The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA (Gerald K. Haines) · 2013. 5. 17. · Pike Committee...
Transcript of The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA (Gerald K. Haines) · 2013. 5. 17. · Pike Committee...
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Looking for a Rogue Elephant
The Pike Committee Investigations and
the CIA
Gerald K. Haines
For the first time in the
Agencys history, CIAofficials faced hostile
Congressional committeesbent on the exposure of
abuses by intelligenceagencies and on major
reforms.
~9
A storm broke over the CIA on 22
December 1974, when SeymourHersh published a front-page articlein The New York Times headlined
Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported inU.S. Against Anti-War Forces.Hershs article alleged that the
Agency had been engaged in massivedomestic spying activities.1 His
charges stunned the White Houseand Congress.
In response, President Ford estab
lished a blue-ribbon panel, theRockefeller Commission, to investi
gate CIA activities in the United
States. Ford later complicated the
already-delicate issue further by hint
ing of CIA involvement inassassination attempts against foreignleaders. Congress soon launched itsown investigation of the entire Intelli
gence Community (IC) and its
possible abuses. On 27 January 1975,the US Senate established the Senate
Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities (the Church
Committee). On 19 February 1975,the House voted to create a House
Select Intelligence Committee (theNedzi Committee, which was
replaced five months later by the Pike
Committee.)
These Congressional investigationseventually delved into all aspects ofthe CIA and the IC. For the first
time in the Agencys history, CIAofficials faced hostile Congressionalcommittees bent on the exposure of
abuses by intelligence agencies andon major reforms. In the Congress,there was no longer a consensus to
support intelligence activities
blindly. The old Congressionalseniority1system and its leadershipwas givir~g way. With the investigations, the CIA also became a focal
point in ~he ongoing battle betweenthe Congress and the executivebranch o~ver foreign policy issues andthe imperial presidency.
The inve~stigations of the Pike Committee, l~eaded by Democratic
Represer~tative Otis Pike of NewYork, pafalleled those of the ChurchCommittee, led by Idaho SenatorFrank Church, also a Democrat.
While the Church Committee centered its lutention on the more
sensatior~al charges of illegal activitiesby the CIA and other components ofthe IC, the Pike Committee set
about ex~mining the CIAs effectiveness and its costs to taxpayers.
Unfortui~iate1y, Representative Pike,the committee, and its staff never
develope~l a cooperative working relationship with the Agency or the Fordadministration.
The con~mittee soon was at odds
with the CIA and the White House
over que~tions of access to documents and information and the
declassifi!cation of materials. Rela
tions bet~veen the Agency and thePike Committee became confronta
tional. C~IA officials came to detestthe committee and its efforts at inves
tigation. Many observers maintained
moreover, that Representative Pike
was seek~ng to use the committeehearings to enhance his senatorial
ambitions, and the committee staff,
almost 4tirely young and anti-establishment, clashed with Agency andWhite House officials.
Gerald K. Haines is the AgencyHistorian at CIA. He also heads
CIAs History Staff.
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Pike Committee
The Nedzi Committee
Following the lead of the Ford administration with its Rockefeller
Commission investigation and the USSenate with its Church Committee
inquiry, the House of Representativesin 1975 established a special committee to investigate the activities of theIC.2 On 16 January 1975, Democratic Representative Michael
Harrington introduced a resolution inthe House to create a select commit
tee to conduct such an investigation.Even Democratic RepresentativeLucien Nedzi, Chairman of the
Armed Services Subcommittee on
Intelligence and a strong supporter ofthe Agency, concurred in the need forsuch a broadly representative committee. Republican Minority Leader JohnJ. Rhodes also endorsed the proposal.Only a few members of the Housequestioned whether it was necessaryto create such a committee in light ofthe Church Committee investigationsin the Senate and the Rockefeller
Commission investigation in the executive branch. On 19 February 1975,the House, by a vote of 286 to 120,passed House Resolution 138 creatinga House Select Committee on Intelli
gence, the Nedzi Committee.
The committee consisted of seven
Democrats and three Republicans.Because it was a select committee,the House leadership appointed themembers. Unlike the Senate Com
mittee, which was carefully balanced
politically, Speaker of the HouseCarl Albert and Majority LeaderThomas P. ONeill, Jr., chose to givethe committee a liberal Democratic
majority.3 All Democratic membersof the Nedzi Committee had strong
negative feelings about the IC. Democratic Congressman Ron Dellums,for example, stated even before thecreation of the committee that I
think this committee ought to come
All Democratic members of
the Nedzi Committee had
strong negative feelingsabout the Intelligence
Community.
