World Bank Document · 2017. 11. 7. · Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No....

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Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1 531 Project Performance Audit Report BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (Credit 147-BU) March 21, 1977 OnAratinna Vvaliutt-4nn -nav- thirof d ies. I contents maynotothr be dosed wBrecipients a t In io their o0ffi_cialduties. itscontentsm;ay_not; oth;erwise -be -dsclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Transcript of World Bank Document · 2017. 11. 7. · Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No....

Page 1: World Bank Document · 2017. 11. 7. · Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1 531 Project Performance Audit Report BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Document of

The World bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 1 531

Project Performance Audit Report

BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

(Credit 147-BU)

March 21, 1977

OnAratinna Vvaliutt-4nn -nav-

thirof d ies. I contents maynotothr be dosed wBrecipients a t In iotheir o0ffi_cialduties. itscontentsm;ay_not; oth;erwise -be -dsclosed without World Bank authorization.

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Currency: Franc Burundi

Exchange Rate:

until December 1972 : US$1 = FBu 87.50Ta..... 1070- U a 1 18074 *T -Tc1 =D.. 70 Iq

.jLAL L Lt rJ LA A IUv * - 1- I

May 1, 1976 - present : US$1 = FBu 90.00

(NB: The exchange rate US$1 = FBu 78.35 has been used in this report).

ABDREVIAIUD

.01nDU Iustitut nes Scieuce agLULUUm1qUCb UU DULUILUL

(Agricultural Research Institute)

OCIBU = Office des Cultures Industrielles du Burundi

(Agency for industrial Crops).

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PrefaceBasic Data SheetHighlights

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. Summary of the Project Completion Report iTT. ORD Commentn

General iv7hp Prniet'A Ficnerimental value v

Socio-Economic Environment viiEffort4vanpsnof tha Vwtanainn Qprv4ra 74 4 4

Importance of Price Policies ixAn nVArall FAVOrshla Tmpr-asion

The Income Issue

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Table of ContentsI. Background 1

II. Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 1TTT Tma n4,n A

IV. Organizational Aspects 22Ill D.--4,4 ojt Jt I pctjL .-

VI. Government and Bank Performance 28113"r1r. Change sLn the .. Secon inV L.e HO L 1 L%C OCUUa U rLVUJ=L ;LAnnexes 1-3m.1- 1 /.

Chart

Maps

innumunwmnanar=nncwuounnouuonanomymsedenyrecipantsoxyinthepetneneof their official duties. Its contents may not otherw be disclosed without WorMd Bank authoriastion.

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Project Performance Audit Report

BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

(Credit 147-BU)

PREFACE

Credit 147-BU for US$1.8 million was signed in April 1969 insupport of the Government's coffee improvement program, and closed, fullydisbursed, in June 1976. It was followed by a pAcon e gmgy MemepL ojec t- pr'iv 17 a-(e-dCF ,~L~p.I$ by QI ion, signed inDecembR T . e audit report deals with the first project, thoughsome comments are offered on the role of the second.

The bulk of the report is composed of the Project CompletionReport, issued by the Eastern Africa Regional Office in September 1976.The PCR's description of the project, and analysis of effects at thelevels of the farm and washing stations, is outstanding. The summaryprepared for the PCR appears first in the covering memorandum, and isfollowed by an OED discussion of some interesting and important issuesthat are illuminated by the PCR.

This OED short audit was based on a review of the two appraisalreports and twelve supervision reports, in addition to the PCR. Judgingby that limited material, OED finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate.

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ARABICA COFFEE TMPROVPNT PRTvT fw CnTrT 1A7.nmr

A. Amounts (in US$ million)Outtunulg

Original Disbursed (as of 6/30/76)

Credit 147-BU 1,800 1,800 1,900 -Foreign Exchange Adjustment 100 )

B. Project Data

Original Plan Actual

First Mention in Bank Files 1966Government's Application 1966Board Approval 0W/08/69Credit Agreement U4/11/69Credit Effectiveness 07/15/69Last Disbursement 03/18/76Credit Closing 12/31/73 06/30/76Total Costs (US$ million) 2.1 2.5

Cj coffee growing: 15%

coffee processing; less than 10%C. Mission Data

OriginMi -in M-+n+h/Ye. No n P.-n- No. f Weeks Man Weeks Date of Report

Preparation FAO/IBRD July 1967 3 3 9Appraisal HQ March 1968 4 3 12 10/22/68Technical Assistance HQ March 1969 1 1 1 04/01/69

Total 3-5

Supervision 1 HQ July 1969 2 1 2 10/22/69Supervision 2 -Q jun 197 2 8/87Supervision 3 HQ Feb. 1971 1 2 2 03/11/71Supervision 4 KQ Dec. 1971 2 1 2 01/18/72Supervision 5 HQ April 1972 2 1 2 06/02/72Supervision 6 RMEA Sept. 1972 1 1 1 09/22/72Super- s-; 7 MMtA V-~ Inl7O 0 1.- -0

Supervision 8 RMEA Aug. 1973 la/ 1 1 08/22/73Supervision 9 RMEA Feb. 1974 lb/ 2 2 03/12/74Supervision 10 RMEA Aug. 1974-eI 1 1 1 09/27/74Supervision 11d/ HQ May 1975 1 2 2 07/01/75Supervision 12 RMEA Dec. 1075 1 1 1 12/2hi/7

Total 22

Completion HQ April 1976 1 1 1

D. Follow-up Pro.iect

Credit 593-BU of US$5.2 million, signed December 5, 1975 for Second Coffee Improvement Project.

a/ Accompanied by another RMEA staff member to assist Government with the preparation of the Phase II Project.b/ Together with one RMEA staff member and one consultant to give further assistance for Phase II preparation work.c/ The second project was appraised in October 1974 by a four-man mission which staved about three vppk. in Rn-Id/ Combined with further discussions on the second project.

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nTTnTKMT ADAtTrA rOVWT TMPZUITMNT PROlTF.rT

tr,.Af 1A7_-RTT)

HIGHLIGHTS

n- e.A audi reviews. progresso uinder t-he A-.1-4c o ffee improvenment

ILL~ UU.L 9L I. _ - _ V k'~j..'J~. '~f'4. S.*

Project, which is Government's main vehicle to increase coffee productivity.±IL prisio o.VL UlL L1e-n-dLca.L Lerlies as well~J as imrvmn ofJ ote culti

vation Practices,, were the main elements of the project; the improvement of

cuLLee quality through Lue wet pruebing uLeLtLU W LLIC ULLM1 LinJU1 pLlJuJo.Lcomponent.

The agricultural part of the project was implemented almost asplanned; the washing stations component, which had been added at appraisal,was implemented slowly. Lack of reliable data makes it impossible to assess

the project's impact on the volume of coffee production, but it is unlikely

that more than one-third of the appraisal's overly optimistic target was

achieved. Improvement of coffee husbandry practices should be regarded as

a profitable undertaking, but serious doubts remain with regard to theprofitability of the washing stations.

An effective coffee extension organization was eventually estaD-

lished and, under the second, follow-on project, has been integrated with

the general extension service.

The following points may be of special interest (single and doubledigit numbers refer to paragraphs in the Memorandum; triple-digit decimalnumbers refer to paragraphs in the PCR):

- the Bank support to exploratory projects (paras. 7 and 8)

- the project's experimental value; role of the Government

and role of the Bank (paras. 9-11)

- socio-economic factors ignored by the Bank (paras. 12-14)

- advantages and drawbacks of project organization; effective-ness of the extension service (paras. 15-18, and 4.01-4.04)

- importance of price policies (para. 19)

- incentive value of the low incremental incomes provided toparticipating farmers (paras. 21-24, and 5.09)

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-- Uank 4nvolvment in ~rMjeCt prpaato (annr"0 9 l -9 R

rolean ,n@.. of4epatr 4te inprojae mfanhaement (pmaras. 3 .23.5)

- factors affetin the efcientu and profiblyof

the washing stations (paras. 3.32-3.39)

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Pvn4ert Ppvfnympnc Audi-t ---- A

'RTTO~TTK1TT APAR~TrA rnrrvV TVfPnl7rVMT P'PnTT?rT

RUNDI 1-0-0 CO M E I- R M N - 0-E M

I. SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

'T , A,-aI64C. r,-f-F-p T-rvmn Project - ,.,.,,4. .. foermn

in 1964 or 1965, identified by an FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program mission inApri1966C, prpae by another 1 ~- - - Prga sin -------- I-In July_ _ 1f-C and_.appraised in the field by a Bank mission in March 1968. The project under-went substanotl changes at all stages between conception and appraisal.Government at first was thinking in terms of securing financing for the pur-chase of 10,000 ton fertilizeL aHnually for a country-wide coffee fertiliza-tion program. The final project, as it emerged after the appraisal, wasrestricted to th e better half of ---- I± rroinc copisn abou --scotsUu &_ LuLI uLe HLl L Oi6uinl Province comprlsing aDOUL 44,UUUsmallholder coffee growers with about seven million trees, or about onesixh ofC Burund 's total area under coffee. The provision of chemicalfertilizers was still an important element of the project but improvemento vtner cultivation practices, such as pruning..mulching and insect con-trol, were other features. The improvement of coffee quality through thewet DrocessInz method was included in the project as another major componentby the appraisal-team. An IDA credit (147-BU) of US$1.8 million was approvedin April 1969 and became effective in July. The project started on schedulein mid-1969 but was completed two years behind schedule in late 1975, andthis despite the substantial reduction in the project's size during prepara-tion and appraisal. It appears that the late start of the processing compo-nent, consisting of the construction of four coffee washing stations. was amajor reason for the delayed completion of the project. The civil distur-bances of 1972, changes in project leadership and continuous transportproblems between Burundi and the Indian Ocean ports slowed progress as well.

2. The agricultural part of the project, in effect the improvementof coffee husbandry practices, was implemented along the lines indicatedin the appraisal report. In particular, mulching and pruning of the coffee,trees has much improved and should.heregardedas thp main accomDlishmentof the project. The application of chemical fertilizers in coffee was alsoimplemented in accordance with the original plan, but because of the lackof a reliable data basis the effect of fertilizer applications on coffeeproduction can still not be satisfactorily quantified. Common sense,based on experience elsewhere, and the results of trials conducted in the1960s, suggest that nitrogen must have a positive effect on Burundi'scoffee yields. But it is important that the use of fertilizers be com-bined with high standards of coffee husbandry. The profitabilitv of fertizlizer depends very much on the prices of both coffee and fertilizer- Bothprices were subject to large tiuctuations in the last few years and under

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present conditions (normal fertilizer prices and extremely high coffee prices)there should be little doubt that the application of fertilizer in coffee isjustified. The application of insecticides on coffee somewhat improved underthe project but serious questions have been raised (and are not yet answered)with regard to the types of insecticides to be used.

3. The coffee processing component has been the subject of very inten-sive discussions between the Government and the Bank. The Government attachesgreat importance to the construction of coffee washing stations, but the Bankwas not convinced that the undertaking is a profitable one. Firstly, theconstruction of the stations turned out to be four times more expensivg thananticipated during the appraisal. Secondly, the stations were operated farbelow their designed capacity during the initifyeas; in 7,'and, par-ticularly in 1976, the performance has improved markedly, however, andthroughput no longer is a major concern. Thirdly, and most serious of all,the fully washed coffee has so far failed to command a price premium suffi-ciently large enough to justify its production. The possibility of realizinghigher premiums in the future, when Burundi would produce larger volumes offully washed coffee and when the presently distorted world coffee marketwould return to more normal conditions, should not be ruled out, but theexperience of the last three years does not hold out much hope. The BurundiGovernment has repeatedly pointed out that the impact of the coffee washing

sttion pogrm is greater than can be measured in strict economic r finan-cial terms. The stations can serve as focal pMWfff! I'-e RuerErural development activities, for example demonstration of better growingpractices for both coffee and food crops and sales of farm inputs and con-sumer goods.

4. Lack of reliable data makes it impossible to assess with a reason-able degree of accuracy the project's impact on the volume of coffee produc-1ion, but is cerain that araisal estimgates gte too optimistic. It isunlikely that more than one third of the appraisal target was achieved.Export Rrices for coffee always exceeded the appraisal estimates, at Presenta tleast b afcoof three. In contrast with the wet processing componentof the project, which seems a marginal economic proposition, improvement ofcoffee husbandry practices should be regarded as a profitable undertaking.Average farmers' incomes are estimated to have increased by a modest UT.lper household only, but the number of beneficiaries is very large.

5. Despite serious uderstaf fin of the project with expatriate per-sonnel during part of the project period. and the adverse effPcfR nf the1972 civil disturbances, the project has in the course of its final yearssucceeded in establishing an effective coffee extpnAion nannisn4nnGovernment has consistently displayed a keen interest and staffed theproiect with Personnel in a manner whirb chuni1d hi ronrandf no ataking the severe limitations of the country's human resources into account.Since the Droject was nnnePrned with coffee vmen only the Mi y oAgriculture's general extension service remained in poor shape, because of

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lack of resources and proper guidance, and could accomplish little. Under

of Ngozi, both extension services have been integrated. The second project,S07=-w-hich. an TTNA CreAl /CO I_DTT1 4 TTroQC . I 1J a 1s 1 - 1- Y L &Us .n--& wan .Ur % .JJ"DU} V.L UayJ.f million was apprUVeCU u LLe DULu

in November 1975, aims at a more balanced development of coffee and otheragL ililtua.L M-C-161Vi.-L-Ces LLALIUU6LL Ole incLLlusion oL a .LUUU ULUP ULU1PULLCLLL anIU

experiments with other rural development activit iimprove-ment of avyZe rouL.Un. A larger provision ror corree researcnparticularly in the field of insect control, has also been madeA wile asmall team of internationally recruited advisers would visit Burundi atregular intervals to assist in formulating work programs and advise onspecific project problems.

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II. OED COMMENTS

6. The audit finds the PCR to be a balanced description of theproiect. The analysis of the attributable economic effects at the farmlevel, an analysis carried out with little field information, is outstanding.These comments focus on some issues, explicit or implicit in the PCR, towhich OED wants to attract special attention.

General

7, The smallholder project was presented in 1969 as a profitablernffpp imnroverent- program, bAsed p-rimarily on nit-rogen feriliza_tion,with an economic rate of return forecast at 32%. The PCR now forecaststhe ratp of rpfivirn to t-hp fiPlr pnTnr%nnunt, of the ojc atrO5, nd, tothe factory component 9%. The PCR's calculations are based on conserva-

may have been offset in part by an assumption about annual benefits continu-C,~m-nIh -_i,v. a -_-,wi Cot O -LJ"' believes t- bebt uVSS t an

overall project rate of return should be about 10-13%. That is not an unim-pressive range for a qmallhol1er nrnipnt hiEV 4t h4Aa aho t sfne- *h-4n 4m--

fect farm data presently available suggests that the coffee yields andincre-me-ntal prneiit-t-cinn Tnny 'haie reached only one-third their appraisalestimates, now thought to have been too optimistic. Whatever semblance

of in_-___a roftblt that-- accue to the project would be due thento an unexpected increase in export prices. In short, the PCR is notdsrbn a peroven, profitable coffee -- p-m a

L LLHPLUVf=L11U1AL JJEOgLalllIUatUall, anamakes no such claim.

8. What is described is a modest, though essential set of activities -some tt, sme new!:- focud un deveLoping cost-effective methods formodernizing Burundi's premier cash crop (80% of exports). Given the Burundi

omanuler a traditonally low yields (one-third those on some of the fewlarge coffee estates in the country), and the poor competitive value of hisparhmMelt,.t, quality improvement of the cottee crop was and should have been

1/ Similar combinations of such treatments had been tried and proven underS ular ecological conditions elsewhere in Atrica, in Kenya for example.

ti ine rollowing terminology is used in this report: Cherry, the completefruit of the coffee tree, should be picked when it turns red, and nor-mally contains two beans. These beans are individually covered by mem-branes, the silver-skins, and parchment-like shells, all covered by amucilaginous substance. Immediately surrounding this is the skin of thecherry. Skin is removed in the pulping process, and mucilage duringwashing and fermentation. Pulped coffee, when dried, is called parch-ment coffee. The parchment and silver-skins are removed in hullingfactories, which produce clean or green coffee. All coffee trading isin green coffee, which is eventually roasted before consumption."Source: Appraisal Report for the Second Coffee Improvement Project,October 30, 1975, p. 4.

