SoPhA | SoPhA - 7S4L%...extended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider...

SoPhA - 2012

6ème congrèsParis, 4, 5, 6 mai 2012

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SoPhA - 2012

Bienvenue

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SoPhA - 2012

Bienvenue au 6ème congrès de la Société de philosophieanalytique à Paris !

La philosophie analytique se porte bien. Dans beaucoup de pays, les méthodes de notre traditionse sont imposées à l’ensemble de la communauté philosophique, et les critères de sélection desmeilleures revues internationales de philosophie sont celles de la tradition analytique. Ce qui faitl’unité de cette tradition, ce n’est ni un champ thématique particulier ni une base doctrinalecommune. Faire de la philosophie analytique, c’est considérer que l’argumentation est l’essentielde la philosophie. Ce qui importe avant tout, c’est d’être clair et explicite : exposer explicitementet clairement les prémisses dont on part, la conclusion à laquelle on arrive, et surtout la structurelogique de l’argumentation qui mène des premières à la seconde. Il est souvent - quoique nonnécessairement - utile d’améliorer la clarification de la structure argumentative par des outilsde logique formelle. La philosophie analytique cherche à répondre correctement aux questions etproblèmes philosophiques, et plus généralement à découvrir la vérité. Voilà les convictions quetous les philosophes analytiques partagent. Lisant ces lignes, le lecteur sera peut-être tenté dese demander si une conception si large ne transforme pas toute bonne philosophie en philoso-phie analytique. Et en un sens, il me semble tout à fait légitime de considérer que Descartesétait un philosophe analytique au sens où son travail est conforme aux principes énoncés plushaut. En revanche, la poursuite de ces objectifs est par exemple incompatible avec la conception« thérapeutique » de la philosophie selon laquelle il s’agirait de faire disparaître les questions etles problèmes plutôt que d’y répondre. Par ailleurs, la philosophie analytique, telle qu’elle existeaujourd’hui et telle qu’elle s’exprime dans des revues comme Dialectica, Dialogue, Mind, Analysisou Erkenntnis, est aussi unifiée par une tradition commune qui prend ses origines dans les travauxde Frege, Russell et le cercle de Vienne. Il n’est pas nécessaire de trancher si la référence à cettetradition est indispensable.Ce qui est surprenant, c’est qu’il subsiste, en tout cas en France, deux malentendus. Beaucoup dephilosophes français se font une idée de la philosophie analytique qui est soit trop large soit tropétroite : pour les premiers, on peut être analytique sans exposer clairement ses prémisses ou saconclusion ou surtout la structure logique de son argumentation. Il suffirait de faire partie d’unetradition qui remonte à Frege, Russell ou le cercle de Vienne. Pour les seconds, la philosophieanalytique est définie par la thèse selon laquelle la seule méthode philosophique est l’analyse dulangage, soit à la manière du cercle de Vienne soit surtout à la manière de l’analyse du langageordinaire dans la tradition wittgensteinienne.Les exposés qui seront présentés lors de ce congrès montrent qu’il s’agit là d’une méprise : touteargumentation ne passe pas nécessairement par l’analyse du langage, et aucune des présentationsque vous écouterez ne fait de compromis à l’égard de l’exposition claire et explicite de ses pré-misses et de la structure logique de son argumentation, ni à l’effort de rechercher la vérité.Je vous souhaite un excellent congrès.

Max KistlerProfesseur à l’université Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne

Président de la SoPhA

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SoPhA - 2012

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Sommaire

Le mot du président . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Sommaire v

Revues 1The Review of Philosophy and Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Appel à contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Igitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5REPHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Appel à contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Dialectica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Programme - Horaire 11Vendredi 4 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Samedi 5 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Dimanche 6 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conférences plénières 25Anouk Barberousse : Computer simulations and empirical data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Allan Gibbard : Meaning as a Normative Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Katherine Hawley : Trust and Distrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Christian List : Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise . . . . . . 27François Recanati : Communication référentielle et fichiers mentaux . . . . . . . . . . 27Galen Strawson : Real naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Symposia 29Metaphysics and Science

Helen Beebee - Stathis Psillos - Anna-Sofia Maurin - Claudine Tiercelin . . . 29Epistemic Democracy, Self-Interest, and the Common Good

Enrico Biale - Charles Girard - José Luis Marti - Christian Rostbøll . . . . 32Higher-Order Attitudes : Knowledge, Beliefs and Social Interaction

Paul Egré - David Spector - Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic - Olivier Roy . . . 35Symétrie, structure et réalisme

Elena Castellani - Michael Esfeld - Alexandre Guay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Quantum Mechanics Faces the Location Problem

Jean-Pierre Llored - Michel Bitbol - Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica . . . . . . . . 40

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SoPhA - 2012

La dimension volontaire des croyances collectivesOlivier Ouzilou - Alban Bouvier - Raphaël Künstler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriéesJulien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - Andrew Reisner - Krister Bykvist -Christine Tappolet - Mauro Rossi - Stéphane Lemaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Résumés 47A - F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47G - N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69O - Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Informations pratiques 109HOTELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109RESTAURANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Numéros utiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

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Revues

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Editor-in-Chief : Paul EgréExecutive Editors : R. Casati ; C. Heintz ;D. Taraborelli ; F. de VignemontISSN : 1878-5158 (print version)ISSN : 1878-5166 (electronic version)Journal no. 13164

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a quarterly journal published by Springer and hostedby Institut Jean-Nicod. The journal was launched in 2010, with Dario Taraborelli as Editor-in-Chief, and R. Casati, P. Egré, C. Heintz as executive editors. F. de Vignemont is joining theboard in 2012 !The journal provides a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psy-chologists, and fosters interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciencesof the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.The Review publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articleson issues of philosophical relevance. It also publishes themed issues featuring invited contributionsfrom leading authors, together with submitted articles.Regular submissions are encouraged to RPP, as well as thematic proposals by prospective guesteditors. Guidelines for submissions and detailed calls for papers can be found at :http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/13164

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Revues SoPhA - 2012 Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Recent and forthcoming issues include :RPP 2 :2 : Joint Action : What is Shared, Butterfill, S. & Sebanz, N. (Eds.)RPP 2 :3 : Social Cognition : Mindreading and Alternatives, Hutto, D., Herschbach, M. & Sou-thgate, V. (Eds.)RPP 2 :5 : The Body Represented / Embodied Representation, Alsmith, A. & Vignemont, F. (Eds)

Recent and current calls for papers :Consciousness attributions in Moral CognitionGuest Editors : Mark Phelan and Adam Waytz (Deadline March 31, 2012)

Distributed cognition and memory research : How do distributed memory systems work ?Guest editors : Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton (Deadline June 15, 2012)

Appel à contribution

Distributed cognition and memory research : How do distributed memory systemswork ?

Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Guest editors : Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton

Call for Papers

Deadline for submissions : July 15, 2012

According to the extended mind hypothesis in philosophy of cognitive science and the relateddistributed cognition hypothesis in cognitive anthropology, remembering does not always occurentirely inside the brain, but can also be distributed across heterogeneous systems combiningneural, bodily, social, and technological resources. Much of the critical debate on these ideas inphilosophy has so far remained at some distance from relevant empirical studies. But claims aboutextended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider acceptance, must both makesense of and, in turn, inform work in the cognitive and social sciences. Is the notion of extendedor distributed remembering consistent with the findings of empirical memory research ? Can sucha view of memory usefully inform empirical work, suggesting further areas of productive enquiryor helping to make sense of existing findings ?