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down hard and clear on the side of
stopping any intelligence agency inthis country from utilizing, corrupting, and prostituting the media, the
church, and our educational
system.4
Albert and ONeill selected Nedzi as
committee chairman. Nedzi, a 14-
year veteran of the House, also had
strong liberal credentials. He had
opposed the Vietnam war, the devel
opment of the B-i bomber, and the
antiballistic missile system. Since
1971, he had served as chairman of
the House Armed Services Subcom
mittee on Intelligence. As chairman,Nedzi had conducted a thoroughinvestigation into the CIAs role in
Watergate.5
CIA officials found Nedzi to be a
solid choice, but other Democrats in
the House and on the committee had
major reservations. Harrington especially felt Nedzi had been co-optedby his service as chairman of the subcommittee on intelligence. He asked,How could he investigate himself?6
The party ratio on the committee
upset Rhodes and the other Republicans. Nevertheless, Rhodes
appointed three ideologically conservative and strong supporters of the
IC and the White House to the com
mittee.7 The 7-to-3 ideologicaldivision represented a broad spectrum of political thought fromDellums on the left to RepublicanRobert McClory on the right.8
Nedzi tried to set an agenda for thecommittees investigations. Hebelieved that the committee should
focus on the Agencys family jewels the list of abuses and possibleillegal activities the Agency itself compiled in the early 1970s. On 5 June1975, however, before the committeecould meet to discuss its program,The New York Times published detailsof the family jewels and revealedthat Director of Central Intelligence(DCI) William Colby had briefedNedzi about them in 1973, when
Nedzi was chairman of the Armed Ser
vices Subcommittee on Intelligence.9His fellow Democrats, led by Har
rington, revolted. Nedzi resigned aschairman of the committee on 12
June 1975.
Harrington suspected that Nedzi s
resignation was simply part of a plotto abolish the Select Committee and
prevent a House investigation of theIC and the CIA.10 Accordingly, on13 June, with a rump caucus chaired
by Representative James Stanton, theDemocrats tried to hold a hearing onintelligence with Colby as the firstwitness. At Nedzis urging, however,the Republicans refused to attend,thus preventing an official meeting.The committee investigation then
ground to a halt.1
The circus-like atmosphere continued on 16 June, when the House
rejected Nedzis resignation by a voteof 290 to 64. But Nedzi refused to
continue as chairman. On 17 July,the House abolished Nedzis Select
Committee and voted to establish a
new Select Committee with Representative Pike as chairman.12
The Pike Committee
The new committee did not differ
greatly from the old one. Enlarged to
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Pike Committee
Privately, Pike indicated
13 members, the committee, led byDemocrats, continued to provide asolid liberal Democratic majorityeven after it dropped Nedzi and Har
rington from membership. Pike alsoretained Searle Field as chief of staff
from the Nedzi Committee and
brought in Aaron Donner from NewYork as his chief counsel. Despite the
new start, the committee remained
badly divided on ideological grounds.The majority was still hostile towardthe CIA and the White House.13
Pike, like Nedzi, would have no mandate to develo? an effectiveinvestigation,
~ the expiration datefor which was 31 January 1976.
Unlike the Church Committee,
which had carefully balanced
younger staff with Hill professionalsand ex-IC members, the Pike Com
mittee had a predominantly youngstaff with little experience either onthe Hill or in the Intelligence Community.5 This would cause majorproblems in dealing with the Agencyand the White House.
The CIA Reaction
Just as he had done with the Rock
efeller Commission and the Church
Committee, DCI Colby promisedhis full cooperation to the Pike Committee. Colby, accompanied bySpecial Counsel Mitchell Rogovinand Enno H. Knoche, Assistant to
the Director, met with Pike and Con
gressman McClory, the rankingRepublican on the committee, on24 July 1975. At the meeting, Colbyexpressed his continuing belief thatthe committee would find that the
main thrust of US intelligence wasgood, solid, and trustworthy.
Pike responded that he had no intention of destroying US intelligence.What he wanted, he told Colby, wasto build public and Congressional
that he believed the Agencywas a rogue elephant out
of control.
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understanding and support for intelli
gence by exposing as much aspossible of its nature without doingharm to proper intelligence activities.Pike related to Colby that he knewthe investigation would cause occasional conflict between us, but that a
constructive approach by both sidesshould resolve it. Privately, Pikeindicated that he believed the
Agency was a rogue elephant outof control, as Senator Church had
charged publicly. It needed to berestrained and major reportingreforms initiated.
Colby, unaware of Pikes privateviews, then sought an agreementwith Pike and McClory on procedural matters much like the Agencyhad negotiated with the ChurchCommittee. Colby outlined his
responsibility for protecting sourcesand methods and the complexityposed in meeting far-flung requestsfor all documents and files relatingto a given topic.
Pike would have none of Colbys rea
soning. He assured the DCI that thecommittee had its own security standards. He also refused to allow the
CIA or the executive branch to stipulate the terms under which the
committee would receive or review
classified information. Pike insisted,
moreover, that the committee had
the authority to declassify intelli
gence documents unilaterally.16He
appeared bent on asserting what hesaw as the Constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch overthe executive branch, and the CIA
was caught in the middle.
Given Pikes position, the committees rela~ionship with the Agencyand the ~White House quickly deteriorated. It soon became open warfare.
Confron~tation would be the key toCIA an4 White House relationshipswith the~ Pike Committee and itsstaff. Eafly on, Republican Representative James Johnson set the tone forthe relat~onship when he told Seymour Bolten, chief of the CIA
Review Staff, You, the CIA, are the
enemy. ~ Colby came to considerPike a jackass and his staff a ragtag, imthature and publicity-seekinggroup.~7 Even Colbys ratherreserved counsel, Mitch Rogovin,saw Pik~ as a real prickly guy. . . todeal with. Rogovin believed Pikewas not~really wrong in his position.He jus~ made it so goddamn difficult. You also had to deal with Pikes
political ambitions.8
The CTJk Review Staff, whichworked~ closely with both the ChurchCommittee and Pike Committee
staffs, r~ever developed the samecooper~tive relationship with thePike Committee staffers that it did
with th~ Church Committee. TheReview~Staff pictured the Pike staffers as flower children, very youngand irr~sponsible and naïve.