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an objective of highest priority for the Government. An exploratorynro4A^11- elf f-14. -4 --- A-A U.,,14- -I .n-- -4: return., forec.ast to be 4-ti

fied. The Bank has to learn how to be comfortable with giving moreweigl t, to t*, e l-kar "ng.l -'ue of. th-1, 4ro et and- less 1 o t-he economic

.orecasts, and to help design and supervise the projects with thosesyiTnh en -4nA

experience. In important respects its experimental nature was not reflected4" U. . -tuA - e vis o a.nA .LtJZ- Aate -- reacC Uit eAL AO w, 4-t.UcS -L +-L

knowing which components of the original package worked and which did notandA wh.is T- particu.lar theret s no convinc--- that -- 4- ---

J~AA -. ~L 1- -AL -LL inUg LUL L I t.ir respLose

to nitrogen boosters, given the kind of prices Burundi expects to pay andWULLL & LL LC 1HU.LV UAL uIs llhoULde or to tUe economry.

Whatever rise in average yields was reported in the project area, and thereis evidence that yields auvanceU relative to otner corree regions, is dueto some mixture of improved husbandry practices - including fertilization,punng, muluhig, anU insecticUes - whic cannoT De separately evaluatedfrom available evidence. Moreover, as shown in the appraisal report of thesecunu project, whatever has been earned by those farmers of the first proj-ect who continue the new practices is the sum of the effects of increasedcherry qualities and yields. The quality improvement affects incomes onlywhen the cherries are sold to the stations; it is worth nothing when thecoffee is sold, as most of it is, withintraditional marketing arrangements.If the yield estimates presented in the PCR are reasonably accurate (somecomaentators feel the estimates both of present yield increases and offuture levels are too pessimistic) then the yield improvement is smallenough in aDSOlute value to be almost matched byan alternative strategyof expanding h small plantation onto marginal land (for farmers with achoice). Even if the yield improvement is somewhat better than the existingdata indicates, it is difficult to see how the project extension officercan convince the participating farmer that he ought to persevere. Thepresent situation makes one wonder whether the PCR does not demonstrate thatthe smart farmer has been the one who planted additional accessible acreageto coffee, once the new supplies of free seedlings became available in 1974,,but otherwise did nothing new during the project period unless it was free,except perhaps to continue the pruning practices he had learned under asmaller, predecessor project in 1967-69. He did not pay for fertilizer,did not use more pesticide, and did not sell to the washing stationsunless forced by Government to do so. And he does not now intend to startdoing these things, even when he runs out of marginal land. That model isnot an encouraging one for the future, and we do not pretend that it iscorrect. But the Bank cannot show the model is not correct. If theresearch components of the project as appraised had been pressed vigorously,

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and if the warning of the second supervision mission (June 1970) about the4prance of corecing th rel Aar.-n a of -1a.- 4 14 --F

4nl. I-Iian .naros

had been followed up in subsequent supervision, some of the researchablequestions raisedA by appraisal may by now ha-"-V- U-- -- A 1/ T-+-4aA

they are to be investigated in the second project./

10. This comment on the low experimental value of the first projectdosnot apply to all ilts aspects. r_TIA th rspect to tI1e techLILUU 3

economics of the four coffee washing stations established by the projectunit an enormous amount us iterest and useful analysis nas veen gener-

ated, as discussed in the PCR. Also, some of the technical issues oftue farm improvement program - ror example tne errects ana siae errectsof chemical pesticides - have been investigated to the extent projectfinance and complementary Government services permitted. Much more workof this sort could have been financed (the Government's agriculturalresearch agency, iSABU, had only one plant pathologist to serve the countryand all its crops), but the issues were not neglected. What seems to haveDeen neglected in particular was the economics or the farm package,,anathe other influences bearing upon the smallholder's decision to adopt.

11. The previous paragraphs carry an implicit criticism of projectsupervision. In fairness to the supervisory staff itself three qualifyingcomments are in order. First, staff constraints at the Bank's regionalmission in Nairobi did not permit exhaustive field3 nalysis. Second, theproject financed research equipment and materials,- but not research

1/ This is not to belittle the difficulty of coffee research, given the longgestation period and problems of enforcing farmer trials throughout theperiod.

2/ The Bank can be credited with having greatly reduced the fertilizer com-ponent at appraisal of the first project. The original proposal calledfor 10,000 tons distributed per year, or 67 kg each for 150,000 farmers.The appraised project called for 500 tons, or 11 kg each for 44,000farmers. It is not known whether this reflected doubts in the Bankabout the economics of fertilization. The PCR suggests it was donepartly to make the project more manageable (paragraph 2.07). In anycase the Government always referred to the proposal as a fertilizercampaign (project d'application d'engrais).

31 In fact, the project did not even finance research equipment and materials(although envisaged) since Government was not aware that provision forthis had been made in the Credit Agreement (see 3.42 of PCR).

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staff. At the same time, ISABU's limited budget and staffing were notcommensurate with the needs of either this proiect or the country as awhole (which points to a possible flaw in the project design). Third,supervision must respect the appropriate balance between technical assis-tance and direct involvement in project management: it would have beeninappropriate to intrude far into the latter area.

Socio-Economic Environment

12. Within the socio-economic enuironment tht AhnnApm the nntPvn nfthe farmer's response, a number of factors that are absolutely essentialto understanding him hAhauinr wmild annnr tn han been 4gnovaA by annpr-vision and other commentators on project developments, at least as recordedbI the -oi n1~ parntpiular th connection between. the farmers andthe traders, including the roles of the extension officers in the delivery

of~~~ esicde a1zp ndr t~ he saeo ofe snowhere wellexplained. The only significant reference to the give and take at this"int-Prfnt-P1 is In the i&i+ 1Q7/iIo pr. M- .- ~"- ismade to expain why the farmers were not bringing the cherries-to-thenew,

_.Q_a____42_t*_A__4_e%_n_ rioi,.'= -+16 L - L ..J Em D ... L CL.LLLUt_LLL p 9U£J-

By hand on the farms or at the small, communal and pulping stations as wastf 4 1- 0 - 1 _^~ 1i 4-A,.., ff~ *~L L L~~ L 5C i

lpoQnts on designated Coffee-tr-ading days. The report said that the.tralders,r;:77:6 nmW sor -- -o. ote offeredU -UVM-nC=-S tO LLLC 'LULIUt-L: S ssouUI"4

Bank staff feel'this description may have been incorrect) and had shared5m L ILeMUu witu respct to picLig L[e crop. iL aiso-mentions

that the extension ge__t themselves were involved-in the trade - "oneincentive of an wouhewise puutty PAtu 0I U Heweb of traditionLrela-EtRps In E =T6cTf 'economy Tn be expected to r tnew patterns of

-r-0r--- Iusuues eatend from the towns too. Several supervisionY siake brief mention of the political power of the traders' organi-vA., tLlu =mumaLun ue Commercanrs Barunaais, set up after independence

to promote Burundians vis-a-vis non-indigenous traders. However, what theupJ.JaLLULLun LLoJ5 power nave Deen for project success has also never

been carefully examined, as far as OED can tell. (The Association itselfan ionerex4 a4±Cs .

.the problem is not just that the traders can fight the washingstations. The problem is also that the financial incentives one would11wI pLov±ueU for quality improvements in coffee husbandry are notpeen n price paid for parchment by traders. Government sets thelocal marKeL price ior traders.tUDscounts in the tield reflect onlygrees faults such as excessive stone or water. Cheating is reported tobe common.

14. How the increased wealth flowing into the project area of Ngoziprovince, wealth attributable to improvements in quality and quantity of

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coffee deliveries, is shared among the farmers, the traders, and the exten-sion agents isalso no exnrn1enA ThORA rosanrrhal mnatters that

should be included in the project definition. They are not mentioned int-he first4 apris4al repr, so~ supevision in, a sensea did not fail to

follow through. But another function at the "interface", the fertilizer

of a fertilizer sales program") and there has been no progress to date bythe project unit t1oward creating a- self-sustaining "ivte griultra

supplies system and no comment on that fact by supervision, even though

ment. It would be interesting to know for example whether the traders or

indeed have basis to hope to harness them as salesmen. To date OCIBU hasruAnte Suppflies.L~ syCsem, g.L 4LL L*Le fertlize fo free. LthroughNJS

5L 1 an,..

charging subsidized prices thereafter. The project cries out for carefulsocLLU.iLcaIlwe aD wel1. as ConUomi-L.. LIHVCbLgLakLLUL-- U. LLLC ULLLLLU LoL.LUeImaL UL CHcoffee economy: investigations of all factors that seem to influence small7LueUe CLV.LUL igirL.Li.LnLLLLy, .LfuctuULig, iL LL LN LIm1pUrLeLIL, LLIC LrLVUILquestion.

Effectiveness of the Extension Service

15. Another part of the micro climate that is not well enoughIreatedLI supervi5ion reports is the efficiency of the extension service. The factthat the position of Training Officer was not refilled either by anotherexpatriate or by a Burundian, arter the first expatriate incumbent waspromoted to Project Manager in early 1971 has drawn the criticism (apparentlywithout effect) of several supervision missions (and the POR: see paragrap!3.03). They did not accept the Government argument that the ExtensionOfficer, a position filled Dy a Burundian after mid-1972, could handle Dothof these appraisal assient. Supervision reports make occasional commentthat suggests the quantity and quality of the extension work at the farmerlevel was not up to appraisal standards. But there is practically noexplanation or the training program given to this staff or of its qualifi-cations to discuss with f armers theproject practices and answer difficultfarmer questions. OED is left with no sense as to whether the shortfallsin farmer performance - in his average yield, in the extreme variability ofperformance among farmers, and in the high rate (50%) at which the firstproject farmers are thought to be abandoning the fertilizer component ofthe husbandry package, once a price was charged for fertilizer- are attribu-table mostly to weakness in extension or in the technical package the staff!has to extend. Comparable problems with extension components have emergedin other smallholder projects in Eastern Africa, and the Bank is aware thatthe development of an effective extension service is a long, dispiritingprocess that invariably exceeds in time the years allowed by appraisal.Performance in this project may be relatively good, but the documentationis not enlightening.

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16. What is of most concern about extension, however, is that the

second nrdiet intends to expand the assignment of the project extension

service to cover other crops and livestock: to absorb, in effect, the para-111 work of the reIgular ertnsion servie of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Experience in other parts of the world shows that the development of an

efectiveanrnan4n .mITe nftAn etArts with single cron campaigns. whichallow the fledgling and under-tralF YIer3T- E-f-Te "tsusiness'. Singlecrop evens.li .arw4ca ne usally more effective than multi-ourDOse exten-

sion services, though of course a developing country cannot afford a prolif-

eration of single crop sev4ces Ther e are A few instanePA where a single

crop service, once proficient in the art of extension, has expanded success-

.AJ.U Iy o cver othe crops. Some pesn identif th4-- -- ------------ Rratpv

for building a multi-purpose extension system. What must be avoided is

expaing.IL before LLe prjectJ extenion servic is red to. fv f-IkA

Premature expansion would exhaust the capacity of the existing service,even bef.ore .Jt La learne -toLLV had le~± LLe cofee ssinmet wll

fI. WhLthe tHE pjLUJcvL s raLVC Yr 4O . D's e Wos t c asr

in the files - and the absence of material - is not encouraging, notwith-

staUG1Hg Ze 1Upre81VC appeUZCLU UL LLH: LLLLL jJLuje a CcuoL v

in the field. That appearance can be traced partly to new buildings andvehicles, an esprit-de-corps that rates wel 1 cumpared to regular Ministrystaff (to some extent explained by better emoluments), and the busy-ness ofUelivering free fertiizers Unu uter supplies. It s nueacesarily ind

ative of the underlying technical quality of the extension contact with the

farmer or of the respect and demand that that contact engenders. Le secondappraisal report does not forecast any rapid expansion of the extension

assignment, in fact only 6,UU of 110,UU target coffee farmers will be

advised about food crop improvements as well. T ex2ansion asarrectlyseen as a step by step process. But the base nevertheless must be strong.

The need for expansion is obvious: the great maorit of the coffee farmersand of their children, cannot raise their incomes much aDove present levelsrFom"oeeao.

18. The reports do not discuss another issue, related to extension,that is mentioned in the first appraisal document: "the expected spread of

improved coffee husbandry to other coffee areas". Whether the first projecthas had any demonstration effect, either on farmers outside the project area

or on other extension and promotional activities, is not known. The secondproject will attempt to spread the new technolo and adminis systemto the rest of Ngozi province.

Importance of Price Policies

19. The PCR shows how relative changes in fertilizer and coffee priceshave up-ended much of the economic analysis conducted up to and including

appraisal. When the ratio of the two prices has risen, the justification

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for fertilization has been undermined. When, as after July 1975, coffee

prices soar A_ coffee of all quantities have benefited and the differential

between grades was almost lost. The incentives for quality mprvment bywashing at the stations were diminished. Clearly program success is depen-ent upon astute manageent of and response to prices, a point which the

Bank fullyappreciates.

An Overall Favorable Impression

20. The first project has sensible qualities and we suspect comparesfavorably in some ways with many other smallholder crop projects. It hashelped strengthen the basis for further development of the coffee sector,even though it did not offer as many lessons as it should have. Governmentis described in the PCR as having done a reasonably good job. The assess-ment contrasts with many complaints - about inadequate administrativeservices, poor accounts, initial shortages in Government counterpart con-tributions - reported by the supervision missions. But the PCR assessmentis probably fair on balance, particularly when considering Government'slimited resources and how these were turned to support the project - lesoften than required by the project agreement but more often than not Thefac'that the project recovered from the 1972 violence - one senior under-study, four of the seven agronomists, nine of the 72 lower level staff andmany participating farmers were "lost" in the action - is in some senses astatement on the priority Government gave it. The violence caused theproject to pass into a period of stagnation, nevertheless most of themissing staff were replaced within a few months and the largest volume offertilizer distributed during the project was distributed just after thetroubles. The fact that the Minister of Agriculture swung his influencebehind the washing stations in 1975, causing local government staff andyouth brigades to a1 pressure on the smallholders to deliver cherry tothe stations, is another welcome indication. The PCR presents the storyin detail.

The Income Issue

21. The final point to be added to those in the PCR concerns t l9wincremental incomes Drovided to narticinatina farmprn- One must wonderwheTer theaounts offered by either the first or second projects areenourh to attract sustained farmr intrpat_ The PrP til1m11Atac thAs I-h

farmers in the area of the first project will have earned for theirefforts an extra TTqA6 in 197; snel TTRAI in 107. Thna syarsaafigures, hiding a wide variation. The increase from 1975 to 1976 reflectsthe extraordinarv riQP In onffee inrit- _int- tix 107% Tn m44107r +,-I__- ------ --- -- __ In. mid-1975 the

appraisal report of the second project estimated that farmers entering thenaream in i h teant-a ofeth first prj 47 con t-in to use pthene

areas $2.30. Veterans of the first project who continue to use the newinpuits weare then expected-n ton earn~ 0 3.80. Th copst farm budget..,

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presented in the second appraisal report represents nine farmers, three ofwhom mnprove and fert414z.other crops as well eascffee. he bPRt of them

could expect an increment of $35.00. But only 2,000 of the 110,000 target

Ninety-five percent of the target group are expected to take only the

level, within the range $2.30 to $7.50. Seventy-nine percent will average$3.20. r Both apprals-I reo- say that the pecuinary Incent-Tve are

strong enough to attract the target farmers and convince half of them.

over pre-project coffee earnings - not insignifican - and maybe 5% to su.of total cash earnings. Since other income opportunities are generallyunavailalDe, famliles lookng for more cash will not ignore these potentialbenefits. However, shifting up to the newer husbandry regime requireslevels of entrepreneurial and labor inputs - and loss of leisure - whichonly under the strangest of assumptions would be valued lower than $3 or$4 per year. The incentives which the two projects offer participatingsmallholders would seem therefore to provide only a short term encourage-ment. The coffee components of the projects may lead to yield improvementshigher than those now reported, and may promote a self-sustaiing techno-logical transformation of the coffee economy. But the orders of magnitudeof available data indicate that these coffee components cannot offer tomost farmers a means to continuing income advances. The limits are tightlydrawn by the absence of extra land and the tremendous population pressure.The coffee smallholder schemes must be considered therefore as only smallsteps in the right direction. A larger solution must still be sought, as,in a way, the second project does by extending out to cover food crops.et

1/ This point is not mentioned in the summary section of the appraisalreport, which describes only the $35 farmer.