This special issue will bring together supporters and critics of extended and distributed cogni-tion, to consider memory as a test case for evaluating and further developing these hypotheses.Submitted papers should thus address both memory and distributed cognition/ extended mind :ideally, papers should aim simultaneously to make contributions to relevant debates in both phi-losophy and psychology or other relevant empirical fields. While primarily theoretical papers arewelcome, they should make direct contact with empirical findings. Similarly, while empirically-oriented papers might draw on evidence from a range of areas, including the cognitive psychologyof transactive memory and collaborative recall, cognitive anthropology and cognitive ethnography,science studies and the philosophy of science, the history of memory practices, and the cognitivearchaeology of material culture, they should seek to advance the theoretical debate over extendedmind and distributed cognition, rather than simply presenting findings from these fields.

Potential topics include (but are not limited to) :

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• Relations between biological memory and external memory

How do forms of representation and storage in neural and external memory differ, and why dosuch differences matter ? Can theories of distributed cognition deal with the existence of multiplememory systems ? For example, does the expert deployment of exograms in certain externalsymbol systems affect working memory ? How might the development and operation of distributedmemory systems affect neural memory processes ? Is evidence for neuroplasticity relevant forassessing claims about distributed remembering ? Given plausible links between memory and self,what might distributed memory systems imply about identity and agency ? What happens whendistributed memory systems fail or break down ?

• How do distributed memory systems work ?

What is socially distributed remembering, and does it offer any support to revived ideas aboutgroup cognition, or to a naturalized understanding of collective memory ? Can theories of exten-ded or distributed cognition encompass socially distributed remembering in addition to artifactsand other forms of memory scaffolding ? What are the implications of experimental studies ofcollaborative recall and transactive memory for theories of distributed cognition ? How do suchtheories deal with memory practices and rituals, and with the roles of the non-symbolic materialenvironment ?

• Distributed memory and embodied cognition

How central in theories of extended or distributed memory should be the study of skill acquisitionand of expertise in the deployment of external resources ? What accounts of embodied skills,procedural memory, and smooth or absorbed coping are required to support such theories ? How dodistributed memory systems work in specific contexts of embodied interaction, from conversationto music, dance, performance, and sport ?

Guest authors

The issue will include invited articles authored by :

• Robert Rupert, University of Colorado (Boulder)

• Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis, and Rick Dale, University of California (Mer-ced)

• Mike Wheeler, University of Stirling

Important dates

Submission deadline : July 15, 2012

Target publication date : December 15, 2012

How to submit

Prospective authors should register at : www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login andselect Distributed cognition and memory research as an article type. Manuscripts should beapproximately 6,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on thejournal’s website.

About the journal

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN : 1878-5158 ; eISSN : 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and focusing on philosophical and foundationalissues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics

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of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research atthe crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural andsocial sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well asempirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invitedcontributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for paper.

Contact

For any queries, please email the guest editors : [email protected], [email protected]

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Revues SoPhA - 2012 Igitur

Igitur

Igitur est une revue philosophique à comité delecture, en ligne et d’accès libre. Son objectif estde promouvoir, dans l’espace francophone, l’ar-gumentation et la discussion dans les grands do-maines de la philosophie : métaphysique, phi-losophie du langage et de la logique, philoso-phie de la connaissance, philosophie de l’esprit,philosophie des sciences, philosophie morale etpolitique, philosophie du droit, philosophie dessciences humaines, esthétique, philosophie de lareligion. L’histoire de la philosophie y trouve saplace, dans la mesure où l’argumentation des au-teurs étudiés est prise pour objet.

Les articles soumis sont sélectionnés à l’issue d’une double lecture anonyme sur la base des critèressuivants : argumentation, clarté, précision et originalité de la contribution.

Igitur est éditée par les universités de Nantes (Centre Atlantique de Philosophie - EA2163) etRennes I (Philosophie des normes - EA1270).

http://www.igitur.org/

Igitur is a free-access online philosophical journal with a reading committee. Its aim is to promote,within the French-speaking world, argumentation and discussion in the main fields of philosophy :metaphysics, philosophy of language and logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy ofscience, moral and political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of social science, aesthetics,philosophy of religion. Articles on history of philosophy are also accepted if they focus on theargumentation of the author(s) studied.

Articles are accepted after a double-blind refereeing based on the following criteria : they shouldbe well-argumented, clear, precise and original in content.

Igitur is published by the Universities of Nantes (Centre Atlantique de Philosophie - EA2163)and Rennes I (Philosophie des normes - EA1270).

http://www.igitur.org/

Comité scientifique

Vincent Descombes (EHESS - Paris)Pascal Engel (Université de Genève)Paul Gochet (Université de Liège)

Claude Panaccio (UQAM - Montréal)Philip Pettit (Princeton University)François Recanati (CNRS - Paris)

Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin)

Comité éditorial

Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim (Université de Rennes I) - Directeur adjoint de la publicationBruno Gnassounou (Université de Nantes)

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Revues SoPhA - 2012 Igitur

Pierre Joray (Université de Rennes I)Stéphane Lemaire (Université de Rennes I)

Pascal Ludwig (Université de Paris-Sorbonne)Cyrille Michon (Université de Nantes) - Directeur de la publicationSébastien Motta (Université de Nantes) - Administrateur du site

François Schmitz (Université de Nantes)

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Revues SoPhA - 2012 REPHA

RÉPHA - Revue Étudiante de Philosophie Analytique

RÉPHA (Revue Étudiante de Philosophie Ana-lytique) est une revue semestrielle qui, tout enrespectant les standards académiques (le prin-cipe de sélection « double aveugle », des rappor-teurs compétents. . .) publie des articles conciset rigoureux, traitant de problématiques perti-nentes dans les débats (analytiques) contempo-rains.L’accent est donc mis sur l’aspect argumenta-tif et clair des articles et sur la pertinence dusujet dans l’actualité philosophique. Les auteurssont principalement des étudiants avancés ou dejeunes chercheurs à qui RÉPHA offre l’occasionde publier leurs premiers articles académiques.L’ambition de la revue est de diffuser la cultureanalytique en langue française, en sollicitant lesjeunes chercheurs, tout en promouvant des cri-tères élevés de scientificité.

Chaque numéro contient un article écrit par un philosophe professionnel, ainsi que 2 à 5 articlesoriginaux écrits par des philosophes ‘juniors’ (mastériens, doctorants, post-doctorants). Depuisle numéro 4, nous avons décidé d’inclure à la revue deux nouvelles rubriques : une traductiond’un texte-clé de la philosophie analytique, précédée d’une introduction, ainsi qu’une recension.Nous souhaitons encourager la recension des livres originaux de langue française, ainsi que destraductions récentes d’ouvrages de référence.

Nous avons fait le choix d’une revue papier pour son caractère trivialement matériel qui vouspermettra de la placer dans votre bibliothèque entre Ramsey et Russell. Le premier numéro deRÉPHA est sorti en septembre 2009 et a été lancé avec succès à Genève à l’occasion du congrèsde la SoPhA. A ce jour, 5 numéros ont été édités, à un rythme semestriel.

Appel à contribution

RÉPHA a pour objectif de favoriser la diffusion de la philosophie analytique francophone enproduisant un espace d’études mêlant des articles écrits par des étudiants et par des professionnels,destinés aussi bien aux universitaires qu’aux amateurs éclairés.

La revue est aussi un laboratoire d’écriture, qui permet aux étudiants avancés, au seuil de futurespublications professionnelles, de produire leurs premiers articles et d’obtenir une première publi-cation. Les étudiants contributeurs peuvent également parfaire leur pensée personnelle dans uncadre stimulant.

