Hayek's Unconventionalism

Volume 9, Number 4 1999 Article 2

Journal des Economistes et desEtudes Humaines

NUMÉRO 4

Hayek’s Unconventionalism

Jacques Garello, University of Aix-Marseille III, Aix-en-Provence, France

Recommended Citation:Garello, Jacques (1999) "Hayek’s Unconventionalism," Journal des Economistes et des EtudesHumaines: Vol. 9: No. 4, Article 2.

DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1171

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Hayek’s UnconventionalismJacques Garello

Abstract

L’article est un essai qui propose de faire trois additions à la théorie évolutionnistehayékienne.

La première pour éclairer l’émergence des règles, sociales, zone d’ombre chez Hayek, enintroduisant le concept “ d’espaces relationnels ”, embryons des espaces institutionnels.

La seconde pour faire apparaître le rôle de l’action humaine dans l’évolution des règlessociales : des individus ou groupes d’individus jouent un rôle “ entrepreneurial ” et cherchent àchanger des institutions qui ne conviennent pas à leurs exigences éthiques.

La dernière pour réintroduire une référence à l’ordre naturel qu’Hayek avait voulu éliminer,mais qui valide le processus hayékien à condition de retenir une approche subjective du droitnaturel (comme l’approche thomiste) par opposition aux approches objectives courantes(s’inspirant d’Aristote et de Puffendorf).

This paper tries to add three elements to Hayek’s theory of evolution.

The first element sheds light on a moot point in Hayek’s thought, the emergence of socialrules. It does so by introducing the concept of “relational spheres”, deemed as incipientinstitutional spheres.

The second element tries to make the role of human action conspicuous in the evolution ofsocial rules: individuals or groups of individuals play an “entrepreneurial” role and seek to alterinstitutions which are no longer in harmony with their ethical moorings.

The last element introduces a reference to natural order which Hayek discarded in histhought. This reference validates the Hayekian process as long as a subjective approach to naturallaw (as in the Thomistic approach) is retained in contrast to contemporary objective approaches(taking their heed from Aristotle and Puffendorf.)

Author Notes: I am indebted to Neelkant Chamilall, Frédérique Chaumont-Chancelier andEmmanuel Martin for helpful discussions about this paper. Thanks are also due to them for usefulreferences.



HAYEK’S UNCONVENTIONALISM*

Jacques Garello°

1. Introduction

Hayek’s evolutionism yields only inadequate answers to some issuespertaining to the emergence and evolution of institutions. These are construed associal rules likely to provide plausible information about the behavior of individualsin their interactional relationships.1

The first issue relates to the selection criterion that accounts for the fact thata rule comes to “institutionalize” itself. Hayek gives us to understand that the rulewhich will have secured the prosperity and perenniality of the group that embracedit is the benign rule. A sheer efficiency criterion, if not a tautology, ostensiblyunderlies this explanation. Moreover, conceptually, Hayek’s point of view partakesmore of a sociological perspective than of an individualistic methodology.2

The second point bears on the way rules emerge. If it can indeed bereckoned that spontaneous ordering forces are always at work, this neverthelessleaves open the issue of knowing whether rules emerge mysteriously, suddenly orunwittingly. Hayek undoubtedly wished to lead himself out of contractarianconceptions: the idea of a social contract from which an unchallenged and everlastingrule springs into existence is not in keeping with the Hayekian perspective aboutan ongoing process of social experimentation. Notwithstanding this fact, Hayekurges us to accept institutions as they are as if they have existed from the outset:3

we are left with a theory bereft of both an alpha and an omega. What accounts forthis conspicuous lack of interest in the emergence of institutions?

* I am indebted to Neelkant Chamilall, Frédérique Chaumont-Chancelier and Emmanuel Martin forhelpful discussions about this paper. Thanks are also due to them for useful references. ° Professor of Economics, University of Aix-Marseille III, Aix-en-Provence, France.1 Horwitz-1993.2 See Barry-1982, p. 46. 3 Buchanan-1986.

Volume 9, numéro 4, Décembre 1999, pp 513-527.

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Garello: Hayek’s Unconventionalism



The third and last question turns on the evolution of institutions. If thisevolution is indeed generated through social practices or is the outcome oftraditions, then, the process that causes a rule to change or that perhaps leads to it being forsaken for a new one is far from obvious. The methodologicallyindividualistic grounding of Hayek’s theory hints that human action should bepresent in this evolutionary process: could we not conceive the existence of“institutional entrepreneurs”4 ?