2/ One must ask whether the two appraisal reports erred in the same direc-tion, by including so many farmers in an experimental program. Concen-trated extension, on the progressive few, may have given higher "ve "earnings and a better base for expansion. That argument cannot bepushed too far, because the project extension staff probably did con-centrate whatever time they had for classical extension work (technicalguidance) on the progressive few. Also, it was essential to includeall farmers in the pesticide program.

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These postage stamp coffee plantations in northern Burundi are in no sensecomparable to the smallholder coffee farms which have attracted attentionelsewhere in Eastern Africa: in Kenya, for example, where they have helpedprovide the liquidity that has fueled a minor technical revolution in sec-

tions of that country's rural sector. A look at map 1 shows that the firstproiect was located in Burundi's most favorable smallholder zone. The $4contribution to the solution of rural poverty which the project seems tooffer - by attackinz the best of the country's cash crops in its heart-land - sets a ceiling to what this type of project offers for the rest ofthe country.

23. What the permanent solution to this problem is will not be easilydetermined. It is clear, however, that the Bank is not at all close todisbursine excessive amounts per target farmer in Burundi to find it. Toprovide a background to a discussion of rural strategies, of those that

ffe-nit spent in thNe rirst profject oaroximate - -on each o abot 55,000Ruru ian es mlTnlderc to enahl them to inrrPa. 1hpir annual in-

comes by $4, frm sam8 ~7~J~gT~ ost exactly thesae pr nitT;~~r n the or_nlnan nf Pnnvin MoJw Ciiinon n-rnria Ann-rr%---

mately $5,400 each to about 1,600 oil palm settlers at Hoskins to enablethem to incrpanp their annual inenmn hv ahni- A 1,00, startino f-ron einea

to zero (see PPA Report No. 1400, dated 12/18/76). Even at Hoskins thereic~ CnMP miioctt

4nn W11thA Oint-F

4nr.,em -. 411 1k 1, 4-1, .- -1, 1,-

to inspire optimal husbandry performance. Nevertheless the Hoskins incomesna 4n +- vnge, whkichive plnners cofr h-t thbe poverty problemn(LDC context) has been solved for the participants. Those persons in thePnn~l- Tdhn na praesngy tnoa eep per cait cost as4 low asepossibl

ment schemes, or to focus efforts on traditional village areas rather than

over more farmers - have never suggested that there is a $45 per family

__ _- r-- LL~ i dul patici~pani C

24.ni i-at th ncmparison of Uoskins -A WgOZi offers then~ is theCon-

trast between an immediate solution for a tiny number of farmers, and a-* Jl J .4.. .y MJ .Q lLLL C * ±I1 L a LL I-. LUL Li LiLe i L L L

THe-y Th- 7 wide coverge. Te"tow iTncremental income is partly offsetLvyn p u.L.uI.y InLL tLat further tecunica MIovemence may De self-

generating and that the coffee crop activities can thus help acceleratethe purce uf growth. what the $4 figure does is remind the Bank thatthe improvement is, after all, terribly small compared with the targetrange mentioned in the previous paragraph, and that, if this is the chosenstrategy, or the only feasible one, whatever progress has been achievedto udCe must not oe arrowed to distract planners from seeking the nextincremental steps, or more radical measures, toward the longer term solu-tion. There is also the danger of exhausting some of the country's bestextension talents on assignments where opportunity costs may be very high.

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Given the extreme population pressures in Burundi, however, no project pro-posals are likely to look much more attractive than these cottee projects,provided their lessons are put to work.

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E4TRTTNDT

AR A'RTr,A C)WWR TMPROVEMNT PRO.TCT - CREDIT 147-BU

rnMPT.ETTON REPORT1/

Table of Contents

Pa a

T l A rTFi flfeTTNTT

TT Tr^TmT AmThT DDVnAnAMATT ATM ADDDATCAT 1

'r 'I 1'f1 M TMnffMAWTMI A Mr^N 14

Stuart-upStaffing Position during Implementation 5Agricultural AspectsCoffee Quality and Processing 14Washing Stations 16Other Project Activities 20Project Costs 20Financing and Disbursements 21Procurement 21

IV. ORUuANZATIUNAL ASPECTS 22

V. PRECUET IvACT

Coffee Production 2Coffee Prices 26Value of Incremental Coffee Production 2oFarmers' Incomes 27Economic Performance

VI. GUYVERN1ME;NT AND BALNA PEFORUMANCE

VII. CHANGES IN THE SECOND PRUjECT

ANNEX 1 Project DescriptionANNEX 2 Memorandum on Allocation of Proceeds for the Project

ANNEX 3 Economic Evaluation Agricultural Component

TABLE 1 Distribution of FertilizersTABLE 2 Project CostsTABLE 3 Coffee Exports, 1960/61 - 1975/76TABLE 4 Coffee Exports, 5-Year Moving Averages

CHART 1 Expatriate Staffing Schedule

1/ This report was prepared by Mr. H. von Voorthuizen, who visitedBurundi in April 1976,and was issued on September 27, 1976.

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BURUNDI

ARABICA COFFEE IPROVEMENT PROJECT - CREDIT 147-BU

COMPLETION REPORT

I. BACKGROUND

1.01 The introduction of arabica coffee as a cash crop in the traditionalsubsistence farms in Burundi (and also Rwanda) started only in the 1930's andmost of the coffee was planted between 1947 and 1961. By now more than400,000 or well over half of Burundi's 800,000 farmers have small plots of onaverage 0.1 ha with about 150 coffee trees each and coffee is by far-the mostipexort cro and source of cash income. Of Burundi's foreign exchangeearnings, which averaged about US 30 million per annum over the last few years,no less than 85% comes from coffee and probably few other countries d somuch on one single export commodity. During the last decade Government hasstarted to diversify its agricultural production, mainly through the implementa-tion of tea projects with"iancialassitance from Belgium and the EuropeanDevelopment Fund. But simultaneous efforts have been undertaken to increasethe production of coffee as well. Dartly through a further expansion of the areasbut, since not much unused land is left, mainly through activities to increasethe productivity of existing plantations.

1.02 The "Arabica Coffee ImDrovement ProJect". for which a first IDA Credit(147-BU) of US$1.8 million was approved by the Board in April 1969 and a secondCredit (598-Bu) of US$5.2 million in November 1975, is Government's main vehicleto increase.coffee productivity. The first coffee project-! , for which the lastdisbursement was made in March 1976- was the nlv ariiultural nrniect in Burundisupported by the Bank Group until the Credit for the second coffee project wasanroved and has only renentlv been fnllnwe by An TnA Crerit. fnr n iqbhripProject.

II. IDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

2.01 The first coffee improvement project was conceived by Government,nrohahly in 1Q6 eh 10i- and 'Mrnt.3ffa v an wA/Trn rnn*+v PatA/Pmmission in April 1966. The project underwent substantial changes at all stagesfrom idAnf.i-PatAnn t.hrmnah prearation 'Mlevr PAO/TAT) +n n"a 4i*al

Government's principal objective seems to have been to spread the use offArf.i17wr +.r all ^ffA, p-r4"&nvmareSinund and it was therefor- ailinterested in securing financing for fertilizer purchases. A small pilot projectof fertilizer distribution ad already been started in a few ocations in ngoz

/ Project description is at Annex 1.

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province with Belgian assistance, following what were regarded positiveresults4 of a seri.es of on-farm- tri-l wbUi ~c.N. 1ad- comme,neA during the e~-I1arly,

1960s, also in Ngozi province. The project, as identified in 1966, wasestim--ed +o cos+ .bk-+ TTOk C -4-1 14m - nP u aa aAwel or

involved the procurement d7i-s'tribution of 10,000 tons of fertilizer

(up from 100 ton in the pilot project). Burundi's total production ofV .LA -. L-VC6S%=0IX-0111 CLL1 E =16 5,U 03. 1 , %A IJ LUIL0.11

1,0ton per ear ais a RIVcftEsa-tin

2.02 The Bank was apparently not very eager at the time to finance theprJ.L . UL.±L1LLLy L %ACLUL10.L.t%.UL1 .L .LOUII. %0 L±U1b er aie

whether Burundi's production goals were compatible with the quotas allocatedby thie InternatiLonal1 Coffee Organi zati'on 'I,LV WLLe' UL I L '.LLLJCZwas fully justifiable on economic grounds, whether there would be enoughinceunives uo tne faermers to responu to tne proJec nu Wnu:ner a11 Ulleneeded new staff could be found. In the fall of 1966 the Bank came erroneouslyunder the impression that Burundi was no longer interested in DaniDA f11anCigand no further actions were taken for a while. It took an early 1967 letterby Burundis Prime Minister to the President of Tne Bank, complaining about thelack of progress on the matter, to get things moving again. In May 1967 -

more than a year aftUer the miLsio had visLteu b use country - traUslateu copiesof the identification report were sent to the Burundi Government.

2.03 A 3-man FAO/IBRD preparation mission was subsequently mounted inuly 1967 and its report was circulated the following November. The project

which emerged was somewhat wider in scope but smaller in size than the oneiuentified a year earlier. The project would be confined to Ngozi Province(where about one third of the country's _coffee is grown and which has thebest potentiali instead of being extended over all corree growing areas.One half of the Province with seven million trees would be e osed tointensive action- , Including-the application or 2,000 ton or fertilizers per6num fromyear 3 onwards (down from the 10,000 ton mentioned_by The 'entifi a-ton mission), wnile the other naif the Province, with another seven milliontrees, would be treated in a more "extensive" manner with empHasis on better4msmmov? .lip -crop nusbandry methods without fertilizers. At the same time the project wouldcarry out pilot studies in order to determine the possibilities of diversifyingagriculture away from coffee in the marginal areas, and to introduce some othercrops into the existing cropping pattern. The idea was " to make full use ofthe existing administrative structure", but the division of responsibilitiesremained pretty much unclear in the proposals. The estimated project cost was downto US$2.5 million over four years (from US$5.6 million during identification),and the incremental production of green coffee resulting from the project wasestimated at 2,800 ton (down from 6,000 ton during identification).

2.04 It is interesting to note that much of the preparation mission'sthinking was in terms of "rehabilitating" Burundi's coffee industry. Thiswas reflected in the project's name at that time: "Coffee Rehabilitation andAgricultural Development Project". The perception was that the productivityof the coffee trees had declined rapidl yduring the years following the country's

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Independence in 1262, There have indeed been a few lean years - 1963production was particularly low, but this was probably more due tonormal cyclical Datterns CmairLty caused by weather conditions) than toa breakvdown in Government services and reduced farmers' efforts. The fiveyear movinR average of Burundits coffee production staRnated somewhat inthe early 1960s but continued to increase regularly from 1964 onwards,There was. however. indeed a breakdoma of coffee hand nutina facilities.which was later correeted by the project, and a deterioration of coffeeQuality which continues to the present day CTee further nara 3.30).

2.05 During apraisal in March 1968 the nrolect area was furtherreduced to the better half of Ngoz's coffee roing areas Lwith sevenmillion trees arown by some # .000 small holders for whinh tht nrenara-tion mission had envisaged the 'rintensi-ve' treatment, nBooster" applicationsof fertilizers would be 2iven to all seve n mMilnn tret free of charge tothe farmers, during three subsequent years and some 50 percent of thefarm1Rs Were exneeted to Lnnthnue fee.rP sg ther trf#C theRyfter at theirown expense; the total volume of fertilizers to be sold by that time wasestimated at In tn no- v-A" Cae%n tPrm P Ann +^n ai,"ho rennncti

n ine with the proposals of the preparation mission the pro ectwould alsonnav'id f'armi nT~os to partctiengn nmweeeaw a inraf r.e+ s'in 1o

a aign free of charge to the farmersY, rehabilitate 'e2sting o 'eehand rnnn PAn+tsvc ^ntn+m, t,ha, -P"41v +-iale "n O"fa A m" -triAdhandt- i e o- e a d . . dfor expaia and urundian management and extension staff. The appraisalmisSion did not re-tain h nrapsals for pilot wt+k o+h+and rejected also the proposed improvement of coffee marketing facilities.The mission included were-rl a ne-wr compon am n=ely -se+ procesigocoffee in four pulping cum washing stations to be constructed under themn 9t..o+ r +deastn prov tne qua e.U14.4w uJ J mUAJ. [email protected] . . Ann

tion and the stations- were to be modelled after similar centers which hadben built ad suu operated since the early 19uc in KLenya _se-further para 3,321. The mission also included a small amount for the repair

the p r eT_earer ta ath preparation stage: a special depart--- t was to ue crea in Glovrnment i mpleentu-u agency, OnTu, TTo

would be responsible for the extension of improved coffee production andprocssng methods MU A~ -- TTUIZ. L %UZL ws UUW1 U UOr..L HuJiL0 UVe Iycyears compared with US.7miion oe four ears es ifaed during preparation

PLoVJ ue UurLemenLaC green coftee production was estimateu at1,600 ton,down from e 27 t07on figure mentioned in the preparation report.

2.06 The leader of FAO/IBRD's preparation team raised objections againstsome of the changes made by the appraisal mission. The composition of theenvisaged expatriate team, which included experts for training and coffeequaLity control, was considered too specialized and, according to thepreparation team, more emphasis on the establishment of an efficientextension service was necessary through the assignment of two experiencedexpatriate extension staff. The preparation team also disagreed with theinclusion of the four washing stations, since these wouTd7probably raise

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staffing poems. and recommended to 1imit the processing component toune eabiltatxon of the existing small pulping centers,. Other objectionsconcerned the types, of fertilizers recomiended by the appraisal missiontpure nitrogen instead of compoundsl and the,wv the pest control campaign wasto be set up &ndividual dusting by, the farmers themselves instead of organizedspraying team.l. There are no indications in the files that the appraisalreport raised questions, within the Bank. The main concern was again whetherthe International Coffee Organization would object to the project, The ICOSecretariat was informally contacted by the Bank and the Executive Director ofICO gave his personal, but obviously authoritative, assurance that the otherexporting members of 100 would not object to the project since notnialproduction increases would not raise Bhrundi's exports be d

2.0T Looking back over the pre,-implementation stage of the project itcan be concluded that the Government started out demanding ubig" and thatFAOIZBRD and Bwnk staff gradually redueddt7heyroLect toa sizwich a.6considered more compatible with ernment's implementing capacity.12 Tesereduetions were jusTed and it turned out that even tbe-smaler project took

two additional years to complete. Because of an increased sense of urgencyto transfer financial resources to the poorest countries, like Burundi (andRwanda for that matterl, there may at present exist a greater willingness toaccept proposals for what are essentially over-sized projects, The Bankshould, however, resist the temptation to go along with such proposals andcontinue to carry, out one of its principal tasks, namely to ensure thatprojects do not overstress Governmentts implementing capacities.