Afin d’en assurer la rigueur, les articles sont évalués par un comité de lecture compétent. Ilspeuvent traiter des domaines suivants :

• philosophie du langage

• philosophie des sciences et de la connaissance

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• philosophie de la logique

• philosophie de l’esprit et sciences cognitives

• métaphysique

• esthétique

• philosophie morale

• ou autre dans l’esprit de notre présentation ainsi faite

En outre, ils doivent être introductifs, clairs, concis et pertinents. Nous souhaiterions particuliè-rement qu’ils traitent de l’actualité relative à chaque domaine. Deux formules sont acceptées pourles articles originaux :

(i) d’une part, selon le format préférentiel de la revue, des articles ‘courts’, compris entre 10000 et16000 signes (espaces compris), soit environ 5-7 pages dans une configuration A4 classique (police12, interligne 1,5) ;

(ii) d’autre part, des articles ‘longs’, compris entre 16000 et 24000 signes. Un ou deux articleslongs pourront être publiés par numéro, selon la qualité des soumissions.

Conformément aux différentes rubriques présentes dans la revue, n’hésitez pas, en plus des ar-ticles inédits, à nous envoyer vos recensions (16000 signes) ainsi que vos traductions d’articlescourts.

Nous acceptons les formats suivants : .doc, .rtf, ou .odt. Nous attirons votre attention sur le faitque les fichiers reçus au format .pdf ne sont pas acceptés. Les articles doivent permettre uneprésentation anonyme au comité de lecture.

Contactez-nous pour de plus amples informations : [email protected]

Toutes ces informations peuvent être retrouvées sur le site de la revue : http://www.repha.fr

Soutiens académiques

Daniel Andler (Université Paris-Sorbonne)Pascal Engel (Université de Genève)Jean Gayon (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, IHPST)Max Kistler (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne)Pascal Ludwig (Université Paris-Sorbonne)Mélika Ouelbani (Université Paris-Sorbonne/Tunis)

Bureau de l’association

Marie Robert (Présidente)Arturs Logins (Vice-Président)Nicolas Liabeuf (Trésorier)Emile Thalabard (Secrétaire)

Comité de lecture

Bruno Ambroise, Adrien Barton, Laure Blanc-Benon, Jiri Benovsky, Denis Bonnay, Felipe Car-valho, Christine Clavien, Fabrice Correia, Santiago Echeverri, Luc Faucher, Charles Girard, Jean-

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Baptiste Joinet, Laurence Kaufmann, Xavier Kieft, Stéphane Lemaire, Stéphane Leyens, FlavioMarelli, Alberto Masala, Anne Meylan, Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Ru-wen Ogien, Fabrice Pataut, Jérôme Ravat, Sébastien Richard, Xavier Sabatier, Christian Sachse,Yann Schmitt, Daniela Tagliafico, Fabrice Teroni, Hugo Viciana, et d’autres.

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Revues SoPhA - 2012 Dialectica

Dialectica

Dialectica publishes first-rate articles and discussion notes predominantly in theoretical and syste-matic philosophy. It is edited in Switzerland and has a focus on analytical philosophy undertakenon the continent, being the official organ of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy. Thismeans that while dialectica publishes articles from all over the world, selected by a rigorous triple-blind refereeing process, it particularly encourages the best analytic philosophers working on theEuropean Continent to submit their best work.

Dialectica was founded in 1947 by Gaston Bachelard, Paul Bernays and Ferdinand Gonseth as ajournal of philosophy in order to promote dialogue between philosophy and the sciences. Amongthe authors publishing in dialectica during its early years were Ayer, Bohr, Carnap, Dieudonné,Einstein, Gödel, Pauli, Popper, Piaget and Reichenbach. After dialectica had served as the or-gan of the “Association Gonseth” for several years, Henri Lauener, of the University of Berne,Switzerland, became its editor in 1977 and remained so until 2001. While dialectica still publi-shed articles in epistemology and the philosophy of science, the number of articles dealing withother branches of analytic philosophy increased. In 1996, dialectica became the official organ ofthe European Society of Analytic Philosophy (ESAP). Among the authors who have publishedin dialectica since 1977 are Barcan Marcus, Chisholm, Davidson, Føllesdal, Hintikka, McDowell,Putnam, Quine, Rorty, Searle and Vuillemin.In 2001, Gianfranco Soldati, of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, became editor of dia-lectica. Under Soldati’s editorship, dialectica signed a publishing contract with Blackwell (nowBlackwell-Wiley) and established itself as the leading journal for analytic philosophy on the Conti-nent. In 2005, Pascal Engel, professor of modern and contemporary philosophy at the Universityof Geneva, took over. The number of submissions doubled again, now approximating 300 per year,while we further reduced the acceptance rate to almost 7% and the median turnaround time tounder 2 months. Last year, Pascal Engel stepped down from his position as editor, to be replacedby Marcel Weber, newly appointed as professor of the philosophy of science at the University ofGeneva.

Dialectica is ranked A on the European Research Index for the Humanities of the EuropeanScience Foundation and is also ranked A in the Australian’s Research Council’s ERA for 2010.Marc Lange, "A Tale of Two Vectors", dialectica 63 :4, 397-431 has been elected one of the tenbest papers of 2009 according by the Philosophers’ Annual.

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Programme - Horaire

Vendredi 4 mai 2012

LégendeLieu, Horaire, Disci-pline

Symposium Allocution d’ou-verture, conférenceplénière

Contribution in-dividuelle, autreévénement

Lieu Ens, salle Dussane

9h00 - 9h15 Allocutions d’ouverture : P-Y Quiviger, directeur de l’UFR de philosophie, M.Kistler, président de la SOPHA

9h15 - 10h30 Conférence plénière : Galen Strawson (Reading, invité à l’EHESS) : Real Na-turalism, Prés. J.-B. Rauzy

10h30 - 11h00 Pause

11h00 - 12h15 Conférence plénière : François Récanati (CNRS-EHESS-IJN) : Communicationréférentielle et fichiers mentaux Prés. J.-B. Rauzy

12h15 - 12h35 Présentation des revues : REPHA, Igitur, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

12h35 - 14h00 Déjeuner

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Programme SoPhA - 2012 Vendredi 4 mai 2012

Lieu Collège de France, amphi Budé

Symposium Metaphysics and science, (Tiercelin, Kistler)Prés. C. Tiercelin, M. Kistler

14h00 - 14h50 Stathis Psillos (Athènes) :Regularities all the way down

14h50 - 15h40 Helen Beebee (Birmingham) :Dispositions as real essences

15h40 - 16h00 Pause

16h00 - 16h50 Anna-Sofia Maurin (Lund) :In Defense of Taxonomic Monism

16h50 - 17h40 Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France, Paris) :In defense of metaphysical bold-ness

17h40 - 18h20 �18h30 - 19h45 Conférence plénière Christian List (LSE), Panthéon, amphi 2B : « Free will,

determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise », Prés. P. Jacob

20h00 Dîner RU Mabillon : 3, rue Mabillon 75006 Paris

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Séances parallèles

Lieu ENS, Beckett ENS, Actes ENS, Dussane ENS, Info 1 ENS, Info 2 ENS, Info 5

IntituléPrésident

Philosophiedes sciences,H. Zwirn

Philosophiedu langage,I. Stojanovic

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’action,M. Panza

Philosophiepolitique, phi-losophie dudroit, et philo-sophie sociale,Ch. Girard

Histoire de laphilosophieS. Hirèche

Philosophiemorale,P. Ludwig

14h00-14h30 A. Marcellesi :Invariance andExplanatoryDepth

M. McCul-lagh : Distri-buted assertion

Cozic & Bon-nay : Consen-sus and higher-order informa-tion

F.-E Rollet :L’agent et sesexcuses endroit pénal

D. Fisette :Brentano et lesthéories néo-brentaniennesde laconscience

V. Aucou-turier & B.Gnassounou :Les vertus etles limites dela doctrine dudouble-effet

14h35-15h05 D. Portides :Idealizationand ScientificModels

E. Glick :Know-Howand LinguisticAnalysis

P. Egré :Unawareness,uncertaintyand the know-ledge of one’signorance

A. Lever : Dis-criminationand Appea-rance : WhatDoes EqualityRequire ?

S. Sanhueza :The Realistand the Vulgar

E. Baierlé : IsOur Phenome-nology Liberta-rian ?

15h05-15h20 Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause

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IntituléPrésident





Histoire de laphilosophieD. Fisette


15h20-15h50 D. Blitman :La notiond’innéitéest-elle scien-tifiquementpertinente ?