These three issues might explain that Hayek’s agenda, with its ill-delineatedoutlines, has been perceived by some as incomplete.5 I wonder whether thiscritical assessment cannot be smoothed out by inserting in Hayek’s evolutionismtwo constituent parts which Hayek himself knowingly ruled out, namely, naturalorder and ethics. In this brief essay, we will try to reconstruct Hayek’s theory byreinstating these two components. This should allow us, first, to understand thatthe process of institutional emergence is relatively well accounted for (section 2),further, to uncover the veil of mystery behind the process of institutional change(section 3), such that, ultimately, the direction towards which institutionalevolution heads will be shown to owe nothing to a mere random process (section 4).

2. From the relational spheres to the institutional sphere

Hayek did not burden himself with going into all the details when heupheld that institutional rules are the by-product of a historical selection processcarried out in social experiences. For several reasons which shall not detain ushere, he was much more interested by the historical process than by the humanactions underlying this process.

However, Hayek made no secret of his skepticism with regard to the ideaof a “social contract”. The vision of a collective and unanimous choice from whichsocial order originates was at variance with Hayek’s outlook, even when thesubtleties of James Buchanan’s thought6 toned down what was too abrupt in theleap out of the Hobbesian jungle or even in Locke’s proposals. Like Bastiat,7

Hayek was too much convinced of the prior existence of individual rights withrespect to rules of positive legislation to admit that every legal tradition could betraced back to a unique origin. The root of the matter is that he dismissed the ideaof conceiving the “natural state” as a “lawless state”. None the less, while actingupon what Hayek says on this issue, how can we explain that individuals findthemselves acting under the rule of law? How can we concede that, at a givenmoment, institutions, that is commonly approved rules, emerge?

4 Kirzner-[1990] 1992.5 See for example Witt-1992. 6 Buchanan-1975.7 Bastiat-1995a and Bastiat-1995b.

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If the perspective of a social contract as the founding moment of a greatsociety is indeed unreasonable, if unanimity — even salvaged by James Buchanan’sveil of uncertainty8 — is unthinkable between individuals so different in theirinterests and in their ethical moorings, we can nevertheless acknowledge thatthings proceed otherwise in small social groups.

In confined spheres, be they “geonomical” (such as the family, the tribe orthe village) or “abstract” (like the family once again or else a community sharingreligious beliefs), individuals can have much enough in common so as to be ableto agree rapidly about rules of mutual conduct.

We suggest to call these rules, relational rules, and these spheres, relationalspheres. Their soundness comes from the solidarity that unites them, this solidaritybeing itself the outcome of the mutual acquaintance and trust among individuals.However, these relational rules are not expected to govern the interactionalrelationships between individuals indefinitely. They will ineluctably come intocontact or even clash one another. At this level, we can graft the Hayekian patternof selection and realize that among all the relational rules, some will prevail overothers. At times, they shall cause the other rules to fall into abeyance; at times, theyshall evolve through the input of other rules and this shall enhance theirinformational content; at times, they shall offer an alternative. What characterizesthis process is that it is a discovery process of experimentation, through trial anderror, until certain relational rules come to crystallize and stabilize themselves:from now on, they are institutional rules.

It is easy to locate what distinguishes the two types of rules: - The relational rule is personalized, it rests upon the mutual trust that

persons entertain in their interactional relationships. The institutional rule isanonymous and trust in the rule serves as a substitute for trust in the persons: theinstitutional rule is hence liable to govern interactions in the Great Society.

- The relational rule is contractual, it is laid down for particular circumstancesof time and place. The institutional rule is congealed, what confers its significanceis its everlasting character.

- The relational rule is malleable, it can leave room for conflicting, or atleast dissimilar, modes of behavior. The institutional rule excludes, at least for along period of time, any tentative move or challenge.

- The relational rule is endowed with an ethical content that is acquiescedin by those who abide by it, precisely because they share a common perception ofGood, of their duties and of law. The institutional rule is of an alleged ethicalneutrality in that it seems to be abided by in spite of the manifold ethical mooringsof the individuals and the groups concerned.

