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Philosophy after Wittgenstein and HeideggerAuthor(s): Charles GuignonSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jun., 1990), pp. 649-672Published by: International Phenomenological Society

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PhilosophyandPhenomenological esearchVol. L, No. 4, June i990

Philosophy f t e r ittgenstein

n d eidegger

CHARLES GUIGNON

Universityof Vermont

1. Philosophy's"LegitimateHeir"

RichardRorty begana seriesof lectures n the early seventiesby saying,

"Justas no one in the nineteenthcenturycouldgo on doing philosophy

withoutcomingto termswith Kant,so no one in ourcenturycango on

doing philosophywithout comingto terms with Wittgensteinand Hei-

degger."Thoughnot everyonewould agreewith this judgment, t doespose an interestingquestionaboutwhat it is we aresupposed o come to

termswithinthewritingsof thesetwo figures.How arewe to understand

the upshotof theirthoughtforphilosophy?Rortyhimselfseemsto hold

that Wittgensteinand Heideggerare masterdiagnosticians f the tradi-

tion whose"therapies"nd "de-structions" aveenabledus to stop doing

philosophy.In contrast,CharlesTaylorclaims that theirwritingsopen

thewayto a newtypeof inquiry ntotheconditions or thepossibilityof

intentionality.nhis view, whattheyoffer sa "critique f epistemology nwhich we discoversomethingdeeperand more validabout ourselves as

agents], . . somethingof our deepor authenticnatureas selves."'Rorty

replies hat Taylorhasgone onlyhalfway ngraspingheconsequences f

Wittgenstein'sand Heidegger's hought.For if humanbeingsare truly

"self-interpretingnimals," f theyare"interpretationll thewaydown"

(inthe phraseTaylorborrows romH. L.Dreyfus), hen "thereare ots of

waysto describe,andthusto study,humanbeings,"and hence"there s

no metaphysicalprivilegeattached o [the] way of describing hem"as

agentsthat Tayloradvocates.'Taylor,for his part, thinksRortyis too

precipitousn takingthecollapseof foundationalismo meantheend of

philosophy.WhatWittgenstein ndHeidegger how us is not how to shut

I "Overcoming pistemology,"n K. Baynes,J. Bohman,andT. McCarthy, ds., After

Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge: The MIT Press, i987), pp. 482-83

(henceforth OE").2"AbsolutelyNon-Absolute,"TimesLiterary upplement,December , i985, p. 1379.

PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 649







philosophydown, but how to open upa new, nonfoundationalist ind of

inquiry hat can shore up our views on politics and society.

Behind his debate s thesharedassumption hat Wittgenstein ndHei-

deggerhaveunderminedwhatRortycalls"epistemology-centeredhilos-

ophy,"andso have permanentlyhifted hegroundon whichphilosophymoves.In what follows, I want to examinesomeof the convergencesn

the writingsof Wittgenstein ndHeidegger hatjustify his assumption,

focusingespeciallyon theirdescriptions f oureverydaypredicament s

agents nthe worldandon theirvisionsof the role of languagenour lives.

But there s a deeperquestionIwant to address,andthat is the question:

Whatdirectiondoes their houghtpointfor thefutureof philosophy? s it

purely negative, undermining raditionalphilosophical questions and

puttingnothingnewintheirplace?Or is it positive nthe senseof paving

thewayto a refurbished nd transformed hilosophy?Wittgenstein nce

spoke of the "legitimateheir" of the subject which used to be called

"philosophy."" he question, hen, is: What, if anything, s philosophy's

legitimateheir? Although t will be impossible o argue for it here, my

hunch s that Taylor'spositivevision of the futureof philosophy s more

defensible.

At firstsight it mightseem bizarre o thinkthat Wittgenstein nd Hei-deggercan be comparedat all. Heidegger'sBeingand Timeannounces

itself asa work of "fundamental ntology"whoseaimis to laya founda-

tion for the regionalsciencesby posing"thequestionof the meaningof

Being."Itsturgidproseandheavy-handed rchitectonicmark t asawork

in the grandtraditionof metaphysics.The writingsof the laterWittgen-

stein,in contrast,consistof sprightlyaphorisms,piecemeal herapies or

"whatwe aretempted o say,"andoften inconclusive xchangeswithan

unidentifiednterlocutor.Where Heidegger s steepedin the history ofphilosophyandwantsto "de-structurehe historyof ontology,"Wittgen-

Wittgenstein,TheBlue and BrownBooks (NewYork:HarperTorchbooks, 95 8), pp.

28, 62 (hereafter ited as BB). In the text I also use the followingabbreviations:rom

works by Wittgenstein, hilosophical nvestigations,rans.G. E. M. Anscombe New

York:Macmillan,967) =

PI; On Certainty,rans.D. PaulandG. E. M. Anscombe(New York: Harper Torchbooks, i969) = OC; Philosophical Remarks, trans.

R. Hargreaves nd R. White (Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 975) = PR; Remarks n the

Foundationsof Mathematics, rans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge:MIT Press,

i983) = RFM;Zettel, trans.G. E. M. Anscombe Berkeley:University f California

Press,967) = Z; by Heidegger, einundZeit (Tubingen:Max Niemeyer,972) = SZ,

with translationsromBeingand Time,trans.J. Macquarrie nd E. Robinson New

York:Harper& Row, i962), which contains he Germanpaginationn the margins.

Unlessotherwisenoted, quotesfromWittgenstein's orksrefer o sectionsrather han

page numbers.

650 CHARLES GUIGNON







steinconcentrates n naturalassumptionshatarisewhendoingphiloso-

phy and generally gnoresthe historyof philosophy.

Yet despitethese importantdifferences, hereare also some striking

affinities n their thought.Both writersfocus on our practical ives and

criticizeattemptsto justifythose practicesby appealto timeless truthsaboutthe natureof reasonorto factsabout he world.Bothchallenge ep-

resentationalist ccountsof ourrelation o theworld Wittgensteinby

criticizingraditional heoriesof meaninganddesignation,Heideggerby

questioninghe primacyaccorded"mere eeing" nthetradition.Bothare

"contextualists"n the senseof holding hat,sincewe haveno clearaccess

to formsand categoriesof purereasonor to intuitionsof essences,our

startingpoint must be a descriptionof our everydaysituationsin the

world, or a phenomenologyy f everydayness."4The source of these similarities,I believe, is to be found in the

"philosophies f life" that dominated o muchof German houghtat the

turnof thecentury.5With thecollapseof Idealism,andwith thegrowing

senseof a "loss of meaning"accompanyinghe ascendancy f positivist

science,a naturalresponsewas to interprethe role of philosophyas try-

ingto articulatewhatis contained nthecontingentandtemporal low of

life itself.So we findSchopenhauer'semand hatphilosophybeginwitha"hermeneutic" f concrete life-forms,Herder'sand Humboldt'streat-

mentof languageas anexpressionof life, Lotze's"teleologicaldealism"

which definesthe "real" n terms of what is valuable for life, Marx's

emphasison the basic needsof life, Nietzsche'scall for life-affirmation,

and the Neo-Kantians'definitionof truthin terms of its value for life

("truth-values"). hevitalisms,energismsand biologismsof the turnof

the century, ogetherwith the immensely nfluentialLebensphilosophie

movement,which evolvedin the twentiesinto the "philosophyof exis-tence"andlater nto "existentialism,"lltestifyto the appealof this con-

cern with rooting philosophy n life.6

4 The expressions Heidegger's, ut see T. R. Schatzki's aluablediscussion f Wittgen-

stein'smethodas a "phenomenologyf the everyday"n "ThePrescriptions Descrip-

tion: Wittgenstein's iewof the HumanSciences,"n S. MitchellandM. Rosen,eds.,

The Need for InterpretationAtlanticHighlands,New Jersey:Humanities,983).

5 NicholasF. Gierhas madea convincing asefor Wittgenstein'sffinitieswith ife-philos-

ophy in Wittgenstein nd Phenomenology Albany:SUNY UniversityPress,1981),

Chapter3. I discussHeidegger's ebt to life-philosophyn Heidegger nd the Problem

of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, I983), section 4.

