tout exercice ontologique, c’est avant tout

le dépassement d’un soi égotiquement compris, sans pour autant être pour un effacement de soi, ni

pour toute forme de résignation. Au contraire, l’ontologie fonde une ère. Il s’agit de dire qu’elle forme

une herméneutique déterminée de l’être et donc de la vérité. Qu’elle soit réaliste, transcendantale ou

dialectique, l’ontologie obéit à quelques gestes d’exclusions simples, toujours, les mêmes, à quelques

décisions premières identiques, jamais remise en cause. Vu sous cet angle, l’ontologie est même de

part en part un geste de séparation, de rupture et la consécration d’une rupture, et même la

célébration d’une rupture, par quoi elle se comprend comme dis-cours part, comme sphère autonome.

L’ontologie veut parler ou se représenter l’être en tant qu’être. Tout est dans ce redoublement qui

distingue et délimite. De cette délimitation, résonne ici chez Eboussi une critique de la fameuse

« ontologie bantou », qui est appelée à sortir des instants/élans/relents vitalistes pour retrouve sa

quiddité en tant que quête de l’Instant des instants qu’est l’être.

Avec l’agir associé au faire qui n’avait pas été annoncé, Eboussi inverse l’ordre pour commencer par

l’agir plutôt que par le sentir. Pour lui, la dimension que constitue l’agir est à comprendre dans une

union avec le faire. L’action est d’abord transitive (mouvement d’un agent vers un patient), elle est

ensuite immanente (quand le mouvement reste intérieur à l’agent) enfin, l’action est « "opération

inverse" » (dissémination de soi dans les œuvres).

Le sentir pour finir, est compris comme un mouvement d’aller vers « la redécouverte de son "être" ».

Il est « la communication originelle avec le monde, c’est l’être au monde comme corps vivant. Le sentir

est le mode de présence à la totalité simultanée des choses et des êtres » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 121). Par

se sentir, l’homme est au monde et le monde est en lui, de là, s’établit une relation fondamentale

entre le corps et l’art, car nous assistons à une véritable articulation de l’être corporel face à la totalité

du monde.

Par ces quatre éléments que sont le parler, l’être, l’agir et le sentir, nous entrons avec Eboussi dans le

moment de la pensée africaine critique. Pour lui en effet, par la philosophie,

on se demandera comment la pratiquer de manière à se libérer des obscurantismes

qui maintiennent en position de faiblesse, comment faire de la discipline

philosophique une discipline critique qui inquiète les savoirs acquis et stimule un

esprit de recherche et d’intrépidité rationnelle et scientifique. En bref, ce qui nous

interpelle, c’est le souci de l’autonomie et de l’universalité vraie, ou plus


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correctement c’est, en termes encore négatifs, le désir de libération comme mode

d’existence et de maîtrise de la science et de la technologie (Eboussi, 1977, p. 175)10.

De cette exigence de libération, Eboussi va arriver à la dialectique de l’authenticité, qui sonne comme

un refrain pour terminer son ouvrage. Avec cette entreprise trine, Eboussi nous montre la destination

que devrait se donner le discours du Muntu. C’est donc dans le prolongement de sa réflexion sur la

modernité, qu’Eboussi propose sa dialectique, comprise comme rapport de la conscience à l’histoire.

Il s’agit en quelque sorte d’une prise de conscience du passé (tradition) et du présent (modernité) pour

soi et pour les autres. Ce ne sera donc pas un hasard si cette dialectique s’articule autour de trois

discours : « en soi », « pour soi » et « pour autrui ». Il s’agit en fin de compte, prenant conscience de

soi, de tenir un discours actualisable et finalement ouvert à l’universalité. Le message de la Crise du

Muntu, semble ainsi rejoindre l’idée d’une démarcation du discours philosophique africain, des

attitudes réductionnistes et limitatives. Signalons cependant que la critique que fait Eboussi de

l’ethnophilosophie ne devrait pas s’enfermer dans un logicisme susceptible de se démarquer de la

réalité qui peut nous être spécifique et pas particularisable à tout prix.

S’il est une chose en même de faire le sérieux philosophique en contexte africain, elle est chez Fabien

Eboussi dans l’usage même du référent philosophique. Aussi, que disons-nous ou voulons-nous dire

lorsque nous parlons de philosophie africaine ? Il y a un certain emploi du concept de philosophie à

sauvegarder et à ne pas galvauder au pinacle de la quête identitaire ou du repli sur une certaine

africanité à forte coloration culturelle. Cette liberté de pensée suppose une lucidité intellectuelle toute

authentique, conditions pour une philosophie africaine critique. C’est elle qui parle le langage de l’être

et pas celui des êtres, un être qui est rupture d’avec un certain ordre. C’est à partir de là qu’une action

féconde du sentir philosophique véritable est possible.

III. EMPLOI ET REEMPLOI DE LA PHILOSOPHIE POUR UNE QUESTIONNEMENT DIALECTIQUE SUR LE SENS DE LA QUESTION

« Construire un nouvel imaginaire pour un bonheur collectif à bâtir et proposer au

monde entier cette route du développement solidaire et du bien-vivre-ensemble,

voilà le prix à payer pour rebâtir l’espoir sur nos terres. Le prix de la nouvelle vision

10 Nous retrouvons ici les grands thèmes si chers à un autre penseur de la tendance dite « critique », à savoir

Marcien Towa, qui fait de la philosophie une entreprise essentiellement sacrilège (Towa, 1971, p. 30), ne

connaissant ni le sacré qu’il soit de l’ordre du « sacré » spirituel ou de celui du sacré culturel. Idem. Il faut aussi

souligner que pour Towa, la science et la philosophie qui ont fait le secret de la civilisation occidentale sont à

« suivre à la trace » pour un véritable épanouissement de la pensée philosophique africaine. Il convient donc pour

lui de travailler avec l’aide de la science et de la technologie, aux conditions « d’émergence d’une Afrique

prospère, puissante et autocentrée, une Afrique formant un centre autonome de besoins et d’aspirations » (Towa,

M., 1979, pp. 54).


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de l’Afrique qu’il nous faut développer et faire rayonner partout », (Mana K.,

2009, 29).

L’objectif avoué par Fabin Eboussi dès l’entame de la troisième partie de son livre, est celui de

contribuer à une véritable autodétermination de l’Homo africanus philosophicus. Et pour y parvenir, la

critique se présente à lui comme instance régulatrice et fondatrice d’un tel idéal. Discerner les écarts

et se désolidariser de ce qui est source de distance, le tout pour se faire/rendre créateur. C’est bel et

bien sur cette exigence créatrice que repose notre projet de « dépassement », pas seulement de

l’ethnophilosophie, de sa critique et de la critique de sa critique, mais projet de « reprise » de ce

quelque chose sans quoi ni l’ethnie, ni l’ethnophilosophie comme projet fondateur ne trouvent sens

ni même non-sens. Des propos d’Eboussi, il s’agit d’être des « créateurs, qui visent à constituer ce qui

est examiné dans sa vérité ou à lui substituer d’autres vérités » (Eboussi, 1977, p. 115). C’est cet effort

de théorisation qui peut transformer la crise, toute crise, évènement transhistorique et fondateur en

son sens d’un avènement à être autrement que ce par quoi la violence de l’histoire dans une

dynamique avant/après a voulu faire de nous. C’est donc pour vaincre l’« allégation du spécifique »,

que s’instaure un discours philosophique qui se veut pratiquer, émancipateur, remettant en cause le

sujet philosophant, la diversité de son topos et son exigence méthodologique. L’articulation de cette

question de philosophie africaine nous est donnée dans les formes de ses figures et dans ses aventures

du sens.

1. Pour ou contre Tempels ? Au-delà/horizon d’une émancipation conceptuelle

En réaction à La philosophie Bantoue, si Alioune Diop, montor de Présence Africaine et Alexis Kagame

en ont fait le credo de l’homme Africain, A. Césaire dans son Discours sur le colonialisme, considère par

contre l’ouvrage comme un instrument soporifique pour les libérations nationalistes. Tandis que L. de

Sousberghe trouvera des « équivoques profondes » dans cet ouvrage, notamment sur la confusion

entre le prélogique et le préscientifique, mais aussi sur le risque de faire de la philosophie une

expression « passe-partout ». Dans cette perspective critique, la conférence donnée au Goethe

Instutute de Léopoldville par Franz Grahay le 19 mars 1965, formule trois principales critiques à

Tempels : la confusion du vécu et du réflexif entre « philosophie » et « Bantoue » qui érige une

conception vulgaire de la philosophie en une acceptation technique ou « informée » ; l’usage abusif

du mot « philosophie » et sa confusion constante avec la métaphysique, l’ontologie et la psychologie ;

et le rapport entre philosophie et science. Pour lui, la condition fondamentale dans laquelle une


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philosophie bantoue est possible, est d’éviter les risques du « culte de la différence »11. Le même son

de cloche se fait entendre chez F. Eboussi Boulaga, lorsque dans « Le bantou problématique », il

adresse une violente diatribe contre la méthode et l’objet de La philosophie Bantoue. « Philosophie

ethnologique », l’ouvrage est selon lui, un assemblage de « pétitions de principe », de

« généralisations hâtives », bref le « nivellement des sphères de compréhension ». De ce point de vue,

la prétendue ontologie bantoue n’est finalement qu’une « contradiction formelle dans les termes,

mais qu’elle est réellement impossible, et qu’en outre elle ne peut fonder immédiatement ni la morale,

ni le droit »12. Notons que cette position va quelque peu évoluer, car dans La crise du Muntu, il va

proposer « dans l’exercice ontologique », « le dépassement d’un soi égotiquement compris, un

dépassement qui ne va pas avec l’effacement de soi et une hâtive résignation, mais qui le fait accéder

à une présence qu’il puisse éprouver comme unique et durable, au-delà de l’illusion » (Eboussi, 1977,

p. 197). Dans la même lancée, l’Histoire d’un mythe de Paulin Hountondji se fait en 1973 le répondant

direct d’Eboussi contre Tempels. Pour le penseur béninois, il n’est pas possible de parler d’une

« philosophie bantoue » comme vision collective du monde. Elle devrait aller vers un penser par soi-

même qui s’émancipe de toute tentative de fixation dans un « ghetto africaniste ». Dans son Essai sur

la problématique philosophique dans l’Afrique actuelle, Marcien Towa vient donner le coup fatal à

Tempels et à ses épigones, en reprochant à ce groupe de penseurs de brader la philosophie au prix des

manifestations culturelles de toutes sortes, critique que reprendra d’ailleurs Ebenezer Njoh-Mouelle

dans son ouvrage Jalons II. Pour Towa, c’est au prix d’une transformation scientifique et économique

que l’Afrique peut vraiment mettre sa culture à l’abri des « puissances de notre temps » (Towa, 1979,

pp. 51-52).

Disons de façon générale, que les différentes critiques ainsi formulées, voudraient promouvoir une

pensée africaine qui est adhésion libre, consciente et volontaire, plutôt que recherche d’une originalité

dans les hypostases d’un passé idyllique. L’ethnophilosophie dans sa tentative de donner un contenu

à la pensée africaine au niveau philosophique, doit malheureusement rencontrer sur son chemin ces

différentes tentatives d’« encadrement ». Objectif atteint ou pas atteint, il faut bien remarquer que

ces critiques de l’ethnophilosophie en voulant pout l’Afrique contemporaine un savoir opérationnel et

opérant, ouvrent à une clarification sur le continent des excroissances de la notion de philosophie. S’il

est vrai que les défenseurs de l’ethnophilosophie se comptent tout aussi bien que ses détracteurs,

c’est toujours la philosophie africaine qui tire la part belle de cet exercice dialectique. Loin de célébrer

11 F. GRAHAY, « Le "décollage" conceptuel : conditions d’une philosophie bantoue », extraits repris par A. J.

Smet, dans Autour de la philosophie africaine. Textes choisis, Kinshasa-Lubumbashi, Université Nationale du

Zaïre, 1973, p.p. 345-370. 12 F. EBOUSSI, « Le Bantou problématique », in Présence Africaine, N° 66, p.p. 4-40, extraits repris par A. J.

SMET, dans Autour de la philosophie africaine. Textes choisis, p.p. 175-216.


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la critique, le rejet de la critique de la critique est de ce fait tout aussi suicidaire pour la philosophie

africaine. C’est pour cela qu’une émancipation conceptuelle est importante pour au moins commencer

par distinguer/distancer l’ethnophilosophie de la philosophie africaine. Pour aller plus loin dans le

projet, le nécessaire passage d’une quête des vérités à un sens de l’histoire des idées en contexte

africain ne peut-il pas constituer le lieu d’une instauration/insurrection ?

2. Les aventures du sens comme réconciliation du soi historique et du soi déterminé

Le sens de la question reste celui de la quête d’un lieu commun, détermination de l’instant à partir

duquel les différents moments de la pensée philosophique africaine prennent un certain sens. Si

l’entreprise est avant tout historique, elle pose un problème dynamique, fondé non seulement sur la

marche de l’histoire africaine, mais aussi sur ce que nous voulons appeler ici les « aventures du sens ».

Tenir un discours pour le moins sensé sur le sens est pour nous accepter d’entreprendre un voyage

méta-structurel, puisque ce vers quoi nous voulons aller à la rencontre, dépasse le simple langage

(entre sémantique et sémiotique en matière de discours), pour renvoyer à l’histoire même de tout un

peuple, à la manière dont il articule le discours qui parle de lui. Une telle discursivité13 ne s’accomplit-

elle pas dans le récit, en tant que ce dernier est à la fois articulation discursive et projection dans une

détermination concrète ?