Accord~ng to CIA officer RichardLehman, the Pike Committee staffers
were ~bsolutely convinced that theywere d~aling with the devil incarnate. For Lehman, the Pike staff
came in loaded for bear. Donald
Gregg,~the CIA officer responsiblefor coc~rdinating Agency responses tothe Pike Committee, remembered,The rhonths I spent with the PikeCommittee made my tour in Viet
nam s~em like a picnic. I wouldvastly prefer to fight the Viet Congthan d~al with a polemical investigation by a Congressional committee,which is what the Pike Committee
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Pike Committee
investigation] was. An underlyingproblem was the large cultural gapbetween officers trained in the earlyyears of the Cold War and the youngstaffers of the anti-Vietnam and civil
rights movements of the late 1 960sand early 1970s.
As for the White House, it viewed
Pike as unscrupulous and roguish.Henry Kissinger, while appearing to
cooperate with the committee,
worked hard to undermine its investi
gations and to stonewall the release ofdocuments to it.9 Relations betweenthe White House and the Pike Com
mittee became worse as the
investigations progressed. William
Hyland, an assistant to Kissinger,found Pike impossible..
Pike and the committee members
were just as frustrated. On 4 August1975, Pike aired his frustration in a
committee hearing. What we havefound thus far is a great deal of the lan
guage of cooperation and a great dealof the activi7 of noncooperation, heannounced. ~ Other committee mem
bers felt that trying to get informationfrom the Agency or the White Housewas like pulling teeth.21
By September, the relationship waseven worse. The CIA Review Staff
found the Pike Committee requestsfor documents silly and the deadlines impossible to meet. For
example, the committee on 22 September 1975 issued a request for
any and all documents relating to aseries of covert operations. At thebottom of the request it added it
would like them today, if possible.
The final draft report of the Pike
Committee reflected its sense of frus
tration with the Agency and theexecutive branch. Devoting an entire
The CIA Review Staff
found the Pike
Committees requests for
documents silly and thedeadlines impossible to
meet.
~9
section of the report to describing itsexperience, the committee characterized Agency and White House
cooperation as virtually nonexistent. The report asserted that the
executive branch practiced footdragging, stonewalling, and deception in
response to committee requests for
information. It told the committee
only what it wanted the committeeto know. It restricted the dissemina
tion of the information and ducked
penetrating questions.22
The Agency did not allow the draftPike Report to go unchallenged. CIAofficials believed that, to a greatextent, the committees troubles with
regard to access were of its own mak
ing. Accountability was a two-waystreet and the committee staff was
self-righteous and blind, accordingto Robert Chin, Associate LegislativeCounsel. Searle Field did admit later
that the committee had far more
trouble with the State Department,the White House, and the Defense
Department than it did with the
Agency with regard to access to sensitive documents.
Investigation of IntelligenceBudget
Pike himself set the agenda for theHouse investigations. Unlike theChurch Committee and the Rock
efeller Commission, which allowed
their agendas to be determined by the
executive branch, Pike refused to getcaught up in the sensationalism ofthe press charges of domestic abuses.Initially convinced that the IC wasout of control, Pike focused his committees investigations on the cost ofUS intelligence, its effectiveness, andwho controlled it. In his first meetingwith Colby on 24 July 1975, Pikeindicated his committee would beginits investigation by concentrating onintelligence budgets. He told Colbyhe personally believed that knowl
edge of intelligence expendituresshould be open and widespread.
Illustrative of just how quickly the
relationship between the Agencyand the Pike Committee turned
sour was a sarcastic letter Pike
addressed to Colby on 28 July1975, only four days after their first
meeting. In the letter, Pikeinformed the DCI that the commit
tee would be investigating the ICs
budget. Pike began the letter by stating, First of all, its a delight toreceive two letters from you not
stamped Secret on every page.Pike then criticized Colbys letterswhich laid out the basic legislationestablishing the National SecurityCouncil, the CIA, and the DCI and
detailed the compartmentation issuein developing the atomic bomb andthe U-2as not particularly pertinent to the present issue.
Pike made it clear he was seekinginformation on the ICs budget. Hewrote that he was not interested in
history, sources and methods, or thenames of agents. I am seeking toobtain information on how much of
the taxpayers dollars you spend each
year and the basic purposes for
which it is spent, he wrote Colby.He justified his focus on the budgetby citing Article I, Section 9 of the
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Pike Committee
The Pike Committees final
Constitution: No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury but in con
sequence of appropriations made bylaw; and a regular statement andaccount of the receipts and expenditures of public money be publishedfrom time to time. He then
continued:
1 would assume that a reasonable
place to lookfor that statement ofaccount would be in the Budgetofthe United States Governmentand while it may be in there, I
cant find it. Ihope that Mr.
Lynn James Lynn, Director ofthe Office ofManagement and
Budget] may be able to help me.The Index ofthe Budgetforfiscalyear 1976 under the Cs moves
from Centerfor Disease Controlto Chamizal Settlement and to a
little old count~y lawyer, it wouldseem to me that between those
two might have been an appropriate place to find the CIA but it isnot there. Its possibly in theresomewhere but I submit that it is
not there in the manner which
thefoundingfathers intendedand the Constitution requires.