6 See Herbert Schnadelbach's Philosophy n Germany: 831-1933 (Cambridge: Cam-

bridgeUniversity ress,984) for adiscussion f the crucial onceptof "life" n German

thought.








AlthoughHeideggercame to feel that "philosophyof life . . . says

aboutas much as 'thebotanyof plants"'(SZp. 46) and needsa deeper

grounding,his early interestin examiningLeben-in-der-Weltnd the

meaning"inherentn factical ife"7 still shows through n his projectof

discoveringhe "roots,""origins,""wellsprings,"nd"soil" romwhichour conceptsoriginate. f it is to avoidBodenlosigkeit groundlessness),

philosophymuststartfrom our own personalor "existentiell" raspof

what life is all aboutin ourordinarybeing-in-the-world.n order o find

the existentiall" or essentialstructures f humanbeing(Dasein) n gen-

eral,wemustbegin romour own concrete ives:"therootsof theexisten-

tial analytic, orits part,areultimately xistentiell" SZp. 13). WhenHei-

degger says that the question of Being is "nothing other than the

radicalization f an essential endency-of-being hichbelongs o Dasein

itself- the pre-ontological nderstandingf Being" SZp. 14), hemeans

that ontologystarts rom heeveryday,pretheoretical raspof lifeembod-

iedin our practicalagency.Similarly,Wittgensteinellsus to get outof the

Luftgebdudecastles loating ntheair)of theorizing,andto get "back o

the rough ground" PI ii8, 107) of ourconcrete,ordinarygraspof lan-

guage nuse.Ourwords have meaningonlyin "thestreamof life" (PRp.

8i), in the whole "tapestry f life" (PI,p. 174), not in a "sublime" ogicbeyond ife.Whenwe lookforjustificationsorourpractices,we findthat

whatwe simplydo inliving s "bedrock"PI2I7); there snothingdeeper

than life which could explainor justify t.

The affinitieswith life-philosophyhelp to clarifythe similarities n

Wittgenstein's pdHeidegger'sproceduresn dealingwithphilosophical

problems.Bothsuggest hat these problemsarisefroma stanceof disen-

gaged,theoreticalreflection, nd both tryto dissolvethese problemsby

providingdescriptions f how thingsshow up for us in the courseof our

ordinary, prereflective ives. Heidegger begins with a descriptionof

"average everydayness"where one is caught up in ja "nonthematic

absorption"n ordinaryaffairsand "losesoneself" n what one encoun-

tersin the world(SZp. 76). His goal is to capture heway we encounter

things"inthe concernwhichmakes use of themwithoutnoticingthem

explicitly"(SZ p. 74). Wittgenstein'smethod is also descriptive:"We

must do awaywith all explanation,anddescriptionalone must take itsplace"(PI o9). The aim is to bringout the "aspectsof thingsthat are

mostimportant orus [which]arehiddenbecauseof theirsimplicityand

familiarity,"hosethingsone is "unable o notice . . . because theyare]

alwaysbeforeone's eyes"(PI 29). His frequent eferenceso the "prim-

7 See Heidegger nd the Problemof Knowledge,p. 59.

652 CHARLES GUIGNON







itive" (ursprunglich r primitiv) erveas reminders f the unnoticed ea-

tures of ordinary ife that makeour practices ntelligible.

The descriptionof everydayness ervesas a basis for articulating ea-

turesof our agency hat aregenerally iddenandonly implicit neveryday

life. From his phenomenologyof everydayness,Heidegger arrives at"transcendentaleneralizations"bout the conditions or thepossibility

of agencyin general:those "fundamental xistential" which are the

"basison which every interpretation f Dasein whichis ontical [that s,

particular ndconcrete]andbelongsto a world-viewmust move . . ."

(SZp. zoo). Suchstructures f being-in-the-worlds involvementn prac-

ticalconcerns, uture-directedness,ndsituatedness re said to be "more

primordial" ursprunglich)han theoreticalreflection n the sense that,

whereas heorycanbe seen as a derivative r foundedmode of being-in-

the-world,practicalactivitiescannotbe accounted or solelyin termsof

the representationalistpicture assumed by the theoretical attitude.

AlthoughWittgenstein fficially schewsany "cravingorgenerality" BB

p. i8), hisprocedurehas often been compared o a transcendental rgu-

ment8 n the way it moves fromplain featuresof our lives to the back-

groundconditions hat makethose activitiespossible.The notionsof lan-

guage-games, rammar, ndformsof lifemaybe seen asidentifyinghosegeneral ifnot exactly "essential")haracteristicsf our liveswhichmake

our activities possible.

BothWittgenstein ndHeidegger ejectargumentnthefamiliar ense.

In struggling o conveya sense of our humansituation hatprovidesan

alternative o the traditional,"commonsense" ictureof representation-

alism, heyconcentrate ndescription ndclaimsabout he conditions or

thepossibilityof ourdailyactivities.Since he traditional epresentation-

alistpicture s so deeply ngrainednourthinkingandlanguage,both also

deploydetailedtherapiesand de-structurings, ften loadedwith meta-

phorsandneologisms, o help-usbypass he assumptions hat arisewhen

language s "idling"or when we adopta theoretical tance toward life.

Whatemergesntheirwritings sanunderstandingf humanexistenceas

finite, contingent,and contextualized,a picturewhich undermines he

For instance,by Rortyin "Verificationismnd Transcendental rguments,"Nofus5

(1971): 3-14; by Taylor n "TheOpeningArguments f Hegel'sPhenomenology"n

A. MacIntyre, d., Hegel:A Collectionof Essays (GardenCity, New York: Anchor,

1972); andmorerecently yLynnRudderBakern"On heVery deaof a FormofLife,"

Inquiry 27 (i984): 277-89. To note this similarity to the procedure of transcendental

argumentss not to suggest hatWittgensteins developinga "transcendentalhiloso-

phy."The differences etweenWittgensteinnd transcendentalhilosophy re clarified

in SusanneThiele'sexcellentbook, Die Verwicklungenm DenkenWittgensteinsFrei-

burg: Karl Alber, i983).








assumptionsof traditionalphilosophyand paves the way for the recent

thought of such figuresas Rorty andTaylor.

2. Everydayness,Understanding, ndMeaning

The representationalistictureof our humansituationwe haveinheritedfromDescartes ixes nadvancehowthingscanappear o us "likeapairof

glasseson our nosethroughwhichwe see whateverwe look at"(PI103).

When we aredoingphilosophy,we tend to think of ourselvesas essen-

tiallyminds set overagainsta collectionof independentphysicalobjects

which our ideasrepresent ndour wordsdesignate.Thegoalof philoso-

phy, then, s to show how ourordinary ompetenceninteractingwith the

world ispossibleandjustified. notherwords,philosophy ries o accountfor the familiarntelligibility f thingsas theyshowupin ourday-to-day

lives.The intractable uzzlesof traditional pistemology-centeredhilos-

ophyarisepreciselybecauseof theassumptions f therepresentationalist

model. Forit seems thatwhat is "given" n ordinaryexperienceon this

model (sensory nputand possiblysome inbuiltrules)is too limited to

groundor make senseof our full-blownunderstanding f ourselvesand

our world. Our graspof things appears o be underdeterminedy the

"data"and capacitiesavailable o us.The way Wittgensteinand Heideggerhandle these traditionalphilo-

sophicalproblemss to suggest hattheyarise npartbecauseof therepre-

sentationalist ortrayal f theselfasa "subject"et overagainstanobjec-

tive externalreality. By describingeverydaynessn detail, they lead us

awayfromthetendency o thinkof ourselvesassubjectsormindsdistinct

from a world of bruteobjects,and they therebysuggesta new way of

grasping he sourcesofintelligibility

hat arealreadypresent

nour livesas agents.