Le sens nous situe en plein dans le langage, mais bien plus dans l’herméneutique. Partant de

l’ethnophilosophie en discussion ici, le sens que nous convoquons conduit à penser les possibilités qui

sont offertes à la pensée philosophique africaine en ce qui concerne le contenu de ses formes et les

formes de son contenu. Tout comme le sens est d’abord relation, la philosophie africaine est aussi

appelée à se faire relation. Relation pas seulement à l’histoire des idées en contexte africain, mais

surtout relation actualisée de l’Africain d’aujourd’hui, sujet situé, avec d’une part son héritage, mais

surtout les éléments de son monde présent d’autre part. Si donc l’ethnophilosophie affirme que le

sens de la pensée philosophique africaine se trouve déjà dans les éléments de la culture africaine, ce

sens est de ce fait donné. L’herméneutique quant à elle inviterait à aller à la rencontre de ce sens, à le

construire, ou tout simplement à le dé-couvrir, ce qui fait précisément de ce sens une quête. « Le sens

ne signifie donc pas seulement ce que les mots veulent bien nous dire, il est aussi une direction, c’est-

à-dire, dans le langage des philosophes, une intentionnalité et une finalité » (Greimas, 1970, p. 15).

13 La paternité de l’expression revient à Jeki Kinyongo, qui dans une perspective herméneutique situe le moment

déterminant de la pensée philosophique africaine dans la prise en compte des éléments de discursivité issus de la

culture africaine et qui comme le symbole chez Ricœur, donnent penser.


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L’herméneutique comme quête de sens en contexte philosophique africain, sonne d’abord comme un

aveu de secours (ap)porté à l’intuition fondamentale de l’ethnophilosophie agonisante : donner sens

à la culture africaine, sans trahir (pour la philosophie) son contenu philosophique. Son souci est ici de

prendre part à un débat, celui portant sur la philosophie africaine, même si ses conclusions ont

largement dépassé le seuil des questions-réponses, pour devenir un mode de pensée, une pensée

vivante et « créatrice » pour l’Africain en mal du penser sur son être au monde et son rapport aux

éléments culturels qui lui sont propres. La critique adressée à l’ethnophilosophie dans sa forme, loin

d’être une relativisation de la pertinence de la question, est bien plus un effort de narrativité que de

survie, d’une Afrique qui va au-delà du concept pour retrouver la parole. Nous pouvons donc mieux

comprendre la réalité qui veut que « c’est des non-philosophies que la philosophie doit émerger par

un effort critique », (Kinyongo, 1977, p. 15). Le mouvement n’est donc pas de la philosophie vers la

culture, mais de la culture vers la philosophie. Ceci n’est en rien une « intention de régression » ou la

sublimation d’un passé aux contours flous, mais une manière toute autre de s’approprier son histoire.

Notre projet discursif, voudrait proposer un discours philosophique, susceptible de tenir compte à la

fois de l’héritage culturel, de la réflexion et de la compréhension pour l’articulation d’un certain sens,

précisément discursif. C’est dire dans ce contexte, que la signification met les choses en rapports les

unes par rapport aux autres, dans un souci d’ordonnancement de ces dernières. Il convient donc de

dire avec Kinyongo, que

le modèle herméneutique convient mieux que tout autre à la notion d’une

philosophie proprement africaine, il faut croire que les faits de culture sur lesquels

elle s’appuie sont généralement dégagés de l’immédiateté de notre propre

actualité et de celle de leurs effectuation. Ainsi, ces faits de culture qui,

naturellement, c’est-à-dire habituellement, "veulent dire" parlent nécessairement

"d’ailleurs" tantôt sous la forme précise d’une oralité ou d’un texte écrit, tantôt sous

celle d’événements et d’avènements (Kinyongo, 1977, p. 19).

C’est donc dire que le passage de l’ethnophilosophie à l’herméneutique conduit à un projet de

« reprise » des éléments de discursivité, à de véritables « renversements » qui nous apparaissent tout

à fait comme fondamentaux dans les moments déterminants pour toute pensées philosophique,

constamment appelée à scruter le monde.

CONCLUSION

L’ethnophilosophie est en fin de compte un moment de la philosophie africaine, un de ses principaux

courants contemporains. Si l’africanité se trouve toute justifiée dans ses postulations, la philosophicité


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de ses énoncés quant à elle a eu du mal à trouver preneur auprès des adeptes de la pensée critique.

Nous avons pris pour paradigme illustratif le cas du Fabien Eboussi de La crise du Muntu. C’est ainsi

que nous avons vu abordée la question de la liberté, de la philosophie et de sa fonction essentiellement

critique. La valeur de ce propos est sans conteste sa soif de rigueur et de discipline philosophique. Ce

qui sera caractérisé par Kinyongo comme « éléments de discursivité », fruits de notre héritage culturel,

ne peuvent-ils pas nous aider à « articuler un certain sens discursif ? ». Au plan philosophique, choisir

entre « fuir » nos cultures et « embrasser » la rigueur d’une philosophie scientifique, quelle attitude

choisir ? Disons-le simplement avec Mudimbe : entre une « gentille "sauvagerie" » et la « civilisation »,

si vous choisissez la première, l’impérialisme vous aura, avec pour effet l’ethnocide et la perte de tout.

Si vous choisissez la seconde, « vous vivrez amputés de votre culture ». C’est pourquoi il va proposer

« un subtil usage de l’intersection (la notion et la réalité) inhérente à un type de structure aliénante.

(…) Cet usage peut permettre une insurrection. Pourquoi ne point voir cette ouverture ? ». (Mudimbe,

1973, pp. 153-154). La philosophie devrait peut-être être un peu plus modeste, et surtout considérer

que ce qui est (dit) philosophique et ce qui ne l’est pas sont tous des manifestes de l’esprit humain,

donc potentiels objets philosophiques. Toujours est-il que l’approche critique que propose Eboussi, est

marquée par la conviction que l’« essentiel a été dit sur le rôle critique du philosopher, qui doit laisser

être la rationalité plénière, qui ne saurait être sans la maîtrise scientifique et technologique » (Eboussi,

1977, p. 216). Emploi et réemploi de la philosophie, c’est donc passer d’un discours premier sur les

cultures à une herméneutique d’un discours non pas second et ainsi de suite, mais d’une meta-

discursivité dont la complexité est qu’il ne porte plus que sur des énoncés, mais sur une inscription de

la conscience elle-même dans le temps, le temps d’un temps, celui qui dit, raconte et fait l’histoire de

tout un peuple.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

EBOUSSI Boulaga Fabien, « Le Bantou problématique », in Présence Africaine, N° 66, p.p. 4-40.

EBOUSSI Boulaga Fabien, La crise du Muntu. Authenticité africaine et philosophie, Paris, Présence

Africaine, 1977.

ESSENGUE Yannick, « La force vitale ou l’échec de la métaphysique dans la philosophie africaine de

l’école. Un bilan de la philosophie ? », in Raison Ardente, N° 84, mai 2010, pp. 50-63.

GRAHAY Frantz, « Le "décollage" conceptuel : conditions d’une philosophie bantoue », extraits repris

par A. J. Smet, dans Autour de la philosophie africaine. Textes choisis, Kinshasa-Lubumbashi, Université

Nationale du Zaïre, 1973, p.p. 345-370.

GREIMAS Algirdas Julien, Du sens. Essais sémiotique, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1970.


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HEIDEGGER Martin, Acheminement vers la parole, Paris, Gallimard, 1976.

HEIDEGGER Martin, Questions III. Le chemin de campagne. L’expérience de la pensée. Hebel. Lettre

sur l’humanisme. Sérénité, Paris, Gallimard, 1966.

KINYONGO Jeki, « Essai sur la fondation épistémologique d’une philosophie herméneutique en Afrique :

le cas de la discursivité », in Présence Africaine, N° 109, 1977, pp. 11-28.

MANA KÄ, L'Afrique, notre projet : Révolutionner l'imaginaire africain, Yaoundé, Éditions terroirs, 2009.

MUDIMBE Valentin Yves, L’autre face du royaume. Une introduction à la critique des langages en folie,

Presses Jurassiennes, Coll. « l’Âge d’homme », 1973.

MUDIMBE Valentin Yves, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the order of knowledge,

Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988.

OBENGA Théophile, « La philosophie pharaonique », in Présence Africaine, N° 37-138, 1er et 2e

Trimestre 1986, pp. 3-4. Commenté par G. MPAY KEMBOLY dans un article de la Revue « Raison

Ardente », N° 41, avril 1994, p.p. 14-15.

SMET Joseph Alphonse, dans Autour de la philosophie africaine. Textes choisis, p.p. 175-216.

TEMPELS Placide, La philosophie Bantoue, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1949.

TOUNKARA, Sidy., LOLO, Chadon, MAVOUNGOU-PEMBA, Pénélope-Natacha (Ed), Le réalités et les

défis d’une renaissance africaine, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2015, pp.

TOWA Martien, Essai sur la problématique philosophique dans l’Afrique actuelle, Yaoundé, Ed. CLE,

1971.

TOWA Martien, L’idée d’une philosophie négro-africaine, Yaoundé, Ed. CLE, 1979.

Van PARYS Jean-Marie, Une approche simple de la philosophie africaine, Ed. Loyola, Publications

Canisius, 1993.


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«Christ Was a Jew-Baiter». Religious Beliefs of

William Dudley Pelley and Rev. Charles Edward

Coughlin as Part of Their Political Ideologies

Nikolay Kuznetsov

Radical American ideologies consisted of several parts. In the 1930s in the USA, when the country

suffered from the Great Depression, both conservative and radical movements used American

Nationalism, Isolationism and Christianity as a base for their political actions. Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr.,

Huey P. Long, Charles E. Coughlin, Henry Ford were the most famous leaders of that kind of movements.

Nevertheless, there were other politicians having interesting ideas. One of them was William Dudley

Pelley (1885-1965), whose political and religious beliefs were analysed in this article in comparison with

beliefs of Rev. Charles E. Coughlin (1891-1979).

Political situation in the USA in the 1930s.

The USA, as a part of the Western Civilization, had many social and economic problems at once in the

1930s. The Great Depression became the most powerful crisis in the American history. It led to the rise

of various radical movements and parties like Communists, Socialists, Nazis and Fascists. The last two,

despite their origin (German, Italian and even Russian), had a great influence on American policy from

the Right side of the political specter. American Rights – Conservatives from both parties, Radicals and

Anti-War Movement – consisted of men from various social groups and acted against Franklin Delano

Roosevelt’s policy from the 1932 election to the US Entry into the Second World War.

Religion always had strong influence on the US society. Since the pilgrims from ‘Mayflower’ organized

the colony, it was one of the most important parts of all ideological thoughts from the Colonies and

States, including Nationalism (Gadjiev, 1990:48) with all its Radical branches. One of them was anti-

Semitic propagandist and the leader of American Nazis was William Dudley Pelley.

Looking on W.D. Pelley beliefs.

William Dudley Pelley, son of a Methodist preacher, had, of course, strong religious education since

his childhood. But in 1928 he became a Spiritualist, as he described himself in his own book (Pelley,


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1929). We think that after that he started to believe, that he has a special mission in life to bring his

thoughts and experience to other people.

He thought that he «unlocked the mystery of the Christian faith, the miracles of Jesus, the conversional

power of the Holy Spirit» (Pelley, 1929:30). It led him to call himself a prophet and act accordingly. For

example, all his messages in his own propagandist magazine Liberation were written in the form of the

Biblical prophesies inspired by the Voice of God (AJC, 1933: 3). He was a talented journalist and writer,

what made him a famous in the USA in the beginning of 1920s. He made his talent an arm, which

helped him to translate his beliefs to the others, no matter religious or just political ones.

Pelley identified himself as the White Protestant Christian not a Spiritualist (AJC, 1933: 1) and attacked

Roman Catholics, Orthodox Greeks and the Christian Science Church (AJC, 1939: 5), what tells us more

about how intolerant he was even to the Christians of the other denominations. So, the «Christ

Government» (AJC, 1933: 1) he wanted to establish was not for all the Christendom but only for his

supporters united in the Christian Militia and the Silver Legion. On the other hand, Pelley believed that

Anglo-Saxons were the true descendants of the Biblical Chosen People (Pelley, 1934: 10) and that Jews

just pretended to be the Chosen One, depicting them as liars who wanted to steal the Anglo-Saxon

heritage, given them by God (Pelley, 1938). And it leads us to his political position.

When we are observing texts of and about Pelley, we can notice two important ideological moments

that Pelley provided. It is Anti-Communism and Anti-Semitism. Both were linked one with another,

Communism even was named as «World Jewry in action» by the propagandists (Elmhurst, 1934: 2).

The origin of his Anti-Communist thoughts went from his experience of living in Russia during the

Revolution, which was named by him as «the practical effects of Yiddish Bolshevism» (Elmhurst, 1934:

2). He said that Jews planned and organized the First World War and the Russian Revolution to take

control over the country (Pelley, 1934), and planned a plot to overthrow the Christian government of

the USA (Ibid.; Elmhurst, 1934: 166).