Pike seemed to believe that, by fol
lowing the dollars, the committeecould locate activities and prioritiesof our intelligence services. Accord
ingly, on 31 July 1975, the PikeCommittee held its first hearing onthe CIA budget. Elmer B. Staats, the
Comptroller General of the General
Accounting Office (GAO), was thefirst witness. Staats testified that the
GAO had no idea how much moneythe CIA spent or whether its management of that money was effective or
wasteful because his agency had no
access to CIA budgetaryinformation.23
report concluded that the
foreign intelligence budgetwas three or four times
larger than the Congresshad been told.
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When Colby appeared before thecommittee on 4 August, he refused totestify publicly on the intelligencebudget. The next day, however, he
appeared in executive session and outlined the expenditures of the Agencyin some detail, stressing that the largest portion of the budget wasjustifiably devoted to the Soviet Unionand to China, the primary US intelli
gence targets. Colby argued that
revealing even the total of the CIA
budget would do substantial harm tothe US intelligence effort. Accordingto Colby, it would enable foreign intel
ligence services to improveconsiderably their estimates of US
capabilities. Turning the argumentaround, Colby reasoned that the USGovernment would benefit consider
ably from access to this sameinformation concerning the Soviet
intelligence effort. He then stated, Tothe best of my knowledge, no other
intelligence service in the world publicizes its intelligence budget.
Colby further argued that publicknowledge of CIA budget totalswould not significantly increase thepublics or Congresss ability to make
judgments about CIA programsbecause, without greater detail and
understanding of the programs themselves, no significant conclusions couldbe drawn. Rogovin and other CIA officials evidently believed Colby had
presented a strong case before the committee for maintaining secrecy in the
budgetary process. They thought he
had effec~tively deflected all majorcriticisms.
The CL~. assessment was very differentfrom the Pike Committees. The Pike
groups ¶lnal report concluded that theforeign i~itelligence budget was threeor four t~mes larger than Congress hadbeen tol~1; that money appropriatedfor the I~ was hidden throughout theentire F~deral budget; that the totalamount~offtmnds expended on intelligence w~s extremely difficult todetermi~ie; and that Congressionaland executive scrutiny of the budgetranged I?etween cursory and nonexistent. The report described the GAO
as the aiiditing arm of Congress, but,when it came to the intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, it was no armat all.
The GAO was, the report found, prevented ~y security constraints fromlooking carefully into intelligence bud
gets. Tl~e end result, according to the
report, 1was insufficient executive and
legislari~e oversight. The committeealso saw a too cozy, almost inbred
relation~ship between the Office ofManag~ment and Budget officials andthe int~lligence budget makers.24
Taking on the issue of secrecy, thereport ~irgued that taxpayers andmost of Congress did not know and
cannot~ find out how much they spendon spy activities. The committee saw
this as ~eing in direct conflict with theConstitution, which required a regularand pi~blic accounting for all fundsspent i~y the Federal Government.25The document then addressed Colbys
argum~nt that the Soviets wouldbenefi~ enormously from disclosure.The report claimed that the Soviets
probably already had a detailed
accout~t of US intelligence spending,far mc~re than just the budget total. It
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Pike Committee
On 12 September 1975,
concluded that in all likelihood, the
only people who care to know and donot know these costs are the American
taxpayers.26
In addition, the report found that the
DCI, who was nominally in charge ofthe entire Community budget, controlled only 15 percent of the total
intelligence budget. The Secretary ofDefense had much greater power and
control over a greater portion of the
intelligence budget than the DCI.27
When CIA officials reviewed the
draft report, they took exception tothe document as a distorted view of
the budgetary process. Arguingagainst the disclosure of a budget figure for the IC, Agency officials feltthat any disclosure permits thecamel to put his nose under the
tent. The general feeling amongAgency officials was that the releasewould grossly misrepresent to the USpublic and to the world what wasactually spent on intelligence by theUnited States. They reasoned that, ifsuch gross estimates led to publicpressures for reducing intelligenceexpenditures, it could do irreparabledamage to real intelligence functionsand their ability to support US for
eign and defense policies. They alsocontended that if the report was
released as is, it would give the public the erroneous impression that theCIA did not have thorough budgetreviews. The official Agency positionrecommended deleting almost all thebudget references from the report.
But the Agencys comments and protests had little impact on the final
report. As drafted, it recommendedthat all intelligence-related items beincluded as intelligence expendituresin the Presidents budget, and that thetotal sum budgeted for each agencyinvolved in intelligence be disclosed.
Pike subpoenaed records
relating to the 1968 Tetoffensive in Vietnam. His
action touched off a major(albeit short-lived) war
between the Pike
Committee and the
White House.
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If such an item was a portion of the
budget of another agency or department, it should be identified
separately. The report also recommended that the Congress draft
appropriate legislation to prohibit anysignificant transfer of funds or significant expenditures of reserve orcontingency funds in connection with
intelligence activities without specificapproval of the Congressional intelli
gence committees. in addition, the
committee recommended that the
GAO be empowered to conduct a fulland complete management as well asfinancial audit of all intelligence agencies.28 These clearly were not wildand crazy recommendations.