Heidegger's phenomenology of human agency starts out from a

descriptionof lifeas a "happening" aughtupin "dealings"withequip-

mentin ordinarycontexts.Inourprereflective ctivities,he suggests,we

findourselvesabsorbed n handling hings,andin copingwith situations

we encounteras "significant"nthe sensethatthingsmatteror countfor

us in specificways.Whatshowsupforus in such contexts s not a collec-

tion of bruteobjects o berepresented, uta totalityof equipment rgan-ized intoaweb of means/ends elationsbyourprojects.Heidegger'swell-

knownexampleof theworkshopshowshow,wheneverythingsrunning

smoothly,the hammerappears n hammering,n orderto fastenboards

together,which sforbuildingabookcase.Such amiliar ontextsof activ-

ity are encountered as holistic fields of involvements - the

"ready-to-hand" organizedaroundourundertakings"what t'sfor"),

andultimatelyaroundourself-interpretationssagents n theworld(the

654 CHARLES GUIGNON







"forthesake of which"of our concerns).Given his pictureof everyday-

ness,there s simplyno way to drive n a wedgebetween herepresenting

subjecton the one hand,andmereobjects o berepresented n the other.

The equipmentalcontext gains its significanceand structure rom my

senseof whatIam doing n that setting.Yet,at the same ime,whoIamasan agentthere is definedby the context in which I am engaged: n the

workshop, or instance, canbe a craftsman r an amateur,butnot a line-

backeror anayatollah.The ability o see thingsas mereobjectson hand o

be represented as "present-at-hand" requiresa "change-over"n

our stance towardthingswhichHeideggercalls "the disworldingof the

world."

The description f everydayness lso bringsout the way in whichour

livesarealwaysnestedin the wider context of a historicalculture.Our

possibilities f self-interpretationnd our concreteways of actingaregen-

erallyguided n advanceby thepublic roles,standards,andconventions

weallabsorb ngrowingupinto a communal ife-world.For hemostpart

we arenot so muchunique ndividualsas we areparticipants ndplace-

holders nwhatHeidegger allsthe"They" dasMan):"We akepleasure

andenjoyourselvesas theytakepleasure;we read,see, andjudgeabout

literature nd art as theyseeandjudge.. . . The 'They'. . . which[we]all are,thoughnot as the sum, prescribeshe kind of Beingof everyday-

ness" SZpp. i26-27). Thisattunemento publicwaysof acting theingrainedendency o respondaccording o social standards,o fall into

stepwiththecrowd,to enact standardizedoles definesouridentity n

everydaynesswithoutresidue.Forthis reasonHeidegger aysthat being

theThey s a "primordialhenomenon"which "belongs o Dasein'sposi-

tive constitution"SZp. I29). WhatI amdoingatanytime,as well as my

thoughtsandfeelings,hasa pointand makessenseonly against heback-groundof practices ndinstitutions f mycommunity as, for example,

talking o a groupof peoplecounts as an academic ectureonly giventhe

background f the university ystem.Heidegger'sdescriptionof every-

daynesseadsus to see theworld asa fieldof significanceaid outbycom-

munalpractices:"the They itself articulates he referential ontext of

significance"SZ p. i29). Inthissensewe exist as a shared"clearing"n

whichthingscan show up as relevant n relationto our lives.The description f humanexistenceas boundup with a publicworld

provides he basis foridentifying hreefundamental tructures f human

agency.First,we find ourselves"thrown"or situatedwithina familiar

worldwhere hings"matter"o us becauseof ourpriorattunementStim-

mung) (SZ p. I37). Because hingsalwaysshowup as mattering o us in

somewayorother, here s no horizonless antagepointfor theapprehen-








sion of brute "facts."Second,as agentswe are"outsideof ourselves"n

addressing he concernsof dailylife according o our culture'ssense of

what is important.In dealingwith equipment,according o Heidegger,"Dasein addressesitself to the objects of its concern," and thereby

"expressestselftoo; thatis to say,it expresses tsbeingat homewith theready-to-hand"SZpp. 407-8). Aswe shallsee, theway inwhichDasein

"expresses tself [sprichtsich aus] as a beingtowardentities" (SZ pp.

2z3-z4) is focusedby the possibilitiesof interpretation rticulatedby a

public anguage.Finally,we arealways "aheadof ourselves,"organizing

and interpreting urrent situationsin the light of futurepossibilities.

Understood s "projection," uman ife is teleological,apurposive hrust

toward the futurewhich Heideggercalls "Being-toward-the-end."his

futurityunfolds not so muchin consciousgoal-settingor planningas in

simply driftingalong into the routines and undertakingsdefinedby

socially approved asksandobligations.Ourbeingtoward the future s

the sourceof the "forestructuref understanding"whichpreshapes he

ways thingscan show up for us in our everyday ives together.

Heidegger's laim, then, is that explicitawarenessof mereobjectsis

possibleonly forbeingswho havesomepriorcompetencen copingwith,

what he calls an "as structure" of practical involvements. Thisprereflectivemasteryof the "hermeneutics"of equipment theability

to handle hings nfamiliarwaysinmeaningful ituations is madepos-

siblebyourparticipationnthepublic ife-worldopenedup bytheThey.

It follows that we are always caughtup in a "hermeneutic ircle":our

dealingswith what we find aroundus arepreshapedby our culturally-

definedoverviewof how thingscancountforourcommunity,while that

backgroundunderstandings itselfconstantlyrevised n the lightof our

encounterswith what showsup in our activities.Andso therecanbe noaccess to raw facts independentof our pre-understanding:f one is

engaged n interpretation ndone wantsto appealto what just "stands

there,"Heidegger ays,"thenone finds hat what'stands here' nthe first

instance s nothingotherthanthe obviousundiscussed ssumption f the

personwho does the interpreting"SZp. I50). Inotherwords,whatcan

countas arelevant"fact" salwayspreshaped ythebackground f intel-

ligibilityembodiedin our skilledpractices.For this reasonHeideggerpoints out that fundamentalontology - the inquiry nto what makes

thingsthe thingsthey are - asks "aboutBeingitself insofar as Being

enters ntotheintelligibility f Dasein.Themeaningof Beingcan neverbe

contrastedwithentities,or withBeingasthe'ground'whichgivesentities

support; or a 'ground'becomesaccessibleonlyas meaning,even if it is

itself the abyss[Abgrund] f meaninglessness"SZp. I 5z). TheBeingof

65 6 CHARLES GUIGNON







things s therefore onstitutedbyour sharedbackground f attuned ntel-

ligibility,abackgroundwhich tselfhasnodeeperground hanthe contin-

gent practices hat haveemerged n our historicalculture.WhereHeidegger's henomenology ocuseson ourinvolvementswith

equipment,Wittgenstein's hilosophical nvestigations eginsby inquir-ing into how we refer o things with words. ButWittgenstein's oncerns

may be seen as congruentwith Heidegger's o the extent that the basic

questionfor both is how we are able to understand he world, or how

intentionality s possible. A commonsenseway of accountingfor our

understandingf the worldpresupposes"themodelof 'objectanddesig-

nation"' PI293).According o thismodel,westartout inlife findingour-

selves surroundedby objects;we then learnthe namesfor thoseobjects

through"ostensiveraining" someonepointsto apieceof paperandsays

"paper");and thereafterwe know what objects of that type are. Our

understandingf theworld is builtupfromsuch nstancesof learning he

significations f words.This traditionalaccountof languagepresupposes

the representationalist ictureof ourselvesas mindsrelated to objects,

and thentries to explain ourunderstandingn termsof mentalprocesses

linkingwords to things,that is, knowing the meaningsof words.