We can see, that his plans for government was to make corporative community of all Americans,

guaranteed $1000 per year for each citizen to protect them against poverty. He also planned to start

anti-Hebrew education in all schools and universities, connected with the apartheid-like policy against

Jews and Afro-Americans and the sterilization of all male Jews in the USA (AJC, 1939: 3-4, 7). It is similar

to the German Nazism and in connection with his uniform and symbols he used; it says that he was a

Nazi. However, despite the oblivious sympathy to German Nazism, Pelley wrote:


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«Now don't get me wrong! I'm no Nazi propagandist apologizing for Hitler. I don't

believe his brand of government would work for Americans any more than Stalin's

brand of government would work for Americans.» (Pelley, 1938).

It argues that he preferred to stay outside of Nazism itself, but provided the same ideology as Hitler

did, with American specific features, based on American religious and political traditions, and Pelley’s

own experience both ordinary and extraordinary.

The key moment, that unites both religious and political thoughts of Pelley, is the idea of the new

Christ government administered by the people of the Christian Faith against any forms of socialism,

Jews and Afro-Americans (AJC, 1933:1; AJC, 1939: 4)

He often said that Jesus Christ was his role model, and even called Christ a Nazi (Elmhurst, 1934:5). E.g.

in his work, called The Dupes of Judas (Pelley, 1938), he wrote:

«A tree is known by its fruits. Christ said that, a long time ago. But Christ doesn't

seem to be overly popular with American Legion Posts since the Jews took over -

excepting as a mouth-filling cuss word. How many times have you heard Christ's

name invoked in Legion Post meetings? The name of "God," yes! God, according

to all the best Bibles, is very, very Jewish. But Christ was such a Jew-Baiter that

they dragged Him off and killed Him. If you think that such deletions come about

by accident, you're crazy.»

And it says enough to understand the basics of his political ideology, whose was supported by nearly

75,000 Americans (AJC, 1939: 2) and his Silver Legions of America consisted of 15,000 people (Pro-Nazi

Groups in the USA).

Charles Edward Coughlin’s political position.

Charles E. Coughlin was a more famous politician than Pelley. He was a Canadian-born Catholic minister

with Irish ancestors, who worked in the USA as a Radio-Priest. Pelley used his writing talent, and

Coughlin used his ability to speak well. He became a criticist of both Communist and Capitalist system

as anti-Christian (Coughlin, 1934).


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Coughlin’s Radio Broadcasts were very popular. He had c. 10-40 million listeners in the 1930s when

the total population of the United States was 123 million people. Coughlin’s National Union for Social

Justice was supported by 200,000 Americans (Koshkina, 2010). His political agenda was similar to the

one that the Italian Fascist Party had, and he himself said that he brought methods, that were realized

in Germany and Italy (Hansen, 1939). But it needs to say that for Coughlin, how we think, Nazism and

Fascism were only examples for political activity.

To make any comparisons between Coughlin and Pelley we shall notice the principles of Coughlin’s

plan. There were: liberty of education, guaranteed wage for workers, nationalizing of resources,

private ownership for the property, and also:

«<…>

10. I believe not only in the right of the laboring man to organize in unions but also in the duty

of the Government, which that laboring man supports, to protect these organizations against

the vested interests of wealth and of intellect.

<…>

13. I believe in broadening the base of taxation according to the principles of ownership and

the capacity to pay.

<…>

15. I believe that, in the event of a war for the defense of our nation and its liberties, there

shall be a conscription of wealth as well as a conscription of men.

16. I believe in preferring the sanctity of human rights to the sanctity of property rights; for the

chief concern of government shall be for the poor because, as it is witnessed, the rich have

ample means of their own to care for themselves.» (Coughlin, 1934).

As a Christian minister, Coughlin was, for the first years in politics, for National unity despite the race

or religion (Coughlin, 1935). He believed, that «God gave to the people social rights for all: Catholics,

Protestants, Hebrews, Pagans, Black and White, Rich and Poor» (Coughlin, 1934). He also said:

«I am mindful that I am a Catholic priest whose voice is being carried into the

homes of millions of persons who do not share my faith. I am thoroughly mindful


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that despite differences of religion, of race, of color and of profession, I am also an

American citizen privileged as such to speak to American citizens.» (Coughlin,

1935).

But after 1936 Coughlin became providing Anti-Semitism in the USA, calling Jews a cause of the crisis

and telling they had plans to start Soviet-like Communist revolution in America. Coughlin’s anti-

Semitism was a part of his Anti-Communism what was common for the Right-Radical movements in

the USA in the 1930s (Bell, 1973: 32; Wallace, 2003: 109).

Communism for Coughlin was both Jewish and Atheistic ideology. And that was one of his reasons to

be against any Communist propaganda in the USA. He was against entering the USA into the Second

World War, because for him war in Europe was against Jews and Communism, who wanted America

fighting on their side. But, as J. Hansen wrote in 1939:

«In order to maintain that he is not anti-Semitic, he divides Jews into two

categories. Five per cent of them are religious, he postulates. This five per cent he

favors – and if they are ever persecuted, he declares, you will find him in their

front ranks! The other ninety-five per cent, he says, are not religious. They are

communists, socialists, atheists, international bankers, and dealers in gold.»

(Hansen, 1939)

Coughlin's growing extremism, his increasing determination to cast political problems in terms of free-

floating conspiracy, and his persistent attacks on a popular president made many of his fellow Catholics

nervous. Despite Coughlin was a Catholic Priest, the Church didn’t support him (Coughlin, 1939: 4-7).

It tells us that his political position was too radical for the Church. But we must say, that his religious

beliefs were an ordinary part of Roman Catholicism, without any radicalism or heresy-like thoughts.

Similarities and differences.

First, we must notice the differences between Pelley and Coughlin. We aren’t speaking about the

denomination they represented, we’ll speak about the influence of the religious beliefs of both

politicians to their political programs. We can see that Pelley was a radical and even heresy-like

Christian who used his religious beliefs as a reason to hate even other Christians. Coughlin didn’t use

religion as an arm, but for him this wasn’t the main. But he used his religious rank to contact with the


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people. Both Pelley and Coughlin were Anti-Semitists. But while Pelley was Anti-Semitic politician

during all his active political life (since 1918), what we noticed in his own thoughts, even written post-

factum, Coughlin wasn’t against Jews before 1936, when he already was famous. We think, that he

turned to Anti-Semitism because of the rise of Anti-Semitism in the USA just to be on mainstream of

the public policy.

When Pelley was speaking about sterilization of all Jews in the USA and apartheid against them, which

was similar to NSDAP’s policy against Jews in Germany, Coughlin just criticized that American Jews had

influence on internal and foreign policy, how he often said on his broadcasts. Anti-Semitism of Coughlin

was softer than Pelley’s one, and this can explain also that Catholic Coughlin was more popular in

mostly Protestant USA than Pelley, whose religious beliefs was based on Protestant Faith.

There were more common between them. Both Coughlin and Pelley were Anti-Communists and both

criticized Capitalism that led the country into the biggest social and economic crisis in history. And they

proposed their own programs to make the life of the poor people better. But Pelley’s program was

more radical and more Fascist-like than Coughlin’s one.

By the way, the Federal Reserve was an object, which was criticized by both of them. First, they accused

that bank for organizing crises and manipulating American economy to make the rich richer and the

poor poorer. And both of them called Jews bankers and owners of the Federal Reserve. They, how

wrote both Pelley and Coughlin, controlled also President Roosevelt and his New Deal program. On

the other hand, both of them were accused for being Nazis. We noticed, that both were against that

definition for themselves. The level of Pelley’s radicalism tells us that he really was a Nazi politician.

About Coughlin we can’t say the same, because all his radicalism was in social sphere, not only racial

or ethnical. But his anti-Semitism leads us to thought he was a Far-Right radical politician compared

with Fascists.

In conclusion we can say that they were politicians, who demonstrated various sides of Far-Right

Christianity based on different background in the U.S. society. And that make interesting to study the

questions of their beliefs and political positions as a part of all Christian discourse about social and

national problems of the American society in the 20th century.


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Literature:

1. Archives.

American Jewish Committee Files:

1. Bulletin No. 3.: The Silver Shirts: Their History, Founder and Activities. August 24, 1933.

2. Note: William Dudley Pelley. April 14, 1939.

2. Primary Sources.

Coughlin, C.E.: A Reply to General Hugh Johnson. March 11, 1935.

Coughlin, C.E.: The National Union for Social Justice. November 11, 1934

Elmhurst, E.F.: World Hoax. Asheville, N.C., 1934

Pelley, W.D.: «Seven Minutes in Eternity» With Their Aftermath. N.Y., 1929.

Pelley, W.D.: Dupes of Judas: A Challenge To The American Legion. In:

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/HTML-docs/dupes%20of%20judah.htm, 1938.

Pelley, W.D.: What is a Jew-Baiter? Asheville, N.C., 1934

3. Secondary Sources.

Bell, L.V.: In Hitler’s Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism. Port Washington, N.Y./London,

Kennikat Press, Inc., 1973.

Eliston, J.: New Age Nazi. In: http://mountainx.com/news/community-news/0128pelley-php/, 2004.

Father Coughlin, his «Facts» and Arguments. N.Y., 1939.

Hansen, J.: Father Coughlin. Fascist Demagogue. In:

https://www.marxists.org/archive/hansen/1939/06/coughlin.html, 1939.

Pro-Nazi Groups in the USA. In: http://www.holocaustchronicle.org/StaticPages/89.html

Wallace, M.: The American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh and the rise of the Third Reich. St.

Martin’s Press, 2003.

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/HTML-docs/dupes%20of%20judah.htm

http://mountainx.com/news/community-news/0128pelley-php/

https://www.marxists.org/archive/hansen/1939/06/coughlin.html

http://www.holocaustchronicle.org/StaticPages/89.html


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Гаджиев, К.С.: Американская нация: национальное самосознание и культура. Москва, 1990. (In

English: Gadjiev, K.S.: The American Nation: National Selfidentity and Culture. Moscow, 1990)

Кошкина, М.М.: «Фашизм под крестом»: деятельность Чарльза Эдварда Кофлина. In: Известия

СмолГУ. 2010, 2(10), p. 175-183. (In English: Koshkina, M.M.: «Fascism under the Cross»: Charles

Edward Coughlin’s Activity. In: Papers of Smolensk State University. 2010, 2(10), p. 175-183)


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Dabbling with Ethics: How moral values impact of

our immediate social environment?

Ilie Iulian Mitran

Our minds are bombarded on a daily basis with huge quantities of information that needs to be

processed into thoughts and ideas; the rapid pace in which the human communities outline their

dynamics nowadays is directly influenced by the role of communication technology. As a result, we are

more prone to making ethical errors due to our limited capacity to make a clear distinction between

‘fabricated information’ and the ‘truthful information’. The ethicist is the one that is left with the

difficult task of making a well calculated intervention in a society’s social framework in order to

facilitate the neutralization of its unbalances which so often trace their roots in a moral or ethical crisis.

Moral and ethics are often debated at a theoretical level in academic environments but with a lack of

interest for their practical use in day-to-day life. The study of ethics is in favor of the development of

multi-perspective outlook on the world, of a thought process that avoids falling under influence of

ethnocentric ideas, and even more important, erasing those errors of thought and conduct that set

the foundation lies, corruption and the abuse of one’s power and social status.

It should be made very clear from the very beginning that this paper does not intend to give answers;

I stopped long ago hoping to find solid answers in ethics. I found out that the main objective of this

field is not that of giving us the actual answer, but rather, giving us the epistemological framework that

will lead us to the answer that is the most suitable for us.

Every society has its own way of evolving over time, we can talk about similar development patterns

but we will never find two that match perfectly. Ethics, once viewed only as a branch of Philosophy,

now gained an impressive number of scholars that focus on ways in which the study of Ethics can

facilitate the birth of a new social era, one that is safe from disturbances, violence and inequality

among people. It should be made clear from the beginning that there are a lot of ways in which ethics

can be perceived as a subject, quite often, its critiques highlight the high degree of relativism that

ethical norms have.

This limitation is perceived at three levels – geographic, temporal and cultural - they can overlap, they

can intersect, there’s nothing that could make one incompatible with another. Most often, cultural


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relativism is the one that is used in the battle against the legitimacy that Ethics can hold both in the

class room, as a subject of study, or in a company, as a framework for the employees conduct.

Modern ethicists are preoccupied nowadays with outlining those sets of values that are common to all

of mankind in order to design ethical norms that are applicable regardless of aspects that are linked to

geography and cultural particularities. On the other hand, the temporal limitations that some values

and ethical standards have cannot be ‘fixed’ and there is no need in the majority of cases for their

comeback; there are numerous instances in which some of the values that were held by people in the

past were dysfunctional and counterproductive.

A good example would be ‘blind obedience’, a different form of obedience then the one from nowadays,

the form that we are talking about was in some way a byproduct of the ‘divine command’ which set

certain people into certain social positions as a result of God’s decision to equip them with power over

others. Our talk about ethical errors or errors in Ethics can take two very different paths:

Ethical errors are made up of one’s incapability of coherently understanding the conduct that

an ethical norm wants to apply.

The errors of Ethics rather refers to the way in which an ethical norm was thought of and

structured that it isn’t capable of regulating one’s conduct in such a way that it would lead to

positive results.

An even trickier question comes when we must clarify the distinction between the concepts of error

and flaw. From my own perspective, if there were to be a distinction between the two that would

come from the way in which they make their existence noticeable.