2.08 A second observation concerns the lack of any scheduled food cropdevelopments in the project as it emerged after appraiss. It is a pitythat the preparation teams proposals for pilot food crop activities weredropped for the sake of what was believed to be a clearer project organiza-tion. An opportunity was missed to-aim at a more balanced development ofboth coffee and food crops which would have been Particularly relevantbecause of th-e-igh population density in the_pro ect area,

111. IMPEuaMTATION

Startup

3.01 Prior to 1969 OCIBU had already started coffee extension work inNaozi Province. includin2 the a oqf' for t{wzear on a piln cale.

The new project assumed responsibility for the ongoing activities and therewere no delays in the antual start of the AVYe A expatriate p= ec+manager and a training officer both arrived in April 1969, before the IDACretdit b%am Tn"er .m 15, 10o An expatriate extens-on officerjoined the project in September 1969 and at about the same time about 30

project.

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Buru=di extension staff vere made. available to the -roject by OCIBU andthe Ministry of Agriculture, tenders were written out for the supply ofnext season's fertilizers. vehicles were nurnhased- and extension workwas effectively started.,

Staffin Position during Iplementation

3.02 Exatriate Staff. In terms of numbers, staffing of the projectwith exnatriate essential in view mf the Taek of nualified nationals) wasbetter during the first tve project years than thereafter (see schedulechart 1I Of fthp Pour exnatriate in t+ nv--t- by the aPnnrai1mission that of the coffee processing officer remained vacant until theend nf IQ71 And anniumntTv no re c we fforts iin1Prt%kPn

during the intervening two years. This can be explained by the fact thatr1rTEJL sand nnttnT w? he -+"+nw4a + moa m " mnrw ^"i a ly inke_ -m cirr

port to the idea of constructing four coffee washing stations because ofthe nsatisfat.ry results oa an Oe%stnIM mub larger, central uOpingand washing center operated by OCIBU in the project area. This attitudechanged ranidTy af'ow +'Ne A.n. --r w_.. +"-A -P4. + -S -4-+ ma. JK,+ +I n-

time lost in recruiting the processing officer is certainly one of thema%4m w r eans o r tift -hn+ T + A-T1r - n 4 h- n-4.l-a -4 Ah' Lm -+--

and hence of the project.

3.03 From 1972 onwards there were in effect only two ex-patriates n

officer was never replaced after the first officer was promoted to projectmanger in April r711a "LM_ AUAIHU HC ACMU liC E 8&LP L- ..L7 I L .LJ. 1 P siLul3l U1. l".LeJ .& Al L UI UJ.LLu WM.b ±1 J.L U

1972 taken over by a capable Burundi agronomist who still heads the extensiona . vLU IIUAo .vsy LU wras a m 11e nWCVt:r, UnMU ne.-unertU M Wit t:AP L1A_MUttraining officer not the extension officer were replaced since the pgJectWCL u epr-ve O any rea teclical s ort in whaU shoUJ ve regarueuas Ts main area o acivity. At various occasions Bank supervision missionsUave pointed this out but to no avail. No real efforts were undertaken byGovernment to fill the gap.

3.,o4 In terms of ui.itythe exerience.with the ex-patriate s ecial's gwa U Ac, ie irs' project imanager anu the 1arEt extension oliicer were

TpparenMy both nrepresentatives nor with eacn other. This led first to the dismissal of theextension officer in September 1970 and six months later to the resignationof the project manager. After a short unsuccessful search for a new projectmanager the training officer was elevated to that position, He stayed inofiice ror nearly four years.DUt his tenure cannot be characterized as ae1Z -ood one, either. He was youngand rather inexperienced and, moreover)

not y active. He tended to stay around in his office in Ngozi ispredecessor lived and spent all his working time in Bujumbura), was notwell in touch with the field work - not to speak of directing it - anddevelopped increasingly poor relations with OCIBUls head office. During thatperiod the project benefitted most from the second extension officer andespecially from the processing officer. With the arrival of a third projectmanager towards the end of 1974 the working atmosphere, the level ofactivities and the relations between the project and OCIBU, as well as other

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Government authorities improved markedlyv

-4 n; rrph= P4"a+ Tnainaffa"m~oa wa maAo- airnlnhl 'h-r f.hp P-r-nnh firm

BDPA and the last manager came from ADS. The other expatriates were recruiteddirec+1 r 'yVTWIT Pn

44?ma,+ of theseo +h avnare thrinah .,nn.on1 t4na f^+1qmM

-J.~.. U- -- ~~ Of0~ U-- --h- 1

was repeatedly considered by OCIBU but rejected because of the much highercos+s involve T+ A4i is P4 +ifcl o renAd r 4a ugema- e a+h'er tnis was riht

or not because recruitment through a firm does not necessarily guarantee goodre + snO . w have, however, a defini+e impression +hnat in some cas..publicity should have been given to job openings and that too frequentlyn1T'sTTs choice -s restricted to +Jst a fe, orn-4 e+ R4especially in a country like Burundi, the uality of ex-patriate staff should bereardeD ascriticl f the orderly imupleumentation of a pro+ect, selectionof those staff should have received more attention than it actually did.

3.06 Burundi Staff. The number of agricultural officers ("Agronomes")VaAc-u uCUweI CLu. u L6cU ulLLUMb U1. Us LIC PrVJUkL 1=.L. aJ L%. WC6D 4n LJ_1ue

with the appraisal estimate Te-In-uer of field extension workersL vulgarisateurs anu moultteurs J varieudvwcc UeUWt:l C u wl"L;iil WaD n.L61,ul

than the h4 estimated during appraisal. On the olher hand the project did

appraisal. The appraisal mission's idea was to recruit these assistant-moniteurs amoug the vetter farmers ou ass-are active particip'-ion vy tne

majority Hutu tribe in the extension activities. The idea apparently neverappealeu to te Burunu auuorities but the project UU make use Uo_the.-paid services of some 1,250 leaders of farmers groups Chifo 50 members per

for fertilizers from the farmers. The project suffered a serious set-backduring a period of civil violence in 1972 wich, amongst ouers, causeu thedisappearance of four agricultural officers and nine extension workers.

3.07 Thanks to the good leadership of the Burundi chief of extensiona .1 1 I t .. I ift .1 -_ s *services there is now a good esprit de corps among the extension staff

and most of them are clearly devoted to their work. Extension activities.are well scheduled and supervised and a satisfactory reporting system from-the -feld level to project headquarter fs in existence. The qualy ofthe extension advice coud, however, have been better if the chier or theservice had continuously been supported by,a well qualified and experiencedcoffee agronomist (such a specialist has recently been recruited under thesecond project).

3.08 The position of deputy project-mAnager (not envisaged duringappraisal) was created in 1973 and has since then been filled by a younguniversity graduate. His attitude is good; he maintains excellent relationswith both the project manager and OCIBU's headquarters and has the potentialto become an effective, mature, manager.

Agricultural Aspects

3.09 In line with the appraised project, agricultural extension work wasrestricted to coffee only and work on other crops was left entirely to the

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Miniatrys Provincial extension services Csee para 4,03). Coffee extension' m rv;7-rCr AMvOl P--rAnAPA f1rnm T7" Qe%r-n"-m mnAr in t.he- t-ilr-, rf' IQ71 the

whole project area was covered, By 1975 the number of coffee growers in theproJetf are^a 'NA--5-vNmc- +n c; (inn anAr +'ha, niirm*hAy nf onffpp i-~~t

about 8.5 million Ccompared with an estimated 44,000 and 7 million at thei-Tnp n-f annvAicl) Tlio nn4nfl n---- and, aciveet in Ehe ver -.us

r J go or. -- V--J --- - ---- - - - ..- - -Cr

areas of coffee husbandry are reviewed below.

3.10 Pest Control, The Antestipsis lineaticollis is the most serious

campaigns for many years free of charge to the farmers. At the time of the

appraso- 1.ne effectiveness U the UI.,I was re-rucu ue Iuw 4au o1main project objectives in this field were to improve the application methodand to assure full coerg uf all Coffee trees in the Pro-Jet ara.eglainsect counts during the last four years suggest that the insect control

campai-u as IneUU been better supervised inside the project area than out-

side (on average 3 insects per tree in the project area and 6 to 7 in otherareas of Ngozi Province). But apart from that there has not been a realimprovement in the application method. The farmers still use small bagsof tinlLy woven Cotton lauric il.Led with the dust mixture D.DT malathion)which they shake against the trees. This rather primitive technique allowsno control over the quantities applied to each tree and it is moreovergenerally believed that substantil amounts of theinsctici.es.. Aed

lor domestic p.uposes. The project did not purchase the hand operateddusters envisaged during appraisal (sprayers were ordered instead, apparent-ly because of errors in the French translation of project documents preparedby the Bank) nor did the project organize special spraying teams as recom-mended by the FAO/IBlD preparation mission.

3.11 In recent years serious questions have been raised with regard to_Eneotypes or insecticides to be used. In the country as a whole the presenceof antestia insects has increased from 1970 onwards, which coincides with afurther deterioration of the ualit of Burundirs coffee e Usee alsopara . Is feare that and continuous applications ofDDT malathion may also destroy useful predators and create a DDT resistantantestia population. According to OCIBU's 1970 annual report, ISABU had inthat year already been requested to recommend other insecticides to replaceDDT malathion but up till now ISABU has no gel its recommendation. Mean-while the price of DDT malathion has increased sharply from FBu 22,000(US$280) per ton in 1970 to FBu 60,000 (US$765) per ton in 1975; in 1975UCIUU paid FBu 65.5 million LUS$840,000) for 1,100 ton DDT for its nationalprogram. For both efficiency and cost reasons it is necessary to identifyand introduce alternatives WYthout de3yE 3U-aDs-that the matter

s l rceive the i'es riori u7er the second project.

3.12 Mulching. Mulching of coffee trees is important for enriching theorganic matter contents of the soil, to control both weed gr5EiEEanhili17erosion, and to conserve mistue in the soil during dry weather. The projecthas clearly been successPul in encouraging better mulching standards and itis estimated that this is now satisfactorily done in about 70% of the planta-tions, against some h0% befor e project started. TaMana leaves and otherfood crop residues are normally used for mulching and the project has establishednurseries of Trypsacum laxum grass plants in areas where natural trash wasshort in supply. The combined size of the nurseries varied between 5 and 7ha during the last four years and after initial distribution of the slips,farmers have continued the multiplication in their own fields. The imnact

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of this part of the project was visible in all areas visited in the courseof the completion mission.

3.13 Pruning. The project's extension services also paid much attentionto improvements of pruning techniques. Some 20,000 pairs of pruning sawsand secateurs were sold to the farmers at a subsidized price of FBu 50per pair and an estimated 5.8 million trees, or about 8g_ of the trees whichexisted in 12618, were pruned during the last four proje_ct yers. During the1960s pruning had largely been neglected or done too late. It is now done ona selective basis and the noral runin cycle varies between four and sixyears. depending on the stand of the trees.

3.14 Coffee Fertilizer Trials. A-first series of six fertilizer trialson coffee in farmers' fields in Ngozi province was conducted if6m I 6_-199The 1968 appraisal mission for the first project was of the opinion that thetrials had firmly established the overall importance of good husbandry practicesand of the application of nitrogenous fertilizers for bringing about substantialincreases in the yield of parchment coffee. Only a small effect of potash wasobserved in the six trials and there were no indptions thatateapplications contributed to the yields. The re-estatlishment of the researchprogram was regardd necessary b the mission to provide a basis for continuingadvise on fertilizer use in Ngozi Province. The 1974 appraisal mission forthe second project was less convinced by the results of the trials conductedin the 1960s. The 1974 mission concluded from the available evidence that threeout of six trials hadshown a resnonse ratio of 2.5 to 3.5 gram incremental"parchment coffee for 1 am of uenitFogenetil he other three trialsso ratios of ess than 2PL The main conclusion to be drawn from the sixtrials was, however, that yields vary considerably, both from year to yearand in different locations, whether or not fertilizers are-annlied. Dif-ferences in location, altitude, type of soils, the standard of maintenance ofthe nlantations, the stage in the pruning cycle and the weather conditionswere all of overriding importance and made it impossible to attach statisticalsignificance to the trial results- Th 1Q74 mission concluded that the results

of the six trials did not suort the 169 mission' ss on of an incremental~ld/rt~r to o' I and that a response ratio ofthe ord &eri ofr

EN5Vl seemed to be a more reslistic estimate (appraisal report second project,Annex 1, ara 8-io)

3.15 ~ ~ ~ ~ . sh idng f't ecoand series of trials, conducted under thisproject from 1970-1975 in five other iocations, were summarized and commentedupon in a short paper prepareA by TSABT Apr41 10 76 a+ +ha ocasion of thecompletion mission. But unfortunately the outcome does not contribute to thestt uofu kno-W-11edge o the sub~O~Lject. Theuu main cocuso of th paper isagi

that the small effects of fertilizers, which were observed are statisticallynot sInfcn.As in the FirT series"this is caused by much lwrgw,GuxplTi erences between the yields of individual plots which receivedthe same treatment. it should be noted that there were serious shortcomingsin the design of the trials. Originally, none of the trials had control plotsnu no plus were veing teated with tne recomueuuu projecu formula. Accoruiug

to an August 18, 1970 supervision report, ISABU's director said that these

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plots had been omitted because of the limited area for the trials. Afterthe visit of the 1970 supervision mission, control plots were added tothree trials but the other two were carried through without control plots.The application formulas were not changed. The lowest application rate ofabout 123 gram pure nitrogen per tree ,-oble the rateof 64gram per year ali:edinfYhe project. Besides, otash and phosphatewere on applied in ;8mL7-tfiffitt"VVd1 other - !a.:h - adwith varying quantities of pure nitrogen but not separately. Hence, thedesign of the trials makes it impossible to draw any conclusion on theeffects of either potash, or phosphate.

3.16 Apart from design errors implementation problems have also playedan adverse role. The results are too fluctuating (and sometimes conflicting),to even support the conclusion that fertilizers have only a slight, non-significant effect on production levels. They rather suggs a ack ofconsistency and, probably of proper care and supervision, during theexecution of the trials. The officer-in-charge discussed some of hisproblems with the October 1974 appraisal mission for the second project(he was on leave in April 1976). Since he had a number of other responsibili-ties and because of his occasional absence for leave or other reasons, he couldnot always personally supervise the application of the fertilizers and theharvest of the coffee. Mainly because of frequent staff changes (especiallyafter the 1972 events) he felt that he could not fully rely on his local staffand he was not sure that the correct types and amounts of fertilizers werealways applied at thg_ rtgo meto the correct trees in the correct manner.Similar problems may have jeopardized the FarE- of cof eich_normally is done at regular intervals over a period of several months. Evenon a research station a trial of this kind, which takes at least five yearsto complete, causes problems of consistent, and high quality supervision.If implemented on farmers' fields, spread over an entire Province, there isa further problem that growers sometimes change the standards of maintenanceand care of their plantations for one reason or another which can affectthe yield levels more than any other single factor, including fertilizers.There is good reason to doubt whether farm level trials of this kind, evenwhen properly designed and consistently supervised by an officer who has noother trials to worry about, will produce the right answers as long as thereis no guarantee that the level of maintenance (mulching, pruning, insectcontrol) is consistently the same throughout the trial period. It may wellbe that this can only be achieved if the research organization assumes full

Map~~b i y o h an ance o: attbs 6a yon htatation tvme of situation.

