Tai Lieu Dich Bac Lan (1)

8/9/2019 Tai Lieu Dich Bac Lan (1)

1/65

The Role of Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S.-VietnamRelations

Mark ManyinForeign Affairs AnalystCongressional Research Service

Introduction: The Adantages of a !"ea#$ State

Since the time of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Congress has strongly

influenced American olicy to!ard Vietnam, in !ays that have "oth

romoted and hindered the relationshi. Congress#s role in foreign olicy$

making in general % and to!ard Vietnam in articular

% often seems confusing to non$Americans. &he constitutional division of

o!ers in the United States means that the U.S. often aears to have a

cacohony of voices seaking on foreign olicy, reresenting interests that

are glo"al, national, and highly local.

'S( h)n chia *uy+n l(c trong hin h- M/ 01ng ngh/a v2i vi3c *u4c gia

n5y th67ng s8 c9 nhi+u ting n9i kh:ng ;n kh2 v+ nhnh

s-ch 04i ngo?i th@ hi3n m4i *uan t)m 0n tnh hnh th gi2i, tnh hnh

trong n62c v5 tnh hnh khu v(c.

While the division of foreign olicy o!ers may frustrate foreign countries"y creating dou"ts a"out the a"ility of the residents to deliver on

romises, a relatively !eak Bin structural terms eDecutive can confer

enormous advantages to a country in international negotiations. Skilled

residents can use their lack of ultimate decision$making o!er to

demand concessions, on the grounds that if concessions are not o"tained,

the agreement !ill not "e ratified "y the legislature.

'MEc d s( h)n chia *uy+n l(c cGa nhnh s-ch 04i

ngo?i M/ c9 th@ l5m nIn ch> c-c *u4c gia trJn h gi2i khi chKng t?o ranh


2/65

mNt th v kh> nhm yJu c)u s( nh6Qng "N, khi m5 ch c9 nh6Qng "N th

thXa thuPn m2i 06Qc hJ chuYn "i cZ *uan lP h-.

Moreover, having multile voices on foreign olicy allo!s a country to

eDeriment !ith foreign olicy otions that a unitary government might

consider too risky or threatening.'[Zn nnh s-ch 04i ngo?i

cho h\ mNt *u4c gia c9 th@ th nghi3m nhi+u l(a ch]n ch>nh s-ch 04i

ngo?i kh-c nhau, 0i+u m5 mNt th@ nh5 n62c 0Zn nh=t s8 coi l5 *u- rGi ro

hoEc nguy hi@m.

^ndeed, eDecutive "ranch officials occasionally use mem"ers of Congress

to float trial "alloons "y roosing initiatives that the resident is un!illing

or una"le to initiate at the moment. ^n the case of Vietnam$U.S. relations,

for instance, Congress#s seat at the foreign olicymaking ta"le allo!edindividual mem"ers in the _`bs and _``bs to take the lead in hastening

the normaliation rocess.

&rong tr67ng hQ cGa m4i *uan h3 Vi3t$M/, l=y mNt v> dT cT th@ nh6 v5o

giai 0o?n nh6ng n;m b v5 `b, nh "5n ho?ch 0nh ch>nh s-ch

ngo?i giao cGa *u4c hNi cho h\ mi c- nh)n t( 04c thKc *u- trnh "nh

th67ng h9a *uan h3 gi


3/65

!hich grants Congress certain o!ers, including the o!er to raise

revenue, regulate international commerce, declare !ar, raise and suort

a military, and to make all a!s deemed necessary and roer....

Additionally, Article BSection gives the Senate the secial o!ers of

confirming residential aointees, and of ratifying treaties.&he "ifurcation of authority often makes it difficult to identify !hen and

!here a articular U.S. olicy originated, decide !hen a roosal actually

influences olicy, and determine !hen a modification creates a ne!

olicy._ As a general rule, the resident, as the head of state, is the

initiator of U.S. foreign olicy, !ith the Congress laying a reactive role.

jn this oint, the his$

_ Richard F. rimmet, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,CRS Reort Rb_`, une _, _```, . _.


4/65

_ &he^nstitutionalSettingtorian d!in

Cor!in

made ano"servation

on U.S.

foreign

olicy that

is still

relevant

todayp

While theresident is

usually in a

osition to

propose...th

e Congress

qis often in

a technical

osition atleast to

dispose. &he

verdict of

history, in

short, is

that the

o!er to

determinethe

su"stantive

content of

American

foreign

olicy is a


5/65

divided

o!er, !ith

the lion#s

share falling

usually,

though "y

no means

al!ays, to

the

resident.