Wittgenstein hallenges veryaspectof this accountof thebasisforourunderstanding.How, he asks,would a preverbal hildknow whatpoint-

ing is, or that the teacher spointing o the paperandnot to its color, size

or shape?How does the child learntheuse of the word (asa mass term,

say,rather hanas a countnoun)?Does the childstartout with our under-

standingof objects n the world, so that the only issue is graspingwhat

conventional oundswe associatewith thoseobjects?Orisn't it the case

that the childfirst indsout howwe articulate heworld into "objects"by

learningourlanguage?Ostensive raining eems o explainhow we cometo understand hings because it is seen on the model of "ostensive

definition," .e., caseswheresomeonealreadyknows ourlanguage can

ask,forinstance,"What olor is that?" andso understandshereply

"That'scalled 'sepia"'(PI30). But ostensivedefinitions ucceedbecause

the learneralreadyknows "what place in language,in grammar,we

assign o the word,""thepost at which we station the word" (PI 29). In

otherwords, some understanding f language s necessarybeforethiskind of ostensioncan succeed:"One hasalready o know (orbe ableto

do) somethingnorder o becapableof askingathing'sname," ustasone

mustalreadyhave mastered hegameof chessto some extent in order o

understandhewords,"This s theking,"when shown a particular iece

(PI3 i). The traditionalaccount of how we come to understandwords

thereforepresupposesheveryunderstandingt wassupposed o explain.








"We may say: only someone who alreadyknows how to do something

with it can significantly sk a name" (PI3I).

Wittgenstein's eflectionshere lead to an inversionof the traditional

orderof explanation.Thequestionaskedwas, "How can we explainour

ordinary ompetencendealingwiththingsandgrasping heworld?"andthephilosophical esponsewas to show howunderstandingouldbe built

up from particular asesof grasping he meaningsof words. What Witt-

genstein uggests,however, s that we can learnwords(and,hence,grasp

whatobjectsare)only if we alreadyhaveanunderstandingf the world,

an understandingtself rooted in a priormasteryof language.What is

basic s the"preunderstanding"mbodied nour know-how:our"ability

to do"things,our "mastery" f standardpatternsof discrimination nd

articulationas competent agents in a familiar ife-world.Items in the

worldcan stand out as countingfor us in certainwaysonly becausewe

have some masteryof what Wittgensteincalls the "significance" r

"importance"of the ordinary situationsin which we find ourselves:

"What s happeningnow hassignificancenthesesurroundings. hesur-

roundings ive it itsimportance"PI583). Wordshavemeaningsand can

be understood nlywithin "intelligibleituations" Z I7). But nthatcase

the intelligibility f thingscannot be explainedatomisticallyn termsofisolated dentifications.Rather,"[I]ightdawnsgradually verthewhole"

(OC I4I).

It follows fromthe priorityof this holisticbackground f understand-

ing thatwe can pickout or identify"facts"onlyagainst hebackdrop f a

priorsense of how thingscan count as significantn our lives. Wittgen-

steinasks,"Butwhatthingsare facts'?Do youbelieveyoucan showwhat

fact is meantby, e.g., pointingto it with your finger?Does that of itself

clarify he partplayedby'establishing' fact?"Suppose t takesagraspofthe practicesconstitutiveof someregionof our life-world"to define he

characterof what you are callinga 'fact"'(RFMp. 38i). The world in

which we find ourselvesis always already organized nto intelligible,

meaningful ontextswhich determinewhat facts therecanbe, andso, as

for Heidegger, here is no way to see our understanding f the world as

built up from discriminations f originallymeaningless, solated facts.

WhenWittgenstein sks,"Whatarethesimpleconstituents f a chair?The bitsof wood of which tis made?Or the molecules,ortheatoms?" PI

47), he makes it clear that the simple component parts of things are

specifiable nly byreference o ourinterestsandpurposes n dealingwith

them.

Wittgenstein's ndermining f thetraditional onceptionof grounding

is summedupin the familiar logan,"Whathasto beaccepted, hegiven,

65 8 CHARLES GUIGNON







is - so one couldsay - forms of life" (PIp. zz6). The full meaningof

thiscan bebroughtout by consideringwhatWittgenstein aysaboutfol-

lowing rules.Thetradition ries to explainthe orderliness ndregularity

in ouractivities n termsof underlying"mental" ules.Without hemen-

tal, it seems,therewould be not "action"but merephysicalmovement.Wittgensteincriticizes he assumption hat theremust be innermental

rulesguidingour actionsby, amongotherthings,showingthatruleshave

to beinterpreted,hatevery nterpretationf a rulerelieson anotherrule,

andconsequently hat the appeal o rules eadsto anendlessregress.Gen-

erally,whereverwe mightfeel thatthementalwouldexplainouractions,

Wittgensteinundercuts hatnotionbyshowingthat appeal o themental

is pointless.If meaningfulhumanagencycan be accounted or neither n termsof

mentalprocessesnorsolelyintermsof physicalmovement,how is it pos-

sible?HereWittgenstein's escription f oureveryday ctivitiesgivesusa

new way of looking at our agencyand, indeed, at our own identityas

humans."Toobeyarule,"hesays,"to makeareport, o giveanorder, o

play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).. . . To understand

a languagemeans to be masterof a technique" PI i99). What comes

acrosshere s thatactiongains its meaningnot from"inner"accompani-ments,but from tsplacewithinthebackground f regularpractices,ech-

niquesandcustomsof acommunity.Aswe are nitiated nto a communal

life-world,we become uned n to thosewaysof respondinghat makeup

the background f intelligibility mbodied n the "commonwaysof act-

ing"(Handlungsweise)f ourculture.Consider, orexample,how bow-

ingis learned nJapan.Fromanearlyage Japanesenfantsaretappedon

the backof the head when someoneenters he room.Through hiscondi-

tioning theybegin to "duck" n the appropriate ircumstances, nd this

duckingevolves into the formalJapanesebow. It would be a mistake,

however, to think that bowing is nothing other than the conditioned

reflexof ducking, or a bow is a profoundlymeaningfulgesture nJapa-

nese society. Yet the meaningof the bow does not dependon something

"mental"behindthe movement;anything,or nothing, mightbe "going

throughone'smind"whenone bows. Rather, hegesturegains tsmean-

ingfrom ts placewithin hebackground f practices, ustomsand nstitu-tions of the entireculture.Generally, hen,what is "given"as thesource

of intelligibilityof our actions is the attunement the "agreementn

judgments" Ubereinstimmung, PI242) - we pick up bybecomingpar-

ticipants n a publicworld. As Wittgenstein ays,what "determines ur

judgment,ourconceptsandreactions, s not whatone manis doing now,

an individualaction, but the whole hurly-burly f humanactions,the








backgroundagainstwhich we see any action"(Z 567). Ouractions are

"rule-governed,"oherentandmeaningful ecauseof theirposition n the

entirefabricof socialpractices hat makeup our form of life.

This conceptionof sharedformsof life as the basis for our practices

pointsto a way of envisioninghe self whichprovidesanalternativeo therepresentationalist odel. According o thisviewpoint,what definesour

identityashumanagents s not our capacity orconsciousrepresentation,

but ratherour mode of "presentation" our ways of expressingour-

selvesin the meshof a publicworld.9Wittgenstein dvisesus to think of

the languageof the mentalnot as designating omething"inner,"but as

anexpressionof natural ife-processes:orexample,theword "pain"as

connected with a "primitive,naturalexpression"(PI z44); the words

"We mourn . . ." at a funeral as "an expression of mourning" (PI p.

i89); the exclamation,"Now I know how to go on " as "aninstinctive

sound,a gladstart"(PI 3z3); the utterance"Ihopehe'll come" not as a

"report bout [one's]stateof mind,"but as "an expression Ausserung]

of [one's]hope" (PI585);andthesentence"Iam inpain"as likemoaning

-an "expression" f pain,not a reporton a mentalstate (BBpp.68-69).

The force of these suggestions s to lead us to shift from thinkingof the

mentalassomething"inner" epresented y our wordsto thinkingof it aswhatis presented r expressed n ourcommunal ives. It is somethingwe

embody, somethingwe "body forth"in makingmanifestour attuned

being-in-the-world ogether. Seen from this perspective,we exist as

"meaningfulxpressions"na shared ife-world ather hanas mindsrep-

resenting objects.