8 Buchanan-1975 and also Buchanan/Tullock-1962.

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Several examples borrowed from the history of institutions9 lend credit tothis process of germination and genesis of the institutional rule. We can first of allrecall the instance of the lex mercatoria10 which is but the outcome of successiveaccretions to the customary rules of the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, theBaltic and North Seas. Prior to the emergence of a law of nations liable to rulecommercial relationships, navigators endowed themselves with differing codes ofconduct following the regions where they found themselves: the Rolls of Oléron,the Consolato del Mare of Barcelona, the Laws of Wisby prompted successiveadaptations until merchants ultimately agreed upon simple rules that toned in withthe various traditions.

We can also recall the exemplary account of the emergence of themonetary institution: money is nothing but the outcome of the evolution of bartertrades. “Relational” by its very nature, barter has recourse to several commoditiesas intermediate objects of exchange; the use of these objects is constrained to smallexchange orders. From thereon, what occurs? As Jean-Pierre Centi puts it, “with thespatial and temporal extension of the market nexus, indirect exchanges areincreased manifold and this process concurrently narrows the range of commoditiesselected to serve as intermediate objects of exchange. This process of convergencemaintains itself until a small number of generally accepted media of exchangeemerges: henceforth, money is pervasive in the market and underlies the entireprocess of exchange.”11

A last example can be gathered from the gradual construction of the lawsruling the European Union. At least until the Maastricht Treaty, an evolutionaryperspective has been contrasted to the “constructivist” approach which consists increating a European law ex nihilo. If we consider each of the various memberstates of the European Union as a relational sphere, their respective laws could beregarded as as many rules that did not have whatever institutional significance atthe European level. It is only owing to the “Cassis de Dijon” decree advocating theprinciple of “mutual recognition of national norms”, and to which the Unique Acthas lent countenance, that the institutional scope of Community law has materialized.Thus, it was neither necessary to come to terms about the clauses of a Europeansocial contract nor to define European norms allowing Europeans to organize theirlegal relationships harmoniously.12

But what is at stake in imagining this intermediate stage between aninstitutional vacuum and the institutional rule? Such a step is attractive for severalreasons:

- We can hence call afresh that the “void” pertained only to the institutionalsphere and that the natural state has never existed because even the most exiguous

9 Liggio-1999.10 Benson-1990, Liggio-1999.11 Centi-1997, p. 81. 12 Radnitzky-1991.

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and primitive societies laid down their own rules — without however being endowedwith institutions.

- We highlight the fact that an institution has an ethical lineage - even if theinstitution is in itself ethically neutral.13

- We also disclose the fact that the institutional rule has been subject to a choice (at the level of the relational rules) and has been selected throughexperience.14 Social experimentation and agreement about aims no longer stand in contradiction one another but complement each other. This alternative pavesthe way for a possible reconciliation of the contractuarian and the evolutionaryperspectives.15

3. Institutional challenge and evolution of the

institutional rule

Once the rule is institutionalized, its stability, the trust it symbolizes and itsgeneral character are its essential features. There is allegedly no reason for it toevolve. It is perfect in the original meaning of the term: it has reached its final state,no progress is henceforth possible.

It may be that such institutions exist nowadays: we grapple with thembelow. However, the history of institutions displays an opposite trend: after havingseemingly been deemed suitable by those who had recourse to it, the institution ischallenged, declines and sometimes disappears. Over the long run, an institutionexhibits a life-cycle, just like an ordinary product.16

What has occurred? The answer must be traced back to the origin of theinstitution and we must recall that the latter has never been the outcome of adeliberate choice but only of repeated practices. It is only the relational rules thathave been worked out by purposeful individuals; as far as the institutional rule isconcerned, it originated from an experimental process of social discovery. Peopleadhered to it because it did not offend their deep-seated beliefs. It was a “nihilobtat”. We can thus admit that the incipient institution at least heightens thesuccess of those who use it to achieve their individual aims. This does not meanthat the rule displays only beneficial effects; it simply means that the room left forpotential dissatisfactions would have been greater were the rule not to exist.

Moreover, a very long period of time might have elapsed between the time of the original adoption of the rule and that of its regular application, and,

13 Relativists would say that the institution is respected because it is neutral. I am not a relativist and Ido not think that all ethics are of equal value. 14 Brennan/Buchanan-1985.15 Vihanto-1993.16 North-1990.