The &udget

Process

Congress#s

most

imortant

foreign

olicy tool

is the o!er

of the

urse. &he

resident#s

need to

have

Congress

ass the

annual

"udget

rovides

mem"ers of Congress

!ith a

vehicle to

restrict the

resident#s

freedom of


6/65

action or

re*uire the

resident to

undertake

ne! foreign

olicyinitiatives.

jften, these

congression

al measures

take the

form of

amendment

s to Borinsertions

into

aroriatio

ns

legislation

that the

resident is

unlikely toveto. &he

assage of

the so$

called

ackson$

Vanik

amendment

is one

eDamle ofCongress

using the

"udgetary

rocess to

affect

foreign


7/65

olicy.

^n _`, theiDonadministration !as

attemtingto normalietraderelations!ith theSovietUnion, asart of itsolicy ofd\tente.Congressdefied theadministration "yassingamendments to the

&rade Act of_` thatmade thegranting ofMostFavoredationBMFtreatment to

mostcommunistcountriesconditionaluon thosecountriesli"eraliing


8/65

theiremigrationolicies. Asis !ellkno!n in

Vietnamesegovernmentcircles,anotherre*uirementof theackson$Vanikamendments is that theUnitedStates mustsign a"ilateraltradeagreement,!hich is

su"ect tocongressional aroval,"eforecommercialrelations can"e fullynormalied.

Congressional

'ersight

Congress


9/65

also

influences

U.S. foreign

olicy

through itsongoing

oversight of

eDecutive

"ranch

activities.

&he most

common

eDamles

are

hearings,

!hich may

"e held "y

any

congression

alcommittee

on any

su"ect

!ithin its

urisdiction.

[earings

rovide

mem"ers

!ith an

oortunity

to shae

U.S. olicy

"y raising


10/65

*uestions

for u"lic

discussion.

uring the

VietnamWar, for

instance,

Senate

Foreign

Relations

Committee

hearings

contri"uted

to u"lic

oosition

to U.S.

olicy in

Southeast

Asia.

Mem"ers ofCongress

can also use

their

oversight

duties to

suort a

articularly

controversial

residential

olicy. As

!ill "e

discussed

"elo!,


11/65

wresident

Clinton#s

normaliatio

n of

relations!ith

Vietnam !as

made

olitically

ossi"le "y

the

"iartisan

u"lic su$

ort and

rodding

given "y

several

mem"ers

!ho !ere

veterans ofthe Vietnam

conflict,

most

nota"ly

Senators

ohn xerry,

ohn

McCain, o"

xerrey, and

Chuck Ro"".

jther

eDamles of

congression


12/65

al oversight

include con$

ducting

investigation

s and

imosingreorting

re*uire$

ments on

the

eDecutive

"ranch,

such as the

re*uirementthat the

resident

reort to

Congress on

human and

religious

rights

conditions in

various

countries.

&he

Senate#s

confirmation

and treaty$

aroving

o!ers also

rovide it!ith a

o!erful

means of

eDercising

oversight,

and


13/65

influence,

over the

resident#s

foreign

olicy.

Additionally,mem"ers of

Congress

fre*uently

travel to

foreign

countries to

oversee and

takeositions on

U.S. foreign

olicy.

CongressionalResolutions

very year,individual

mem"ers of

Congress

introduce

large

num"ers of

resolutionseDressing

the sense of

the [ouse,

Senate, or

"oth. When


14/65

assed,

these

resolutions

in effect

"ecome theofficial

olicy of

the

legislative

d!ard S.Cor!in,ThePresident,Office andPowers, _$_`zBe! {orkpe! {orkUniversitywress,_`, .__, ascited inrimmet,. _. rimmet,. _.

rimmet,. _. jverthe years,thisemigrationre*uirementhas "ecomeinterretedto meanli"eraliationof humanrights more"roadlydefined.