Evaluating US IntelligencePerformance
The budget issue was only one majorquestion raised by the Pike Committee. The committee also wanted to
know just how effective the CIA andUS intelligence had been over the
past 10 years. This investigation also
provoked a major confrontationbetween the Agency and the WhiteHouse on the one hand and the Pike
Committee on the other. On 9 September 1975, after submittinginformal requests for information,
the Pike Committee formallyrequested all CIA estimates, currentintelligence reports and summaries,situation reports, and other pertinentdocuments that related to the ICs
ability to predict the 1973 Mideastwar; the 1974 Cyprus crisis; the1974 coup in Portugal; the 1974nuclear explosion by India; the 1968Tet offensive in Vietnam; the 1972declarations of martial law in the
Philippines and Korea; and the 1968Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The committee, of course, wanted all
of this by the next morning. The
request outraged Agency officials.
House Select Committee hearings onthe 1973 Middle East War began on11 September. They almost immediately degenerated into open warfarewith the executive branch. Pike, afirm believer that the classification
system was strictly that of the executive branch and that his committee
had the right to unilaterally declassify and release information, released
part of a CIA summary of the situa
tion in the Middle East prepared on6 October 1973 that had seriouslymisjudged Egyptian and other Arabintentions. The CIA and the White
House both objected, maintainingthat the release compromised sourcesand national security. As released,the report read:
The (deleted) large-scale mobilization exercise may be an effort tosoothe internalproblems as muchas to improve milita7y capabilities. Mobilization ofsome
personnel, increased readiness ofisolated units, and c~reater commu
nications security are all assessed
as part ofthe exercise routine.There are still no military orpolitical indicators ofEgyptianintentions or preparation toresume hostilities with IsraeL29
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Pike Committee
On the same day, 12
According to Agency officials andthe White House, the release of the
four words and greater communica
tions security meant that theUnited States had the capability tomonitor Egyptian communications
systems.But the Agency and theWhite House were on shaky ground.Kissinger himself had leaked the
same information to Marvin and Ber
nard Kalb for their book on
Kissinger. Discussing the Yom Kippur war, the Kaib brothers wrote:
Finally, from a secret US base insouthern Iran, the National Secu
rity Agency, which specializes inelectronic intelligence, picked upsignals indicating that the Egyptians had set up a vastly more
complicatedfield communications network than mere
maneuvers warranted.30
To add fuel to the fire, on 12 September 1975, Pike subpoenaedrecords relating to the Tet offensivein Vietnam in 1968. His action
touched off a major (albeit short-
lived) war between the Pike Commit
tee and the White House. The CIA
played a secondary role in this knockdown Constitutional struggle. Onthe same day, President Ford orderedthat the Pike Committee be cut off
from all access to classified docu
ments and forbade administration
officials from testifying before thecommittee.
Despite this action, each of the principalsthe White House, the CIA,and the House of Representativessought a political compromise thatwould avoid a court test. The Pike
Committee itself proposed to resolvethe issue by giving the executivebranch a 24-hour notice before
September 1975],President Ford ordered
that the Pike Committee be
cut off from all access to
classified documents and
forbade administration
officials from testifyingbefore the committee.
On 26 September, Ford
agreed to lift his order.
9,
release of information in order to
provide for consultation.
At a joint meeting at the WhiteHouse on 26 September, Ford
agreed to lift his order prohibitingthe further release of classified materi
als to the Pike Committee. In return,
Pike and McClory agreed on havingthe President be the ultimate judgein any future disputes over the public release of classified materials.3
The near war over the declassifica
tion issue detracted from the
committees work of evaluating theoverall performance of the IC. In
general, however, the committee wascritical of the performance of US
intelligence in predicting the 1973Mideast war; the 1968 Tet offensive
in Vietnam; the 1974 coup in
Cyprus; the 1974 coup in Portugal;the 1974 testing of a nuclear device
by India; and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.32
For example, using the Agencys own
postmortems on the Yom Kippurwar, the committee found that the
principal conclusions concerning
the commencement of hostili
ties.. .we~requite simply, obviously,and starl~1ywrong.3~ In earlier testimony before the committee, Colbyadmitted that, We did not cover
ourselve~ with glory. We predictedthe day ~efore the war broke out thatit was n~t going to break
out.34
Despite Colbys forthright assessment, tl?e Agency reacted defensivelyto the draft report. Disregardingtheir o~n postmortems, which basically supported the committees
finding~, Agency officials fought tohave most of the section on the Mid
east waif deleted. They argued thatthe section was unbalanced in its
treatme~it of the war and that the
parts w~iich spoke of the Arab fighting units as inferior would confirmArab b~1ief that the US view of themwas degrading, thereby exacerbatingrelatior~s. They also worried that thereport provided too much detail onthe USJ capability to read Soviet traffic to Egypt. Unlike the give-and-take br~kering that characterizedCIAs relations with the Church
Comm~ttee, positions on both sidesof the pike Committee/Agency relationship tended to be
uncompromising. Pike Committeestaffers1 did remove names andsource~, but they left in most of whatthe Ag~ncy objected to. They contende~ that to comply with theAgency recommendations wouldleave qothing.