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Cost

TimeCT

Figure 1. Cost for an individual

Cost

TimeC’T C”T

Figure 2. Cost in the case of several individuals

- - - - - - - Cost of infringing the rule———— Cost of abiding by the rule

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meanwhile, the attitudes of individuals with regard to the rule might have changed.For a relatively long period of time, the rule will live on by the mere fact of it beinginstitutionalized. The cost of transgressing the rule is significant; only those livingon the fringe of society, the outlaws, are ready to incur such a cost. For them,anyway, abiding by any rule implies a huge cost, much higher than that of infringingthe rule.17

But why should some individuals, with the passage of time, not deem thecost of abiding by the rule to be superior to the cost of transgressing it? From thiscritical time, CT, onwards, an individual has an obvious interest in breaking therule (see figure 1). If we now juxtapose several individuals concerned by the rule(see figure 2), we note that by the mere fact of some not hesitating to break therule, others re-examine their attitude: the cost of transgressing the rule is lower if the absence of discipline spreads itself. Hence, the theoretical critical time, CT’’,— as from which others would have broken the rule if there had not been anyprecedent — is forestalled by a new critical time, CT’. The process which challengesthe rule and leads it to fall into abeyance is therefore speeded up merely becausethe first contestants have given free rein to their discontent.

The reasons which have caused these first contestants to infringe the rule still remain to be known. The answer lies in the subjective nature of theperception18 of the rule by the individuals who have recourse to it. The discrepancybetween the two costs is essentially function of the dissatisfaction generated by therule. What does characterize this dissatisfaction? It would be erroneous to seek theanswer in trite motives of revenue or patrimony. Even if it is possible to provide anindirect monetary valuation of it, the cost of a vexation — or of a feeling of injusticeor of an offense against one’s religious faith — does not have a price, for want of amarket, that is for want of an exchange opportunity. Does a dissatisfaction translateitself into a loss of welfare? But, this is the very definition of a dissatisfaction.

Even though economists in theory refrain from probing the hearts andsouls of individuals and from wondering what leads individuals to be more or lesshappy, we can suggest cautiously that the dissatisfaction to which an institutiongives rise is of an ethical nature. In our sketch of the process leading to theemergence of an institutional rule, we have set off the presence of an ethicaldimension: the rule that was deemed benign did not run counter to the commonsense perception of what is good and what is fair. This judgement painfullywithstands the test of time. Some individuals gradually (maybe suddenly) form anew opinion: the rule is no longer ethically appropriate. This eventuality is all themore understandable as the ethical judgement is itself subjective.

17 Even if the analysis that follows deals with the same subject than that tackled by game theorists, — that is, “why do individuals abide by the rules?” —, it, nevertheless, does not draw close to thetraditional approach of game theorists such as Schotter-1981, Schotter-1983 and Sugden-1989.18 Garello-1997.

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With reference to that issue, we can bring in the concept of “meta-ethics”by ascribing a new meaning to it.19 It may seem paradoxical to refer to a “subjective”ethics. By their very definition, the Good, the Aesthetic, the Truth and the Just callfor the absolute. We have already said that we are not tempted by philosophicalrelativism, otherwise termed “philosophical liberalism”, that is this frame of mindwhich is prone to deny the existence of an ultimate truth. If everything is wortheverything, nothing has worth — what is the significance of truth if everyone hashis own? On the other hand, we can easily conceive that it is hard for humanreason to grasp the absolute and that each one of us has only a dim perception ofthe absolute. This blurred conception is often “negative”. On rediscovering theThomist concept of negativity, Hayek has laid stress on the fact that the conceptsthat are fundamental for the understanding of human societies and crucial to theirfunctioning were only discerned from the standpoint of their opposites. We do notknow what is just but we can nevertheless easily experience the feeling ofinjustice. Likewise, we do not know where the Good resides, or what Ethicsconsists in, but this does not keep us from having a subjective perception of theGood or of Ethics; none the less, this subjective perception is sufficient enough totell us what is not consistent with Ethics. I suggest to call this awkward andnegative individual perception a “meta-ethics”.

We can now use the concept of meta-ethics as it emerges in the opinionindividuals hold about the institutional rule. If the rule was completely consistentwith Ethics, there would be no reason for it to evolve,20 and the Hayekian patternwould have no raison d’être. This would imply the existence of an ethicalunanimity: individuals would resort to the same ethics, they would have the sameperception of Ethics. This is how uncompromising rationalists proceed and thisexplains their constructivist stance: they believe they can construct a flawlesssociety or conceive a flawless rule because they claim to be able to recognize suchultimate truths — they are self-satisfied with their reason.