15/65

ialogue on U.S.$VietnamRelations

"ranch. &hey

therefore may "e

considered a

channel of

communication

"et!een the

Congress and the

resident, and"et!een the

Congress and

foreign

countries.z

Resolutions

generally are

considered to "e

a !eak tool|

since they are

not legally

"inding, the

eDecutive "ranch

often ignores

them. [o!ever,

resolutions canlay an

imortant role in

gauging the level

of congressional

su$ort or

oosition to


16/65

controversial

olicies. For

instance, as !ill

"e discussed

"elo!, in _``

wresident Clinton

!aited to order

an end to the

U.S. trade

em"argo on

Vietnam until

after the Senate

had assed aresolution

suorting such

a move.

The

(eterminants

ofCongressional

Influence

Congress#s

a"ility and

!illingness to

modify and

initiate foreign

olicy has e""ed

and flo!ed over

the years, as the

relative o!er of

the t!o

"ranches

changed in


17/65

accordance !ith

the needs of the

day. &he degree

of congressional

influencedeends on t!o

rimary

varia"lesp the

resence or

a"sence of a

foreign olicy

crisis, such as a

!ar| and the

articular issue$

area involved.

Foreign Policy

Crises

&yically, the

endulums!ings to!ard

the residency

during times of

foreign olicy

crises, !hich

lace a

remium on

having onenational voice

and *uick,

centralied

decision$

making. &hus,

the follo!ing


18/65

historical

eriods are

often

considered to

"e ones of

residentialdominancep

_`$_bsBformation of the reu"lic|War of__

_}_$_}`BAmerican

Civil War|Reconstruction eriod

_`$_`_BSanish$American War,World War ^

_`}$early_`bs

BWorld War^^, ColdWar, andVietnamconflict

^n the late _`}bsand early _`bs,

the distrust of

the residency

"rought a"out

"y Watergate

and the failure of


19/65

U.S. olicy in

Vietnam led

Congress to

reassert its role

in forming U.S.

foreign olicy.

^ndividual

mem"ers of

Congress such

as Senator

William Ful"right

emerged as

rominent critics

of wresidents

ohnson and

iDon, most

nota"ly "y

holding hearings

that gave

oonents of the

War a latform.

^t !as during

this eriod that

Congress

increased its

resources

greatly, "y

creating the

Congressionaludget jffice

and the jffice of

&echnology

Assessment, and

"y eDanding

the caacities of


20/65

the eneral

Accounting

jffice and the

Congressional

Research

Service.

uring the

residencies of

Ronald Reagan

and the first

eorge ush, the

endulum s!ung

"ack some!hatto!ard the

residency,

though "y most

measures, not

nearly to the

eDtent that it had

"een at the

height of theCold War.

Congress had

"ecome too

accustomed to a

role in foreign

olicy, and no!

had the

institutionalo!er to assert

itself. ivided

government %

!ith the

emocrats in

firm control of


21/65

the [ouse and

often of the

Senate %

rovided an

additional

olitical rationale

for challenging

the wresident#s

foreign olicy

rerogative.

Furthermore, the

tha!ing of the

Cold War and the

er$ceived

decline in U.S.

economic o!er

rovided oen$

ings for Congress

to directly

challenge the

eDecutive

"ranch#s foreign

olicy rationale.

&hus, during the

_`bs, Congress

ushed the

Reagan and first

ush

administrations

to "ecome

increasingly

assertive in for$

eign economic

olicy,

articularly in


22/65


23/65


24/65

&he^nstitutionalSetting

years sa!

Congress

force the

eDecutive

"ranch to

under$take

initiatives

ranging

from maor

olicy

commitment

s, such as

the

develomen

t of amissile

defense

system to

more

narro! ones

like the

imositionof conditions

on military

relations

!ith

^ndonesia.


25/65

^n contrast,

normaliatio

n !ith

Vietnam

!as a case!here the

Clinton

administrati

on, !ith the

assistance

of individual

mem"ers of

Congress,

!as out in

front of the

maority in

Congress.

&he current

consensus

on the

administrati

on of

eorge W.

ush is that

the !ar on

terrorism

has s!ung

the "alance

of o!er

"ack to!ard

the

residency.

^t remains


26/65

to "e seen,

ho!ever,

!hether

this shift is

temorary

or long$

standing.

&he longer

a sense of

crisis

ersists,

the longer

and moresuccessfully

the

wresident is

likely to

seek

congression

al deference

in foreignolicy.

IssueAreas:

Trade and)uman

Rights

Bto5n "N

hHn n5yCongression

al influence

over foreign

olicy also

varies "y


27/65

issue area.