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An error could relate more to the misconduct, to a lack of understanding of a conduct’s consequences;

on the other hand, a flaw might relate to an error’s result and may be noticeable at both a psychological

and material level. In any case, we can all agree on the fact that the two notions that were presented

in the lines from above are inseparable by nature.

Errors, their structure and the way of functioning, gained a huge interest in the context of the growth

in size and power of companies which are conscious that their stability and further development are

dependent on the minimization or errors in all areas of activities.

Another issue that puzzles many finds its roots in the statement that ‘no ethical norm is universally

applicable due to cultural relativism’; and how can we put our trust in a science that has such shallow

roots? This is a subject that was widely debated, yet again, we can talk about universally accepted

ethical norms only if we bring in to discussion two other elements:

Universal values – based on the statement there is a set of ‘universal human values’ which act

as a base for ethical norms that legitimize their use through the wellbeing that they bring to

the lives of individuals and their communities.

Legitimization of values through their author’s position, strength and influence on others.

Even so, the legitimization of the use of a universal set of ethical norms base on people’s adherence

to a set of common human values can be dissolved by the growing level of nihilist

ideologies which deny legitimacy of value as a base for conduct and generally questions the

very essence morality do to its subjectivism and the credibility of those parties that impose moral

standards as a way of fulfilling the ‘Divine Command’.


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There is quite a controversy over the legitimacy of the Divine Command for a number of reasons.

First of all, if we use this idea in the context of ethics we are heading towards a non-naturalistic

approach in which social harmony isn’t the result of the predominance of conducts which don’t

put man in opposition with the natural world (people, animals, plants), but rather it becomes the

result of an intervention from the exterior that man cannot resist. This poses a lot of problems

when it comes to the credibility that ethical codes can have; it shows that morals and ethics are

impersonal, they don’t represent the product of human thought and experience but rather

represent an element which represents the natural consequence of men’s creation by a superior

being which he is eternally subordinated to. Ideas, doctrines and thoughts which had non-

naturalistic tendencies were raised in popularity during the time of the Reformation in which the

emerging Calvinist teaching was in favor of a life path that was preset, that was unchangeable and

one in which the elements that make up our world don’t have an unpredictable interaction and

evolution.

The popularization of Calvinist ideas lead to the apparition of a new image of the social and natural

world, a vision that was the subject of fatalism and inequality, a vision of a God that set privileges

for some and eternal suffering for others. On the other hand, it comforted some, because there

was no longer a real personal fault for one’s fails in life, it was comforting to know that there were

those who were predestined to spend eternity with God and those who were meant to spend

eternity in suffering and there was nothing that could be changed about it.


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So how can we design a universal set of applicable ethical norms? There is a chance by making a

short analysis of what actual are the criteria by which we label something as ethical or unethical,

and how can we find the right values that can be universally applicable to all cultures and societies?

For much of man’s history, ethical and unethical conducts were quite frequently absorbed into the

concepts of good and evil. This isn’t so surprising the social context of the last centuries in which

the Church held a monopole on everything that related to moral literature and other writings on

this subject. Morality was perceived as a tool that could be administered only by the Church which

was installed with power from the Creator.

Morals were exclusively a subject that related to religiosity and with religious life in general, as a

result, the values that acted as a base for ethical norms fluctuated between the concepts of good

and evil because morality was subordinated to religious ideologies.

Nowadays, we cannot talk anymore about morality which is centered only around good and evil,

but rather it is more constructive to talk about morality and ethics which gravitates around

pleasurable/ irritating; functional/ dysfunctional or harmful/ non-harmful.

Hedonism, and all the ideologies that it fueled, tell us that men is naturally attracted to everything

that gives him joy and comfort. As a result, can we state that there are values that are both

intrinsically and extrinsically positive in any cultural environment and context? If we take the value

of education, which is cherished in all human cultures, can we create ethical norms based on it

that are applicable anywhere? A thing that must be kept in mind is that education doesn’t

encompass only formal education and informal education as we know them in the Western World.

The phrase ‘he’s educated’ or ‘he’s the educated one’ can be attached to the notion of wisdom in

the same way as it can be used to denote one’s academic performances. The translation of values

from a culture to another is in many instances limited and impossible. An interesting case when it

comes to the translation of moral values from one culture to another is when the actual meaning

of a value can be modified by its position within a system. This is the case of the value of purity

which takes a central position within the Hindu system of moral values; in this case, purity has

different substances than it has in the context of the Western World. The ‘Hindu purity’ is different

from the ‘Christian purity’; in both cases purity would be linked at one point to one’s ‘healthy moral

profile’, but yet again, the difference is rooted in the centrality of this value in this two systems of

belief (Gandhi, 1987). For Christians purity came to represent a byproduct in their quest for

obtaining salvation and eternal life; it is a requirement for ‘God’s plan for Salvation’, but it isn’t

held as the Christian faith’s ideological foundation. In Hinduism, purity has a solid and quite well


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outlined configuration, this central value is manifested through in two distinct ways which are

interconnected – purity of the mind and the purity of the body (Arumgam, 1999). The purity of the

mind is the one that dictates that of the body, a mind that is prone to falling into a moral chaos

cannot sustain a healthy body. Moral chaos is unavoidable, it happens to each one of us being a

visible manifestation of our flawed nature; when dealing with moral chaos our struggle is not only

internal, it automatically translates in the way we interact with our immediate environment.

Opposed to Christianity, Hinduism highlights the purity of man in his ‘natural state’, by ‘natural

state’ we understand man from an intrinsic angle, one that did not enter or did not get absorbed

into the society which is a playground for polluting and immoral practices (Hall, 1999). Men’s purity

is, as mentioned above, an intrinsic characteristic, an infant enters into this world both physically

and spiritually pure. Pollution comes from the exterior and infiltrates in to man’s inner self, first

infesting the thought, and immediately after, the physical body.

The elements that set the ground for the installment of moral chaos can vary substantially from

one individual to the other, moral chaos, or the element that triggered it find its source somewhere

in our distant or immediate social environment, highlighting once more that moral values are a

social product and don’t have biological traits.

To many readers purity and pollution may seem quite distant as concepts related or relatable to

morality to the geographic area in which they hold the highest degree of popularity, the Indian

subcontinent. In our world, we tend to judge actions and conduct by applying attaching the label

of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ , rather than using concepts as complex as purity and pollution. The easiest way

that we translate this two moral labels into a theoretical form, keeping mind the social

particularities of the century in which we live, it would be by directly relating them with pleasant-

unpleasant, pleasurable-uncomfortable, functional-dysfunctional.

Conscious or not, all of the notions that are written above can be easily absorbed into a hedonist

social doctrine, one that says that people naturally tend to favor those things that give them a

sense of pleasure, and are inclined to reject those that bring them discomfort. Hedonism reached

its peak of popularity with the advancement of technology and the fall of religiosity; new

technologies promised us a future in which our lives would be easier, a future in which we will do

less manual labor and achieve a bigger quantity of goods. The advance of technology was

fundamentally fueled by the favorable prospective of doing less work and having a higher level of

comfort in our daily life.

Even so, the purity-pollution dual was present in Europe for centuries without being noticed by the

majority of people; it was and still is in use by the Romani people, a group that traces their roots

to the Indian subcontinent. Purity is a central-fixed value in traditional Romani culture, its origins


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are related to the ancestors of the modern Romani who were practicing various forms of Hinduism;

their spread in Europe was synonymous with their abandonment of their ancestor’s faith, or what

was left of it, and adopting the religious practices of the communities in which they settled. Purity

remained up to the present a fixed-central value in Romani culture, and its importance is especially

stressed by conservative communities. The ‘Hindu purity’ and the ‘Romani purity’ are today

notions that are similar in form but have substantial differences in regards to their substance; first

of all, the Romani had developed over time new functions for this notion and nowadays it tends

to be mainly synonymous with the conservation of the vernacular elements of the culture. As a

result, purity became to a certain degree relatable in the ban of intermixing with other groups.

Another function that purity still plays is in some rituals and events that mark important points of

an individual’s and of a community’s life. Weddings and funerals still put a huge stress on the purity

of those that are the central figures of the event or of those who are present as ‘spectators’. After

death, the physical body became polluted, as a result of decay, because of this, there are a number

of costumes that are meant to limit the effects of negative energies. In this case, non-values are

translated in to restrictive ethical norms, and values are turned in to premise and descriptive

ethical norms.

CONCLUSION

This paper had as a focal point the debate on the possibility of the construction of a set of ‘universal

ethical norms’ that could guide the conduct of anybody, regardless of their cultural background. From

what we saw, values vary quite a lot, depending on the cultural environment that we are referring to;

another issue derives from the fact that even there is a number of values that are present all around

the world, some may translate them quite differently into ethical norms than others. There is no set

of guidelines that can offer a unitary way of translation of values into ethical norms, thus cultural

discrepancies tend to get wider.

One thing that we can do is that of listing the criteria that should act as a base for when we were to

pick the ‘universal values’. Are those ‘universal values’ prone to give us pleasure and comfort? Will

they be perceived in the same way in the majority of cultures? Should those norms be affiliated to

hedonist ideas? Should they be counter-natural norms, ones that ban us to do those things that bring

us pleasure and comfort?


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Literature:

Arumgam, Prakash: An Introduction to Hinduism. Giessen, 1999. .

Gandhi, M.K.: The Essence of Hinduism. Ahmedabad, 1987.

Hall, A.: MORAL PHILOSOPHY: General Ethics, 1999 (online available:

http://my.ilstu.edu/~jguegu/MORALPHILOSOPHY.pdf, retrieved 21 November 2017).

Graphical representations by Mitran Ilie Iulian.

http://my.ilstu.edu/~jguegu/MORALPHILOSOPHY.pdf


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The Juche philosophy of North Korea –

Philosophical Content and Practical Failure

Timo Schmitz

The Juche philosophy has been the leading philosophy of the DPRK, probably one of the most isolate

countries of the world, and therefore the content of this philosophy is not known to many outsiders,

and even further, not too many people are interested in it. But what exactly is the content of this

philosophy?

At first, the foreign language state media of the DPRK speaks of the “Juche Idea”, which goes back to

the Korean name Juche sasang, where sasang means ‘idea’ or ‘thought’ and Juche means ‘subject’.

Indeed, it turns around the subject – the subject of man. The main subject of interest is man who is

placed in the center, and therefore, a man-centered theory (Naenara, without year). Even further,

“Man is the master of everything and decides everything” (ibid.). Through this way, Karl Marx’

Historical Materialism is established in Juche, since man is master of everything, there cannot be any

God or higher being which created or influences man, since everything depends on man. To go a step

further, since man is master of everything, he cannot rely on destiny or fate, but has to take

responsibility for everything that happens as he shapes his own destiny. Juche philosophy is not free

from religious thought, however, but is heavily influenced by Korean religious tradition. According to

Schmitz (2015/2017) the Juche Idea Course issued by the state shows clear hints on Buddhism and

Confucianism, though Juche itself is a clear critique to the latter. Unlike Confucianism, where

everybody has a societal rule that one has to fulfill, Juche comes to the conclusion that “Man is the

social being with independence, creativity and consciousness“ (Naenara, without year). It is not even

simply anti-Confucianist, but also anti-Marxist, since in Marxism, through knowing one’s class

standpoint one forms the masses to resist exploitation and to organize into a collective form to get

independent. As Schmitz (2015/2017) points out:

This gives a new definition to the ‘masses’, since the masses are not an abstract

word anymore which is used by politics to paraphrase ‘a will of a group’. In Korean,

the will of the group can not be made without the individuals, which is a very new

form of thinking. However, this relation is important to solve a contradiction which

would appear otherwise. One cannot say that there is a collective conscience while


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preaching highest individuality. The North Korean elite quickly realised after the

founding of the DPRK that appealing to the masses is too abstract and anti-

progressive, but appealing to the individual to take part in the masses, gives the

individual a ‘value’. If someone is treasured for what he is doing, he’ll be far more

productive than just being a part of the masses – a clever move.

However, while the independence of man gives man a certain mind of individuality, and while

consciousness gives him responsibility, his individuality and responsibility have to be sacrificed to work

for the masses in practice. The Korean Communists regarded Confucianism, which is a collective form

of government, to be anti-revolutionary. At the same time they learnt in the USSR that Communism

emphasizes on a collective. The static hierarchy of Confucianism was seen as trouble and reason of

stagnation and to swap it by another collective form thus was an extremely piquant matter. The

Koreans wanted to realize themselves and their dreams and many intellectuals actually favored a

Korea in which everyone could do what one wants to pursuit one dreams. Therefore, the early

philosophers after the founding of North Korea had anti-imperialist, partly even Anarchist thoughts,

that did not fit into the outdated values of Korean society. On the other side, the outdated values could

be easily used to establish might and power. Therefore, even though Juche actually teaches individual

independence so that everyone can pursue one’s dream to work for the society and help to shape the

society for better, it was quickly transformed into ‘political independence’ for the cause of national

independence in the 1960s as can be seen in Kim, 1969.