It is uniquely the existence of different meta-ethics that actuates theeffective evolution of rules. These meta-ethics are scattered over a range goingfrom an absolute anti-Ethics to an absolute Ethics. In this way, in harmony with hispersonal meta-ethics, an individual can deem the existing institution benign whileanother individual will sense a dissatisfaction that will lead him to transgress therule: in keeping with Ethics, or with what he knows about it, he will dismiss therule.

The individuals’ eagerness to transgress a rule will obviously depend, onthe one hand, upon the cost of the infringement and, on the other, upon the

19 In relation to the sense given by certain modern philosophers like Radnitzky-1992, DenUyl/Rasmussen-1991. I unsuccessfully looked for another name: “para-” or “peri-” ethics do notfaithfully translate the idea.20 On this, see Barry-1982.

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degree of the ethical discomfort they experience. I am not ready to die for theabolition of the Toubon Act.21

It devolves on some individuals gifted with a more acute ethical sensitivityor else set in a position prompting a strong ethical response on their part to triggeroff the rebellion. In keeping with the phrase coined by Frédérique Chancelier,22 Iwould readily call them institutional entrepreneurs, or better still, prophets. It isprobably incumbent upon Israel Kirzner23 to have been the first to grapple withthe profile of this personage even if he denies its existence. None the less, theprophet shares many similitudes with the entrepreneur qua creator-innovator:

- Just like the entrepreneur, the prophet forestalls others in perceivingthings. He sees things that already exist but whose existence has not yet beennoticed by others.

- As the entrepreneur, the prophet perceives a kind of disequilibrium, amaladjustment. Things do not or no longer go on smoothly: social coordination nolonger obtains.

- Just like the entrepreneur, the prophet acts. Through a regular applicationof the rule, he opens up fresh institutional vistas. On that issue, we share IsraelKirzner’s point of view: the prophet is not necessarily aware of the fact that he ison the way of doing something new, he is not “constructivist”. In contrast, we donot believe that the entrepreneur opens a new way by accident, merely becausethe route seems to be obstructed; in our view, the prophet has a clear perceptionof the error that lies in following the usual rule or else the traditional ways of doingthings.

- Does he act in his personal interest with a view to capturing a profit? Thisquestion can help us make the distinction between, on the one hand, the standardview of the entrepreneur, on the lookout for interesting opportunities, takingadvantage of his superior perceptive ability and trading upon the ignorance ofothers and, on the other hand, the prophet whom we conceive as being moreconcerned with justice and truth than with seeking a personal profit. But, thoughmoral, isn’t his profit none the less a profit, and indeed a personal one? Ever sinceAdam Smith at least, we know that moral sentiments inspire human action,24

whether it be a mercantile pursuit or not.

It is hence human action that really actuates institutional changes. We donot dwell here upon the details relating to the process that leads to an institutionalchange. We would probably observe imitative or comparative procedures. Maybewe should take an interest in such crucial issues as the transposition from one

21 In France, the Toubon Act (voted in 1994) bans the broadcasting of songs with foreign wordsbeyond a certain quota and imposes that meetings, congresses or seminars be held in French or withspoken or written French translations. This is a real example of a stupid law which, by the way, soonbecame obsolete when it was observed that control was not possible.22 Chaumont-Chancelier-1999.23 Kirzner-[1990] 1992.24 See Petkantchin-1996 on this issue.

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institutional sphere to another, or the intermingling between spontaneous andcreated orders (on which Hayek laid so much stress). On these issues, we can hardlykeep aloof from Hayek’s thought. Once we are aware of the cause underlying theevolution of institutions (point on which Hayek kept almost completely silent) andonce we have evoked the existence of pioneering individuals, be they identifiableor not, then the mode of evolution of institutions devolves once again to Hayek’sanalysis.

4. From institutional evolution to natural order

Yet there is a last important point that will get us away from Hayek’sanalysis. In Hayek’s there is no direction within institutional evolution that can bespotted: the evolution is what it is. This is what earned Hayek the critique ofhistoricism. On the one hand, Hayek incessantly fought historicism, especially inits Marxist version. On the other hand, Hayek indicated that his evolutionism wasof the “third type”.25 If we can conceive of two types of social phenomena, somecompletely determined by physical or metaphysical forces and some entirelyproduced by the voluntary action of individuals, then institutional evolution cannotbe assimilated neither to the former nor to the latter. According to Adam Ferguson’sphrase,26 we deal here with these social phenomena “which are indeed the resultof human action, but not the execution of any human design”. We could probablyuse the term “interactions” in the place of “action”. The result is thus not desired,planned. One needs just one small step, made by Hayek’s denigrators, to deducethat institutional evolution, not being planned, has no direction.