3.17 Distribution of Fertilizers. As a foliow-un on the pilot distribu-tion program involving about 3,000 farmers (1966) the project set out to aarrange for large scale distribution of fertilizer to coffee growers. TheBurundi authorities regarded this activity as the main thrust of the projectwhic-h -.aq rf1PetPd in it. loc(Al1 titleo "Prnipt.

show until the third year and the farmers had only small cash incomes (mainlyfrom co%ffee) it was oq Ai 4 +*rr ++fg.4 ~ ~distributed free of charge to all 44,000 farmers during three years withinthe first -P +4--f + .dy 6 e n project yearsfou fert4ixi

we( to be sold0 ' s=bsdy of 66 percent in project years four to six to~ 4.~ ±~

5UJO4 ~ U~Ji * ii ~ ~ V ~.L,~J~1U dIU.11±i~ ~1I~ ~ LU~i4,

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would be reduced to 33 percent and thereafter be removed. At the recom-mended application rate of 140 gram urea per tree per year it was expectedthat by year ten about 50 percent of the farmers, or 22,000, would purchaseannually about 500 ton of fertilizer. The appraisal report suggests (para4.05 and 4.06 and Annex 6, Table 1) that the fertilizer sales program wouldstart in prolect year three and be implemented simultaneously with theinitial, free of charge, distribution program for late starters. In asideletter to the Credit Agreement the Government confirmed.amongst others,the following understandings, reached during the negotiations:

(i) discontinuation of distribution free of charge in the projectarea of fertilizers - after 1974t and

(ii) subsidv on fertilizer sales, i.e. 66 percent from 1972 through1976, 33 percent from 1977 through 1979, and no subsidythereafter-

3.19 Details on the actual distribution of fertilizers are at Table 1.About 2,665 ton urea were distributed free of charge over a four year periodh,tv,n Ne)vPTmhFr 1QQ an Nnvpmhpr 1071- Tht ciqtribhti.-n -rPahfd n. npakduring the 1972/73 season when a total of about 870 ton urea were distributedto about 80% of the coffee growers: about 75% of all trees in the projectarea were fertilized during that season. The projected 100% coverage duringthe initial "booster ann1iation" vans wa thus not achipvpd hnt. t.'hp totl

volume of urea distributed free of charge corresponded closely to the appraisalestimate bennq an imnrtant numihr n fP?mPrQ rt-nivpA Pf-p fPr.i1i-r formore than three years. The fertilizer sales program through private coffeetradrt9'n a penv,qpopv aniivv-nu annrnia1 -s ra'~ 'ndderPt unun.kshla anr' nvt

executed and it was also felt that the free distribution program could not benpr-ipa mi qimultan.nely with a rogram of salling frtilizes Tnstead

the Government decided in 19 tosop the ree,,distribution entirely and toto chice c r resente fr bou fe rtil ea

S.. nfJ. - -. . 571- ll'. J-- - -fl -~ . .LL. . OJ ~ La. - - _ . JJU

27,1400 grow-rs 5,,-Mt-%1e r"t'-'i 'area whTih _Xpojec ar, were

pr ce c age represented abu n hl fte actual cost of the fertil-

and the agricultural officers. It was the first time that inputs were soldtU coffee gruwers ou cre it - ll LUZUn plt:V.LUULAy rCt.q ub L ufworanv.U4under BurunE--co o The results were encouraging- about FBu 1.9mllion. (UWr$,000) or 82% of thle receivable amount was indeed collected.Bedause the prices of fertilizer tripled fu p e e rchase

ULCL I. L .L-.L L.Z.L L 0 'tL- 'Au K--aA_-4'y .12 I)

FAQ made 500_ton urea available to Burundi at a subsidized price of US$12Qper ton c.1.f., Bujumbura and the entire consignment was made available to theproject; the cost price was about FBu 11-12 delivered at Ngozi. Some 27a tonwere distributed in Ap ri L-;5 to about 200u farmers and the arrangementsfor repayment were similar to those made in 1974 except that the price had been

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increased from FBu 6 to FBu 9 per kg. However, the repayment rate turned outto be worse than in the first year: 64% against 82% in 1974.

3.21 A number of reasons, in addition to the fertilizer Price increase havebeen put forward to explain the deteriorating repayment rate:

(i the total coffee production was much 2Qam J.915 than in 1974f16,000 m ton and 28,000 m ton respectively);

'hP bauPnsn of the slumn in thp onffF-P Pynnrt marketsq ov%rnment.was forced to decrease the official parchment coffee price fromFi hc nr- ka ;_ _ Onn

hA wq- n- n nv -rn I wan r n r, ', r 0r

production was below normal and many of the farmers are said tohave spen+ par+ of +heir aAo mc"l inco-m-e from c-offeoe on food

stuffs.

These are all valid reasons, and the final uRement on the merits and disadvantagesof the SyStem .+.-+-A -- T 07)1 -aA +b- tleast ++,-l+;1 +k- resl+ ofthe current 1976 season are known. The project has made an effort to prevent

Agriculture (who was not aware of the 1975 repayment problem) told thenmio4n misslnde tvhate m ro, rl surge lh loal a;inA ur+onm UO h1ei-p.

supervise the repayments. The 3rospects for e current season are better.4-~d J4 4.~ O4.parch ent .PAlLJIi .L%LC I.LCUO VJccI± d.O ULy 11iJ -Lq=.. ULIuI 1)/41 %,U V1.UUL U,7

per kg, following the sharp increase in coffee export prices, and the 1976harves -11' - -&uliCLL- 1~L -- 'T J4_ 4.Lt-- le Uj± .eL _.L

has meanwhile been maintained at FBu 9 per kg.

3.22 In hindsig it may have been a mistake to distribute fertilizersfree o hUarge for such a 'uu period because it may have encouraged the usethereof under marginal crop husbandry or soil conditions. It would probablyhave been better if a nominal charge had been made from the beginning. Tneproject should be commended for its experimentations with credit sales since-1.7yI, uCo.Ue -ne m-Acu ruC o, -uu Z-4 -be epArie ton- buouu coUn--A - U.

under the second project until a satisfactory system has been developed. Thegenerally helu, unu proUVly curreu view is thau Ute larmers lac. tne cash topay for fertilizers at the time it is applied (November and March-April) "n'

]Un hould M 16be asked to pay at The time the corree crp is sold May-July). Either delaying - as presently out - or advancing of paymentsfor fertilizers seems therefore to be necessary.

3.23 The most important question is of course whether the application offertilizer pays, but as discussed in paragraphs 3.14 - 3.16 the researchefforts undertaken sofar have failed to provide a clear basis to answer thatquestion. Common sense, based on experience elsewhere, and the results of thetrials conducted in the 1960s suggest that nitrogen must have a positive effecton the yields in Burundi but the appraisal mission went too far when it stated

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that inputs were of "proven value". ISABU als rpcommends.annual appligafRg§gof potash a phosphate but one application once evey e he Awell be sufficient if coffee is properly mulched. The question has been raisedwhether the fertilizer strategy was well conceived in view of the shaky researchbasis and whether the project should have concentrated more on other elementsof coffee husbandry. There is no basis to answer these questions unequivocallyeither way. But there is good reason to believe that it would be more difficultto encourage farmers to do a better mulching and pruning job (which costs them

etemel if not combined with the supply of fnputs like insecticides andfertilizer. Again, it is difficult to believe that nitrogenous fertilizerwou uThave no effect under Burundi conditions. Very much depends also on the

price relation bet]oen coffee and fertilizer. The economics look quiteETferent when coffee sells at US$0.50 per pound and urea costs anywhere fromUS$350 to US$450 per ton, as in early 1975, or when the coffee price approachesUS$1.50 per pound and urea costs less than US$200 per ton, as at present (forsome detailed calculations see the appraisal report for the second project).These are god.reasms-to-be,prudent and for not pressing too hard on thefarmers to apply fertilingesTh.der is also importantthat the farmers' prices for fertilizers reflect the economic costs and theproject should rely on the judgement of the individual farmers to establishwhether they consider fertilizers worthwhile to spend their money on. Quitea number of farmers, whose opinions were asked in the course of the completionmission, seemed convinced that the use of fertilizers is beneficial to thembut so far they have never paid more than half the true economic cost. Itseems clear that in any event the use of fertilizers should be combined withhigh standards of coffee husbandry.

3.24 New Coffee Planting. The original prolect did not include a Drovisionfor lanting of new coffee trees to replace oxising_old or diseased trees or toexpand the cofee areas. For many years small coffee nurseies were maintainedin all adMinistrative communes of Burundi's coffee growing areas. Seeds werepurchased by the Ministry of Agriculture from ISABU and maintenance of thenurseries involved little cash expenditures because all work was done bycommunal labour under the manaiement of the Youth Revolutionary Movement. Duringpreparation and appraisal of the project this arrangement was apparentlyconsidered satisfactory and the sublect is not even discussed in the annraisAl

report.

3.25 A November 1971 supervision mission observed, however, that Burundi'sarnhinn nnr~f'fPA ndiintinn Pyppp t.he anmnl TrnO Pyn+ min+nc fonr them caqnn.

year in a row. This was attributed to a massive pruning campaign conducted in

effects of t IDroj ct, and especially, increased lantings. The numberof cofe in the coutr iv'as a whole ~b .illion trees p ar, which corresponded to an anulL rthof 5- . The

International Coffee Agreement and that the Bank had agreed with ICO to take

success of ICO's production limitation policy. The mission suggested thatUwo.0 practical wa.ys~ I.o. reuceL neVw p.P-a.IIL1e5Z WUU.LU Uq= U ±U -Lwt.ULUU..L- PLutIZ5 -

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wuI.n was Veu . vuuc vy I-n1e Government at tnat 4-e- u u imWILLI O. LC..Liles %;V1O.L~UC1 L 3 U .Y li UV hatit~ t. ,L~U imeI. - aiL to. 1iJ.it

plant distribution to replacements only. Taking also into account thatmany ___ -1t.----a. ...&

VfI tL 1 e A ~W~.,LU1 werLe es U .L;D11CU L11 PJUU1 V a,kiU WJLk11 ULI

much supervision the mission concluded that the project should controlnurseries and pleaut distribution in the projeCt area while in other areasthe Government should undertake to reduce new plantings.

3.26 The Government at first did not react to the mission's opinionto uring the coffe- nurseries under the project-s control. Accoruing tothe September 1972 supervision report, OCIBU's director maintained that thiswas unnecessary since OCIBU received all its requirements. Later duringthat year, however, all communal nurseries in the project area were closeddown, except for one (near tne new Musnonge coffee washing station) whicnwas taken over by the project. The capacity of the Mushonge nursery was35,000 trees at that time and according to the March 973 supervision reportthe project proposed to establish a further six nurseries of equal capacity.With these nurseries it would take 8-10 years to replace an estimated 15;of the total trees in the project area which were assumed to be eitherneglected or dead. The March 1973 supervision report flashed a warningsignal in reaction to the authorities apparent determination to issueyoung plants prior to-urooting of the trees they were supposed to replace.The mission commented that this would almost certainly lead to unwantedextensions of the coffee areas, since the farmers would be disinclined touproot any of their old trees, no matter how bad they were. In the customaryletter following supervision, Government was urged that seed.ing should besold at FBu 3 each in order that farmers could appreciate their value, andthat seedlings must not be handed over until after old or dead trees hadbeen removed.

3.27 Both points were ignored in the ensuing years. There is still anold law on the books in Burundi prohibiting farmers to uproot their coffeetreesvwithout specific intu T Me n F ieiTe o o hris i hvid.en etasuch-instrt tosh-ave been issued in the last few years;to qualify for new plants farmers were only required to prepare the plantholes before the distribution of the young trees. No prices were chargedfor the plants either, mainly because it had never been done before andbecause it was considered difficult as the farmers continued to provide freelabour for the establishment of the nurseries (though not for their maintenance).This point was overlooked during the appraisal of the second project and inhight it would have been better if the Bank had insisted on a small payment.In the course of the completion mission the subject was discussed againand the authorities seemed inclined to agree with the idea in order to helpreduce wastage of young plants and to discourage plantings on marginal soils.

3.28 From 1973 onwards the project's nursery program expande ag sk1YAAfter attempts to renew the ICO agreement failed in 1973, Burundi followed apolicy of expansion of coffee areas since other coffee growing countrieswere believed to be doing the same. The number of plants distributed fromthe project's nurseries increased from Eabout 25,000:n 1973 o ,

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in .Lg IUnu nearly 1.c mLoilo in e. uLYI I icUS Qurretpoullucu oUnearly 157 of the then ex ing tree population in the project area. Thenew LIO agreement, wnicn wIll become ellect.iyein pepember 1q, Uoes notproEibit-Burundi trom expaning its plantations at such a rate but the majorproblem in this connectdon is one of space. Ngozi province is very denselypopulated and s lms inevitable that young trees are planted either onmarginal soils or on land previously cultivated x-itnjo P, of whicnthere are frequently shortages. During the completion mission it wasobserved that many of tne young plantations_are planted on very steep slopes,on marginal soil in the strips between the old hpantaEfons anEe road[snhich ereprioslyle" uncultivated to allow the passage of cattle. In

tElatter case many of the young coffee trees are planted in the shade ofeucalyptus or pine trees along the road sides, which does not promise ahealthy development for the coffee trees. Government's position is thatmany young famtiles want, to establish their own corree gardens and thatthere is a backlog in the supply of young plants because only small numberswere issued in recent years. For the second project it was agreed that thenumber of trees to be isuedac year would not exceg. ifexistingLaDout e0A ror replacement and 1.575 to establish new gardens for youngfamilies&. Enforcement of this condition seems difficult unless Governmentagrees to a nominal payment for young plants or the Bank refuses toreh,Aburse for claims for excessIve nursery costs,

3,29 In retrospect it seems that the Bank's insistence on bringing thenurseries under project control has encouraged rather than discouraged theexpansion of the coffee areas. It also appears that our insistence was basedon the oviously wrong assumption that through the project the clear andconsistent policy of Government to encourage coffee expansion wherever andwhnever possible could be changed. The dialogue with Government on thissubject was not fruitful and the only effective message would have been,as just suggested, to stop disbursing against nursery costs.

Coffee Quality and Processing

3.30 Coffee Quality. The juality of Burundi's arabica coffee xportshas steadily deteriorated over the last 15 years as shown in the summary below(in percentages of total arabica exports)7

Grade 1962-65 1966-71 1972-75

Fully wished 1 1 1OCIRU 2._/ 30 2 1OCIRU 3A 58 77 61OCIRU 3B 6 16 31Broken 6 5 6

Source: OCIBU Annual Reports

1/ Quality standards are those established since before Independence by theOffice des Cafes Indigenes du Ruanda.- Urundi (OCIRU) and are the inter-nationally recoRnized standards on the basis of which exnort sae are meap

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The proportion of OCIRU 2 arabica coffee dropped from nearly one third in theearly 1960s to about 2% from 1966 onwards, and no OCIRU 2 coffee was ex-ortedin the last two years. The export premium for OCIRU 2 coffee is normallyabout er pound over the standard OCIRU 3A coffee which wassold in early 1975 at about US cts 45 per pound fob Dar-es-Salam and atpresent (after the Brazilean frost and some other adverse developments) atabout US cts 125-130 per pound. The proportion of OCIRU 3B, which normallysells at bout U et und less than OCIRU 3A. increased steadilyfrom just over 5% in the early sixties to nearly one third in recent years.This development causes great concern in Burundin ET t-TR"MAse of theobvious loss fuayitinvolved but also because it is almost0MTTS-1_1"'couDled with increased losses in nroduction volumes. Poor eoffee proess-singFacTM an ower rop usiah standards are seen as the mainreasons for the decline. The decreasing effectiveness of the insect controlprogram is probably the single most important factor because it both reducesthe volume of nroduction and increase the pronortion of insect damagedbeans. TheRprin_ofJd%aged beans increased from about 15% in theearly lQ70s to more than 'Rn -tr- Go No

rois1 This show cle---arly-that improve-ments in the insect control programs are urgently needed (see also para3.11).