Wittgenstein's escription f our everydayivesoverlaps hepicturewe

findin Heidegger.The self, regardedas agency,appearsas an ongoing

"happening"mbeddedn a public ife-worldwhose actionsandself-un-

derstandingdraw theirsignificance rom their locationin the practices

and customsof the "They."Given hisportrayal f our humansituation,

thepictureof theself as a mindrepresentingbjectssimplyhasno role to

play. For both thinkers,to graspthe situatednessof our liveswithin a

background f life-expressions f a community s to see that the mental

canbe made ntelligiblewithoutrecourse o a "yetuncomprehendedro-

cessinthe yet unexploredmedium" PI3o8). AsWittgenstein ays,"Onlysurroundedby certainnormalexpressionsof life [Lebensausserungen]s

theresucha thingas an expressionof pain. Onlysurrounded yaneven

morefar-reaching xpressionof life, sucha thing asthe expressionof sor-

row or affection" Z 5 34). And,for both thinkers, he contextualization

9 This accountdrawson JamesC. Edwards'EthicsWithoutPhilosophy Tampa:Univer-

sity of Florida, I 9 82), pp. i 83 ff.

66o CHARLES GUIGNON







of our livesin a communalworld our existenceas, so to speak, com-

mentarieson the text of our culture'sways of interpreting hings -

implies hat therecan be no accessto brute,uninterpreted facts"about

independently xisting objectsto be usedin justifyingor explainingour

practices.At the sametime, however, he description f everydaynessetsus see thatour livesandthe worldarealreadyntelligible, ndthereforedo

not need any philosophicalexplanationor grounding.

3. Languageand Truth

In the writingsof both Wittgenstein nd Heidegger, anguageplays a cru-

cial role in articulatingour shared sense of ourselvesand the world

aroundus. We saw that, for Heidegger,Dasein "expresses tself"in itseverydaydealingswith equipment.Theseordinaryways of articulating

oursurroundingsnto a fieldof significance re focusedand organized n

advance by a background of intelligibility opened by discourse:

"Intelligibilityhas always been articulated,even before there is any

appropriativenterpretation f it. Discourse[Rede] s the articulation f

intelligibility.Therefore t underliesboth interpretation nd assertion"

(SZ p. i6i).

To understandwhatHeideggermeansbydiscoursehere,we mustkeepin mind hat the term"Dasein does not simplydesignate solated ndivid-

ual humanbeings.Dasein, as we have seen,is essentially"Being-with,"

communalbeingwhose senseof reality s initiallypreshapedby the way

the "They"articulates ignificance.Accordingly, anguages the medium

in which a community's"clearing" its understanding f itself and its

world) is opened up and maintained."Inlanguage,as a way in which

thingshavebeen

spoken out,there is hiddena way in whichthe under-

standingof Dasein has beeninterpreted.. . . Proximally,andwith cer-

tain limits, Dasein is constantlydeliveredover to this interpretedness,whichcontrolsanddistributes hepossibilitiesof averageunderstanding

andof the situatednessbelonging o it" (SZ pp. i67-8). Seenfromthis

standpoint,Daseinasa clearingsmadepossiblebythearticulations uilt

intoapublic anguage."For he mostpart,discoursesexpressedby being

spokenout, and hasalreadybeen so expressed;t is language.Butin that

caseunderstanding ndinterpretation lready ie in what has thus beenexpressed" SZ p. i67). Heideggerelsewherecalls this linguisticback-

ground he "projectiveaying"of apeople, he linguistically ttunedgoal-

directednessnwhich"theconceptsof ahistoricalpeople'sessence, .e.,of

its belonging o world history, are preformed or that people."'"

t" "TheOriginof the Work of Art," in Heidegger, Basic Writings,ed. D. Krell (New York:

Harper, 1977), p. i85.

PHILOSOPHY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER 66i







Our everydayalkcontributes o sustaining hissharedbackground f

intelligibility. In talking, Heidegger says, our "Being-withbecomes

'explicitly'shared";throughtalk "the articulationof being with one

anotherunderstandinglys constituted" SZ p. i62). In otherwords, the

centralrole of languageuse is to "express"or "make manifest"oursharedattunement o a publicworld:"Intalking,Daseinexpresses tself

not because t has, in the first nstance,been encapsulated s something

'internal'over against somethingoutside when it understands.What is

expressed s precisely hisbeing-outside. . ." (SZp. i 62). CharlesTaylor

has discussed he role of language n expressingor makingmanifestour

shared"being-outside" ith one another."AsTaylorpointsout, the tra-

ditiongenerally egarded anguageas a tool at ourdisposalfordesignat-

ing and communicatingnformationabout objects.In contrast to this

kind of "designative"iewof language,Taylorproposeswe see language

asprimarily medium n whicha "public pace" sopenedup.Totakehis

example, f Igetontoa crowdedbus on ahotdayandsay to a fellow-pas-

senger,"Hot,isn't t?"myutterance either onveys nformation or asks

aquestion. nstead,ts role sto makemanifestoursharedpredicament,o

"getsomethingout intotheopen betweenus," to fine uneour senseof the

existentialspacein whichwe stand.Similarly, or Heidegger,communicationinis neveranything ike a

conveyingof experiences, uch asopinionsorwishes,fromtheinteriorof

onesubject nto the interiorof another.Dasein-with s already ssentially

manifest n a co-situatedness nd a co-understanding"SZp. i62). Itfol-

lowsthatlanguages notprimarily tool forrelayingdeasfromone sub-

ject to another,but is instead the medium n which our sharedunder-

standingof ourselvesand our worldis depositedandmaintained.Thisis

why Heidegger aysthat t is not humanswhospeak,butrather"languagespeaks" - "Humansspeak only insofar as they corespondto lan-

guage. i Becauseour shared ense of realityandthepublicspaceof our

practical life-world are constituted by language, "essenceand Being

expressthemselves n language."'3Languages the "dwelling"n which

our sense of who we areemerges,and so "wehumanbeingsremaincom-

mitted o andwithin he essenceof language,andcannever tepoutsideof

it in order to look at it fromsomewhereelse."'4

""Language nd HumanNature"and "Theories f Meaning," eprintedn his Human

Agencyand Language,Philosophical apers,Vol. I (Cambridge: ambridgeUniversity

Press, 985).

I ThePietyof Thinking, rans.J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo (Bloomington:ndiana

UniversityPress,1976), p. 25.

'3 Introduction o Metaphysics,rans.R. Manheim GardenCity: Doubleday, 96I), p.

44.

662 CHARLES GUIGNON







Correlatedwith Heidegger's escription f the self as a place-holdern

the public ife-world,and of languageasmakingmanifesta sharedback-

ground of intelligibility, s a transformedway of looking at "truth."

Accordingto this outlook, "primordial"ruth is the "disclosedness"

which makes t possiblefor thingsto emerge-into-presence,nd truth as

"correspondence" r "correctrepresentation"s derivativefrom thismoreprimordial ruth.The notionof primordial ruth s clarifiedn Hei-

degger'sattempt o show thatwhatusually s assumed o be the primary

locus of truth, the subject/predicatessertion, s derivative rom a more

basic involvementn practicalaffairs(SZsec. 33). Inour normaltrans-

actionswithequipment,we layoutandappropriate quipment ccording

to ouraimsandneeds.Language,when it hasaroletoplay, usually peaks

into these concerns, ightingup aspectsof the "hermeneutic s" of taking

somethingas something n our concernfuldealings.Forexample,calling

out "Tooheavy Handme the otherhammer "nthe midstofhammering

makesmanifesthow thingsstand ntheworkshop: t shows how the work

is going, and lets things become manifest as they are in our clearing.

Through his expression, he entirecontext of significance elations s lit

up.