In fact, it seems to me (as well as to others27) that Hayek simply wanted torecall the inability of human reason to control an evolution which is under way.We do not even know at what stage of maturity we are (witnesses and artisans). Ido not dispute the validity of this reasonable position that is in harmony with the critical dimension of our reason, a reason able to understand when we arewandering from our path without however knowing our path. I only argue herethat Hayek went to great pains to make himself understandable when he justneeded to use the concept of natural order.

Yet Hayek precisely and explicitly rejected this concept and wished tooffer a theory of evolution with no reference to natural order.28 This paradox canbe accounted for by the fact that Hayek referred to concepts of natural order which

25 Hayek-1967.26 Hayek used Ferguson’s phrase in a quote: “Nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeedthe result of human action, but not the execution of any human design”. See Hayek- 1967.27 For instance, Barry-1982, Ullmann-Margalit-1978, Vaughn-1987.28 Nemo (Nemo-1988) puts forward a similar argument.

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could relate institutional evolutionism to a social phenomenon of the first type: ahistorical determinism as detestable as Marx’s.29 It seems that Hayek had twoschools of thought in mind:

- Aristotelian natural order, which is immanent but also immutable, givenonce for all; man is free to conform to this order and, to do so it is necessary toknow the laws of nature. Man must maintain his rank.30

- The natural order of the seventeenth century Jusnaturalists like Grotiusbut above all Pufendorff31, for whom natural order is explained by humannature.32 Like with Aristotle, this order is not evolutive since human nature isuniversal and timeless. The corollary is that this order is “objective”, it can bedefined and discovered by human reason.

We can understand that Hayek wanted to free himself from such credentialssince he had another idea of liberty and humanity, more respectful of social realityand of the experience of communal life, more modest intellectually speaking,acknowledging the ignorance we are plunged in, which represents a limitation anda challenge at the same time, a source of error and of progress simultaneously.Why then did Hayek leave aside the Thomist conception of natural order when hehimself admitted his intellectual debt toward the sixteenth century Scholastics?33

Hayek preferred to relate Aquinas to Aristotle than to make him the inspirer of theScholastics34 — who incessantly claimed to draw from Aquinas’ thought. Seenfrom the prism of Thomistic natural order, Hayekian evolutionism allows a fewpropositions helpful for our reflection and understanding.

1) In the same way as Thomistic natural law is borne by a dialecticmovement between the experience of men (positive law) and God’s will (divinelaw), natural order is the expression of men’s permanent efforts to reach aperfection of which they have the intuition but not the rational control.35

2) Men in quest of permanent progress correct institution in discarding ofrules that “do not suit”, rules that they feel are not going in the direction of the Good.

3) On the other hand, rules that do not evolve and seem to suit all thepeople can be regarded as being in harmony with the natural order, after beingtested through repeated and generalized social experience.

These propositions have a far-reaching impact.1) They give a direction to the evolution of institutions, while this direction

is not known in advance.2) They indicate the limitation at which institutions aim: they evolve until

they reach perfection.

29 See Hayek-1988.30 See Nemo-1998.31 See Rothbard-1995, Villey-1990.32 See O’Connor-1967, Simmonds-1989, Strauss-1953, Tuck-1979.33 See Chafuen-1986.34 See Hartwell-1995.35 See Novak-1993.

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3) They explain why some men are, sometimes involuntarily, the actors ofinstitutional evolution: they are in search of progress and are aware of the fact thatwe are wandering from the path to progress.

4) They allow to test the solidity of certain institutions, but also their claimto universality: they belong to the “natural order’’. Maybe we should classify privateproperty, care of children by their parents, respect of contracts among thoseinstitutions.

5) Thus they can help appreciate the chances of an institutional transposition:maybe that institutions that have successfully passed the test of social experimentationwith no major alterations can be transposed in various spaces, a repeated test notbeing required. This is probably the case of private property in Southern andEastern countries.36

These last issues show what is at stake in the debate about institutions. In this field, Hayek has been a pioneer, I’d be tempted to say, a prophet. But the deciphering of prophecies is a delicate task and I apologize for potentialapproximations contained in this hermeneutics of Hayek’s œuvre.

36 For the problems raised by the transition of formerly communist economies to market economies,see Boettke-1994.

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DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1171



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Hayek's Unconventionalism

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