3.31 Hand Pulpers. In general terms the firstapoject has thus notsu-y in revers'ing the tre-nd o~f deterf-Ang4+1-

the exception oA e _Tywashed coffee produced in the new coffee washing

washin and drying has been done by the farmers themselve At first the

than 300 simple hand-operated disc pulpers were established in the coffeegroin aras of -~1 whichabou 70 inK- the-project are. The.-------------

always built near perennial streams and included some 6-10 small concreteha"n +-5 soak" andLi.1 th parchme t offee. afte puI5lpJing. in thie lat.e

1950s and early 1960s most farmers made use of these facilitiesbut later inu o mo.JO Ay W uhn puAprs vecame uperauional yU vecausq 0Mr andmMS.theand puloejrs en ties sof te pro ecT was to

and by the end of 1975 some 60 hand pulpers were in use (nine pulperswer close after the consotruction of four coffeec washn statiUns). Thehand"Upulpers certanyfclte i of the coffee bu donot seemJ~

Tu e washn uun,Mies at tne pulping centers areare s d most coffee is not washed before drying. Short and irregular

drying at the f=5ers nomesoften necessitates further drying before hullingand stimulates the spread of micro-organisms that produce off-flavou Tproblems a armers are not paid in accoruance with the quality or theircoffee and are thus aged to do a better jo Introduction ofprmrs lur udierent qualities is considered impracticable in the framework ofthe present marketing system, involving hundreds of small private coffeetrauers. Yet, it would be the only effective way of ensuring better careduring picking and processing.

.L/ No separate figures are available for the project area.

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Washing Stations

3.32 With the objective of improving coffee qualiy the project alsoprovided for the construction and operation of four mechanized coffeeulpin and washing stations. As stated earlier (para 2.05), the fourstations were not included in Government's application but added duringthe appraisal of the project. The idea was to model the stations on thesuccessful Kenya Coffee Authority (KCA) pattern and to achieve a greaterincrease in quality through the purchase from the farmers of coffee--cT-re,rte h2_p.soesr a more closely

9 gr s a n pa rchment coffee, and thusoenueamrcleyconrolled processing. At the timeof appraisal it was expected that forfully washed coffee an export preMium of about US cts 6 per ound would bereceived which corresponded to about 18% of the price of standard OCIRU 3Acoffee at that time.

3.33 Implementation of this part of the project was slow. The firstproject manager expressed serious reservations on the economic prospects ofthe washing stations and the Bank stressed the point that the_price ofcoffee cherries, to be paid to the farmers, needed first to be raised tomake delivery at the stations attractive. The construction of the firststation (Mushonge) started finally in December 1971 (two years after thestart of the project) but, because of late arrival of equipment, thestation became fully operational during the 1973 harvest season only. Theresults of the 1973 and 1974 seasons were disappointing since no more than40-45 ton parchment coffee (35% of the designed capacity) were producedduring each season. The main reasons were a notorious lack of cooperationfrom local administrators, who associated themselves more closeIy wittheiTrests -t 'te pr'ia e-coffTee-tradTers hE-nh!jt,Fe ,anratvecof?e e prThe green lightf or commencing the

construction of the three other stations was delayed for some time by theBank on the assumption that the early results of the Mushonge station shouldfirst be evaluated. But after Mushonge failed to become operational in1972 the Bank authorized the construction of the three stations in February1973. The actual works on the new stations did not start, however, untilOctober 1973 because of slow processing of bidding documents. The newstations thus did not come into operation until April 1975 and the dryingareas were not even fully completed at that time because of late deliveryof plastic sheeting. During the 1975 season (a full six years after theproject had started) for the first time an important volume of fully washedDarchment coffee was _roduced:'94 ton- or about 80% of the desiwnPd enanitvof the four stationsl7. The conditions for cherry deliveries by the farmersha much imnroved. The Government maintained the rnf-rPP cherry nice at the

1974 levels while the official price for semi-washed parchment was reducedfmm PR7 FTh 1r5 TPer ka t.n~ TRn '4Q 'he-.ui f - theii vrY low exort p rce levels iearly 1975. And the local authorities, after personal intervention by the

Minister of a"rictue m- ia aae ser-4ius and sccessfu--lefrto ovicfarmers that they had to deliver the cherries at the stations rather than

1/ Production for the just completed 1976 season is now estimated atC:C:( -4--L - -u - 4. --U~LL --J I op LJJ.. -- .. 3 LOL *L-L1

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3,34 Although it is now finally proven that the project is capableof producing a higher quality fully washed coffee, serious doubts remain_with regard to the profitability of the washing operation. First of allthe constructi costs of te stations trned out to be much higher thanestimated at appraisal: about FBu 6.5 million (US$83,000) actual cost perstation compared with an appraisal estimate of FBu 1.6 million (US$18,000at the 1969 exchange rate). Inflation can be blamed for only part of thecost escalation. In the Burundi situation. and taking the late construc-tion of the stations into account, one would normally have expected a costoverrun of at.the most 50-75%. For one thing it seems that the base costestimate was too low; the appraisal report specified that prices werebased on actual cost of washing stations built in Kenva plus 10 percentto cover transportation to and within Burundi. A supplement of 50% overthe Kenva cost figures would have been more appropriate for Burundi condi-tions. It further seems that the appraisal mission had a far simpler andless costly station in mind than those which were actually built. Itshould indeed be possible to construct satisfactory stations by using lessconcrete and less steel and by installing less engine power. There wasalso some, probably unavoidable, wastage resulting from experiments withdiffprpnt tv-npq f drvinz fantitT-mnnliv nt the Muhone sation.The moving "Warnier" and vertical "Henderson" dryers both turned out to beunastsf'actory under Burndi cnnditions a now only fixed, hriAntal,drying tables (which are cheaper) are being built. Finally the projectdid not alwv- , t tho hpqt nonsible dAl on eninment nrnon1urPd Vnr

example, the equipment for the last three stations was ordered too hastilyin an unsccessful effo+r to get +tem into npea+nn dur +h 1O7k

season. Besides, some of the materials (amongst others plastic sheeting)were nrnocal-d loaliv a+ 'h4oh yv4^0a - afarn^= +Ina +ha ff4^neamainl

because of disruptions in the supplies from abroad.

3.35 The second, even more important factor for the profitability of the

this premium has been lower than projected during the appraisal: about US ctsper pound I n7l: TTC -. 4--. ), -~ ,v7), --.. A TTO -4--.. -Q [_ O - -

.- ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ W .kVQ -'M.J4 LLI J_I.., 'JL .U . 1 C611"0.IU UW. %-UD _) %VL -IU U~VIU1 UI L k±~j'JJ4

ing price for OCIRU 3A coffee) in 1975. The premium obtained in 1975 wasnov4 -nin r. , A4...nr.4vm+4... o,,A no.. ,'...hkh1w, h-e a,rrmle4omA hw.. +ha r.a,ra,e

shortage of coffee following the July 1975 Brazilean frost. Prices fora.verage. grade.L coffee.~, lik nrJ'IDT'.JA .I, were~ A-J4.* -4, -- J. P-4-0. U --. L A J4 0k -

apparently attached less value to quality than in normal times or in times

.J. .J'W 4. so,%U.lV4 UA .u"rthher be noted~U lchadc. L.L ULAU 1L11= .4.7 I )o Y)J.Luw U.&LUII 0±L Ulle1

four stations about 75% was classified as FWA for which the export premiumwoo A .GVL, %L C Uk1 blaCv WaD Cblafe as eiher VCIRU DA U UCIRU 3D

and sold together with traditionally processed coffee classified in thosegraudes. On te outer nduu te hulling elliciency of the ully wasneuparchment coffee (80%) was markedly better than for traditional parchmentcoffee (about 71). iThe implications are not fully clear. Tne appraisalmission for the second project found it difficult to believe that equalamounts of coffee cherries produce different amounts of green coffee whenprocessed differently. Traditionally processed parchment coffee certainlycontains more moisture and remaining mucilage and therefore shows a bettercherry-parchment ratio but a lower parchment-green ratio than coffeeprocessed in the coffee washing stations. Project management believes,

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however that strict quality control on cherry dliveries at the washing

stations (and for which two different prices are paid, according to grade),encourages better coffee picking practices by the farmers which ultimately

leads to a better overall cherry-green coffee ratio for fully washed coffee.The nroject is currently trving to establish the facts throngh tvi.ls*

meanwhile it may be assumed that the quality control measures at thewashing wtations will indeed lead to some (but difficult to quantify)improvement of harvesting practices.

3.37 A full evaluation of the merits' of the washing prCess i Lsn tye~sible but the prospects, at least in" economic rms,A ~ ___

good. The opeRa cost of the kushonge station, comprising, amogsothers, salaries and wages, maintenance and repairs, fuel, 4

insanae

transport costs, but excluding depreciation and the overhead costs (mainlythe cost of an avtri+v4t+ proce ssn oP4fficr) +t+oti1A for 1075 abo+FBu 700,000. The station produced 141 ton parchment coffee which, afterhall4ng gaa 110 +on ran coffa* +he nra+i, ng e+e 14+ A ohv,n +hu

worked out at about FBu 6.3 per kg green coffee or about US cts 3.6 per poundof green cSffee. TicldAi ne AJ. 4 0nk + dpeai ,a FBu 55,0 TT or+U jSct 3pe rAound

green coffee) and overhead costs (about FBu 375,000 per station when tens taQ,tons wil.l. beJ in operat.Lin, or1 US) ct 2C per pound theLJLL total cos.LtJ of produc

tion would be approximately 8.5 US cts per pound of green coffee. These costswoulA be +1 Pe+ r epartly ofse bynsaving+ foaAnn4ng +he +trA4+4inal semV

washed coffee (elimination of traders commission and additional drying of thecoffe 4. j-4-"ura, +oge+her e.A stimated at FBu 3 per kg or TT As 147 perpound of green coffee). The balance, or about US cts 7 per pound of greencoffee wouU neeU to be coverCe vy tne capurt premium fur fully wasueu cUofeeand does not include a return on the capital invested. The experience oftS ao three yearsoues not hold out much hupe for achieyiug a premiumof that size;

3.38 The Government, however, attaches great importance to a continua-tion of the program and hna at various occasions expressed a number ofreasons for taking that position,including the following:

Ci in a situation of oversuply on the world coffee markets, whichwas very much the case in 1914and early 1975 and which may welloccur again after another three or four years, buyers will bemore selective in their corree purchases and thus be more inclinedto pay a premium for good quality coffee. Therefore, it is inBurundi's interest to invest in quality improvement schemes;

li1) so far Burundi has produced only small amounts of fully washedcoffee and a production of say at least 1,000 ton FWA coffeeper year is needed to attract sufficient buyer interest and toestablish a name on the market as a quality producer;

(iii) the impact of the coffee washing station progry is greater thancan be expresse-Tin-triCt con mi cEFfl ft .10 errp. Thewashing stations, where farmers of the surrounding areas delivertheir coffee, can serve as focal points for a large number ofrural development activities, for example demonstration ofbetter growing practices for both coffee and food crops and salesof farm inputs and consumer goods;

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U1v) not expressed in so many words, but probably very much onthe minds of Burundi Government officials:the washing stationsare visible signs of development which is of great importancein the Burundi country situation.

3.39 For the second project Government reguaste iancial_assistancefor the construction ofLng less than ;i new stations. Since there wasclearly not sufficient basis at the time of appriasal to have confidencein the prospects of such a scheme, it was, after protracted discussionsand great reluctance on the Bank's part, agreed to provide for the constructionof four additional stations which would have to be of a simpler and lesscostly design (see appraisal report for the second project). The numberwas later increased to ten in an agreement between Burundi and the KuwaitFund for Arab Economic Development, which co-finances the project. Toenhance the prospects for successful implementation, Burundi will have tofocus very much on the following aspects:

(i) strengthening of coffee research, especially insect control.Insects not only destroy or damage the coffee beans butthere are also indications that they cause off-flavours suchas potato-taste (the fruit-fly is suspected to be the culprit)which results in down-grading of coffee qual (and damagesBurundi's reputation on tI ional coffee markets;

(ii).gict c ontrol of_the quality of cherries delivered at thestations, gQupled with_Drip± j4ffeentials for differentgrades. The project's record in this areais satfsfactory sofar; present standards should be maintained and if possibleimproved;

(Mi) strict gualt control duln

and_drying. again the project's record is not bad so farVu= uch attention should be given to avoid deterioration ofstandards when the number of stations increases; a wellqualified expatriate processing officer is almost certainlyneeded for quite some time to come;

(iv) the production per station should be increased as much aspossible to reduce theexcessiveburden of the fixed coRst, whichaeffar T greate HE'T$ variab e costsR.The bottlenecks atthis time are the drying tables which at most stations can be easilyexpanded at relatively little cost. A production of 150-200ton parchment coffee per station, rather than 100-150 ton,would make a big difference in the costs ner kl/:

(v) the Dossibility of alternative marketing arranaempnts forfully-washed coffee should be exlored. Organization of a

lclauction saleis rein_ rf'faeih r)nr- A qiiffinipent.volume of fully-washed coffee becomes available (800-1000 ton).

1/ See foot note page 16.

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Other Project Activities

3.40 Outside the project's main areas of activity, namely extension on

improved coffee husbandry practices and the supply of inputs, coffee research

and coffee processing, the project has undertaken xew ouner actono. = prec

administration office with clerical staff was established in Ngozi-town during

the third project year when it turned out that, because of both the volume Of

work, and the long distance to Bujumbura, OCIBU's headquarters was unable to do

a satisfactory job. On the other hand the envisaged improvement o culverts

and small bridges on existing coffee tracks was not done by the project but left

to the local communal administrations, which are responsibue for mainnanou e nfthe tracks. Not much seems to have been accomplished: the March 1973 super-vision report says that one small bridge had been improved.

Project Costs

3.41 It is not possible to fully reconcile the appraisal estimates with

ly weak, underwent several changes during the implementation of the project

O.IA UL J. J L D J O.~.JiLLOJ ~.L.. A I i.L-L L' LA-L =0 UVA.)CD ILV L, CL.LW .y ZD LU.L i 1CDVJYJIIU

to the categories used in the appraisal report. The closest possible comparison

estimate more than four times (see para 3.3) and total capitalLUb ~ ui-z u-me hi.L~ hIIC IUI~i±er thanI thte Or-!-!-i

V_L_L) actual expenditures for pesticides an d fertii' r Wtfre both1 only

slightly higher than the appraisal estimates. On the other hand

expenditures for pruning tools and particularly for drying traysremained far below the appraisal estimates. For pruning toolsthe appraisal estimate was too high since the project farmers werein fact already well served with tools. But drying trays, whichwere originally envisaged as a major expedient to improve coffee

quality, were dropped after a small initial distribution programin the first year and the project continued thereafter to focusentirely on the washing stations for coffee improvement purposes;

(iii) staff and operational costs exceeded the appraisal estimate by some257; the costs of the coffee nurseries are included in this categorybut the costs of the coffee fertilizer trials are not;

(iv) the project records indicate that the total cost of the projectwas nearly 20% higher than originally estimated.

There are indications that the project's records include items not included inthe appraisal estimates, namely expenditures for land compensation on buildingsites and tax components of a number of purchases. To determine the amountsinvolved would require a major research effort which is beyond the scope ofthis report.

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.J.LLI JL . JL-.Le$.L"mL J." .L %;.L1Le5 PJ.Lu CLLu wl, 0A . U=L ± L.L6L..LJ V.± JJ±.VJ1=%.%

costs compare as follows:

Appraisal Estimate ActualroDu rerceun

Million Million

IDA 157.5 84 163.1/ 74ur4 m. . Ca ^CU ov rnMLC-U-t r- ±2. ) C

Total Mr. -9 100 221. U 100

During the completion mission Government made the point that it had beenfinancing a larger proportion of the project's cost than envisaged. Theabove summary supports that view although it should be added that some of

nthe expenditures may not actually De regarded as part or the project cost(para 3.41). Government obtained 100% IDA financing for expenditurestotalling Fnu 83 million (38% of total cost) which represents part ofthe foreign exchange costs of the project. Actual foreign exchange costswere proDDly higher, however, since there is ample evidence that occasion-ally imported goods were procured locally and paid for in local currency. Thetrue disbursement percentage for these and other local expenditures was 707throughout the project period. Government never claimed for expendituresfor the coffee fertilizer trials, conducted Dy 1SABu, and during the comple-tion mission it appeared that Government was not aware of the fact thatprovision for this had been made in the Credit Agreement. During theentire project period research costs were financed from OCIBUts normaloperational funds. Government financed its share of project costs almostentirely through a special tax on all coffee exports. The tax rate wasdetermined each year depending on anticipated expenditures and theproceeds of the tax (FBu 55.5 million over six years) were made availableto the project.