R. Bluhm :LinguisticCorpora inPhilosophicalAnalyses

O. Roy : Nor-mativity in In-teraction

N.Tavaglione :Séquestrer sonpatron

A. Mihali :Toward aCartesianEpistemic RuleConsequentia-lism

A. Billon :Happiness fordummies

15h55-16h25 V. Israël-Jost : Iterativeempiricismand scientificobservation

D. Belleri &M. Palmira :The AccuracyView of Disa-greement

D. Spector :On the foun-dation of themargin for er-ror principle

M. Ostinelli :Libéralismepolitique etrépublicanismeclassiquesont-ils compa-tibles ?

M. Hertig :Self-confidenceand practi-cal reason inAristotle

P. Szalek :The MinimalTheory ofGoodness

16h25-16h40 Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause

14



IntituléPrésident





Histoire de laphilosophieD. Fisette


16h40-17h10 Ch. Mala-terre : Onthe distinct-ness of causalvariables

J. Zakkou : Se-mantic Relati-vism for Me-taontology

A. Bernin-ger : TheOntology ofEmotion andPerception

B. Cassegrain :Obligation po-litique et auto-rité

B. Goebel :Was Anselmreally animmanentrealist ?

S. Berkovski :Welfare, sub-jectivity, andattitudes

17h15-17h45 J. Caba-ret : Diseaseconcepts indomesticatedanimals

E. Clémençon :La théorie cau-sale de laréférence etl’épreuve de lanomenclaturebiologique

S. Wilkin-son : Den-nett’s Perso-nal/SubpersonalDistinction inthe Light ofCognitive Neu-ropsychiatry

S. Livio :Qu’est-ceque le pro-blème de lanon-identité ?

G. Fréchette :Dispositionalhigher-orderacts. A Bren-tanian account

�

15

Programme SoPhA - 2012 Samedi 5 mai 2012

Samedi 5 mai 2012

9h15 - 10h30 Conférence plénière (ENS, salle Dussane) Anouk Barberousse (Lille) : « Don-nées empiriques et simulations numériques », Prés. J. Gayon

10h30 - 11h00 Pause

Lieu ENS, Dussane

Symposium : L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées (Tappo-let, Lemaire), Prés. Ph. Mongin

11h00 - 11h45 J. Deonna (Genève) & F. Teroni (Bern) : From Justified Emotions to JustifiedEvaluative Judgements

11h45 - 12h30 A. Reisner (McGill) : Why the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value is Morallyand Metaphysically Implausible

12h30 - 14h00 Déjeuner

14h00 - 14h45 K. Bykvist (Oxford) :’They smiled at the good and frowned at the bad.’

14h45 - 15h30 Ch. Tappolet (Montréal) : Comment ajuster les attitudes et les valeurs

15h30 - 16h00 Pause

16h00 - 16h45 M. Rossi (Montréal) : A fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value

16h45 - 17h 30 S. Lemaire (Rennes) : Pour une approche pratique de l’analyse des valeurs entermes d’attitudes appropriées

18h00 - 19h15 Conférence plénière : Katherine Hawley (St Andrews), ENS, Dussane. « Trustand Distrust », Prés. D. Andler

19h30 - 20h00 Assemblée Générale de la SOPHA : ENS, Dussance

16


Séances Parallèles

Lieu ENS, Be-ckett

ENS,Théâtre

ENS, Info 1 ENS, Info 2 Info 5 ENS,Rataud ENS, Résis-tants

IntituléPrésident

Métaphysique,F. Correia

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’action,S. Chauvier

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’action,J. Zeimbekis

Philosophiemorale,C. Michon

Philosophiede laconnais-sance,F. Wolff

Philosophiedes sciences,P. Mongin

Esthétiqueet philo-sophie dulangage,S. Darsel

11h00-11h30

S. Richard :Les deuxvoies del’ontologieformelleanalytique

A . Ciau-nica :Superna-tural Mindand InfiniteDecomposa-bility

J.-M. Cheva-lier : L’unitédu raisonne-ment !

Y. Eylon :Blamingand Kno-wing

E. ThomasButts : Slimis In

F. Athané :Outils dephilosophieanalytiquepour l’étudede la cir-culationéconomique

A. Sullivan :Semantically-Driven In-terpretiveProcesses

11h35-12h05

A. Frisch-hut : Theviciousnessof Mc-Taggart’sregress

M. Bitbol :Conscious-ness andquantummechanics

J. Lafraire :IEM, Non-conceptualContent andSemanticRelativism

M. Spranzi :Moraldistress,reasons andcontext

Ch. Pfis-terer :Predica-tion inPerception

C. Imbert :Collectivescience

J. Cook :SemanticDeferenceand theCase ofMalapro-pisms

12h10-12h40

G. Guigon :La questionspéciale surl’explication

J.-P. Llo-red : Rela-tion betweenlevels of or-ganization

A.-S. Brueg-gen : Thecontent ofimaginingsand the"MultipleUse Thesis"

N. Delon :The moralstatus ofanimals

A. Meylan :Solving theproblem ofdoxastic res-ponsibility

M. Cozic &B. Hill : Lesthéorèmesde représen-tation

E. Terrone :The Fictio-nal WorldViewed

12h40-14h00

Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner

17


Lieu ENS, Be-ckett

ENS,Théâtre


IntituléPrésident


Philosophiede l’es-prit et del’action,J. Dubucs



Philosophiede laconnais-sance,P. Egré

Philosophiedessciences,M. Cozic

Esthétiqueet phi-losophiedu langage,D. Bonnay

14-14h30 D. Costa &A. Giordani :Events askind instan-tiations

M. Mu-rez : Self-Locationand Pros-pectiveControl

M. Ar-cangeli :Imaginationand Memory

D. Cicic :A NewVersion ofthe Mani-pulationArgumentfor Incom-patibilism

J. Du-tant : TheNormativeScepticalParadoxand itsPracticalSolution

F. Longy :Why do wehave hybridconcepts ?

M. Re-nauld :What ismake-believe ?

14h35-15h05

M. Camp-delacreu :Do we needtwo notionsof constitu-tion ?

M. Haem-merli : TheCase forPerspectivalRepresen-tations ofSpace

Ph. Mea-dows :Holey NaiveRealism,Batman !Look At TheAir ! !