Whenwe shiftfromusing anguagen order o expressourabsorption

in a fieldof significanceo using t to make "apophantic ssertions," hereis a change-overn our mode of comportment o the world.In a subject/

predicate ssertion uch as "Thehammerweighs fourpounds,"we focus

on the hammeras a present-at-handbjectwith a property, upposedly

severed romany particular ontext of practical ignificance."In ts func-

tion of appropriatingwhat is understood,"Heidegger ays, "the 'as'no

longerreachesout into a totalityof involvements.. . . [I]thas been cut

off fromthat significancewhich, as such, constitutesenvironmentality"

(SZp. I58). The baresubject/predicatessertion s disengaged romits

rolein disclosinghow thingsstand with our activities,and is regarded s

merelyrepresenting "fact"abouta meaningless, resent-at-handhing.

Onlywhen therehas been this kind of change-over o decontextualized

assertions anquestionsabout "correctness" r "correspondenceo the

facts"arise,and now standardsorts of checkingand confirmationget

underway. What this account of assertionshows, however, is that

encountering hings as mere objects representedby subject/predicateassertionss parasiticon the "clearing" pened n advancebythoseprac-

tical concernsand involvementshroughwhichthingsare discoveredas

meaningfuln our lives.

14 On the Wayto Language,rans.P. D. Hartz(New York:Harper& Row, 1971), p.

'34.








Heidegger's erivation f the traditional onceptof truthascorrespon-

dencefroma "moreprimordial" xperience f truthas disclosednessSZ

sec. 44) follows the samepattern.The claim sthatonly because he world

and the thingsin it are alreadyopened up by our discursivepreunder-

standing s it possiblefor a conceptionof thingsas mereobjects o arise.Ourpracticalactivitiesdisclose the arena n which questionsabout the

correctness f beliefs or the truth of statementsget off the ground.And

within this clearing, "'things tand in different ruths"'5dependingon

our interestsand our concerns forexample,acrucifixwouldplayadif-

ferentrole withinthe "truths"of science,aesthetics,or religiousexperi-

ence. But it is only because Dasein in general "is 'in the truth,"'and

becausedisclosedness"belongsto its existentialconstitution"(SZ p.

zzi), that these "different ruths"and the standard ypes of regionalinquirycorrelatedwith them are possible.

Wittgenstein lso seesourlanguageandpracticesas openinga fieldof

intelligibility n which the issue of truth as correspondence an arise

(though, o besure,he wouldnot callthisbackgroundtself"truth").As

the medium n which our understanding f ourselvesand our world is

maintained, anguagearticulatesand shapesour attunement o shared

forms of life and definesour own beingas meaningful xpressions.Ourordinaryanguage-gamesmakemanifestour attunedparticipationn the

customsandpracticesof our publicworld. But language-games o not

merelyformulatean understandingwe could just as well havewithout

language.Forlanguageconstitutesourwaysof encountering hings and

interpreting urselves.WhenWittgenstein ays that a dog can "feel fear

but not remorse,"and that this is so because t "can't alk"(Z 5i8), he

means that, althougha dog can react to physical danger,it lacks the

capacity to grasp public standards of conduct, to recognize thesignificanceof the situation in relation to those standards, o contrast

remorsewith shame or regret, o revise ts self-evaluationn the lightof

redescriptionsf the situation all thoselanguage-dependentapacities

thatconstituteourability o feelremorse.We areableto havecertain orts

of feelingsand to identify hings n ourenvironment s significant, hen,

becauseof the masteryof whatWittgenstein alls the "grammar" the

backgroundarticulationof our possibilitiesof understanding thatprestructureshe language-games e learn n growingupintoa linguistic

community. For this reason he says, "Essence is expressed

[ausgesprochen]y grammar," nd"grammarells us whatkindof object

anything s" (PI37I, 373).

" What sa Thing?,rans.W. B.Barton, r.andVeraDeutsch Chicago:HenryRegnery,I967), p.

14-

664 CHARLES GUIGNON







I take Wittgenstein's onceptof "grammar" s referring o what he

sometimescalls the "system"of standard connections and relations

organizingour languageuse which is embodied n the regularpractices

and contextsof communalife.Thus, t seems o be partof thegrammar f

obtainingand reporting esultsof measuringhatthere s "acertaincon-stancyin the resultsof measuring" PI242). Similarly, t is part of the

grammatical"framework n which the workingof language s based"

that disputests do not breakout (amongmathematicians,ay)overthe

questionof whetherarulehas beenobeyedor not"(PI 40, myemphasis).

The "framework"r "scaffolding"hat makesthe activityof mathemat-

ics possibleis found not by conceptualanalysis,but by describing he

familiar ife-expressionsf mathematicians. his contextof familiarprac-

tices is referred o (perhapsmisleadingly) s "agreementn judgments":"If anguage s to bea meansof communicationheremust beagreement

not only in definitionsbutalso . . . in judgments"PI242). Theattune-

mentto regular,orderlypracticesmakesupthe "grammaticalmultiplic-

ity"of our language,butit cannotbe thoughtof asjustifyingor explain-

ing our language-games: I have not said why mathematicians o not

quarrel,butonly thattheydo not" (PIp. zz6). Nevertheless, urattune-

mentconstitutes heconceptswe have:"If herewerenotcompleteagree-ment [in the calculationsmadeby mathematicians],hen neitherwould

humanbeingsbe learning he techniquewhich we learn"(PI p. 226).

Ifthisway of readingWittgenstein's otion of "grammar"s right, hen

grammarmight be thoughtof as a web of practiceswhich,likea grid or

template,guidesourwaysof speakingandtakingthings n ordinaryan-

guage-games.Wittgenstein ompares his background f understanding

to a "world-picture"ra "mythology"hatmakesupthetacit,"inherited

background gainstwhichI distinguish rueand false"(OC94-95), andto "asystem,astructure" f taken-for-grantedonvictions OCIo2) that

makes dentifications nd discriminations ossible.But this background

of understandings not a "webof beliefs"(asthe term"judgments"ug-

gests); t is something hat is embodied nthose sharedpracticeswe come

to expressas we become nitiated nto theformsof life of our culture.For

thisreason,Wittgensteinaysthatgivinggroundsdoes not cometo an end

in aproposition hat one justseesas true:"itis nota kindof seeingon our

part; t is ouractingwhichlies at thegroundof thelanguage-game"OC

204). Thegroundof our beliefsandpractices"is not anungrounded re-

supposition:t is anungroundedway of acting"(OCzio; myemphasis).

ForWittgenstein,hen, languageembodiesa grammarwhichconsti-

tutesour senseof realityandgroundsour beliefsandwaysof doingthings.

But,as is trueof Heidegger'sbackground f intelligibility, rammar an-








not itselfbe groundedby appeal o any extra-linguisticacts.Accordingo

Wittgenstein'swell-known"autonomyof grammar" rgument,"I can-

not use language o get outsideof language" PRp. 54). That is, to put it

roughly, since every attemptto justify grammarby appeal to "facts"

about realityonly succeeds n makinguse of somedescriptionof realitywhich itselfpresupposeshe correctness f thegrammarn question,any

such attempted ustificationbegs the question.Insofaras our grammar

constituteswhatcancount asreality orus,there s noexit from anguage

to non-linguistic"facts" about ourselvesor our world which could

ground he grammarwe have.But neither s it correct o thinkwe create

our language-games r theirgrammar:"alanguage-game oes not have

its origin in consideration orreflection].Consideration or reflection] s

part of a language-game" Z 39i). Hence, though languagemay look"arbitrary"o the extent that "the use of language s in a certainsense

autonomous" Z 320), in anothersenseit is not somethingwe cook up

ourselves itis "notasifwechosethisgame" OC3 17]). Alanguage-game

"is not basedon grounds. t is not reasonableor unreasonable).tis there

like our life" (OC559).