^n general,

Congress is

"est a"le to

take the

initiative, or

"lock

residential

initiatives,

on narro!

issues. ^n

art, this is

due to the

difficulties of

marshal$ing

hundreds of

la!makers

to suort a

"road olicy

initiative.

Also, it is

due to

Congress

"eing in

many !ays

closer to the

American

eole.

Mem"ers of

Congress

often find

themselves

to "e the

"est voice of

interests,


28/65

articularly

economic

ones that

ercolate u

from

American

society.

Many of

these

interests

tend to "e

arochial,

and thus

their

advocates

often find

them assed

over "y the

eDecutive

"ranch,

!hich has to

"e

concerned

!ith the

"roader

elements of

U.S. foreign

olicy. ^t is

not

surrising,

for instance,

that

comlaints

a"out

Vietnamese


29/65

catfish

imorts

entered the

olicy

domain

through the

Congress,

during the

Senate#s

confirmation

hearings of

U.S. &rade

Reresentati

ve Ro"ert

~oellick.

[uman

rights have

"ecome

another

issue tailor$

made for

Congress to

assert itself.

Since

Congress

does nothave the

resonsi"ilit

y for

eDecuting


30/65

foreign

olicy, it has

the luDury of

insisting

that olitical

and religious

freedoms "e

included on

the U.S.

foreign

olicy

agenda.

Additionall

y,

allegations

of human

rights

a"uses areoften most

forcefully

raised "y

mem"ers

of eDile

com$

munities

and non$

governme

ntal

organiati

ons,

grous


31/65

that

mem"ers

of

Congress

are "etter

reared

to hear

and

reresent

than the

eDecutive

"ranch.

Congresshas "een

rincially

resonsi"le

for

institution$

aliing

human

rights on theU.S. foreign

olicy

agenda.

ven !hen

romoting

human

rights has

"een officialolicy,

residents

tyically find

it difficult to

maintain

this riority


32/65

!hile

managing

"roader

security and

economic

concerns, as

wresidents

immy

Carter and

Clinton

discovered.

&o counter

this

tendency,Congress

has used all

its tools

availa"le to

try to

elevate the

imor$tance

of humanrights. ^n

_`z,

Congress

re*uired

that the

State

eartment

monitor andreort to

Congress on

human

rights

conditions in

all reciients


33/65

of U.S. for$

eign aid. ^n

_``,

Congress

elevated

religious

rights on the

foreign

olicy

agenda "y

assing the

^nternational

Religious

FreedomAct, !hich

!as signed

"y wresident

Clinton. &he

la! created

the U.S.

Commission

on^nternational

Religious

Freedom

BUSC^RF

and the

State

eartment

jffice of^nternational

Religious

Freedom.

&he latter is

headed "y

an


34/65

am"assador

at large,

!ho is

su"ect to

Senate

aroval

and must

reort to

Congress

annually on

the state of

religious

freedom in

othercountries.

&he la! also

identified

sanctions to

"e laced on

countries if

they are

found tohave

engaged in

or tolerated

articularly

severe

forms of

religious

erse$cution.} &he

[ouse

^nternational

Relations

Committee,

Senate


35/65

Foreign

Relations

Committees,

and the

USC^RF

have held

hearings on

the religious

rights

situation in

selected

countries.

Congress

and U.S.Policy

To*ardVietnam Bto5n "NhHn n5y

For the astz years,

Congresshas taken asecialinterest

} See Vitaite,ReligiousPersecution

Abroad:Congressional Concerns

and Actions,CRS Reort` `}F,anuary _z,_```.


36/65

ialogue on U.S.$VietnamRelations

in Vietnam, at a

level out of

roortion to

Vietnam#s actual

strategic or

economic

imortance to

the United

States. ^n bbb,

for eDamle, the

monthly reort

that the

Congressional

Research Service

BCRS roduceson Vietnam, The

Vietna!"#$#

%orali&ation

Process, received

nearly t!ice as

many re*uests

from

congressional

offices as the

CRS#s monthly

reort on U.S.$

aan relations.


37/65

Since the end of

the Vietnam War,

no resident has

"een a"le to act

on Vietnam!ithout

roducing

intense, often

imassioned

congressional

resonses.