A. Vereker :UniversalReasons,UniversalConstraints

BenoîtGaultier :La valeur dela connais-sance et lanature de lacroyance

M. Egg :The Roleof CommonSense in theDebate onScientificRealism

S. Darsel :Le paradoxede l’artconceptuel

15h05-15h20

Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause Pause

18


Lieu ENS, Be-ckett

ENS,Théâtre


IntituléPrésident


Philosophiede l’es-prit et del’action,J. Dubucs


Philosophiemorale,R. Ogien

Philosophiede laconnais-sance,P. Egré

Philosophiedessciences,F. Longy

Esthétiqueet phi-losophiedu langage,D. Bonnay

15h20-15h50

J.-D. La-france : TheBundle ofUniversalsTheory ofMaterialObjects

M. Serban :On func-tions andmechanismsin the in-vestigationof cognitivecapacities

M. Gallotti :Internalismand the Mys-tery of theWe-Mode

A. Mar-tin : SomeThoughtsOn Vulne-rability inHealth Care

A. Logins :Pheno-menalConceptionof Evi-dence andPragmaticFactors

S. De Tof-foli & V.Giardino :Visuali-zation intopology :illustrationsvs diagrams

P. Snider :A Role ThatFunctionalBeautyDoes NotOccupyin ourAestheticExperience

15h55-16h25

F. Dra-peau VieiraContim :Le mo-nisme de laconstitutionmatérielle etl’objectionde l’indiscer-nabilité

J. Mégier :Conscience,circularité,régressioninfinie, etconsciencede soi

C. McHugh :Control ofBelief andIntention

I. Fouche :Le dilemmed’Euthy-phron etla critiquedu modèlelégal enmétaéthique

N. C. Sal-vatore :Wittgen-steinianepistemo-logy andcartesianskepticism

E. Casetta :Arguing fora PluralisticSpeciesConceptin the As-sessment ofBiodiversity

�

16h25-16h40


16h40-17h10

N. Lia-beuf : Méta-métaphysiqueexpérimen-tale (MME)et "défi del’intégra-tion"

� F. Pataut :Anti-realismand the self-ascription ofattitudes

F. Müller :Phenome-nology ofMinimalActions

� M. Vorms :La notionde modèlechez Er-nest Nagel(1961)

�

19

Programme SoPhA - 2012 Dimanche 6 mai 2012

Dimanche 6 mai 2012

9h15 - 10h30 Conférence plénière : Allan Gibbard (Michigan), ENS, Dussane,Prés. J. Proust

10h30 - 11h00 Pause

Lieu ENS, Dussane

Symposium « Symétrie et structure en philosophie de la physique » (Esfeld,Guay), Prés. F. Nef

14h00 - 15h00 Elena Castellani (Florence) :Symétrie et réalisme structurel

15h10 - 16h10 Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) :Réalisme structurel et ontologie de la physique quan-tique

16h10 - 16h30 Pause

16h30 - 17h30 Alexandre Guay (Dijon) : Symétries parfaites et structures

17h30 - 18h10 Pause

18h15 - 18h45 P. Soom : Réductionnisme et élimination

17h40 - 18h10 �20


Séances ParallèlesLieu ENS, Be-

ckettENS,Actes

ENS, Dus-sane

Info 1 Info 2 Info 5 ENS, Ca-vaillès

ENS, Ce-lan

IntituléPrésident

Philosophiede l’es-prit etde l’action,F.Récanati

Philosophiede l’espritet del’action,J.Dokic

PhilosophiesocialeB.Cassegrain

MétaphysiqueA.Guay

Philosophiedu langageY.Ghodbane

Philosophiede laconnaissanceS.Leuenberger

Philosophiedu lan-gageF.Schang

Philosophiepolitique,S.Lemaire

11h00-11h30

G. Peebles :Deflatio-nism aboutTemporalPerception

Ph. Lus-son : Jointactions

O. Ouzilou :Croyancescollectives,acceptantescollectives etintelligibilitédes compor-tements degroupe

Ch. Stei-ner : TheProblem ofa Definitionof Life

P. Engisch :SingularThoughtand the Ac-quaintancePrinciple

J. Langkau :ReflectiveEquilibriumand Counte-rexamples

L. F.Moreno :Kripkeon Mill’sTheoryof Natu-ral KindTerms

E. Diaz-Leon :SocialKinds andConcep-tual Ana-lysis

11h35-12h05

F. Hof-mann : TheGeneralityConstraint- verti-cal, nothorizontal

M.Guillot :Unders-tan-ding theConcept"I" asa Phe-nomenalConcept

A. Bouvier :Croyances,accep-tions, co-engagementset argu-mentationen contextejudiciaireet politico-religieux

M. De :Two ways ofmeeting theHumphreyobjectionon theobjector’sturf

A. Basak :L’empi-risme logiquecomme uneperspectivepolitique surle langage

L. Saller :The Case fora StimulusAccount ofthe Senses

D. Ze-man :TemporalBindingin theEventAnalysis

I. Toader :Phenome-nologicalIntuitionsand Intui-tionisticGrounds

12h10-12h40

D. Ta-gliafico :EpisodicMemory,Imagina-tion andthe No-tion of aMemoryTrace

D. Lig-gins :Unpropo-sitionalattitudes

R. Künstler :Accepter unethéorie quel’on croitfausse

N. Deng :An Inter-pretationand Defenseof Fine’s’ArgumentFrom Pas-sage’

C. Verheg-gen : InDefenceof Aus-tere Non-Reductionism

C. Proietti &F. Zenker :PluralisticIgnoranceand Infor-mationalCascades

J. Yli-Vakkuri :Why theSemanticArgumentfor Re-lativismFails

Ch. Béal :Le posi-tivismejuridiqueinclusif

12h40-14h00

Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner Déjeuner

21


Lieu ENS, Be-ckett

ENS, Actes Info 1 Info 2 Info 5 ENS, Ca-vaillès

ENS, Celan

InituléPrésident

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’actionC. McHugh

Philosophiemorale,M. Guillot

MétaphysiqueG. Guigon

Philosophiedes sciences,D. Blitman

Philosophiede laconnais-sance etdu langageB. Gaultier

Philosophiedu langageA. Arapinis

Logique,philosophiede la logiqueet des ma-thématiquesF. Pataut

14h00-14h30

R. Lo-catelli :Disjuncti-vism andthe puzzle ofphenomenalcharacters

Ch. Girard :The Com-mon Goodas EqualPromotionof all In-dividualInterests

G. Tor-rengo : Me-taphysicalExplana-tions

Th. Boyer :L’unité d’undomaine derecherchescientifique,d’un pointde vuepratique

J.-B.Guillon :Held Hos-tage, theEpiste-mologicalObjection toLibertaria-nism

F. Schang :Quelle lo-gique pourles itéra-tifs ?

R. Ciuni &C. Proietti :Superva-luations,Subvalua-tions andindetermi-nism

14h35-15h05

M. Jorba-Grau : DoWe ThinkOutside TheStream OfConscious-ness ?

E. Biale :DemocraticBargaining

B. Le Bi-han : Whya GunkWorld isCompatiblewith Nihi-lism aboutObjects

S. Tossut : ACooperation-BasedAccountof SocialScientificKnowledge

P. Marton :Calling theSkeptic’sBluff

C. Filotico :Relativismand theNorms ofAssertion

J. Vidal-Rosset :How andwhy intui-tionisticlogic defusesDiodorus’masterargument

15h05-15h10


22


Lieu ENS, Be-ckett


ENS, Celan

InituléPrésident

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’actionF. Hofmann

Philosophiemorale,M. Guillot

MétaphysiqueLeuenberger

& Keller

Philosophiedes sciences,D. Blitman




15h10-15h40

S. Miguel :Conscious-ness andTheory ofMind

J. L. Marti :Who (andhow) knowswhat’sthe rightthing to dopolitically

S. Leuenber-ger : Relationsintrinsèques

V. Ar-dourel :La sous-déterminationdes théo-ries phy-siques chezNewton-Smith

M. Gra-jner : ATwo-FactorTheory ofEpistemicJustification

V. Richard :The internalnature ofmeaning

F. Fran-chette :Hypercom-putationand Verifi-cation

15h45-16h15

A. Rafto-poulos :Late vision :perceptualor though-like ?

Ch.Rostbøll :Against In-corporatingSelf-Interestin the De-liberativeIdeal

Ph. Keller :Represen-tation —relational, butintrinsic

C. Amo-retti & N.Vassallo :Women andmedicine

F. Liho-reau : AreNormativeReasonsEvidencefor Obliga-tions ?

D. Kirkby :Frege’sContextPrincipleand ProperNames

P. Quinon :The NumberConcept

16h15-16h30


23


Lieu ENS, Be-ckett


ENS, Celan

InituléPrésident

Philosophiede l’esprit etde l’actionF. Hofman

Philosophiemorale,S. Lemaire

MétaphysiqueLeuenberger

& Keller

Philosophiedes sciences,I. Drouet




16h30-17h00

Ch. Sachse :Is there me-taphysicalfree will ?