In the picture of our situation that emerges from Wittgenstein's

reflections,we come to see ourselvesas participantsn public language-gameswhich are not groundedon anythingoutsideour lives, and yet,

insofaras they constituteour lives, theyarenot somethingwe createor

can fullymaster.The background f intelligibility pened by our gram-

mar is neithertrue nor false ("Ifthe true is what is grounded, hen the

ground s not true,noryet false"[OC 205]). Yet,as the "scaffolding f

our thoughts"(OC z ii), it is what makes t possibleto believeand say

thingsthat countaseither rueor false.Forlanguageas a whole, "we see

that the idea of 'agreementwithreality'does not haveanyclearapplica-tion" (OC 2I5). Thus, althoughWittgensteinwouldeschewHeidegger's

talk of "primordial ruth,"the view he presentsparallelsHeidegger's

notion of a linguistically onstituted"clearing" r "disclosedness" s the

backdropwhich makespossibleoureveryday ssertions nddenials, est-

ing and disconfirming, xplanationsand justifications.

4. The Legacyof Wittgensteinand HeideggerThe question posed at the outset was: What is the impactof Wittgen-

stein's andHeidegger's houghtfor traditionalphilosophy? n this con-

cludingsectionIwant to summarize he resultsof thecomparisons have

made,andsketchout someof the issues n the debatebetweenRortyand

Taylor.Wemightsumupthe outcomeof thethoughtof Wittgenstein nd

Heideggerby saying hat it is holistic,anti-dualist, ndnonfoundational-

ist. The holismappears n theirconvergentpicturesof our transactions

666 CHARLES GUIGNON







with theworld as constitutedby a background f understandingmbod-

iedin ourpractices ndshapedbyour language.ForHeidegger, ur deal-

ingswithequipmentmake t possible or theworldto showup forus asan

interrelated web of "significance" where what anything is is

"ontologicallydefined"by its relation to our goals and practices.Therelationsof "inorder o," "4for hich,"and "forthe sake of which"that

defineour life-worldare not properties ackedonto pre-existent bjects.

As "relationshipsnwhichconcernfulknow-howas suchalreadydwells"

(SZ p. 88), they definenot only the "worldhoodof the world"but our

own identityasagents ntheworldas well.Similarly,orWittgenstein,he

"essence" f anything whatmakes t theobject t is- is definedbythe

"grammaticalmultiplicity"of our language-games.What thingsare is

inseparablerom theirplacein the contextsof significance penedup by

the linguisticcustoms,conventions,andpracticesof our life-world.

One consequence f thisholism is thatunderstanding lwaysoperates

withinahermeneuticircle.Ourwaysof encounteringhings nthe world

are sketchedout in advanceby what Heideggercalls a "blueprint" r

"groundplan"'f preunderstanding,while that understandings con-

stantlyredefinedas a resultof ourongoingtransactionswith the world.

Thereis consequentlyno way to gain access to brute factsor raw dataindependentof some frameworkof understanding. n Wittgenstein's

example,a chemist's nvestigations remadepossibleby the fact thathe

"hasgot hold of a definiteworld-picture not of course one that he

invented:he learned t as a child."This world-picture"isthe matter-of-

coursefoundation or his researchand as such also goes unmentioned"

(OC i67). Yet, since a world-picture r mythology"maychangeback

into a stateof flux, theriver-bed f thoughtsmay shift" (OC97), there s

no unchanging oundation hat underwriteshe grammarwe have.

A second affinitybetweenWittgenstein ndHeideggers found in the

way theyundercut raditionaldualisms. t should be evident, irstof all,

thattheir hought ubvertsheCartesian ppositionsof subjectandobject

or mindandmatter.If our actions are understoodas expressions nter-

wovenintoa public"tapestry f life,"then thenotionsof mind and con-

sciousnesshaveno necessary oleto playin describing ndgraspingour

everydayness.One can "divide hrough"by the mental;"itcancelsout,whatever t is" (PI293). Yet, at the sametime,neitherWittgensteinnor

Heideggereels hatdisplacinghemental hereby ommitsus to physical-

ism or behaviorism. n theirpictureof our livesas boundup with a life-

worldwhere hingsshowupassignificantnrelation o ourpurposesand

needs, here snoplace nthedescription f everydaynessorthe notion of

brute,meaninglessphysicalobjectsor "mere"physicalmovement.In








fact, since both thinkerssuggestthat the naturalsciencesarederivative

from and parasiticon a "moreprimordial"way of understanding ur-

selvesand our worldas participantsn themeaningful ontextsof every-

daylife,there s no reason o assume hat theconceptionof realitywe get

from physics has any privilegedstatus in tellingus what the world is"really" ike.

Deflating he oppositionbetween ubjectandobjectshouldalso under-

mine the traditionaldistinctionbetween dealismand realism.This dis-

tinctionhasalwaysbeenparasitic or its sense on the representationalist

pictureof oursituation,according o whichreality s either "outthere,"

independent f us, or "inhere,"within the mind.Butif the representa-

tionalistmodel s discarded, o is the dilemma: itherrealismor idealism.

Thus, t seemsmisleadingo suggest hat,since "our anguage . . shows

us everything s it appears o-our nterests,ourconcerns,ouractivities,"

andsincetheseare"thingswhich areexpressions f mind," his"provides

grounds. . . for calling such a view a kind of idealism... ."'s For the

verynotion that ourinterests, oncernsandactivitiesare"expressions f

mind" s exactlywhatWittgenstein ndHeideggerhaveblocked.Wecan-

not explainouractivitiesby recourse o extra-linguisticacts,but neither

can we considerthe possibilitythat all thereis is languageor mind asopposedto gettingin touch with the facts. It also seemswrong to say,

"Horsesandgiraffes,colors andshapes the existenceof these is not [a

productof human inguisticpractice].. . . Butthe metaphysical ecessi-

tiesbelonging o the natureof suchthings theseseemto beregarded y

[Wittgenstein]as 'grammatical ules.""7For, on the one hand, since

what we meanwhenwe try to affirm he existenceof horsesandgiraffess

always constitutedby the linguisticarticulationsmadepossible by the

background f our "grammar,"here s no wayto getout of language n

orderto assert he existenceof thesetypesof thingsas theyarein them-

selvesindependentof any grammar.And, on the otherhand, since the

"metaphysical ecessities"of suchthingsareindistinguishableromthe

concreteways those thingsshow up for us in our languageandactions,

talkaboutmetaphysical ecessityseemsto be a wheelin a machine hat

turns when nothingelse is moving.

Finally,Wittgenstein's ndHeidegger's isionof oursituation s non-foundationalisto the extentthatit underminesheprospectsof findinga

finalexplanationor justification or our lives. ForHeidegger,our exis-

z6 BernardWilliams,"Wittgenstein ndIdealism,"n his MoralLuck(Cambridge: am-

bridgeUniversityPress, 98I), p. 153.

7 G. E. M. Anscombe,"TheQuestionof Linguisticdealism,"n her FromParmenides

to Wittgenstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I98I), p. I2z.

668 CHARLES GUIGNON







tence as a "happening," s a "thrownprojection," s finite,contingentandhistorical n the sense of beinganongoingdialoguewith thepast forthepurposesof the future.As the sourceof all intelligibility,heclearingthat we are is itselfsuspended ver "theabyssof meaninglessness"SZp.

152z). AndWittgenstein onstantlyremindsus of "thegroundlessness four believing" (OC i66), the transience of even our most central

"mythology" OC 96-99), and the seemingly"arbitrary" atureof our

core beliefs.