The Committee Reviews Covert
Actioi~s
The ~gency, with close WhiteHous~ cooperation and support, continued its assault on the Pike
Comr~ittee investigations and findings w~hen the committee announcedit wot~1d investigate 10 years of
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Pike Committee
covert action in general, as well asspecific CIA actions with regard tothe 1972 Italian elections, US covertaid to the Kurds in Iraq from 1972to 1975, and US covert activities in
Angola. Under orders from theWhite House, CIA officials refused
to testify in open session before thecommittee on these operations,declaring that such hearings wouldonly benefit foreign intelligenceservices.35
The committee instead heard from
Congressman Michael Harringtonand Harvard law professor RogerFisher, both of whom called for the
outlawing of all covert action; formerNational Security Adviser McGeorgeBundy, who opposed covert actionin peacetime; and historian Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., who claimed thatthe CIA was indeed a rogue ele
phant and who suggested that the
only remedy was to impose strictexecutive and legislative oversightand drastically cut the intelligencebudget as the ways to curb covertactions.36
The committee followed these hear
ings with a detailed examination ofthe role of the National SecurityCouncil and the 40 Committee,the major decisionmaking bodieswhen it came to covert action
approval. The key question for thecommittee was whether the CIA was
a rogue elephant or under strictcontrol of the President and the exec
utive branch?37
The committee found that covert
actions were irregularly approved,sloppily implemented, and, at times,had been forced on a reluctant CIA
by the President and his national
-security advisers. Except for assassination attempts, however, it did not
The CIA never did
anything the White Housedidnt want. Sometimes
they didnt want to dowhat they did.
Rep. Otis Pike
~9
recommend abolition of all covert
action; it merely called for tightercontrols.
With tighter controls in mind, thecommittee recommended that the
DCI notify it in writing with adetailed explanation of the nature,extent, purpose, and cost of all covert
operations within 48 hours of initial
implementation. It also proposedthat the President certify in writingthat such a covert action operationwas required to protect the nationalsecurity oi the United States.38
The committees findings in this areawere generally unexpected by CIAofficers. These findings made clearthe committee believed that the CIA
was not out of control and that the
Agency did not conduct operationswithout approval from higher authority. Pike himself stated publicly thatthe CIA does not go galloping offconducting operations by itself.The major things which are done arenot done unilaterally by the CIAwithout approval from higher up theline.39
The committees final report also
made it clear that the committee did
not believe the CIA was out of con
trol. It stated, All evidence in hand
suggests that the CIA, far from beingout of control, has been utterlyresponsive to the instructions of thePresident and the Assistant to the
President for National SecurityAffairs.40 Even Pike, who startedout convinced that the CIA and the
IC were indeed out of control,concluded:
I wound up the hearings with ahigher regardfor the CIA thanwhen I started. We didfind evidence, upon evidence, uponevidence where the CIA said:
No, don .t do it. The State
Department or the White Housesaid, Were going to do it. TheCIA was much more professionaland had afar deeper reading onthe down-the-road implicationsofsome immediately popular actthan the executive branch or
administration officials. One
thing I really disagreed withSenator Frank] Church on washis characterization ofthe CIAas a rogue elephant. The CIAnever did anything the WhiteHouse didnt want. Sometimes
they didnt want to do what theydid.41
The Final Report
Determined to finish his work by 31January 1976, Pike pushed his committee for a final report. Searle Field
at first hired Stanley Bach, a politicalscientist with some Hill experience,to write a draft report. Working primarily from the transcripts of thecommittees hearings, Bach produced a rather balanced report not
uncritical of the IC. The reportcalled for the establishment of a jointintelligence oversight committeeusing the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as a model.42
88
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Pike Committee
The solid
recommendations the
Pike rejected the draft and assignedthe responsibility for producing a satisfactoiy final report to Field andAaron Donner. By early January,they had a draft.
On 19 January, Field turned over a
copy of the 338-page report for
Agency review. He wanted it back bythe close of business on 20 January.Rogovin responded with a scaldingattack on the report. He criticized
the extreme time constraints placedon the Agency in making its responseand pictured the report as an unre
lenting indictment couched inbiased, pejorative and factually erroneous terms. For Rogovin and mostof the Agency, the report focusedalmost exclusively on negative matters and totally lacked balance. It
gave the American public a distortedview of US intelligence, therebyseverely limiting its impact, credibil
ity, and the important work of yourcommittee.
~
Despite Rogovins protest, on 23 January 1976 the committee voted 9 to
7 along party Lines to release its
report with no substantial changes.The Republicans on the committee,strongly supported by the Agencyand the White House, now led the
fight to suppress the report.
At the same time, Colby, fearing thatthe report would be released, called a
press conference to denounce the
committee and called the committee
report totally biased and a disserviceto our nation. Colby claimed the
report gave a thoroughly wrongimpression of American
intelligence.44
Unofficially supported by the
Agency and the White House,McClory and the other Republicans
committee made.. .
were
overlooked in the
commotion surroundingthe leaking of the
committees report to
the press.