M. Gi-bert : Voirson steakcommeun animalmort

S. Aimar :Aristoteliandispositions

M. Darra-son : Es-quisse d’unethéoriegénétiquemécanistede la mala-die

M. Soll-berger :Introspec-ting OtherMinds

S. Hirèche :For a Wea-ker Formof Compo-sitionalityin NaturalLanguages

M. Fischer& J. Stern :Paradoxesof interac-ting modalpredicates

17h05-17h35

F. Kam-merer : Leproblèmede la dispo-nibilité ducontenu

R. Myers :Smith’sPracticalityRequire-ment

J. Raba-chou : Lesimplicationsmétaphy-siques d’uneacceptationde la re-lativité del’identité

M. Pégny :Calculeravec desalgorithmes,calculeravec desmachines

A. Bandini :La dérive dela croyance

E. Paga-nini : Adefence ofcommoncurrencynames

D. Rizza :Applied Ma-thematicalConcepts

17h35-17h40


17h40-18h10

J. Smort-chkova :Argumentsfor the richcontent viewof perceptualcontent

F. Orsi :Moral obli-gations andrationaldesires

F. Lau-ria : OnDirection ofFit

M. Drechs-ler : ThreeTypes ofUncertainty

J. Zanic :Externa-lism andthe Trans-cendentalSituation ofSemantics

A. Nasta :Logical orAlogicalWords ?

G. Tarziu :Mathema-tics and theWorld

18h15-18h45

L. Jaeger :Un miracleviole-t-il leslois de lanature ?

F. Cova :"I couldn’thave doneotherwise"

� � � � D. Chiffi etS. Gaio :The Kno-wabilityParadox inthe Lightof Logic forPragmatics

24

Conférences plénières

Anouk Barberousse

Université de Lille 1

Computer simulations and empirical data

Whereas computer simulations are often used as substitutes of field or lab experiments, theiroutputs are usually considered as having a less epistemological value than data that are obtainedthrough the use of detecting or measuring instruments. In this talk, I will discuss the reasons thathave been proposed for this appraisal. I shall focus on the question whether computer simulationsare able to yield new information about physical systems.

Computer simulations are usually supposed to be incapable of producing any new data for tworeasons : (i) their main components, the program and the input data, are built up from alreadyavailable information, (ii) the computer program only processes this information, without intro-ducting anything new. As a result, their outputs can hardly come as a surprise to the scientists.By contrast, the outputs of experiments are sometimes unexpected. I shall distinguish betweendifferent meanings of epistemological novelty and argue that the outputs of computer simulationscan sometimes be said genuinely new and unexpected.

§ § §

25

Conférences plénières SoPhA - 2012

Allan Gibbard

University of MichiganAnn Arbor

Meaning as a Normative Concept

It has been claimed that the concept of meaning is a normative concept, and likewise with theconcept of mental content, of what a person is thinking. The talk sketches a project of interpretingthese claims and understanding the concept of meaning as normative, for my forthcoming bookMeaning and Normativity. My analysis of normative terms is expressivistic : to say what one oughtto believe is to say what to believe. This form of expressivism thus applies to itself : claims ofmeaning are explained as ought claims, and the meaning of ’ought’ is explained expressivistically.I experiment with sketching such an account, and ask what the upshot would be. One questionwill be whether the account is really distinct from non-naturalism as a theory of normativeconcepts.

§ § §

Katherine Hawley

St Andrews

Trust and Distrust

Our attitudes of trust and distrust have consequences for other people, whether they are thetargets of our (dis)trust, or otherwise dependent upon us to trust wisely. Distrust can damage itstarget, but unwanted trust can also be a burden. I begin by exploring the middle ground betweenthese : what do we want when we want neither trust nor distrust ? I argue that the notion ofcommitment can help us understand this point.

I then discuss our obligations to others in (dis)trusting. Miranda Fricker has argued that wecan damage other people as knowers when we allow our prejudices about their social status(for example their race or gender) to undermine their credibility in testifying. Can these ideasencompass trust and distrust more generally, trust in others to meet their practical commitments,as well as trust in what they say ?

26


Finally, I explore an apparently more benign form of partiality in trusting and distrusting. Wetend to trust our friends, but does friendship permit or even require us to trust in ways which gobeyond the evidence of our friends’ trustworthiness ?

§ § §

Christian ListLondon School of Economics

Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to requirethe ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility ofdoing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinc-tion between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one futuresequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely definedstate of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence,and thus different actions can be "agentially possible". The agential perspective is supported byour best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer towhat an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical pheno-menon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency andintentionality.

§ § §

François RecanatiInstitut Jean-Nicod

Communication référentielle et fichiers mentaux

Dans le cadre de la théorie des fichiers mentaux, je présenterai une analyse de l’emploi référen-tiel des descriptions définies mettant l’accent sur l’analogie entre descriptions référentielles etindexicaux, et je comparerai cette analyse, d’inspiration millienne, avec une analyse d’inspirationkaplanienne qui met également l’accent sur l’analogie avec les indexicaux.

§ § §

27


Galen Strawson

University of Reading

Real naturalism

[1] Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. The bedrock ofreal naturalism, i.e. realistic naturalism, is realism about experience (i.e. conscious experience),because the existence of experience is a certainly known natural fact (it is the most certainly knowngeneral natural fact). [2] By ’realism about experience’ I mean real realism about experience. Whatis real realism about experience ? Real realists about experience take experience to be what theytook it to be before they did any philosophy, e.g. when they were 6 years old. [3] Physicalismis the view that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature. I take physicalism to be partof naturalism, so I take it that experience is entirely physical. Obviously physicalist naturalismrules out anything incompatible with the truths of physics. There is, however, a respect in whichphysics only gives structural information about the nature of concrete reality, and has nothingto say about the intrinsic nature of the concrete reality in so far as its intrinsic nature is morethan its structure. It follows that physicalist naturalism can’t rule out mentalism or panpsychism,the view that there is no non-structural non-experiential being. Considerations of simplicity andparsimony support the view that there is no non-structural non-experiential being.

§ § §

28

Symposia

Metaphysics and Science

Helen Beebee - Stathis Psillos - Anna-Sofia Maurin - ClaudineTiercelin

According to an important approach in contemporary metaphysics, science should, if not dictate,at least guide us in our description and explanation of the fundamental nature of reality and of itsproperties. However, metaphysicians who accept such a strategy disagree widely on several crucialissues. Here are some of the debates that will be pursued in this workshop. Does making senseof scientific theories require the postulate of laws of nature in a sense distinct from regularities,or do mere regularities suffice ? Does metaphysics imply some commitment to scientific realism ?Or are there other options ? Does the analysis of contemporary science justify the idea thatnature is structured according to a unique taxonomy, or is taxonomic pluralism the adequatedoctrine ? More generally, should our best method in metaphysical inquiry involve the analysis ofthe ontological commitments of our best scientific theories ? Can the analysis of scientific theoriesreally justify metaphysical theses on the existence of such things as laws, dispositions and powers,and natural kinds ? To what extent must metaphysicians remain "humble" ? In what ways arethey possibly justified in being "bold" ? And in case they are justified in being so, what kind ofgenuine metaphysical "knowledge" can they provide ?