Congress#seculiar

fascination !ith

Vietnam has

"een rimarily

due to the

emotional

legacies of the

Vietnam War,articularly after

the Vietnamese

!ithdra!al from

Cam"odia and

the resettlement

of most of the

"oat eole

effectivelyremoved

Vietnam from

U.S. strategic

thinking in

Southeast Asia.


38/65

Until the early

_``bs, the

vestiges of the

!ar hurt

Vietnam#s

standing in

Congress. &his

situation

gradually

reversed itself

over the course

of the _``bs, to

the oint !here

the desire to

close the chater

on the Vietnam

War actually

heled the U.S.$

Vietnam "ilateral

trade agreement

B&A sail

through "oth

[ouses in bb_.

&he agreement#s

leading roo$

nents on Caitol

[ill !ere

Vietnam War

veterans. AndAmerican unions

offered little

oosition to the

act in art

"ecause their


39/65

rank and file

vie!ed it as an

end of War

issue.

Congress%sRole in the

+ormali,ation

Process

Until the mid$

_``bs,

congressional

interest in

Vietnam !as

dominated "y a

desire to o"tain

a full accounting

for U.S.

risoners$of$

!ar•missing$in$

action BwjW•M^As. ^n _`,

"oth [ouses

assed

resolutions

oos$ing U.S.

aid to Vietnam

follo!ing [anoi#srefusal to

rovide

information on

American

wjW•M^As until


40/65

after it received

a romise of

"illions of dollars

in aid. A

!idesread"elief ervaded

Caitol [ill that

Vietnam !as

!arehousing

several hundred

remains and

releas$ing them

incrementally to

gain tactical

advantage in

negotiations

!ith the United

States. Faced

!ith strong

ressure fromveterans grous,

Congress

throughout the

_`bs continued

to insist that

normaliation

could not occur

until Vietnam

cooerated in

roviding

informa$tion on

wjW•M^As, a


41/65

osition that

"ecame official

U.S. olicy.

Mem"ers of

Congress alsoeDressed their

con$cern a"out

human rights in

Vietnam,

focusing on the

light of olitical

risoners, and

a"out the

situation of

Vietnamese

refugees.

Starting in the

early _``bs,

Congress "egan

to take a moresuortive vie!

of normaliation.

A maor

contri"utor to

this change !as

the "iartisan

Senate Select

Committee onwjW•M^A affairs,

!hich "et!een

August _``_ and

ecem"er _``

conducted !hat


42/65

many consider

the most

eDtensive

indeendent

investigation of

the wjW•M^A

issue

undertaken.

Chaired "y ohn

xerry and vice$

chaired "y

Senator o"

Smith, the

committee#s

reort concluded

that there !as

some evidence

that wjWs !ere

alive after the

U.S. !ithdra!al

in _`, and that

although there

!as no

consiracy in

Washington to

cover u live

wjWs, the U.S.

government had

seriously

neglected and

mismanaged the

issue,

articularly in

the _`bs.


43/65

werhas most

imortantly, the

committee#s

televised

hearings !ere

cathartic for

many Americans|

they layed a

maor role in

defusing much of

the assion that

had surrounded

the wjW issue.

&he committee is

an eDcellent

eDamle of ho!

Congress can use

its oversight and

investigative

o!ers to

influence U.S.

olicy.

egislatively, a

turning oint

!as assed on

anuary ,

_``, !hen,

follo!ing months

of high$level

interaction !ith

Vietnam on

resolving

wjW•M^A cases,


44/65

the Senate

aroved a

resolution urging

the lifting of the

U.S. tradeem"argo on

Vietnam. &he

follo!ing !eek,

wresident Clinton

formally ended

the em"argo.

&he language of

the Senate

resolution,

attached to

authoriing

legislation,

roved

controversial in

the [ouse, "utultimately

survived.

Follo!ing the

lifting of the

em"argo in

_``, each ste

to!ardnormaliation

confronted

assionate yet

declining

oosition from


45/65

Congress. As

"efore, the key

to overcoming

oosition !as

rogress on thewjW•M^A

Figure : [ouseVotes onVietnam#sackson$VanikWaiver, _``$bb


46/65

issue. &he

increased

suort for

normaliatio

n is indicat$ed "y the

steadily

increasing

suort for

residential

!aivers of

the ackson

Vanik

amendment

restrictions

Bsee Figure

_, and "y

the

over!helmin

g margins

"y !hich the

U.S.$

Vietnam &A

!as assed

in late

bb_.