Anyways, when Juche was founded, the spirit of individualism stood clearly in the foreground and it

was not meant to be a philosophy to ‘make’ everyone equal, but to ‘treat’ everyone equal. As Schmitz

(2015/ 2017) emphasizes:

Concerning the individual independence, every human-being has a ‘consciousness

of independence’, and according to Juche philosophy, it is the reason why human-

beings will always try to achieve freedom and independence. The individual

independence goes along with the political independence, so to say ‘life is politics’,

which means that life and soul equals “social and political integrity” [Naenara,

without year]. North Korean literature has many examples, where personal life and

politics go together, and people are described to devote their whole life to politics

[…] As important as independence, which is described the soul of human-beings (or

‘the soul of man’), another essential feature is ‘creativity’ […]

Despite the preservation of the national independence – called Jaju - economic autarchy (Jarib) and

self-sufficiency in defense (Jawi) were added on the political agenda of Juche politics in the mid-1960s


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(Kim, 1969; Schmitz, 2015/2017). However, the philosophical core of Juche does not deal with national

defense, however, autarchy is important, but not in a political agenda, but in a way to make ‘man’

autonomous, and thus help him to strive for his independence. To understand the need of it, one has

to understand the Juche view of philosophy.

The Juche Idea Course on NAENARA states:

The fundamental question of Juche philosophy becomes a new thesis of the basic

question of philosophy. That is because it implements the requirement of the law of

the development of the world outlook of humankind. Philosophy has thousands of

years of history and many philosophical schools and well-known philosophers had

issued various philosophical viewpoints in the long history. What did such many

philosophical schools and philosophers regard or have to regard as the basic

question of philosophy? General Secretary Kim Jong Il said: "In the past the relations

between substance and consciousness, between being and thinking were regarded

as the basic question of philosophy." Multifarious things exist in the world where

we live. It is called the material world or matters in philosophical term. People feel

various things with their sense organs like eyes, nose, ears, tongue and skin, and

find out characters and value by synthesis, analysis and reasoning of the materials

by their feelings, making this or that concepts. It is called consciousness or thinking

phenomena in philosophical term. In the past the relations between matter and

consciousness, between being and thinking were regarded as the basic question of

philosophy. This is the question of which is prior, matter or consciousness. Here

materialism means that matter is primary and consciousness comes from the

matter, whereas the idealism means that consciousness is primary and matter

comes from consciousness. The previous philosophies were classified into

materialism which analyzed the world materialistically and idealism which analyzed

the world idealistically according to the understanding of the relationship between

matter and consciousness.

This means that North Korean scholars are taught that philosophy is traditionally a struggle between a

materialistic and idealistic worldview in which either matter or consciousness precedes. Indeed, this

form of classification is purely Marxist.

From the earliest Greek philosophy, of which European philosophy is but a

continuation, the philosopher has had to contend with the question: how is reality

known? The answer is given from two principal viewpoints, the materialist and the


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idealist. The materialist method stands at one pole, the idealist at the other. (Tripp,

1970)

In other word: either everything is matter or everything is mind.

However, philosophy is divided in different kinds today, mostly theoretical and practical philosophy

and within these two the directions are categorized within their disciplines. Anyways, the North Korean

basic thought is that the focus on matter or mind has disadvantages, and instead, the focus shall be on

man. Man and all his abilities and social relations shall be in the foreground, rather than metaphysics.

And within this, Juche comes to the conclusion that man is asocial Being who transforms society

through independence, creativity and consciousness.

By understanding these three essential features, we can describe all interrelations

of human-beings. Human-beings can act creatively, because they are independent

and conscious. They are independent, because they are creative and conscious; and

they are conscious, because they are creative and independent. Without

independence, one cannot be creative without limits, and if one is not conscious

when not being independent, then there would be no resistance. (Schmitz, 2015/

2017)

One of the main founders of this philosophy is Hwang Jang-yop, who is often depicted as ‘main

ideologue’ of the Kim Il-sung era, which might be right on the one side, but on the other side Hwang

was a professional philosopher. His goal was not to indoctrinate the people, but to develop an

authentic thought which could move the country forward. His ideas gained large popularity in the

government to justify the DPRK politics, but Hwang felt that the state rather feudalized than

democratized and therefore he left to South Korea in 1997. Instead of the high individualistic Juche

thought in which everybody should be completely free to put in his effort to server for the masses and

help to shape the state politics, it was decided very early that North Korea shall go the Kimilsungist

way of juche which means that everything is collectivized and everybody has to follow the leader.

Juche itself was only introduced in 1955 as a temporary solution as Korea faced two problems. First,

the Sino-Soviet split led to the question whether North Korea shall get closer to China or the Soviet

Union. To keep both partners, neither Maoism nor the destalinized Khruchevism was adopted, but the

Korean way to Socialism was proclaimed. Through this, the state pride could be regained and the state

could promote Korea as an independent entity not being dependent on anyone. Second, through

emphasizing individualism, Kim could avoid a split between right-wingers and left-wingers. In the

beginning of the 1950s, there were probably even more party members in the Chondoist Youth Party,

which had close ties to Korean nationalists, extreme right-wingers and church associations than the


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Korean Workers’ Party. Kim could not betray his left-wingers but also had an understanding for right-

wingers, since most Korean Communists received a classical and extremely conservative education. In

his first mentioning of Juche in 1955, Leftist internationalism is clearly exchanged though Korean

nationalism, which led to party-internal struggles and purges followed. The result, Korean Socialism,

was not Juche anymore in the sense of his founders.

The clearly nationalistic character can be seen as such:

Why does our ideological work suffer from dogmatism and formalism? And why do

our propagandists and agitators fail to go deeply into matters, only embellishing

the façade, and why do they merely copy and memorize foreign things, instead of

working creatively? This offers us food for serious reflection. What is Juche in our

Party’s ideological work? What are we doing? We are not engaged in any other

country’s revolution, but precisely in the Korean revolution. This, the Korean

revolution, constitutes Juche in the ideological work of our Party. Therefore, all

ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution.

(Kim, 1955/ 2008)

Schmitz (2016/2017) critically analyzed this passage and came to the conclusion that blaming his

ideological writers for copying foreign ideas is too nationalistic and not good. Even further, putting

creativity in this context is rather dangerous for the independence of creativity.

To be creative, one should be able to be inspired by ideas from everywhere and

accept these so-called “foreign ideas” to work creatively […]. Generations build up

on knowledge, thoughts and arts of long tradition to develop on a higher stage.

Therefore, I strongly disagree with Kim Il-sung’s image of creativity and his

ideolgical course proposed in his speech. (Schmitz, 2016/2017)

However, too strongly nationalistic views were not welcomed in all fractioned and therefore, Kim

always had to swap between right and left to please both political spectrums and consolidate his power.

However, through this, he failed to implement Juche philosophy from the beginning.

The content of the Juche philosophy is clearly individualistic and focusses on the freedom of human-

beings to engage in a Socialist society. Juche indeed gave new chances to the people as it abolished

the Confucianist hierarchies and duties, but gave freedom to shape one’s own destiny and gave every

human his own responsibility. However, Juche in practice failed to do so, because it was never

implemented, but instead was overtaken by Kimilsungism from the beginning, giving it no chance to

develop.


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Literature:

____: Juche Idea Course, Philosophical Principle, NAENARA,

http://naenara.kp/en/juche/course_juche.php (retrieved on 26 June 2010)

Kim Il-sung: On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work

(1955), available on Marxists Internet Archive (2008), https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-

sung/1955/12/28.htm (retrieved on 9 July 2015)

Kim Ir Sen [Kim Il-sung]: Über den sozialistischen Aufbau und die südkoreanische Revolution in der

Koreanischen Volksdemokratischen Republik, Pjöngjang [Pyongyang]: Verlag für fremdsprachige

Literatur, 1969

Schmitz, Timo: Individualism between Moral and Virtues, Government and Religion, 12. Philosophical

Principle and Historical Context of the Juche Idea (2015), in: Collected Online Articles in English

Language, Berlin: epubli, 2017

Schmitz, Timo: Individualism between Moral and Virtues, Government and Religion, 13. The

Advantages and Disadvantages of Juche Philosophy (2016), in: Collected Online Articles in English

Language, Berlin: epubli, 2017

Tripp, Ted: An outline of philosophy, 2. Materialism versus idealism, Victorian Labor College,

https://www.marxists.org/history/australia/1970/philosophy2.htm (retrieved on 12 October 2017)

http://naenara.kp/en/juche/course_juche.php

https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm

https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm

https://www.marxists.org/history/australia/1970/philosophy2.htm


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Über Toleranz und Extremismus im Islam/ On

Tolerance and Extremism in Islam

Lava Mella

Der vorliegende Artikel soll die immer wieder aufkehrende Frage der Toleranz im Islam besprechen.

Besonders in Hinsicht auf die Situation und Rechte der Frauen wird dem Islam hier oftmals

Unterdrückung und Extremismus vorgeworfen. Die Motive, die die Kritiker hierfür verwenden, sind

nicht selten immer wieder dieselben: dass die Frau durch die geregelten Ge- und Verbote im Islam in

ihrer Handlungs- und Entscheidungsfreiheit eingeschränkt ist und damit im Vergleich zum Mann

benachteiligt wird. Was die einzelnen Vorbehalte und Rechte der Frau im Islam jedoch näher bedeuten,

wird von denselben leider oftmals nicht hinterfragt und unmittelbar ausgeblendet. In diesem

Zusammenhang soll zudem auf den Extremismus eingegangen werden, der dem Islam immer wieder

zugesprochen wird.

Der Islam verspricht an vielen Stellen im Koran die Freiheit im Glauben und die Zwangslosigkeit hierbei.

Dies erläutert der folgende Vers aus dem Koran:

"Es gibt keinen Zwang im Glauben." (Sure 2, 256)

Hiermit wird einerseits gemeint, dass es den Menschen auf Gottes Erde frei steht, sich zum islamischen

Glauben zu bekennen. Jeder Mensch ist frei von Gott erschaffen worden und durch seinen Verstand

mit der Gabe zur eigenen Entscheidungsfreiheit ausgestattet worden. Es wäre paradox zu meinen, dass

derselbe Gott, der den Menschen mit der Freiheit zur eigenen Entscheidung in jeder Situation

ausgestattet hat, den Menschen zu einer bestimmten Glaubensrichtung zwingen würde.

Andererseits werden hiermit auch bereits Gläubige in Bezug auf die Ausübung des Islam angesprochen.

Die Praktizierung soll dem Gläubigen freistehen: ob die Muslimin ein Kopftuch trägt oder es unterlässt,

ob der Muslime das regelmäßige Fasten im heiligen Monat einhält oder nicht, ist dem Gläubigen frei

überlassen. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass die genannten Dinge keine Pflichten eines jeden Muslimen sind.

Aber ob er sie auch tatsächlich ausführt, unterliegt der Entscheidung des Muslims. Im Endeffekt wird

laut des Koran jeder Gläubige für das zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden (am Tag des Jüngsten Gerichts),

was er unternommen oder unterlassen hat:


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“Wer nun auch nur einen Deut an Wohl vollbracht hat, der wird Lohn dafür

vorfinden. Und wer auch nur einen Deut an Boshaftigkeit verübt hat, der wird

dafür bestraft”

(Sure 99, Vers 7-8).

Weiterhin ist in dieser Hinsicht wichtig zu betonen, dass der genannte Vers im Umkehrschluss auch

bedeutet, dass jeder Versuch, einen Menschen zum Glauben zu zwingen, eine Freveltat vor Gott

darstellt. Dieser hat dem Menschen nämlich durch Offenbarung des Verses ausdrücklich verboten,

andere zum Glauben zu zwingen. Nur Gott allein kann seiner Schöpfung Ge- und Verbote auferlegen.

Die Menschen sind nicht dazu berechtigt, in Gottes Rolle "zu schlüpfen" und anderen Menschen zu

bestimmten religiösen Handlungen anzuweisen. Immerhin ist die Religion die Sache Gottes. Dieser

Aspekt ist besonders in Hinsicht auf das Kopftuchtragen der Frau im Islam interessant und

bemerkenswert.

Während viele Kritiker des Kopftuchs meinen, die Frau würde das Kopftuch unter Zwang und

Unterdrückung tragen, vergessen dieselben oftmals, dass der Vers (....) auch in Verbindung mit dem

Kopftuch zu deuten ist. Die Entscheidung zum Tragen des Kopftuches soll ausschließlich der Muslimin

allein überlassen werden. Dies ist schon allein aus dem Grund notwendig, da Gott durch seine Ge- und

Verbote prüft, wer unter seinen Gläubigen der Stärkste im Glauben ist, auf dass er diese

dementsprechend belohnt. In diesem Zusammenhang wäre es sinnlos, die Menschen zur Einhaltung

der Ge- und Verbote zu zwingen, da sie dann ihren Glauben vor Gott nicht beweisen könnten. Der

Beweis für die Standhaftigkeit im Glauben zeigt sich jedoch darin, dass der Mensch sich persönlich und

aus eigener Entscheidung für oder gegen eine bestimmte Tat entscheidet, dessen Ausübung oder

Unterlassen Gott angeordnet hat.

Auch in Bezug auf das Kopftuch trifft diese Thematik zu. Entscheidet sich die Frau aus eigenem

Interesse heraus zum Tragen des Kopftuches, so ist diese Entscheidung bei Gott mit einem standhaften

Glauben anzusehen. Die Gläubige entscheidet sich nämlich gleichzeitig dazu, Gott und seinen

Anweisungen zu folgen, obwohl sie jederzeit die freie Entscheidung dazu besitzt, dies nicht zu tun.