3.43 Original disbursement estimates and actual disbursements areshown in the attached copy of a memorandum by IDA's Disbursement Division(Annex 2). The credit was fully disbursed on March 18, 1976, more thantwo years after the original closing date. As indicated earlier (para3.33) late completion of the four washing stations was the main reason forthe delay.

Procurement

3.44 Procurement procedures were in conformity with Bank guidelines

1/ The actual amount disbursed differs from the original estimate becauseof exchange adjustments in both the Burundi and US currencies.

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but on some occasions insufficient time was allowed for prospective bidders(see also para 3.34). Delays in delivery of ordered equipment and materialswas, however, many times a very real problem and sometimes essential buildingmaterials, like cement, were not available for several months (in 1975 forexample). Due to Burundi's isolated location and long transport lines allworks need to be planned far ahead to be reasonably sure of a timely implementa-tion.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS

4.01 OCIBU, a financially autonomous parastatal institution, has since1964 been responsible for a number of major aspects of Burundi's coffeeindustry, including:

Ci) establishment and supervision of quality and packing standards;

(ii) organization of country-wide coffee pest control campaigns;

(iii) promotion of coffee sales;

Civ) maintenance of communal hand coffee pulping centers; and

(v) advise to Government on general coffee policy, in particular,producer prices.

Moreover OCIBU was charged with the imlementation of a Dilot fertilizerdistribution_program in Ngozi Province and for that purpose it employed asmall number of aricultural officers and extension workers in the Province.

4.02 In view of its nrior experience it was understandable that OCIBU wascalled upon to implement the project. But the precise nature of OCIBUIsresnonsibilities had been the sub-ect of extensive discussion durinipreparation and appraisal. The preparation report assigned the "main responsi-hilitv" for the nrnoent to nCTRT urder th' zpnerA.1 superviqion of thp Ministry

of Agriculture while the project would "make full use of the existing

'tionwiTE The Director of OCIBU" but the preparation report did not indicateto whom he would report. Duvin the appanis1 4+ Ame-;Ad A +ce a+oh4lish aspecial Project Department in OCIBU for the implementation of the project and

4+roa co-"^aA +'he+ +ho 'hmsA P +Tim P" 4m^+ D)amew+mnn " nulA hk- +hkme4+it asageed that the- hedofte rJetDeatent V-U- e hepoJcmanager. He "would be responsible under the authority and contfo o:theChairmen wnA Aname -ia+ f nrTTtTT f-w +h- Ao- + A- ma-nam + - ---- P +h

proe . The appraisal report stipulatXs fiFtheYThat coordination of

ISABU, and the Ngozi provincial administration would be through the Minister. Agr J- , ca ru -1SA .J.440J. IItOU %AL..J WII L %II '.±O±Ld11 i L UJ111 /iJ iU _LLJVLUU

Department does not have other responsibilities beides the implementation ofULte proetU. .Lue JAUmU1 as an Cutuy uz Lveu up UV UsZ expecuuions

and has performed reasonably well. Relations between the Department DirectorILIe. the project manager) aru OCiDu's General vjrector were excellenV .urng

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the final year of the project but were strained at times in the precedingyears. The Minister of Agriculture. in his capacity of Chairman of OCIBU.has maintained a consistent and keen interest in the proj ect's progress.The organizational set-up entailed however one ma.or draw-back. as in effectit divorced coffee extension from general agricultural extension work, which-remained under the Ministry of Aariculture. Almost all aualified staff ofthe Ministry's extension service in Ngozi Province were transferred to thenew nrolect entity and the result has been that the Ministry's staff wasreduced to about 80 extension workers of which less than ten had a minimumof basic agricultural education. Durina the project's implementation thetwo ex i.n organizations fuioned Rately, but the Ministry'sextension service was unable to do a satisfactory lob since its staff waslargely untrained and because of an almost total lack of transport meansand funds. Thf 1Q74 annaial minn for tht qefnnr nroint observed thatthe Ministry's chief extension officer in Ngozi Province hitch-hiked regular-lv with nroict vh-Il- vhinh vn for him thp onlv way to at n touch with hisfield agents. Jealousies between OCIBU's and the Ministry's staff oyerr

diff~~r~nrpq pr____o tbe Minitrylpcstaff. The roe of the Ministry's extension service, and exeso workioIther cropsn in genrAl, W1."i Pn+.i"Plir ianrs-a n +.iA appnraisAl rponrt fo-r thp

first project although a number of pilot food crop activities had beenproposed in the pearation report+ Theoraniaonn of the Proi+t+ cnffee

extension service was more straight forward, its size smaller and its taskssimpler than rwould have enn the casse if it had not been taken out of theMinistry's General Extension Service. And it should be added that itsnyrqf 4 ianny ho- I nas cler l wyimrovaA 4n +he cars P 4-ha t'k

4ea+ ts

41--l amemr,+-o+ nn

"RE these are no good reasons for leaving the Ministry's extension service

modest start in the area of other crops.

4.04 For the second project the situation has been improved, The two

aiffsen prUc w18)apraen aranemn hao obfore u n

agricu ff iD,. n wozi P ovince a e now uAben project's supervision.vie cnterted extoensiocn sevice now certainly in a beter shape toexyand its activities to arZ. -9 ia area and to comm (e work

on hrcrp han-i -was lb, 4--atd n.1--A -P~ LuJ.44~i L,. 0.L .. L wo efore the± first projct st U u ULJ Ullq= CIIU Ul

the sec onWproject C1980) a permanent arrangement has to be worked out andthe loia solio woU-ud be= that thle entire eXtenSiOn Service (inicluding6that for coffee) would transfer back to the Ministry of Agriculture whilethe: coffee processing services would remain under OCIBU.

V. PROJECT IMPACT

Coffee Production

5.01 Trying to assess the project's impact on the level of coffee produc-tion in Ngozi province turned out to be one of the most difficult tasks duringpreparation and appraisal of the second project and, again, in the courseof the evaluation of the achievements of the first project. The authors of thepreparation report for the second project observed in 1974: "Quantitativeinformation on Burundi in general, and on the coffee sector in particular,isextremely limited and highly unreliable. For coffee, about the only accurate

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figures are those of realized FOB prices, and of exported quantities, whichare usually equated with production". This is still true today and despiteprovisions in the second project to improve this situation it may take manyyears before reliable additional information will become available.

5.02 The annual coffe_production figures for the country as_a wholeare quire accurately known since virtually all of it is being exported. Onlyinsignificant amounts are consumed domestically in a few urban areas and the

I gers r5Z;;ZTI;Z-18"E ;k-coff;ee. The export figures may beslightly influenced by unrecorded sales in the border areas with Zaire and.Rwanda but, again, the quantities"Tvo1ved are probably insignificant. Themost striking feature in the series of annual production figures is the largefluctutation from one year to another. A record production of 28,0 tongreen coffee in 1974. for example. was a 7 year low of 16.000 ton1T57Table-7Weather conditions re i to^be the major

determinant factor for the volume of the harvest and a year of unusual highproduction is invariably followed by one of lowlylds during which thetrees recuperate from the previous year's heavy bearing. It is generallybelieved that consistent good maintenance ofthe plantations reduces theannual fluctuations to some extent since the trees are then in better shaneto withstand the demanding impact of a heavy bearing. To eliminate theeffect of the yearly fluctuations. 5 year moving averages of the annualroduction 0 een calcul N e CT e4)''. The figures show that the produc-

tion of arabicac.offee (arown by smallholders) has been increasing at anaverage rate of 3% eEara r i the last n 3ea and that ofr&Mta coffee

rownontfew nrivate etates by 2 nr year. Durin the last fiveyearq_including the excellent 197h and poor 1975 seasons, the average annualgrowth rate of the arabica praduction was somewhAt higher. namely 4.-% -

5.03 Information o~n the aeoaraphical disti-ibuti-np of ti -n lini

very poor and unreliab Except for the production of the coffee washing

tion, all coffee is pulped and dried by the farmers themselves and sold tolocal traders, who in turn arrange for transport to one of the hulling

factories in Bujumbura. On arrival in Bujumbura it is impossible to determinethe origin of the cof fee. All gricultural of ficers are' charged with theo etia t offe repeciYe

end of each season. Both the manner in which coffee trading is organized andthe ~ ~ ~ J men a hedspsl fte agricuIltural± oficr p±C~~reventu thlem from

doing a satisfactory job and their reports necessarily involve a great dealof guesswork. in the past CIBU published the amounts of coffee traded on the-loc kets, as reported by the agricultural officers, in its annual reports.But it has not done so siue 1973, apparently because of an understandablelack of confidence in the figures. A comparison of the actual quantitiesexported in the various crop years with the quantities reported by theagricultural officers for the country as a whole indicate that the latter areusually some 10-25%0 too low. According to those estimates the production of

ozj_province averaged 35% of the national production dring the periodo 19-l.nThe year-to-year figures 01-37 in 199, 1972 and 19Y4, 357,

in 1970 and 1971, and 40-42% in 1973 and 1975) suggest that the production ofvgozi province has been growing at a somewhat faster rate than the nationalproduction. On the basis of the figures put forward by the agricultural

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officers the 4-year-moving average production for Ngozi indicates anaverage annual growth of about .5% du ring_th-last-fo.ur__AAr*. As saidearlier, this basis is rather shaKy. It also proves difficult to assessto what extent the growth in coffee production was caused by a_higx_productivit of existing trees or by an increase in the number of trees.here are neither reliable statistics on the number of coffee trees in

the country, nor is it known what the proportion of new plantings has beenin the last decade. In 1974 OCIBU estimated the number of coffee treesin the country as a whole at about 50 million and during the appraisal ofEe second project t e number Ngozi province was estimated t17.5million, QBrn Lr undi' 1. According to project management therewere in 1974 8.5 million trees in the area of the first project, whichcorresponds to one-half of Ngozi's and one sixth of_the nationtstoa,Another estimate of OCIBU suggests that out of Ngozi's 17.5 million trees,2.5 million were planted in the period 1967-1973. This implies an averageannual growth rate of about 2%, which corresponds with the approximateincrease in the number of families (new plantations are said to be estab-lished mainly by newly wed couples).

5.o4 If the above assumptions are correct (and it is impossible toeither confirm or reject them) it can be concluded that in Ngozi province thecoffee production has been growing by -about 2% per lear because of a

corr Donina n -- se i n iPlanat nd by- a further 37o because ofincreased productivity of the trees.

5.05 On the basis of an averaeaua 2pdU _2La2.1 IQ. m cKEnand a atiH! of 10 million the average annual production in

the country as a whole was estimated by the appraisal team for the secondproject at 380_gram green coffee, or 1.33 x 380 = 500 gram parchment coffee,per tree. There is no good reason to change the second appraisal mission'sestimate nor to alter the estimated increase of the produiny theproject area from 7_ gram per ree t Theseestimates are inEline VKiEh a _ncrease in roductivity of 3% per year (para5.0) and with the notion that the productivity in Ngozi is higher thanelsewhere in the country. The actual increase may have been somewhat higherbut certainly not as high as estimated during' the appraisal of the firstproject, namely an increase of 200 gram (from 425 to 625 gram parchment coffeeper tree) with improved husbandry, excluding fertilizers, and another 200gram (to 825 gram per tree) with improved husbandry, including the applicationof fertilizers. On the basis of an incremental production of 75 aram narchmentcoffe er tree and 8.5' million rees in tepoect arpa tetotal annualneremenut at ton archment. or 500 ton areen coffee.

THe last Figure compares with an incremental production of 1,580 ton per year,as given.in the appraisal report.

5.06 There is clearly a need for better information on the nroductivity ofthe coffee trees at various levels of tree husbandry. In the absence ofreliable yield figures for the prolect as a whole- it iq maningless +. tr +n

d tangLthe effects various improved husbandry practices, includingfertilizer. may have had on the vields- Unw the i pmjst management

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has attempted several approaches at measuring coffee cherry production, butthese have all failed or are statistically not sound. A small data collectingand evaluation unit has now been included in the second project and theindividual cherry purchase records, which are now being kept at the coffeewashing stations, may in the future also provide some better information. Butstill, in view of the long pruning cycle and the large annual fluctuations inproduction, it takes at least five years of consi tenA_monitoring before anyuseful concluiio-ns-cante drawn.

Coffee Prices

5.07 The average annual export prices for Burundi's arabica coffee andthe ofricial growers' prices during the project period were as follows (incurrentrterMs):

Average Export Price Official Growers' Price(US cts per lb green coffee (FBu per kg parchment

f.o.b. Dar-es-Salam) coffee)

1969 29 321970 47 361971 35 351972 41 341973 52 3819T4 48 451975 49 391976 n.a. 69

On first sight the average export prices during the last three years havebeen stable but the figures conceal very large fluctuations within the year.The average monthlX export prices fluctuated between US cts 74 and US cts 43.

n betweend US cts 32 in 1975. Since July 1975 theexporEFr-Ts ie-finEreWed dramat ically and they are at pres-entheeeingUS$1.25 per lb_fob Dar-es-Salam. In view of these sharp fluctuations theGovrenaE asTgeaerTITeen-successful in maintaining rather stablegrowerPs g reg, with the exception of .1975. In ri 1T75. Tus erre thestart of the harvest season, the export market was extremely weak and theprices f.o.b. D 1~~'f ~~o ~ t 0~er-ISi. 'Gover-=enthad at that time no choice but to reduce the growers, price as well,Recently the growers' price has been increased to FBu per o o' the 1976season (appraisal estimate FBu 35 per kg).

Value of Incremental Coffee Production

5.08 Calculated at the very low early 1975 coffee export prices ofabout US cts 40 Der lb the incremental troduntion resulting from the p%o-eAt(estimated at 500 ton - see para 5.05) had a value of approximately US$440 000fob Dar-es-Salam but Pt todav's nrinpq of nt lpt TTq.tl P5p 7%mv- 1+

,project production would be worth about US$1,325.000. This compares with ani incremanta nronution of 1,580 tn with a i i f aou+ Ut$ 1250,000 estimatedin the appraisal report.

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Farmers' incomes

5.09 Since the average os are generalUy smal in se an olya modest increase in the level of production has been achieved, average farmincomes have only small amn. No detaled imormusanis available but it can be safely assumed that incremental incomes variedsubstantially depending on the extent farmers have adopted the improvedhusbandry methods. On average the total increase was probably of the order ofUS*b per farm household in 1 . and UBz1U in 15q0 karter the increase of the

inc This does not look very impressive but twoobservations are relevant in this connection:

Ci) the daily wage rate in Burundi is or the order of US cts 35per ; a farmer who would be lucky enough to findemployment would need to work for at least a month to earnthe equivalent of his incremental coffee returns;

(ii) the number of participating families is very large, aboutD and this type of project rates well from the point or

view of equitable distribution of project benefits.

Farmers who delivered their coffee cherries at one of the four new coffeewashing stations received about the same income from their coffee in 1975as those who did not, since the coffee cherry price was about equivalent tothe official coffee parchment price. But those farmers obtained that incomewith a lesse" gLor since they did not need to pup and dry the coffeet emselves. About 8,000 farmers lived in the vicinityiid mide use of thefour washing facilities in 1975 for all or part of their coffee production,

5.10 Therr for several hundreds ofR!Ple, mostly of a temporaryr sasonal nature on its construction sites,nurseries and coffee washing stations.