§ § §

Helen Beebee

Dispositions as real essences

It has been claimed (by e.g. Alexander Bird and Brian Ellis) that fundamental dispositions have’real essences’, akin to natural kind essences, which deliver law-like truths about dispositions thatare metaphysically but not conceptually necessary. This paper will argue that this position lacksthe required Kripkean motivation. The claim that dispositions have ’real essences’ gets no supportfrom Twin Earth-style thought experiments ; moreover, it is implausible to suppose that there isthe epistemic ’gap’ between nominal and real essence that is required to get the Kripkean viewoff the ground, as it applies to dispositions. The dispositionalists’ claim that the laws of natureare metaphysically necessary thus turns out to be a piece of metaphysical dogma that we shouldreject.

29

Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Metaphysics and Science

§ § §

Stathis Psillos

Regularities all the way down

The neo-Humean approach to laws advocates a sparse metaphysical view of the world, accordingto which there are irreducible regularities in nature (there are regularities all the way down, so tospeak) which involve patterns of dependence among members of natural classes (natural proper-ties) and which underpin the causal and generally modal relations there are between them. Hence,there is no need for an additional law-making property of a distinct metaphysical type‚Äîa regu-larity enforcer. In this talk, I defend the regularity view of laws (RVL) against some objections(regarding mostly the robustness of laws) and develop the sparse metaphysics of RVL by articu-lating the view that regularities are mereological sums of their instances (parts), characterised bythe unity of a (natural) pattern.

§ § §

Anna-Sofia Maurin

Lund University

In Defense of Taxonomic Monism : On What What There Is Does

Scientific Realism is the view that our (best) scientific theories are true ( or approximately true )and that what they describe is the ontological structure of mind-independent reality. TaxonomicMonism is the view that this mind-independent reality is uniquely structured. Scientific Realismcombined with Taxonomic Monism yields a view according to which our (best) scientific theo-ries describe the unique structure of mind-independent reality ; that they "carve reality at itsjoints". However, this marriage between Scientific Realism and Taxonomic Monism is arguablyan unhappy one. For, different classificatory practices in the modern sciences furnish us withequally informative yet mutually incoherent taxonomic schemes. In a number of recent publi-cations, Anjan Chakravartty has argued that a reasonable Scientific Realism should thereforedivorce Taxonomic Monism (and marry its distant cousin Taxonomic Pluralism instead). I willargue to the contrary that the marriage between Scientific Realism and Taxonomic Monism ishappier than it may at first appear. The key to marital success, I will argue, lies in rethinkingwhat sort of information about mind-independent reality can be gleaned from our best sciences.More precisely, I will argue, our best sciences can teach us, not what kinds of things there are,but rather, what what there is does.

§ § §

Claudine Tiercelin

In defense of metaphysical boldness

Against various forms of Kantian, Human and Lewisian humility which, despite their respectivedifferences, have all in common to take for granted that our metaphysical knowledge is "elusive"(either because we cannot know how things are in themselves and are doomed to phenomena

30

Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Metaphysics and Science

and regularities, or because our cognitive faculties are limited), I shall present some logical,scientific and metaphysical arguments in favor of a realism of dispositions based both on a causaland dispositionalist account of properties, and on a conditional dispositionalist viewof laws. Indefending such a scholastic categorical realism which neither excludes to retort to some kind of"aliquidditism" nor to some teleological aspects of causation, nor to the necessity of some laws, Ishall argue that such a strategy in-between humility and temerity is the only way 1) to avoid thetroubles met both by armchair and naturalized metaphysics alike, 2) to improve on the meritsof various ontic and causal structuralisms, and, most importantly, 3) to give some flesh to theconcept of metaphysical knowledge, and, in so doing, to provide some tentative answer to the"Integration Challenge"of metaphysics and epistemology which any serious metaphysician has toface.

§ § §

31

Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Epistemic Democracy, . . .

Epistemic Democracy, Self-Interest, and the Common Good

Enrico Biale - Charles Girard - José Luis Marti - ChristianRostbøll

According to epistemic conceptions, democratic authority rests on the assumption that democra-tic decision-making tend to produce right outcomes (Estlund, 2007). But what criteria of rightnessshould we use to evaluate political decisions ? Deliberative democrats argue that democratic pro-cedures should try to identify and promote the common good and that, as a consequence, publicdeliberation foster democracy’s epistemic quality. Not only does it treat citizens respectfully bygiving each one a "fair say", but it is assumed to be, by contrast with bargaining, random selectionor mere voting, the best way to identify the common good (Elster 1986, Cohen 1989, Fishkin andAckerman, 2002). This influent view has faced, however, serious challenges. On the one hand, theappeal to a common good is suspected of dissimulating a systematic bias in favor of particular self-interests (Young, 2002). On the other hand, if the common good is not necessarily non-existentor unknown but rather undesired, deliberation’s epistemic promises are founded on a naïve mo-ral psychology (Elster, 2004). These criticisms have led to recent reformulations, suggesting thatself-interest should sometimes also be promoted by democratic deliberation (Mansbridge and al.,2010). On such an account, while the concept of deliberation was originally defined in oppositionwith negotiation aimed at the satisfaction of self-interests, it should now be extended so as toinclude specific forms of "deliberative negotiation". To put this conceptual reconfiguration to thetest, this symposium will reexamine the relationship between the common good and self-interestsin an epistemic deliberative context.

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Enrico Biale

Università del Piemonte Orientale (Italy)

Democratic Bargaining : Dealing with Self-Interest or Promoting the Common Good ?

A just society has to identify and promote the common good. One of the most powerful justi-fications of democracy that has been provided in the recent decades claims that democracy islegitimate and fair because it is more likely than other institutional systems to pursue the commongood. According to this epistemic justification of democracy, however, to achieve this aim citizensdo not have to aggregate their preferences by voting or negotiate over their interested propo-sals, but they have to deliberate. In this paper I challenge the traditional contraposition betweencommon good and self-interest and I argue that within the public policy debate people cannotidentify the common good if they do not take into account their self-interest and demand that thewhole polity acknowledges the legitimacy of their interested proposals. To pursue the commongood, a democracy has to legitimize some forms of negotiation ("democratic bargaining") thatcould deal with interested claims without undermining fairness. Since an account of democraticbargaining will more likely identify and promote the common good than the traditional accountof deliberative democracy, I will conclude that it is not only a legitimate and fair alternative todeliberation but, at least from an epistemic point of view, a better democratic procedure.

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Charles Girard

Université Paris Sorbonne

The Common Good as Equal Promotion of all Individual Interests

An epistemic conception of deliberative democracy needs to respond to two challenges. Accordingto the false common good criticism, the goal public deliberation pursues does not exist : thereare only divergent self-interests that cannot be reconciled. According to the moral conversioncriticism, while something like the common good might exist, it cannot be reached, becauseindividuals are primarily motivated by their self-interest. I argue that i) the common good is bestunderstood as the equal promotion of all individual self-interests ; and that ii) given this definition,both criticisms should be rejected. To do so, I elaborate a conceptual distinction between one’sindividual self-interest and one’s specific interests, drawing on Barry’s analysis. I criticize Barry’s(and Pettit’s) definition of the common good as the set of interests that are shared by all citizensqua citizens, as it implies excluding particular interests which are ordinarily deemed legitimate.However, they can be included in the perimeter of the common good if it is defined as the equalpromotion of all individual (but not specific) interests. This helps to take up both challenges,since i) the common good does not refer to a (potentially non-existent) set of fixed overlappingpreferences ; and ii) its pursuit does not require a ‚Äòmoral conversion’ as much as an epistemiceffort.