Diese Zuneigung und Zuwendung des Gläubigen zur Religion Gottes stellt bei Gott den Kern des treuen

Gläubigen dar. Diese Treue könnte niemals wirklich standhaft sein, wenn sie unter Zwang

herbeigerufen würde. Demnach sind alle Anregungen an den Islam, die eine angebliche Unterdrückung

der Frau anprangern, letztendlich ohne Sinn.

Wichtig ist auch hierbei stets, die Absicht und das Interesse hinter der Tat zu hinterfragen. Die

Muslimin kann ihr Kopftuch aus verschiedenen Gründen tragen. Trägt sie es aus Liebe zu Gott und aus


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Pflichtgefühl der angemessenen Praktizierung des Islam, so kann man erst dann von einer

angemessenen Ausübung der Religion sprechen. Wird sie dagegen von äußeren Umständen und

gesellschaftlichen Zwängen dazu aufgefordert, das Kopftuch zu tragen, so entspricht dies in keinster

Weise mehr einer aufrichtigen Gottesanbetung, wie sie im Islam gelehrt und geboten wird. So kann

man auch bei Frauen, die ihr Kopftuch ausschließlich aus familiären, kulturellen oder anderen

derartigen Zwängen tragen, hierfür keine religiösen Gründe herbeiführen.

Es ist ersichtlich, dass die Praktizierung des Islam das vollständige Bewusstsein und die aufrichtige

Ausführung dessen als höchste Priorität setzt. Der Islam ist und soll eine Angelegenheit zwischen dem

Menschen und Gott sein. Dritte sind und sollen bei der Gottesanbetung stets ausgeschlossen werden.

Auf diese Weise kann garantiert werden, dass der Mensch sich aus vollem Bewusstsein Gott und seinen

Anweisungen hingibt und diese aus Liebe zu ihm für sich annimmt. In Angesicht des Wandels der Zeit

vergessen sowohl viele Muslime, als auch Andersgläubige, dass diese persönliche Sphäre zwischen

Gott und dem Individuum den Hauptbestandteil der Religion ausmacht.

Mit der Zeit wurden viele grundlegende Aspekte des Islam in Hinsicht auf Gesellschaften, Kulturen und

sonstige Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens ausgelegt. Der Anfang der Gottesanbetung und der

ausschlaggebende Aspekt zum Glauben liegen jedoch in der engen, persönlichen Bindung zwischen

dem Individuum und Gott. Der Islam ist damit keine Kultur, noch ist sie eine Art gesellschaftlicher

Ordnung, die man Gesellschaften auferlegen will.

Er regelt zwar unter anderem auch viele Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, jedoch fängt er im

Herzen des Gläubigen und in seiner Vereinbarung mit Gott, nämlich Gläubiger seiner Religion zu sein,

an.

Ein weiterer Teilaspekt, mit dem sich dieser Artikel verfassen soll, ist der Extremismus, der ihm stets

vorgeworfen wird. In einem Artikel über Präventionsmaßnahmen gegen Extremismus wurde der

Islamwissenschaftler Ali Özgur Özdil gefragt, was er unter Extremismus im Islam verstehe. Darauf

antwortete er: "Alles, was im Namen des Islams getan wird, aber gegen diesen verstößt". Özdil lässt

seine Aussage nicht unbegründet und führt unmittelbar daran die folgende Aussage des heiligen

Propheten (Friede und Segen seien auf ihm) an:

„Geht in der Religion nicht zum Äußersten, denn bereits vor euch gingen die Völker

zugrunde, weil sie ins Extreme gegangen sind.“ (Überliefert bei Ahmad ibn Hanbal,

Nasâî und Ibn Mâdscha).


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Hiermit wird ersichtlich, dass der Islam stets eine ausgeglichene und balancierte Praktizierung

anfordert. Die "goldene Mitte" zu finden ist demnach einer der höchsten Prioritäten bei der Ausübung

des Islam. Da der Prophet seine Gefährten selbst bei guten Werken, z. B. dem Gebet oder dem Fasten,

davor gewarnt hat, bis zum Äußersten zu gehen, liegt es auf der Hand, dass die Überschreitung

moralischer und rechtlicher Grenzen bedeutet, „extrem“ zu sein.

Das Problem vieler Muslime in der heutigen Gesellschaft liegt darin, dass sie eine dualistische Weltsicht

vertreten. Sie teilen die Menschen innerhalb einer Gesellschaft in Gläubige und Ungläubige auf. Sie

bauen ihre Gedanken auf einem Freund-Feind-Schema auf, um ihre Position klar von allen

Andersgläubigen abzugrenzen. Nicht selten liegt dahinter das Motiv, Macht und Kontrolle über

bestimmte Bereiche und Milieus des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zu gewinnen. Begriffe wie "Sharia" oder

"Dschihad" werden in Verbindung mit einer politischen Richtung verwendet und demnach nicht ohne

Grund von der Gesellschaft verworfen. Aus Islam wird "Islamismus" und die Wertschätzung des Salaf

(Altvorderer), welcher ursprünglich als muslimisches Vorbild dient, wird zum "Salafismus". Die

negativen Emotionen, die hiermit geweckt werden, lassen keine Umgebung der Toleranz und des

Friedens zu.

Durch verschiedene Präventionsmaßnahmen, die besonders nach dem 11. September einhergingen,

versuchten muslimische Gemeinden und Moscheen sich weltweit von dem Vorurteil der Intoleranz

und des Extremismus im Islam abzugrenzen. An dem schlechten Image, das sie in vielen Orten

austragen, sind sie jedoch teilweise selbst schuld. Zu selten wurden Interaktionsmaßnahmen von

Seiten der Moscheen bzw. Gemeinden vorgenommen, um Andersgläubige in die Lehre des Islam

einzuführen. Hierzu gehört z.B das Übersetzen von Freitagspredigten oder der regelmäßige Dialog mit

Einrichtungen anderer Religionen. Es ist wichtig, auf die Dringlichkeit einer Auseinandersetzung der

verschiedenen Religionen untereinander hinzuweisen. Diese Maßnahmen sind grundlegend für eine

transparente und verständliche Definition des Islam ohne auf Missverständnisse zu geraten.

Der Aspekt der Gewalt, der mit dem Vorwurf des Extremismus an den Islam oftmals unmittelbar

einhergeht, ist in diesem Hinblick näher zu erläutern. Die Gründe für Gewalt innerhalb einer

Gesellschaft liegen in Unterdrückung und Ungerechtigkeit, wie viele Untersuchungen zeigen. Auch

zeigen viele Studien, dass gewaltbereite Muslime über geringes bis fast kein Wissen über den Islam

besitzen und sich nicht mit dessen Ursprung auseinandersetzen. Diese sind es auch, die in ihrem

Umfeld oftmals Ungerechtigkeit und Unterdrückung ausgesetzt sind und die klaren Richtlinien des

Islam somit als Anweisung und einzigste Hoffnung auf ein geregeltes Leben sehen. Durch sämtliche

Predigten im Internet, die den Jugendlichen einen Ausweg aus ihrer Misere versprechen, fühlen

Letztere sich dazu ermutigt, als "Retter der islamischen Welt" zu fungieren. Wie will ein Jugendlicher,


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der nichts in seinem Leben erreicht hat, jedoch als "Retter" fungieren? Gewalt ist hier, wie das alte

Sprichwort schon sagt, in keinstem Fall eine Lösung.

Die Lösung, die wir als Muslime, Andersgläubige oder sonstige Mitglieder der Gesellschaft heranführen

können, liegt in der Kommunikation und in dem Austausch miteinander. Präventionsmaßnahmen, die

den Dialog zwischen verschiedenen Religionen fördern, sind ein Beispiel hierfür. Hier liegt die

Verantwortung besonders beim Muslim, seine Religion auf verständliche Weise und in Frieden zu

übermitteln. Dies ist laut Koran grundlegend für den Austausch zwischen den Religionen:

"Rufe zum Weg deines Herrn mit Weisheit und schöner Ermahnung, und streite

mit ihnen in bester Weise!" (Sure 16, Vers 125).

Literatur:

New Muslim Guide: Der Aufruf zum Islam, 2017, http://newmuslimguide.com/de/your-new-life/539

zuletzt zugegriffen: 09.11.2017)

Islamiq: Präventivmaßnahmen gegen Extremismus, o. J., http://www.islamiq.de/2015/02/15/alles-im-

namen-des-islams-getan-wird-aber-gegen-diesen-verstoesst-ist-extremismus/ (zuletzt zugegriffen:

09.11.2017)

Quantara: Mit Toleranz gegen religiösen Extremismus, 2015,

https://de.qantara.de/inhalt/saekularismus-unterricht-in-frankreich-mit-toleranz-gegen-religioesen-

extremismus (zuletzt zugegriffen: 08.11.2017).

SPD-Moers: Mit Toleranz und Offenheit gegen Hass und Extremismus, 2012, http://www.spd-

moers.de/meldungen/7346/120560/Mit-Toleranz-und-Offenheit-gegen-Hass-und-Extremismus.html

(zuletzt zugegriffen: 5.11.2017).

http://newmuslimguide.com/de/your-new-life/539

http://www.islamiq.de/2015/02/15/alles-im-namen-des-islams-getan-wird-aber-gegen-diesen-verstoesst-ist-extremismus/

http://www.islamiq.de/2015/02/15/alles-im-namen-des-islams-getan-wird-aber-gegen-diesen-verstoesst-ist-extremismus/

https://de.qantara.de/inhalt/saekularismus-unterricht-in-frankreich-mit-toleranz-gegen-religioesen-extremismus

https://de.qantara.de/inhalt/saekularismus-unterricht-in-frankreich-mit-toleranz-gegen-religioesen-extremismus

http://www.spd-moers.de/meldungen/7346/120560/Mit-Toleranz-und-Offenheit-gegen-Hass-und-Extremismus.html

http://www.spd-moers.de/meldungen/7346/120560/Mit-Toleranz-und-Offenheit-gegen-Hass-und-Extremismus.html


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Imereti – In between Georgian centralism and

local identity in language

Timo Schmitz

Imereti (or Imeretia) is a province in Georgia in the South Caucasus. It lies in the center of the country

and has an important knot with its center – Kutaissi. Imeretians traditionally speak their own dialect

of Georgian, however, in a certain aspect, Imeretian serves the cause of a language. As such, it is an

important part of the Imeretian heritage and identity. Imereti had its own kingdom which existed form

the 13th till the 19th century and was sometimes part of Georgia, Russia and the Ottomans, and

therefore had a lot of different influences shaping their identity. Even further, the region had a

supralocal importance, as the princedoms of Abkhazia, Mingrelia and Guria were part of Imereti from

time to time and therefore, the region had an important impact on whole Georgia and its history. The

importance of the different kingdoms is necessary in understanding the different identities within

Georgia. The Meskheti Kingdom covered the western part of Georgia and is known today for the

Meskhetian Turks. It is the gate between Christianity and Islam. The Kartli kingdom is name giving for

the Georgian language – Kartuli.

The author of this paper informally questioned people from Georgia about their views on the Imeretian

language and its perspective and therefore all the accounts given here are first-hand accounts.

Imeretian is quite understandable for people all over Georgia and has a rather dialectal character. As

such, Georgians see Imereti dialect downgraded and for many it does not sound educated. Especially

people from Tbilisi tend to be hostile towards Imeretian speech, but also people from Imereti

themselves do not like Imeretian and a woman from Kutaissi admitted that she almost speaks no

dialect and that people in the city tend to strive for standard. As we can see from this first-hand account,

people in urban regions and rural regions have a different view on the language. Especially in the

political center of the country, promoting a strong united identity is important and therefore the

necessity for everyone to learn the prestige variety. On the other hand, people in different regions of

Georgia still preserved their identities. In this way, we have to differentiate between mountaineers

who often keep a conservative life style and promote their heritage and traditions, keeping festivals,

mythology, but also language at home alive, and the non-mountainous rural areas, altogether which

is a hotspot for Georgian infrastructure and therefore centralization. Imereti is served by the E 60/ S1,

as well as regionally routes connecting Kutaissi with Tkibuli, Chiatura, and many other places. All major


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towns like Zestafoni and Samtredia are passed by the E 60 and therefore Imereti is an important route

to Georgia’s Adjaria and neighboring Turkey, as well as the breakaway state of Abkhazia. Imereti is also

served by major streets that go to Borjomi which has a main route to Armenia. Even further, Kutaissi

has an international airport and serves flights to major European countries, such as Germany. As a

result of the growing development and the good progress which is made in Georgia, the local identities

face problems as they are already known in countries of the European Union, where regions go back

to tend more autonomy and save their local heritage, rather than centralizing themselves in global

structures. As such, Imeretian faces a problem, as according to the surveyed people, it has a low

prestige in contrast to Classical Georgian. To go further, Imeretian identity phases is decreasing as

people strive for jobs in the cities and want to speak the prestige language as a sign of their high

education. This leads to the decline of Imeretian which serves as main language of Imereti in a

sociological viewpoint, even though it is just a dialect in a linguistic viewpoint.

People in Imereti should be proud to speak their own language and get a self-confidence in their

identity. Being a Georgian well-educated person and being able to communicate in a local language is

no contradiction. As such Imeretian language is important to preserve the heritage of Imeretia which

is very rich and which also shows the diversity in the unity of Georgia. Even after Georgia united in

history, the regions were very diverse and had several languages, minorities, mythological influences,

religions and identity. While Adjaria, for instance, has a lot of Muslim features and has lots of Ottoman

charm, Imereti has its own uniqueness. The preservation of the Imeretian language and the

encouragement of Imereti in public can open many doors for the people. Especially the influence of

the Colchis, which left Greek traces and subjects of Greek mythology in Western Georgia are of

importance. But also the Arabs and Persians who shaped Georgia during the time when Imereti was

Lasika, over thousand years ago, enriched the heritage.