But forboththinkers hisgroundlessness oesnot leadto skeptical es-ignation or perpetualuncertainty.As Wittgenstein ays, "Thedifficult

thing here is not to dig down to the ground;no, it is to recognize heground hat liesbeforeus as theground" RFMp. 33 3). Recognizing he

rootednessof ourbeliefsandactivities n our shared ormsof life and inthe "commonbehaviorof mankind" PIzo6) canthrow us backonto the

groundswe do have- our patternsof upbringing,natural"primitive"

responses,capacitiesfor pickingup skills, and so on - with a deeperrespectfor theirdependability nd bindingness.To acknowledge,with

Seabright,hatmeaningsnsarenot inthe headbutintheworld"'8wouldbeto see ourpracticesasguidedbythesteadyandregular"expressions f

life" of ourculturalworld, and to realize hat,since ourshared ormsoflife constituteour identity,there is no way to regard hem as arbitraryimpositionsoras mereexcessbaggagewith no realconnection o who wereallyare. Ina relatedway, Heidegger hinksthat facing up to ourown

finitudecanthrow us backonto our livesin a fullerway. Inhis view, toclear-sightedlycknowledge hatwe arecaught nthe hermeneutic ircleis also to realize hatthis circularity s an enablingconditionwhichfirstgives us access o ourlives,with theresult hat our aimshouldbe "not to

getout of the circlebut to comeinto it in therightway" (SZp. 153). Andhis discussionof "authentichistoricity" SZsecs. 74-77) proposesthatonce we fullyrecognize he finitudeandtemporality f ourpossibilities f

self-interpretation, e will take over the "happening" f our communi-

ty's historywith deepercommitmentandrespect,appropriatinghepastas a "heritage" ndorientingourgoals forthe futureas partof a shared

"destiny."What this nonfoundationalism oes implyis that there is nofinalexplanation or our formsof life that wouldput an end to inquiry,andconsequently hat attempts o understandourselvesand our worldare an open-ended,ongoingproject.

8 Paul Seabright, "Explaining Cultural Divergence: A Wittgensteinian Paradox," Journal

of Philosophy84 (I987): 11-27, p. 22.








The divergent eadingsof the significance f the writingsof Wittgen-

stein andHeidegger ound nRortyandTaylormightbe seen asresulting

fromemphasizing ifferent trandsof thesethinkers'work. Rorty ocuses

on the anti-foundationalism nd contextualismof their writings and

draws he conclusion hattheyhaveputanend to traditional pistemolo-gy-centeredphilosophyas a searchfor finaltruths about ourselvesand

ourworld.OnRorty'sreading, hewritingsof Wittgenstein reprimarily

therapeutic ndnegative, learingawaythepresuppositionsf traditional

philosophyand offeringnothingnewin theirplace: "WhenWittgenstein

is at his best, he resolutelyavoids . . constructive riticismandsticks o

pure satire.He just shows, by examples,how hopelessthe traditional

problemsare; . . he justmakes unof the whole ideathat there s some-

thinghereto beexplained."'9Andthelegacyof the laterHeidegger who

threwoff thevestigesof "fundamentalntology"still foundin his early

work) is not a new pictureof humans,but "theendless,repetitive, iter-

ary-historicaldeconstruction' f the Westernmetaphysics f presence"

(CP p. xxii).

The outcome of Wittgensteinand Heidegger,according o Rorty, is

"epistemological ehaviorism,"he pragmatistattitude that is content

withexplaining ationality ndepistemicauthority"byreference o whatsocietylets us say""0ather hanby privileged epresentationsr by cri-

teriadictatedby purereason. And "behaviorismwhich dispenseswith

foundations s in a fairway towardsdispensingwith philosophy.""To

see a humanbeingas a self-interpretingnimal s to see "manas a self-

changing being, capable of remaking himself by remaking his

speech.""The lesson to be drawnfromthe insight nto "theubiquityof

language" s that "one cannot see language-as-a-wholen relation to

somethingelse to which it applies,or forwhichit is a meansto an end"

(CPp. xix). Wittgenstein ndHeidegger, hen,are"making nlynegative

points"thatthere s nothingbehind anguagewhich couldground t (CP

p. xx). Graspinghe outcomeof the development f thought nthe twenti-

eth century hould lead us to a new attitudeof ironyandplayfulness:o

"abjure he notion of 'the trulyhuman"'and to "become ncreasingly

9 Consequencesf PragmatismMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I982), p.

34 (henceforth "CP").

10 Philosophyand theMirror f Nature(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.

'74.

"Epistemological Behaviorism and the De-transcendentalization of Analytic Philoso-

phy," in R. Hollinger, ed., Hermeneutics and Practice (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Uni-

versityPress, 985), p. ioz.

m Ibid., p. 104.

670 CHARLES GUIGNON







ironic,playful,free,and inventive n ourchoice of self-descriptions." A

certain"ethnocentrism," hichacknowledgeswe cannever"stepoutside

our skins" or escape from "the 'merelyconventional'and contingent

aspectsof one's life" (CPp. xix), iscombinedwith the ability o "seeevery

human ife as a poem"b4 createdby individuals hrough maginative elf-descriptions.

Taylor,in contrast,emphasizes heway in which the phenomenology

of everydaynessprovidesus with an alternativeway of understanding

who we are. For Taylor,the fact that we are self-interpretingnimals

insures hat we havewhat he calls"agent'sknowledge" OEp. 475), that

is, insight nto whatwe aredoing nsofaras our own self-descriptionson-

stituteour movementsas actions.Althougha person'sown self-under-

standingmaybe shot throughwith self-deception,t provides he expla-

nandum romwhich any accountof the agentmustbegin,andit therefore

has a privileged tatus n graspinghis orher action. Taylor'shope is that

our agent's knowledgewill also providea basis for uncoveringdeeper

insights nto theunderlyingtructures f agency ngeneral.Rorty, ncon-

trast,thinks this beliefin something"deep"or "moreauthentic"about

ourselves sjusta remnant f the"cravingormetaphysicalomfort" hat

Wittgensteinand Heideggerhave undermined.The faith that we have"privileged ccess" o ourselves that we can "readour own program"

(CP p. i65) - presupposesa now untenableessentialism.

Thoughit is impossible o adjudicatehisdisputehere,I want to sug-

gestthatTaylor'sreadingof the"legitimate eir"of philosophy smore n

line with the overalldirectionof Wittgenstein's nd Heidegger's hought.

Taylor correctly criticizes Rorty's view that all language-gamesare

optionalandupforgrabs.BothWittgenstein ndHeideggerhave shown

usthat, althoughourself-descriptionsreungrounded,heyareneverthe-lessconstitutiveof who we are,and so cannotbe takenup or abandoned

at will. As Taylor says, Rorty's pictureof all vocabulariesas optional

makes sense only if we can think of ourselves as "in fact at home

nowhere,"and this assumption eemsto relyon a "notionof thesubject

as disengaged"which is itself "generatedby the epistemological radi-

tion" Rortyseeks to overcome.15If we recognize hat,as agents,we are

alwaysenmeshedn aconcrete ultural ontext,we will see thatthere snovantagepointfor the stanceof global ronyandplayfulnessRortyrecom-

mends.

13 "Freudand Moral Reflection," n J. H. Smith and W. Kerrigan, ds., Pragmatism's

Freud:The MoralDispositionof PsychoanalysisBaltimore: ohnsHopkins,I986), p.

I2.

24 "The Contingency f Selfhood,"London Reviewof Books, May 8, I986, p. 14.

25 "Philosophy nd Its History," n Rorty,Schneewind, nd Skinner, ds., Philosophy n

History:Essayson the Historiography f Philosophy Cambridge: ambridgeUniver-sity Press,I984), p. 30.








Withinour own background f understanding,hen, we cantry to for-

mulate he typesof "transcendentaleneralization"bout the conditions

for agencyHeidegger ought such pervasive eaturesas situatedness,

futuredirectedness,nvolvementnsignificant ituations,andlinguistical-

ity - while holdingonto Wittgenstein'sdistrustof totalizationandhisinsistence on detailed, case-by-casedescription.The results of such a

quasi-transcendentalnquirywill be defeasiblegivenour embeddedness

in an ongoinghistoricalculture,and they can be defendedonly by local

skirmisheswith specificobjections ather hanbyknock-downarguments

starting rom ndubitable remises.But,to the extentthatthis search or a

deeperself-understandinghroughthe critique of representationalism

points to a transformedoutlook on pressingpuzzlesabout our human

situation, t reveals he potentialof a post-Wittgensteinian/Heideggerianphilosophy.Z6

26 Researchor thispaperwassupported ya UniversityResearchGrant rom he Univer-

sityof Vermont nd anNEHSummer eminar rant.Iamgratefulo KathleenEmmett,

MarkBickhard, ndLynnRudderBaker orcomments n an earlierdraftof thisessay.

672 CHARLES GUIGNON