A num"er of factors !ereresonsi"lefor the shiftincongressional oinion onVietnam.


47/65

Mostimortantly,Vietnamese$U.S.cooeration

on resolvingwjW•M^Aissues "eganto convincemem"ers ofCongressthat the[anoiregime !as

sincerea"outimrovingrelationsand could "ea relia"leartner.jther signsof change in

Vietnam %the!ithdra!alfromCam"odia,the doi oi economicreforms, thechange inleadershifollo!ing theSiDth andSeventhwartyCongressesin _`} and_``_ %


48/65

contri"utedto thetransformation inercetions

on Caitol[ill.Changes inCongressand theUnitedStatesheled as!ell. &he

assage oftime and theU.S.victories inthe Cold Warand the ulf War haddulled theemotional

edge ofVietnamWar$eraissues. Also,theleadershi of severalmem"ers ofCongress!ho !ereveterans ofthe Vietnamconflict !ascrucial inconvincingcolleaguesthat it !as


49/65

time tosuort"ilateralnormaliation.

Additionally,led "ySenatorsohn xerry,ohnMcCain, o"xerrey,Chuck Ro""and

Am"assadorweteweterson Baformercongress$man, thesemem"ers!orked"ehind the

scenes toer$suadethe Clintonadministration that thetime !asright toacceleratethenormaliation rocess.wresidentClintoninitially !asreluctant todo so"ecause


50/65

throughouthis first termhe !asdogged "yallegations

that he hadavoid$edmilitaryservice inVietnam inthe _`}bs.Without the"iartisanolitical

coverafforded "ytheseveterans inCongress, itcertainly!ould havetaken theClinton

administration longer toush aolicy ofnormaliation.

)umanrights

With thedefusing of

the

wjW•M^A

issue,

Vietnam#s

human


51/65

rights record

has

emerged as

the sorest

oint of

"ilateral

contention.

^n articular,

congression

al critics of

normaliatio

n have

seied uon

human

rights as a

vehicle for

oosing the

olicy. &hese

mem"ers,

!ho tend to

come from

the far right

on the

olitical

sectrum,

are ket

!ell$

informed of

accounts of

ersecution

"y overseas

Vietnamese,

eDiled ethnic

minority

grous, and


52/65

religious

organiation

s.

Congression

al critics

have

intensified

their

camaign in

recent

years, even

as most

individual

Vietnamese

"egan to

enoy more

ersonal

freedom

than

erhas at

any time

since

Vietnamese

reunification

. Until

recently, the

legislative

results of

their efforts

generally

!ere

confined to

a num"er of

resolutions

condemning


53/65

the

Vietnamese

government

for

ersecuting

one or more

grous.

&heir most

am"itious

roect to

date, the

Vietnam

[uman

Rights Act

B[.R.,

sought to u

the ante.

&he act !as

introduced

"y

Congressman Chris

Smith in

late une

bb_ and

assed the

[ouse in a

_b$_ vote

in early

Setem"er.

^t ultimately

stalled in

the Senate

due to an


54/65

anonymous

hold

laced on

the

measure "yat

&heserestrictionsrohi"it thewresidentfromnormaliingcommercialrelations

!ithselectedsocialist andformerlysocialistcountries ifthey do notmeet cer$tainre*uirements regardingfreedom ofemigration.


55/65

ialogue on U.S.$VietnamRelations }

least one

mem"er. ^ts

suorters !ere

a"le to achieve

such a lo"sided

victory in the

[ouse in art

"ecause the act!as !eakened to

such an eDtent

that even the

cham$ions of

U.S.$Vietnam

normaliation

could vote in

favor, articularly

since they kne!

that it !as

unlikely to ass

the Senate. As

originally

roosed, the act

!ould have

created a

congressional$

eDecutive

commission on

Vietnam to

monitor ho! !ell

Vietnam lives u


56/65

to inter$

nationally

recognied

human rights

standards. ^t

!ould have!ithheld

"ilateral, non$

humanitarian aid

unless Vietnam

received a

residential

certification that

it is meetingcertain human

rights conditions.

U.S. suort for

aid from

international

financial

institutions

!ould have "eensu"ect to a

similar

re*uirement. &he

"ill also re*uired

that additional

money should "e

allocated to!ard

romotingdemocracy in

Vietnam, through

su$ort of non$

governmental

organiations

and Radio Free


57/65

Asia "roadcasts.