Econoic Performance

5.11 The economic rate of return for the first project as a whole wasestimated at 32X during appraisal; no separate rates of return were calculatedfor the project's agricultural and processing components at that time. Thefollowing observations are relevant for updating that estimate:

(i) actual incremental coffee production cannot be accuratelyestimated but probably no more than one third of the appraisaltarget was achieved Cpara 5.05);

CiiI actual export prices for coffee fob Dar-es-Salam exceededappraisal estimates on average by about 25-30% during the period1970-1975 and are expected to exceed those estimates in thefuture as well; at present export prices are more than threetimes as high\as forecasted in 1969;

Ciii) the total project cost was about 15% higher and the projectperiod about one third longer than estimated during appraisal;the actual annual expenditures were thus lower than originallyestimatedt and

(iv) about one auarter of actual project cost was related to the

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coffee processing component. This corresponds with theax _ L U .L ~U ULL &I L 4 .OU L U ±L± 4L U c.1L r on

drying trays, as estimated during appraisal, almost the

the four coffee washing stations;

5.12 The up-dated economic rate of return for the project's agriculturalcomponent Vimprovement of coffee Cativa-LULIu z .. ,)p wLuln IuIeq=ru Ckunue

shadow priced at 120% of the official rate (see Annex 4). This is anestimate and as indicated in paragraph 3.42 the cost figures uSeu in theanalysis may include items which in fact should not be regarded as part ofthe project t s cost. But in any event the rate of return (ealculated at1975 constant prices) is much lower than estimated during the appraisal of theproject because the project*s impact on coffee production was over-estimated.The shortfall in production was thus far partly compensated by unexpectedincreases in coffee export prices. Actual economic performance of the projectwill ultimately very much depend on future coffee export prices and fertilizerimport prices. During the last two or three years both prices were subjectto large fluctuations.

5.13 With regard to the coffee processing component not much can beadded to the arguments presented in the appraisal report for the secondproject. Unless the stations produce in the future at least 150 tonparchment coffee per year and a price premium of the order of US cts 8per pound fully washed coffee can be obtained,the rate of return would bemarginal. Recent information suggests that the production target can bereached but there is as yet no such proof with regard to the price premium.

VI. GOVENMENT AND RANK FERFORMANCE

6.01 Government and Bank performance has already been commented upon inthe earlier chapters of this report, sometimes in a negative sense, withregard to problems encountered during project implementation. As a moregeneral statement it is fair to say that neither has performed badly.Government has kept a consistent and keen interest in the project andhas staffed the project with personnel in a manner which should be regardedas satisfactory taking into account the severe limitations of the country'shuman resources. Government's persistent drive to expand the areas undercoffee and to increase the number of coffee washing facilities conflictedwith what the Bank regarded to be appropriate in the particular Burundisituation. The differences in yiewpoints have, however, never led to abreakdown in communications. The discussions continue under the secondproject and only the future can tell whose opinions are right. The correctunderstanding of the Bank s role in these discussions is to follow develop-ments closely and to spell out the risks and possible implications ofspecific Government policies anact ions. The Bank's record on this matterhas been satisfactory during the last years.

6.02 During the completion mission Government officials expressed theirsatisfaction with the way the Bank has been supervising the prolect. There

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was a complaint, however, that in many cases it took too long before theBank responded to Government's queries. There exists indeed a genuineproblem of communication between the Bank and Government which often is causedby trivial matters such as late arrival, or even loss, of correspondence andcables. Having also regard for the often limited understanding of Bankprat e a d aeureson teprt pQvnet ,ylike Burundi, every a Bank reresentative on the scene.DIrecfcontacts between the Bank and the Government are now limited to oneor two supervision missions per year and there is ample evidence thatactions were delayed or problems remained unresolved until a supervisionacquired the first hand knowledge often necessary for the Bank to take aposition. Within the framework of the present supervision system the Banktsperformance should be regarded as good, however. There was an excellent con-tinuity in the _superyision missions; all of these missions (twelve in total),e5kept for the last one, included at least one staff member who had visitedthe project on one or more earlier occasions.

6.03 There were no flagrant breaches of the covenants included in theCredit Agreement.

VII. CHANGES IN THE SECOND PROJECT

7.01 Reference to some of the changes in the second prolect has alreadybeen made in the earlier chapters. They can be summarized as follows:

(i) e of the entire (rince of jg2&j whereas the firstDrolect was limited to the hiah Dotential coffee arowinaareas;

(ii) balanced develpme of coffee and other agricultural activi-ties through the inclusion of a food cron comnonent andexperiments with other rural development activities, includingthe imnrovement of livestock nroduction;

(iii) a unified extension service, rather than a separate service for-c-ffee C6y? Ee irst project) and other crops (Ministryof Agriculture):

Uiv) a larger provision for cn??eP rpereh- narfAinla-rly in t.hpfield of insect control;

(v) a provision for a small team of internationall, recruited-v ntnrvals t

assist in formulating work programs and advise on specific

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ANNEX 1

BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Project Description

The project is the improvement, over a five year period, of coffeeproduction and quality from about seven million existing coffee trees. Thesetrees are grown on some 4,400 ha and are owned by about 44,000 smallholders.The project consists of:

(a) the creation-of a specialized department in OCIBU for theextension of improved coffee production and processing methods;

(b) the provision of in-service training for Burundian coffeeextension and processing personnel;

Cc) the implementation of a program of fertilizer trials onfarmers coffee Dlots:

(d) the provision of farm inputs and tools to Darticipatinifarmers;

(e) the establishment of a fertilizer sales program;

(f) the construction of four pulping and fermenting factories,and the imorovement of about 80 communal pulnina centerstand

(g) the improvement of about 350 small bridges on existingcoffee tracks.

Source: Appraisal Report , October 1968

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WORLD BANK/INTERNATONAIL FINANCE CORPORATION

ANNEX 2A N ~KIDløtMi

UM-IUt- IVLIVIUr /-\iNjUI

T Nr. John Schwartz, ountry Programs II, E. rica DATE: May 6, 1976

FR Peter Gil, Diabursmenta Division

SUBJECT: I7 BL - Ooffee Iprovement Proect

rAabursements uder the above eredit were coipleted on March 18, 1976.For your information the folloving is the final allocation of proceeda for

Category n Iber Total Total

aud Description Allocation Diburøød

la Vehicles & Pulping Paot."quipr-nt $ 38,000.- $ 259,131.38

lb Peaticides I. Fert4iiser

Fara 53,000.- 424,790.94

le Tbola and Materiale 84.,000.- 33,999.00

2a Civil Wrks, Const.Material & Services 197,000.-- 506,018.24

ing orm. Ta5,0.- IL,314.52

2c Salaris & Vages for Techni-cal Services 621,000.- 571,745.92

3 Unallocated 163,000.-

$1,800,000.- $1,800,000.-

Exahange Adjustment 129,019.45

Total $1.929.019

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BURUNDI

Coffee Improvement Project - Credit 147-BU

Economic Evaluation Agricultural Comonent

Benefits Costs

Incremental Coffee Production,i.2/ Green Coffee- Prices - Value Incremental Actual 2/6/ In 1975 Constant 3/

SLiontre)_ fob Dar- am Local rrket Production at Local Prices

Parchment Total Total Actual Constant 1975 equivalen' constant )4rket, constant

Coffee parchment Green prices ices A / 1975 prices, 1975 prices

per tree coffee Coffee USc/in USc/fib FBr?7S FBukg FBu'000 FBu'000 FBu'O00

Gram Ton Ton

1969 . - - - - - - 5,219 9,289

1970 - - - - - -- 20,383 35,262

1971 15 123 97 35 56 97 74 3,589 30,745 49,806

1972 30 246 194 41 62 107 84 9,312 37,909 57,621

1973 45 369 291 52 73 126 103 19,497 27,435 38,409

1974 60 492 388 48 55 95 72 23,280 29,041 33,251

1975 75 615 485 49 49 85 62 30,070 13,916 13,916

1976 65 533 421 - 100 173 150 63,150 - -

1977 55 451 356 - 89 154 131 46,636 - -

1978 45 369 291 - 86 149 126 36,666 - -

1979 40 328 259 - 81 140 117 30,303 - -

1980 40 328 259 -- 79 136 113 29,267 - -

1981 40 328 259 - No projections; value incremental 28,000 - -

1982 40 328 259 - production assumed to decrease 26,500 - -

1983 40 328 259 - gradually from 1980 to 1985. 25,000 - -

1984 40 328 259 - 24,000 - -

1985-88 40 328 259 - 64 111 88 22,797 - -

Internal Economic Rate of Return, without shadowpricing of foreign exchange, 13%

Same, with shadowpricing of foreign exchange, 15%

NB. Benefits 100% foreign exchange,Costs 50% foreign exchangeForeign exchange valued at 120% of official exchange rate

1 Hulling efficiency (from parchment to green coffee): 79%.2/ Decreasing incremental production from 1976-1979 and exclusion of ongoing maintenance costs from 1976 onwards consistent with

appraisal report second project; Annex 1, paragraph 23; Annex 12,, paragraph 2 and Table 5.

3/ Actual prices have been converted in 1975 constant prices by using IBRD's Index of International Inflation.

4/ Green coffee prices, fob Dar-es-Salam, from 1976 onwards are assuned to be UScts 7/lb lower than projected prices for

Guatemala, prime washed, spot New York (see appraisal report second project, Annex 3, Table 1).

5/ Local market value of green coffee FBu 23 per kg below projected fob Dar-es-Salam prices (see appraisal report second

project, Annex 12, Table 7).6/ Actual costs of the agricultural (coffee growing) component represent 75% of total project costs; the balance was spent

on the project's coffee processing compoe nt.

September 13, 1976

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BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE

Distribution of Fertilizers

Year Month Number of Farmers Number of Coffee Trees Quantity of Fertilizers FarmersTotal Under Proportion Total Under Proportion Total Per Tree Price of

Project Using Project Fertilized Fertilized FertilizerAdministration Fertilizers Administrat ion

(Number) (%) ('000) CNumber) (%) (ton) (gram) (FBu/kg)

1969 November 7,000 4,4oo 62 1,300 470 36 51 l09 Free -

1970 April 14,000 12,700 90 2,300 1,575 68 170 l08 FreeNovember 28,000 23,000 82 4,4o0 3,210 73 224 70 Free

1971 April 43,000 32,600 76 6,900 4,750 69 332 70 FreeNovember 47,000 33,400 71 7,700 4,800 62 336 70 Free

1972 April 50,000 34,600 69 8,000 5,630 70 368 65 FreeNovember 51,000 40,800 80 8,250 6,340 77 439 70 Free

1973 April 51,500 42,600 83 8,300 6,230 75 428 69 FreeNovember 52,000 36,200 70 8,460 4,770 56 317 67 Free

1974 April 52,000 27,4oo 53 8,480 3,710 44 386 104 6November 53,000 - - 8,600 - - - -

1975 April 53,000 27,900 53 8,840 3,330 38 270 81 9November 55,000 24,900 45 9,000 2,990 33 207 69 9

July 1, 1976

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TABLE 2

BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Prjct Costs

Appraisal ActualEstimate

Capital Costs

Vehicles 2.1 6.0Washing Stations 5.6 26.THand Pulping Center Improvement 2.8Track ITmprovement 0.4.Moniteur Housing, Equipment Shed 1.5Constructions (unspecified) 21 12.

Sub-total 12.4 45.6Contingency (10%) 1.2 -

Total Capital 13.6 45.6

Inputs

Pesticides 12.5 16.6Fertilizer 34 .7 40.6Dusters 1.9Pest Control Materials - 1.1Pruning Tools 5.6 1.2Drying Trays 19.2 1.2

Sub-total 73.9 60.7

Contingency (10%) 7.4 -

Total Inputs 81.3 60.7

Technical Services

Staff CostsExpatriate 32.3Burundian 45.2

Other, includes Research 6.1Materials and Services 3/ 29.1Wages and Social Security 86.2

Sub-total 83.6 115.3

Contingencies 8.4 -

Tota,l Techntc4l Services 92.0 115.3

Grand Total l8. 221.6

1/ Source: Project Report, April 1976.

2/ Included in "Constructions" (unspecified), a category not included in theappraisal estimate. This category covers the cost of one house in Ngozi,a number of low cost houses for moniteurs and a total of eight fertilizersheds.

2/ The break-down of the cost of Technical Services in the project reportdiffers from the categories used in the appraisal report. The actualfigures do not include the cost of the fertilizer research trials.

July 1, 1976

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TABLE 3

BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE IPROVE4ENT PROJECT

Coffee Exports, 1958/59 - 1975/76, m ton

Coffee Year

-- 1/.Coffee rear- Arabica Robusta Total

1958/59 9,640 300 9,9401959/60 20,727 900 21,6271960/61 9,991 278 10,2691961/62 12,937 196 13,1331962/63 12,972 204 13,1761963/64 5,856 197 6,0531964/65 17,689 600 18,2891965/66 12,826 731 13,5571966/67 14,094 917 15,0111967/68 17,929 753 18,6821968/69 15,517 1,023 16,5401969/70 13,299 1,251 14,5501970/71 21,184 900 22,0841971/72 23,365 1,780 25,1451972/73 17,960 1,600 19,5601973/74 19,601 1,794 21,3951974/75 26,445 1,693 28,1381975/76 14,528 1,701 16,229

1/ The coffee year in Burundi runs from the 1st of May to the 30th of April.

Sources: Banque de la Republique du Burundi and OCIBU.

July 1, 1976

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rPA MT.V I

BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE IMPROVEMNT PROJECT

Coffee Eports, 5-Year Movinñ Averages, ton

195r/r9 - 1962/63 1,25 376 13,629

Jý'J.Lfl Y7 J..7 (U M -IuJ- -2- t

in959/6n -1^. 193/64 1,97 355 .2,852

160/6V - 196Y/65 V',* 29ý «2,>8l

1962/63 - 1966/67 12,687 530 13,218

1963/6I - 1967/'68 13,679 640 14,319

1964/65 - 1968/69 15,611 805 16,416

-1969/70 14,733 935 15,668

1966167 - 1970/71 16,405 969 17,374

1967/68 - 1971/72 18,259 1,141 19,400

1968/69 - 1972/73 18,265 1,295 19,553

1969/70 - 1973/74 19,o81 1,465 20,546

1970/71 - 1974/75 21,711 1,553 23,264

1971/72 - 1975/76 20,379 1,713 22,093

Growth Rate (cumulative)- last 13 3.4% 12.5% 3.8%- last 5 years 4.4% 12.0% 4.9%

July 1, 1976

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BURUNDI

FIRST COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Expatriate Staffing Schedule

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 h 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2_ i ± L W -i -| _ | W . -

Project Manager Carbon . b Dubois Heidebroek

Training Officer Dubols Vacant

Extension Officer Vacant Warnier Gely Pasteels (coffee)

Processing Officer Vacant Veeger

Construction Officer Gasparini(second Project'

July 1, 1976

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IBRD 3971C6TRAL MAY 19771

7 BURUNDI

REPUBLIC OP ZAIRE %ØF CO F EErrr DINIC~ AHIUN RWANDA NIURUND f

IA

ANGOL A

LAWE RWERU<

RWANDA (éAN7ANI

\'* I

I *ÆI"UMBURAV///7//

/OENSITY OF COFFEE TREES

?Very High

High

Medium

Low

Very Low

.- Inteirnaonal Bokindane

THE Bo UNDARIES SHOWN ON THIS MAP DO NOT 0 10 20 30 40 Km

bo IMPlY ENDORSEMENT OR ACCEPTANCE By rHE '-- -a--

WQRLD BANK AND LT$ AFFILIATES. 1300

Page 66: World Bank Document · 2017. 11. 7. · Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1 531 Project Performance Audit Report BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
Page 67: World Bank Document · 2017. 11. 7. · Document of The World bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1 531 Project Performance Audit Report BURUNDI ARABICA COFFEE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

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