,,
took the fight to suppress the reportto the House floor on 26 January1976. McClory argued that therelease of the report would endangerthe national security of the UnitedStates.45 On the same day, The NewYork Times printed large sections ofthe draft report.46
On 29 January 1976, the Housevoted 246 to 124 to direct the Pike
Committee not to release its reportuntil it has been certified by thePresident as not containing information which would adversely affect the
intelligence activities of the CIA.47Democratic Representative WayneHays seemed to reflect the basic feel
ings of the majority in the Housewhen he commented just before the
vote:
I wiliprobably vote not to releaseit, because Ido not know what is
in it. On the other hand, let me
say it has been leakedpage bypage, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph to The NewYork Times, but I suspect, and I
do not know and this is what dis
turbs me, that when this report
comes out it is going to be the biggest non-event since BrigitteBardot, after 40 years andfourhusbands and numerous lovers,
held a press conference to
announce that she was no longera virguin.48
Pike was1 bitter over the vote. Heannoun~ed to the House, TheHouse ji~ist voted not to release a document it had not read. Our
committee voted to release a document it had read.49 Pike was soupset th~it he threatened not to file areport at all with the House becausea repor~ on the CIA in which theCIA would do the final rewrite
would t~e a lie.50 Later, Pike
reflecte~ that They, the WhiteHouse, ~wanted to precensor our final
report. This was unacceptable.5
In an at~tempt to pacify Pike,McCloiy on 3 February made amotionjin committee that SpeakerCarl Albert be asked to submit the
final re~ort to President Ford so thatit might be sanitized and released.The co~nmittee rejected this lasteffort ar compromise by a vote of 7to 4~52 Journalist Daniel Schorr then
gave a Øopy of the entire Pike Reportto The Village Voice, which publishedit in fuil on 16 February 1976 underthe titl~ The Report on the CIAthat President Ford Doesnt Want
You to~Read.~~ When Schorr admitted that he leaked the report to The
Village~ Voice, the House voted tohave its Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct investigate theleak. After extensive inquiry, it failedto finc~ out who leaked the report. Soended the House investigation of theIC.54
The dommittee Recommendations
The sclid recommendations the Pike
Comr~ittee made for improving Congressiqnal and executive oversight ofthe IC and for strengthening the
89
-
Pike Committee
DCIs command and control authori
ties were overlooked in the
commotion surrounding the leakingof the committees report to the
press. In addition to its recommenda
tions for prohibiting assassinations,opening the IC budget, allowingGAO audits of the CIA, and intro
ducing stricter oversight of covertactions, the committees number-one
recommendation, like the Church
Committees, was the establishmentof a Standing Committee on Intelli
gence. Unlike its Senate counterpart,the House committee would have
jurisdiction over all legislation and
oversight functions relating to all US
agencies and departments engaged inforeign or domestic intelligence. Itwould have exclusive jurisdictionover budget authorization for all
intelligence activities and for allcovert actions.
The Pike Committee also proposedto vest this committee with subpoenapower and the right to release anyinformation or documents in its possession or control. Coupled with thislast recommendation was an addi
tional section that recommended
criminal sanctions for the unautho
rized disclosure of information
tending to identify any US intelli
gence officer.55
All these reform recommendations
were attempts to improve the organization, performance, and control ofthe IC without adversely affectingUS intelligence capabilities. Yet, inthe turmoil surrounding the controversy over whether to release the
report, the recommendations were
ignored, forgotten, or simply lumpedin with the report as outrageous and
missing all the points. Not until
July 1977 did the House vote to create a permanent House intelligencecommittee. Later, a reflective Pike
saw the leaks and fights over disclosure as distracting from thecommittee findings.56
Assessment
Despite its failures, the Pike Committee inquiry was a new and dramaticbreak with the past. It was the first
significant House investigation ofthe IC since the creation of the CIA
in 1947.
In the final analysis, both the CIAand the committee were caught upin the greater power strugglebetween the legislative and executivebranches in which the Congress inthe late 1970s tried to regain controlover US intelligence activities and
foreign policy. The investigationswere part of this overall struggle.And the inquiry foreshadowed,
although it was not clear at the time,that Congress would become muchmore of a consumer of the intelli
gence product.
NOTES
1. Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against AntiWar forces, The New York Times,22 December 1974, p. 1.
2. FrankJ. Smist, Jr., Congress Overseesthe United States Intelligence Commitnily, 1947-1989 (Knoxville:University of Tennessee Press, 1990),
p. 134.
3. Congressional Quarterly, 19 February1975, p. 240. See House ApprovesInvestigation of CIA, FBI. TheDemocratic members were Robert
Giaimo, Don Edwards, James V.
Stanton, Michael Harrington,Ronald Dellums, and MorganMurphy.
4. Smist, Congress Oversees the UnitedStates Intelligence Community, p. 161.Dellums is quoted in House SelectCommittee on Intelligence, US.intelligence Agencies and Activities:Committee Proceedings, 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976): 2163.
5. Smist, Congress Oversees the UnitedStates Intelligence Community, pp.146-150.
6. Ibid.,p.151.
7. Rhodes appointed Robert McClory,David Treen, and Robert Kasten tothe committee. Smist, Congress Oversees the United States IntelligenceCommunity, pp. 137-145.
8. Smist, Congress Oversees the UnitedStates Intelligence Community, p. 161.
9. See TheNew York Times,5 June1975, p. 1. The CIA family jewelswas a 663-page internal report compiled on possible Agency illegalactivities. It was ordered by DCIJames Schlesinger following theWatergate revelations in 1973. Seealso Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Communitypp. 152-153.