Realiing that

most of these

measures !ere

likely to doomthe "ill in the

[ouse, its

sonsors allo!ed

most of them to

"e eliminated or

significantly

!atered do!n.

&he commission

on Vietnam !aseliminated. &he

final "ill "anned

only increases in

non$

humanitarian aid

a"sent an

affirmative

residentialcertification. U.S.

suort for

international

institution aid is

effectively freed

of any

conditionality.

Most

imortantly, the

"ill allo!ed the

resident to

!aive the

rovisions of the

act even if


58/65

Vietnam is not

found to have

met its human

rights standards.

Although the actstalled in theSenate, it islikely that in thefuture itssuorters !illtry tocircumvent the hold "yinserting theact#s rovisionsinto an amend$ment to another"ill.

Congress%s

i#ely Role inFuture U.S.-

VietnamRelations

Congress#s

ercetion of

Vietnam has

undergone a

remarka"letransformation

over the ast

decade, from

that of a !ar to a

country. ^n large

measure, this


59/65

shift may "e

attri"uted to the

Vietnamese

government,

!hich through its

actions has

demonstrated an

eagerness to

undertake

domestic

reforms,

cooerate !ith

the United States

on wjW•M^A

cases and other

issues, and

reoin the

international

community.

ecause of these

stes "y [anoi,!artime legacies

moved from

"locking to

aiding the

normaliation

rocess.

^n the coming

years, ho!ever,Vietnam !ill "e

less a"le to use

the !ar to its

advantage on

Caitol [ill, as


60/65

history#s

resonance fades

and "ecomes

largely confined

to the fe!

remaining

normaliation

issues "et!een

Vietnam and the

United States.

&he !ar may

also remain a

su"teDt % al"eit

a diminishing

one % of clashes

over human

rights, as many

minority ethnic

and religious

grous in

Vietnam fought

!ith U.S. and

South

Vietnamese

forces. ^n other

areas % such as

trade and

security issues

% U.S. relations

!ith Vietnam !ill

"e treated on

their o!n terms,

udged "y their

resent

strengths and


61/65

future otential.

^n articular,

!ith U.S.$

Vietnam trade

likely to increase

significantly in

the neDt fe!

years,

Vietnamese

officials !ill have

to "race them$

selves for a high

level of

congressional

attention to

"ilateral

economic

relations and

Vietnam#s

imlementation

of the &A.

Also, contrary to

conventional

!isdom, the !ar

on terrorism is

likely to increase

congressional

scrutiny of

Vietnam#s humanrights situation.

Unlike other

Asian countries

% such as

^ndonesia % that


62/65

are the targets of

human rights

accusations,

Vietnam as yet

has little to offer

the U.S. in

com"ating

terrorism. [anoi

may there$

€[olds€ areinformal devices that

ermit a singlesenator or anynum"er of senators

to sto %

sometimes

temorarily,

sometimesermanently % floor

con$sideration of

measures or matters

that are availa"le to"e scheduled "y theSenate. A hold, in

"rief, is a re*uest "y

a senator to his or

her arty leader to

delay floor action ona measure or

matter. ^t is u to

the Senate maority

leader to decide!hether, or for ho!long, he !ill honor a

colleague#s hold.

Scheduling the

"usiness of the

Senate is thefundamental

rerogative of the


63/65

maority leader, and

it is done in

consultation !ith the

minority leader.[olds are uni*ue to

the Senate.

Although there have"een attemts to

end the ractice ofanonymous holds,

the ractice still

continues. See

Walter jlesek,

[olds in theSenate, CRS Fact

Sheet on Senate

egislative wrocessp`$_ jV.


64/65

&he ^nstitutional Setting

fore rove to "e a safe outlet for

human rights roo$nents, !ho mayfind their arguments on other

countries# a"uses falling on deaf

ears. Furthermore, the ackson$

Vanik !aiver rocess !ill continue to

rovide an annual vehicle for

Congress to continue to monitor

Vietnam#s domestic situation closely|

a vehicle that fe! other coun$trieshave to face. As mentioned earlier,

Vietnam#s most imortant "ackers in

Congress have "een veterans of the

Vietnam War. &he challenge for

Vietnam !ill "e to identify ne!

chamions of the "ilateral

relationshi % erhas looking in the

ranks of the Vietnamese$American

community % !ho can hel to carry

it into the future.


65/65

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