As an essential part of this is the local language which should be taught more actively. Even if Imeretian

does not qualify itself as a minority language, as in fact, it is a dialect of the majority language, this

does not mean that the dialect can get a certain prestige and upgrade. It should be pointed out that

even if Imereti gets a stronger confidence in its identity, it will not lead to a decline of Georgian identity.

As many regions are so unique, some of them tended to go their own ways, such as Adjaria which was

governed by a secessionist government backed by Russia till 2007 and the Mingrelian awakening in the

1990s which was accompanied by an insurgency until 2003. Therefore, keeping together Georgia is

one of the main policies of the country, but Imereti’s population identifies itself as Georgian as the

surveyed people pointed out. Therefore, even if Imereti heritage is strengthened it is unlikely that a

kind of national movement could arise, since most people in Imereti are Christian Orthodox and

identify themselves with their state. As a historical center for Western Georgia and an important hub


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for economy, strengthening the local diversity will lead to even more progress in the country. It will

help people identify themselves stronger with their region and avoid that people move away, as like

in every progressing country, people tend to move from towns to the cities. Imeretis will move back to

the towns and help improving infrastructure and development there if their heritage is stronger

encouraged and the worth of Imereti is stressed. In addition, same as the individuality through the

diversity, so is the diversity of creativity through preserving the local language. If everyone only speaks

the prestige variety, then creative processes that are developed through local expressions and local

thought, will disappear. By preserving Imeretian speech, the diversity will also enrich the processes in

society and thus innovations for different branches which will benefit the whole of Georgia and which

will strengthen this ties between people and the government, an exchange between growing

centralism in the self-understanding of national unity and local Imeretian accentuation through self-

reliance.

The region is the gate to Europe, but also the ‘backdoor’ to Russia. Imeretians should write literature

in Imereti dialect and promote the spirit of the region. As such, Imereti can become a place of peace

and stability where interest of Europe, Russia and Turkey can meet the rich Georgian mentality and

their spirit and where new solutions for the future can be found.


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Exploring Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy’s Exotic Brand of

Christianity. What makes Christian Science unique

in the religious landscape of Christian America?

Iulian Mitran

Born in the early XIX century on a farm in New England, Mary Baker Eddy, which will come to be known

both a distinguished Christian scholar, and one of the few prominent female religious leaders from

history, she will embark early-on on a quest for seeking the greater truth in regard to how faith and

healing are interconnected, and how does a Christian need to act in order to benefit from their works.

Christian Science aligns itself with the traditional tenets associated with Christianity, but it also

introduced some novel ideas and practices that were rapidly enhanced by some, and were classed as

heresy by others. Through her works, Ms. Baker Eddy tried to redefine the role of the Church, and of

Christ Himself, in the physical wellbeing of the faithful, but in the same time she challenged century-old

doctrines that emphasized more the role of the Church as a social disciplinarian, rather than that of a

force that will militate for the forgiveness of the sinners, and the reconciliation between former enemies.

The current paper aims at analyzing the particularities of Christian Science, its rather “exotic elements”,

and the various controversies that arose from the claims that the practices popularized by the church

were, in fact, rooted in science. As it is today, Christian Science is still holding own strongly to its original

tenets, no major doctrinal reforms being made along the way. Unlike other American Christians,

Christian Scientists tend to be overrepresented in urban settings, as indicated by the available data.

Scholarly works concerning the rich tradition of American Christianity are more visible within academia.

This may be in correlation with the fact that our current society, especially if we are talking about

Europe and North America, is shifting away from the traditional of religiosity that we inherited from

our forefathers, and is more in favor of a church that is more committed to the wellbeing of its

members, and to society as a hole. But it is important to keep in mind that certain shifts in paradigm

already occurred within certain Christian groups, as we have the case of the Catholic Church in the

post-Second Vatican Council era, which was marked by some visible changes in the way in which the

Church presented itself in relation to its adherence, and to its general mission (Maslin 1951). Being

labeled as a pastoral council, there were not changes made in relation to issues that were more

strongly connected to Church dogma. Another noticeable influence that left their mark on the XX

century in terms of religious novelty is represented by the rise of the Charismatic Movement, which

influenced Protestant and Catholic congregations alike. The ‘70s were marked by the rise of the New


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Age Movement which diverged from almost any other existing religious tradition, but in the same time

having roots in several Western and Oriental religions, being essential an eclectic construction that

was keen on using multiple concepts reinterpreting them in such a manner to be easily understood

and accepted by those living in the industrialized world.

Christian Science represents a particularly interesting case within the wider tradition of American

Protestantism, from its very beginning the movement was devoted to bring faith and healing together

in a universally coherent theological framework. Even so, Christian Science, or the Church of Christ,

Scientist – as it is known in its organized form, is not by any means the only “American Religion” to

emphasize the strong bond between faith and healing, but it remains the only, or the most mainstream

out of all, to have it as its core theology up to this day. The beginning of the XX century witnessed the

rise of Pentecostalism which, a little bit more marginally, put emphasis on the works of the Holy Spirit,

faith healing becoming popular among its adherence. The founder of the Christian Science movement,

Mary Baker Eddy, remains up to this day one of the most influential women in Western theology, being

actually one of the few female figures that left a persistent mark on the history of the Universal Church

up to this day (Feuerbach 1881). Even so, the church often found itself in the middle of controversy,

being accused of, mainly by other Christian churches, that its interpretations of the Bible and Scriptures

are deeply tainted due to the lack of consideration that it gives to the Biblical tradition, subsequently

to the historical context to each writing is linked.

Mary Baker Eddy and the early influence of New England Congregationalism

Mary Baker Eddy was born on a farmhouse in rural New Hampshire in the early XIX century, both

parents were practicing Christians, her father, Mark Baker, was a devout Congregationalist which held

on tightly to the Calvinist views of the church. For most of her life, Mary Baker Eddy was a practicing

Congregationalist Christian. Her newly founded movement inherited a consistent part of the hierarchal

and theological framework of the XIX century Congregationalist Church of New England. Up to this day,

there are numerous discussions and controversies that revolve around the specific role that

Protestantism played in early America, and how much did it actually contributed to the coming into

being of the legal and institutional framework of the United States (Hedrick 2008). This debate is even

more controversial if we acknowledge that there is a global shift toward less formalized forms of

religious practices, stating that the Protestants had from early on a decisive role in building what will

constitute the moral core of the American ethos is highly problematic and controversial.

America, a protestant nation – would rather refer to a specific outlook on communal life, work, and

human relations, that is indigenous to the American way of life. Mary Baker Eddy’s theology was built,

brick by brick, on an already existing congregationalist foundation, this having visible effects on both

the theology itself, but also on the manner in which the Eddyan Church will be latter organized. As we


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have the case with the traditional congregationalist churches, within the Church of Christ, Scientist the

congregations are self-governed but are subordinated to the Mother Church, which is located in

Boston. The Church has a Board of Directors, their sole purpose is that of overlooking administrative

tasks and making sure that the organization is run smoothly.

Unlike in other religious organizations, the Board is not empowered with authority over the dogmatic

heritage of the Church, their primary role is not one that can be labeled as being solely missionary in

essence. Congregationalism is one of the three main governing models that various churches adopted,

the other two putting a greater emphasis on centralized authority and bodies of representatives.

Congregationalist churches are self-governing, the Lordship of Christ is strong emphasized both in

doctrine and daily practice. Even so, we cannot radically label the Church of Christian Science as being

congregationalist, in the most traditional meaning, as the Mother Church acts as a hub which

prescribes both the adequate literature and the local congregations have the status of branches, which

have a great level of autonomy, but all branches should retain the same set of primary points of

doctrine and practices, which are looked on by the gatekeepers from the Mother Church (Mary Baker

Eddy 1895). From this perspective alone, the Church of Christian Science is somewhat leaning to a

more Presbyterian structure, which mainly manifests itself through the presence of the Board, we

cannot talk about a purely congregationalist structure, as this were to be, no central or semi-central

hub would had existed. We also need to take into consideration a few basic facts, it would be almost

impossible for a new religious movement to maintain a coherent doctrinal core with such a fragmented

framework as that of the Congregationalists.

Going on from matters that are more closely linked to church governance to ones that are centered

around theology, it is crucial to point out some of the key resemblances and differences that are

noticeable when putting the two churches side by side. First of all, Congregationalists tend to lean

heavily toward a Calvinists theology, one that stresses elements such as predestination – the elect,

those that were chosen by God to obtain Eternal Salvation, and the dammed, those that were

predestined to Eternal Damnation. A very distinctive mark of this doctrine is given its rigidness, if we

can call it this way, mainly the fact that no matter what one may do during his earthly life. This is also

known as Unconditional Election, unconditional being here quite self-explanatory. If we were to take

this point alone, Christian Science is quite divergent from the Congregationalist-Calvinist doctrine of

Salvation, as, first of all, the Church denies that there will be no Final Judgement (Branch 2010).

Salvation is guaranteed to all of mankind as a result of God’s kindness, also we need to point out that

Christian Science presence human suffering as an error, an illusion, and that the world, essentially, is

benevolent. When comparing the two dogmas here, we can notice very clearly that the Eddyan take is

more leaned toward forgiveness, at a first glimpse, but if we look closer we can find some quite

surprising aspects. First of all, even though Eddy’s theology seems to be more forgiving towards lost


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souls, at the same time it clearly states that some people live in error, and are not able to correct their

errors in order to obtain healing, and a better life, generally. This means that Eddy suggests that

through our free will, which is never denied within Christian Science, we can decide between a life of

fulfillment and health, or one that is dominated by error, bodily and spiritual illness. On the other hand,

Calvinism forwards the idea that men is incapable of changing God’s plan, as a result there is not

particular judgment towards one’s capacity to obtain Salvation, or not, due to the fact that Salvation

is beyond men’s reach if he was not predestined. Even if predestination sounds extremely harsh and

unforgiving, at first, it also creates an atmosphere less dominated by the judgment of failure. With this

being said, it is far from men’s reach to know who is elected and who is damned. This creates quite a

paradox, as one may ask “Why would the damned even bother any longer to worship a God that has

no mercy?”

Science and Health with a Key to the Scriptures encompasses the core theology of the Church, as the

name already suggests, the work is heavily focused on the correlation between faith and healing.

Healing and Salvation from an Eddyan perspective

From the perspective of Eddy’s theology, there is no need for Salvation, as men is not damned to

eternal suffering. Besides the points that were previously discussed, Christian Science and Calvinism

diverge so much that, at one point, many start to question the Christianity from within the Eddyan

Church. This criticism is mainly motivated by the fact that the Church downplays, or to a certain, denies,

some of the universal Christian doctrines that are commonly acknowledge throughout Christendom.

One very interesting viewpoint that is more coherently, or incoherently, suggested through Mrs. Eddy’s

writings is a pantheist view of God, as God is not particularized as a free-standing being, this is quite

foolish to state in this manner, as God is generally regarded as the creator of everything that is, He

usually is regarded as existing in everything that is to see, feel, understand, experience. The issue

comes more from the idea that God is presented diffusely, without particularizing Him. Pantheism is

more indigenous to Eastern Religions, especially Hinduism, as they do not strictly confine the concept

of god, or goddess, with the image of an anthropomorphic being (Branch 2010). Another interesting

topic that needs to be brought forward is the views regarding the Holy Trinity, unlike the traditional

protestant churches, which share the same doctrinal views on the issue as the Catholics and the

Oriental Christians, the Church of Christian Science is rather emptied from its traditional meaning, and

it is filled with an ambiguous meaning.

In her writings on Christian. Science, why does Mary Baker Eddy refer to the trinity

as Life, Truth, and Love instead of using other synonyms for God—such as Mind,


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Soul, Spirit, or Principle? Wouldn't these be just as accurate in defining the trinity?—

from a reader in Dorset, England

Mary Baker Eddy uses many synonyms, or names, for God throughout her writings.

The seven she uses most prominently are Life, Truth, Love, Mind, Soul, Spirit, and

Principle. Each synonym is useful in bringing to thought certain aspects of God's

nature. These synonyms are wholly interchangeable, however, since they refer to

the one God.

“What about the trinity?” - January 1998 issue of The Christian Science Journal

An article from the Journal of Christian Science, published in 1998, was dedicated entirely to the issue

of the Trinity within the theological framework of the Church. It would be very harsh to directly state

the Christian Scientist totally reject the Trinity, but we can rather see an almost lack of interest towards

it. A key characteristic of the Eddyan theology is that there seems to be a fluid perception of reality,

God, perception, and experience. As pantheism, as strong influence, is well present within the doctrinal

core, both the relevance of the Trinity – God, Son, Holy Spirit; fade away into a realm where the borders

between perception and knowledge outside the senses are quickly lost.