10. See House Votes New IntelligenceCommittee, 18 July 1975, Congressional Quarterly, p. 230. See also JohnRanelagh, The Agency: The Rise andDecline ofthe CIA (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1987), p. 587.
11. Smist, Congress Oversees the UnitedStates Intelligence Community, pp.139and 16 1-165. New Democratic mem
bers included Les Aspin, DaleMilford, Philip Hays, and WilliamLehman. All the original Republicansremained on the new committee, and
they added James Johnson.
12. Pike, a World War II Marine Corpscaptain, was a close friend of Nedzi.Both had served in the House for
seven terms and both had been on the
House Armed Services Committee.
Pike had also conducted the House
90
-
Pike Committee
investigation of the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo in 1968. In 1975,
Pike expressed interest in running forthe Senate irs 1976.
13. See Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,p. 176.
14. Ibid., pp. 176, 208, and 290.
15. Ibid., p.29O.
16. Ibid., p. 290.
17. See William Colby and Peter For-bath, Honorable Men: My Lifi in theCIA (New York: Simon and Schuster,1978), pp. 431-432.
18. Rogovin, telephone interview withauthor.
19. See Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,pp. 157 and 189.
20. See House Select Committee on
Intelligence, US. intelligence Agenciesand Activities. Intelligence Costs,(Washington, DC, GPO, 1975), P.169.
21. See Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,p. 178.
22. See CIA, The Pike Report, (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books,1977), pp. 26-94.
23. See House Select Committee on
Intelligence, US. Intelligence Agenciesand Activities: Intelligence Costs,(Washington, DC; GPO, 1975), p.126.
24. Ibid., pp. 110-113.
25. ibid., pp. 110-113.
26. Ibid., pp. 113-116.
27. Ibid., pp. 115-120. The report alsonoted that the military intelligencebudget did nor include expendituresfor tactical military intelligence, andthat this greatly distorted the intelli
gence budgets of the Services. See alsoHouse Select Committee on Intelli
gence, Intelligence Costs, pp. 109-224.
28. See The Pike Report, pp. 259-260and House Select Committee on
Intelligence, Intelligence Costs, pp.109-224.
29. See Daniel Schorr, Clearing the Air(Boston: Houghton Muffin, 1977),P. 188 and Smist, Congress Overseesthe United States Intelligence Community, p. 185.
30. See Marvin and Bernard Kaib, Kiss
inger (Boston: Little Brown, 1974),p. 454 and Smist, Congress Overseesthe United States IntelligenceCommunity, p. 186.
31. See Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,P. 186. Pike later maintained that this
agreement did not extend to the com
mittees final report.
32. For the Pike Committee evaluations
of US intelligence relating to the Mideast war, see the Pike Report,pp. 141-148; for the Tet offensive,see pp.i30-l38 on Portugal,pp. 149-154; on India, pp. 155-157;on Cyprus, pp. 158-168; and onCzechoslovakia pp. 139-140.
33. The Pike Report, p. 141.
34. See Colby, statement before the committee, 4 August 1975, House SelectCommittee on Intelligence, US. Intelligence Agencies andActivities: Risksand Control, pp. 1771-1773.
35. See Select Committee on Intelli
gence, Risks and Control, pp. 1575-1576.
36. House Select Committee on Intelli
gence, Risks and Control, pp. 1729-
1770, 1848-1850, and 1858.
37. House Select Committee on Intelli
gence; Performance ofthe IntelligenceComr~iunity, Pp. 777-778 and 827-828. The committee issued a sub
poen~ for 40 Committee records on6 No~,rember 1975.
38. The Pike Report, P. 258.
39. House Select Committee on Intelligenc~, Peiformance ofthe IntelligenceCom~nunity, p. 813.
40. The~Pike Report, p. 189.
41. Pik~ as quoted in Smist, CongressOver~cees the United States intelligenceCom~rndnity, p. 197.
42. See Smist, Congress Oversees the
Uni~ed States Intelligence Community,p. 207.
43. Ibid. p. 297.
44. The~ New York Times, 26 Januaryl976,p. 1.
45. SeeSmist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,p. 1~9.
46. Sed The New York Times, 26 January197~, p. 1.
47. Se~ Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,p. 170.
48. Se4 Congressional RecordHouse, 94thCoi~gress, 2nd Session, 29 January19~6, p. 1639.
49. Ibid., p. 1639.
50. Se~ David E. Rosenbaum, House
Pr~vents Release of Report, The NewYork Times, 30 January 1976, p. 2.
91
-
5 1. Quoted in Smist, Congress Overseesthe United States Intelligence Community, p. 162.
52. Ibid., p. 163.
53. See The Village Voice, 16 February1976, p. 1. The Village Voiceversionof the Pike Report, with an introduction by Philip Agee, was published inBritain in 1977. See CIA, The Pike
Report (Nottingham, England:Spokesman Books, 1977).
54. See Smist, Congress Oversees theUnited States Intelligence Community,p. 171.
55. See The Pike Report, pp. 257-258.Under the Church Committee recom
mendations and the subsequentestablishment of a Senate Select Com
mittee on Intelligence, responsibilityfor tactical military intelligenceremained solely within the jurisdiction of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
56. See The New York Times, 10 October 1976, p. 6.
92