On the outskirts of Christendom

Unlike the other “traditional Christian Churches”, the Church of Christ, Scientist finds some of its core

teachings to be highly divergent from the tenets associated with the universally accepted theology

associated with Christian organizations. In a weird way, Christian Science shares a common struggle

with two other religious groups, namely the Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses. We are not suggesting

that the Church of Christian Science emerged from the same movements as the other two, or that they

share a similar theological ground. What we are suggesting is that all three are groups that have a

theology mainly based on a Christian framework, but on the other hand, it encompasses a lot of non-

Christian, or highly exoticized versions of Christian dogmas. As a result, sometimes it is very difficult to

find them a place within Christendom, or to have a “special box” for them, some place them within a

branch of religious organization generally referred to as Nontrinitarian Churches.


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Christian Science and Radical Atheist Scientism

The future of Christian Science in our era is quite uncertain, there already is a slight decline in

membership in Africa, where it used to have a steady ground. It is even more difficult under the

influence of Radical Atheism which is an ardent militant of scientism, dismissing any experience, or

claim, that is uncapable of being scientifically proven. More so, just associating the Christian tradition

with the idea of science is highly inflammatory and unpopular nowadays, as the general public is more

educated in matters that relate to science, and its postulates.

Conclusion

We can briefly conclude that the Church of Christian Science truly marked a unique chapter within the

history of Christianity, as it is the only church to strongly emphasize the bound between faith and

healing. Other groups, such as the Pentecostals, took this tradition to another level, but the Church of

Christian Science remains the first Christian movement that sought to bridge the gap between healing,

faith and scientific rigorousness.

References

Baker Eddy, M.: Manual of The Mother Church – The First Church of Christ Scientist, Boston

(Massachusetts): Christian Science Board of Directions, 1895.

Branch, C.: Watchman Fellowship – Christian Science, New York (New York), 2010. (online available:

http://www.watchman.org/profiles/pdf/christianscienceprofile.pdf, retrieved on 5 December 2017)

Hedrick, C.: What is Christianity?, Piscataway (New Jersey), 2008. (online available:

https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/25605/PDF/1/play/, retrieved on 5 December 2017)

Ludwig, F.: The Essence of Christianity. London: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1881.

Maslin, R. W.: A Critique of The Universal Church Theory. Waco (Texas): Baylor University, 1951.

https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchman.org%2Fprofiles%2Fpdf%2Fchristianscienceprofile.pdf&h=ATO8cSxbhvnlkJ3NWmv-XzN7DXWwv7WiCJIufe2vRluf7j62I87Ry2IUmp_WTnG-0S8uDIZz-bO8YFHxBXXAME2Fj2kBJIIiQyIYSUWHTG88vZQo2SXyX0sxto80LnyAtTFsDyfsqtPG

https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/25605/PDF/1/play/


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James Heartfield, The European Union and the End

of Politics, Manchester (UK)/ Washington (USA):

Zero Books, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-78099-950-0

Alexandru Drăgulin

The politics of the European Union are a very kown and researched theme among social science

schoalrs but is not easily to identify new directions and principles in the development of this

organization. The European Union is not static, it’s evolution is dynamic and requires a combination of

research methods to provide an in-depth analysis and obtain valuable results. Also, offering a few

predictions on the future of European politics is a challenge for a writer such as James Heartfield.

In this book, James Heartfield explains the evolution of the European Union’s rise of power and

influence over its member states in the last decade. The Greek crisis was the apex of this mindset in

terms of politics and government. In the author’s view, the power of EU is related to the weakness of

the national parliaments. In a significant number of the member states there is not yet a consistent

democracy and we cannot see a strong contestation of elites from the people’s side. The quality of the

European democracy is given mainly by the national political systems which are together correlated.

Also the weakness of national sovereignty is a cause for the Brussels’ continuous ascension in

exercising its authority. Some countries, e.g. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic had developed more

and more nationalist attitudes and politics to prevent these European tendencies.

In the introduction, Heartfield analyses the implications of the Greek crisis in the Eurozone and reveals

the real behaviour and principles of the European elites’ politics. As we will see, in the author’s view

the actions of the EU’s institutions are not so democratic as we thought. In the EU there are not a

principle of equality among the members; the effective powers are in hands of some most

economically developed states (Germany, France, Netherlands). Greece was, from this point of view,

a simple victim in the game. On the other hand, there was a conflict between the leftist regime of

Greece and the liberal politics of the European politicians. Liberalism is the main feature of the Union’s

regime at the moment and, as the author argues, it evolves toward a dictatorial style. Italy, with the

prime-minister Silvio Berlusconi being charged with corruption by the European Commission, was in a

similar situation. “In a single week the elected governments of two of Europe’s democracies had been

swept aside. At the very moment that Italian and Greek people needed to deal with the problems they


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faced, they were robbed of the chance. Before they could see their own political representatives argue

out the best outcome on party lines, with the parliamentary contest mirroring the contest for votes.

The party political system was a lever for ordinary people to push their goals right into the centre of

government. But without it, public administration stopped being democratic, or even political. It was

called technocratic - government as technique, not as a negotiation”. (Heartfield 2013, p. 7)

The book has eight chapters in which are presented the main features of European Union’s politics and

its strategies of the integration process. James Heartfield explains the consequences of European

integration from a perspective centred on the dictatorial position of the European Commission.

The first chapter is entitled “Pathological Nationalism?” and debates the relationships between the

autochthonous politics and the European directions. The argument is focused on a positive

interpretation of the nationalism in the EU, faced with the more and more negative opinions of the

important politicians from Brussels and Strasbourg. The author argues “that the contemporary case

for the European Union is bound up with the idea that nationalism in Europe is a pathological condition

that needs the European Union to constraint it – even though the actual historical record indicates a

different origin. We will argue that the antinational claims of the European Union are more

contemporary and correspond instead to the ideology of globalisation”. (Heartfield, 2013, p. 21). In

the next chapters the author discusses the loss of power of national states in the EU (chapter 2), “The

decline of nationalism and the rise of the European Union” (chapter 3), “The domestic allies of

European integration” (chapter 4), “The developing institutions of the European Union” (chapter 5),

“European Identity” (chapter 6). The last two chapters are focused on a very known and applied

research method in political science – the positivism. “Positivist approaches to European integration”

and “Post-positivist theories of European Integration” are the sections which presents the last scientific

perspectives on the politics in this area.

Regarding the research methods used in this book, the author was inspired and analysed a series of

existing connections between the European policies and the national spectres. Surely its hypotheses

are contested by other scholars who are the proponents of the EU, but generally this book have good

structure and arguments. James Heartfield starts from a presentation of facts and continues with a

theoretical approach emphasizing the contradictions in construction of the European Union. Apart

from being a supporter of nationalism, he describe exactly the political context of the last period and

formulates some predictions related to the future evolutions of Europe.

In conclusion we say this writing is an original research in the field of the European Union’s politics. It

has a strong theoretical structure, completed with a combination of research strategies that leads to


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an articulated result. The conclusions of this study may not be appreciated by a part of European public

opinion but it is a signal for a reform in the continental politics regarding the process of integration

and the sovereignty of the member states.


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Artwork: "Ensemble" Sandra E. Hernandez

The shattered mirrored glass background is

meant to reflect our broken reality of equity.

The two hands of different skin tones are a

vision of unity and acceptance. The small

growing flowers is a reference to the

masterpiece called "Guernica" created by

Pablo Picasso in reaction to the Spanish civil

war. This relates to how our past and present

has had an ongoing race war. The delicate

flowers are a symbol of hope and the growth

of humanity when all come together.


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Bibliography for the study of Gagauzian Turks

(Balkan Turkic Peoples)

Non-alphabetical order

Baș, A. (2015). Demographic Engineering: Bulgarian Migrations from the Ottoman Empire to Russia in

the Nineteenth Century;

Ciachir, N. (1992). Basarabia sub stapanire tarista (1812-1917). Editura Didactică și Pedagogică.

București;

Duminică, I. (2011). Viața spirituală a bulgarilor din Basarabia română între 1856-1878/The religious

life of Bulgarians in Romanian Bessarabia between 1856-1878. Revista de Etnologie și Culturologie;

Genov, N. (2010). Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria. Review of European Studies, 2(2);

Haltas, J. (2011). The Gagauz people in Bessarabia. Słupskie studia historyczne. Poznan, Poland;

Măcriș, A. (2007). Găgăuzii în literatura și publicistica română/The Gagauzians in the Romanian

literature and writings. Paco Publishing. Bucharest, Romania;

Duminică, I. (2017). Istoria unei fotografii din satul Beşalma-Comrat /The history of a picture from the

village of Beşalma-Comrat. Conference on Cultural Heritage in Kishinev, Moldova;

Genov, N. (2010). Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria. Review of European Studies;

Măcriș, A. (1999). Găgăuzii/ The Gagauzians. Agerpress. Bucharest, Romania;

Duminică, I. (2016). “Monografiile” comunelor plasei Comrat, judeţul Tighina din 1943 / The

monographies of the communes from the district of Comrat, Tighina County in 1943. Revista de

Etnologie și Culturologie Vol. XX.

Michalopoulos, D. (2016). “The metropolitan of the Gagauz”: Ambassador Tanriöver and the problem

of Romania’s Christian Orthodox Turks.Constanta, Romania.International Balkan Annual Conference

(IBAC), 4th series;

Georgescu, Ş. (1913). Găgăuzii şi originea lor/ The Gagauzians and their origin. laşi, Romania;

Popescu-Ciocănel, G. (1912). Găgăuzii/The Gagauzians. Bucharest, Romania;

Acaroglu, M., Ttirker M. (1967). Tannăver ve Gagauzlar, Tiirk Yiirdii, no. 2. Istanbul, Turkey;

Ciachir, M. (, Dreptatea la Găgăuzii din Basarabia/ Justice among the Gagauzians from Bessarabia


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Macriş, A. (2000). Găgăuzii şi românii/ The Gagauzians and the Romanians. Agerpress Typo. Bucharest,

Romania;

Ciachir, M. (1938), Dicţionar găgăuzo(turco)-român, pentru găgăuzii din Basarabia. Ajutorul găgăuzilor

de a învăţa mai uşor limba română şi de a vorbi bine româneşte/ Gagauzian-Romanian Dictionary for

the Gagauzians from Bessarabia, a handy tool for learning Romanian. Tiparul Românesc Publishing.

Kishinev, Moldova;

Manoff, B. (1940) Originea Gagauzilor/ The Origins of the Gagauzians (translated from

Bulgarian/available in print at the National Military Library in Bucharest, Romania).

Documents from the National Archives (Bucharest, Romania)

Anastase Cavalioti și alții. Acțiuni pentru dezpăgubirilor pentru moșia Țiganca din județul Cahul (1923).

Arhivele Naționale ale României/ The Anastase Cavalioti and others. Actions initiated with the

intention of receiving the compensations for the Țiganca estate from Cahul County (1923);

Fondul arhivistic national privind reforma agrara din 1921 - judetul Cahul/ Archival documents

regarding the agrarian reform from 1921 – Cahul County.

Fondul arhivistic privind reforma agrara din 1921 - judetul Tighina/ Archival documents regarding the

agrarian reform from 1921 – Tighina County;


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Contributors

ALEXANDRU DRĂGULIN

Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest; M.A. in Global and European

Politics, Faculty of History and Political Sciences, Ovidius University of Constanța (2010-2012); B.A. in

Political Sciences, Faculty of History and Political Sciences, Ovidius University of Constanța (2007-2010).

Areas of interest: political regime in the European Union, public space and institutional actors,

compared politics.

IULIAN MITRAN

Iulian Mitran is a young scholar currently doing his doctoral degree at the University of Bucharest. His

areas of interest include historical demography, ethnology, and Eastern and Balkan Studies.

LAVA MELLA

Lava Mella studied Political Science, Public Law and Sociology at Trier University. As a Muslim, she is

concerned about Islam and its essential meanings specialized on how to be a good human-being on

God's earth and how we can get better day by day by the behavioural codex, God has given in Islam.

She also focused on the Love between God and his creatures and how one can achieve complete peace

of mind and inner rest.

NATALIA SCHELCHKOVA

Natalia Schelchkova, from the Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov,

speaks Russian, English and German. She published several articles in the field of psychology, political

science, and environmental problems. Her reserch intrests include the theory of international relations,

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, the political role of religious organizations, religions in general, churches

and cults, and psychology of religion.

NIKOLAY KUZNETSOV

Nikolay Kuznetsov speaks Russian, English, Norwegian, Esperanto and Interslavic. He is historian and

specialist on U.S. history and radical movements as well as Russian Language. He published numerous

articles and is the creator of an Interslavic dialect. Kuznetsov is currently at Saint Petersberg State

University.


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SANDRA HERNANDEZ

Sandra Hernandez is a native of New York who grew up multicultural and enjoys learning different

languages. She is a student at the University at Albany currently studying linguistics and environmental

sustainability. She hopes to teach around the world and help international students, making way for a

better tomorrow.

TIMO SCHMITZ

Timo Schmitz studies Philosophy and Political Science at Trier University. He authored books on religion,

politics, languages, as well as fictional works and his experience in journalism. He is interested in all

kinds of philosophical systems and beliefs that exist around the world and has knowledge of Chinese

and African Philosophy, as well as indigenous religions.

YANNICK ESSENGUE

Yannick Essengue is a philosophical researcher who is interested in analytic philosophy, hermeneutics

and African Philosophy, based in Douala (Cameroon). He’s initiator of the research « Philosophie

africaine. Débats & questions » (www.philoafricaine.com) and the African philosophical journal Jogoo

(www.revuejogoo.com)

http://www.philoafricaine.com/

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