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José Luis Marti

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain)

Who (and how) knows what’s the right thing to do politically : on the epistemicdimension of deliberative democratic decision-making

It is common to justify democracy as the system of government more respectful with certainsubstantive values, such as human dignity, political equality and political autonomy. Any othersystem seems necessarily disrespectful of them. But this is not all what we value in governmentdecision making. We want our collective decisions to be democratic ‚Äìin a procedural sense-,but we also want them to be correct. Deliberative democracy comes to bridge these two centralconcerns. This paper examines the roots for the epistemic value of deliberative democracy : what itis to be known to make correct political decisions ; who is the appropriate knower ; how this knowermay come to know what is to be known. The paper intends to show why deliberative democracymay reasonably satisfy our demand for correction in democratic decisions, while resisting theelitist trend. And it clarifies one crucial point that has generated some misguided criticism in themost recent literature : the ideal nature of the epistemic deliberative democracy and its relationwith more real and practical approximations to it. It ends by stressing that, even if a self-interestedand strategic behavior by the participants in public deliberation is not conceptually inconsistentwith the idea of deliberation, it is inimical of its epistemic value.

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Christian Rostbøll

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University of Copenhagen (Denmark)

Against Incorporating Self-Interest in the Deliberative Ideal

In the development and refinement of the theory of deliberative democracy over the last twodecades, it has become evident that self-interests cannot and should not be excluded from the po-litical process. It is an important aspect of the political process that citizens have the opportunityto clarify and express their interests in order that political decisions do not favor the interestsof some groups over the interest of other groups. But does this mean that self-interest should beincluded in the deliberative ideal ? In order to answer this question we need to understand thatdeliberative democracy is a complex theory of democracy that involves both instrumental andintrinsic dimensions. This paper argues against the suggestion of Jane Mansbridge et al. that weshould award self-interest intrinsic value and make it part of the regulative ideal of deliberativedemocracy. What we need is not integration of self-interest and deliberative democracy into oneunified ideal. Rather, we should maintain an ideal of deliberative democracy that stands apartfrom the politics of self-interest.

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Higher-Order Attitudes : . . .

Higher-Order Attitudes : Knowledge, Beliefs and Social Interaction

Paul Egré - David Spector - Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic -Olivier Roy

Higher-order attitudes occupy an increasingly important place in many areas of contemporaryanalytic philosophy. Higher-order attitudes are attitudes, cognitive or conatives, about attitudes.In epistemology, introspection principles have been the object of heated debates for many decadesnow. Does one always have, or should have, (correct) beliefs about one’s beliefs ? knowledgeof one’s ignorance ? In recent years, questions of higher-order attitudes have proven to be ofimportance not only for these two classical pillars of epistemology, knowledge and beliefs, but alsofor notions such as awareness and higher-order vagueness. To take another example, disagreementis arguably one of the most discussed notions in contemporary social epistemology. Here higher-order attitudes turn out to be crucial as well, but this time in the form of attitudes aboutthe attitudes of others. Has information about others’ information any epistemic significance ?Should one always take others’ beliefs into account while forming one’s own beliefs ? Finally,higher-order attitudes have also occupy an important place in meta-ethics, be it in the discussionof the importance of higher-order desires in views about personal identity, or about the source ofreasons and normativity.

The aim of this workshop is to present, compare and relate a number of debates and questionsinvolving higher-order attitudes. The workshop will consist of four talks, each of which is repre-sentative of a particularly active area of contemporary analytic philosophy. The first two talkswill address questions raised in the modern debates about introspection in the epistemology ofindividual knowledge. The first talk will compare two forms of ignorance and two related forms ofnegative introspection, respectively involving knowledge and awareness, combining insights fromcognitive sciences, epistemology and logic. The second talk will turn to positive introspection, butthis time in relation with Williamson’s margin for error principle for knowledge. The third andfourth talk will explore the social importance of higher-order attitudes, related to questions ofdisagreement and normativity, respectively. The third talk will explore the relation, both at theformal and at the philosophical level, between two well-known mathematical models of consensusformation. The fourth talk will turn to the notions of reasons and rationality in social interac-tion and will investigate, from a game-theoretical perspective, their dependence on higher-orderattitudes. All in all, these four talks will provide a snapshot of contemporary areas of analyticphilosophy where higher-order attitude play a key role and will, we hope, lay the ground for afruitful interaction between these.

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Paul Egré

(IJN)

Unawareness, uncertainty and the knowledge of one’s ignorance

The distinction between uncertainty and unawareness has been at the center of much formalwork in epistemic logic recently. The perspective of this talk will be to discuss the metacognitiveimplications of the distinction in the light of work done on the psychology of known unknowns. Ina classic study, Glucksberg and McCloskey (1982) have proposed a two-stage model of decisions

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about ignorance. On their view, subjects can issue a don’t know verdict when faced with a questionon two grounds : one concerns cases in which subjects find no potentially relevant evidence in theirmemory. For such cases, subjects are expected to give fast verdicts of ignorance. A second categoryof don’t know answers corresponds to cases in which subjects do find some relevant evidence inmemory, but find no conclusive evidence so as to satisfactorily answer the question. For such cases,Glucksberg and McCloskey results indicate that verdicts of ignorance take longer, consistentlywith the hypothesis of a heavier processing load (see also Hampton et al. 2011). A related aspectwe shall focus on concerns the reliability of decisions about one’s ignorance. Cases in which wefind relevant information in our memory but remain uncertain should be cases for which we findharder to give a reliable estimate of the degree of our uncertainty, and more generally for whichwe could easily overestimate or underestimate our ignorance. By contrast, cases in which we findno relevant information in our memory, such as cases grounded in antecedent unawareness, shouldbe cases for which we issue more reliable decisions about the true state of our ignorance.

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David Spector

(PSE)

On the foundation of the margin for error principle

According to Timothy Williamson’s (1994) theory of inexact knowledge, perceptual knowledgesatisfies a margin for error principle resulting from the limited accuracy of individual perceptions.This principle in turn gives rise to the epistemic sorites paradox, which Williamson solves byrejecting the view that knowledge satisfies positive introspection. Several authors (Mott, 1998 ;Dutant, 2007 ; Dokic and Egré, 2009) have criticized Williamson’s reasoning by resorting to anexplicit modeling of perceptions. They showed that even if perceptions are imprecise, individualscan make inferences based on their perceptions and on their knowledge of their perceptual limita-tions, resulting in knowledge that may violate the margin for error principle. Williamson (2000)retorts that this argument is invalid because it assumes individuals to have perfect rather thaninexact knowledge of their perceptual limitations. We assess the merits of the two sides of thisdebate by explicitly modeling perceptual limitations at various orders. We show that, for a certainclass of signal structures, the margin for error principle for perceptual knowledge holds only tothe extent that it holds at all higher orders. However, in order to avoid an infinite regress, onemust assume that there exists some primitive knowledge not resulting from perceptions. A fullmodeling of perceptions at all orders thus casts doubt on Williamson’s claim that the margin forerror principle can be justified by considerations on perceptual limitations. Furthermore, we findthat such a modeling may warrant the rejection of the margin for error principle for perceptualknowledge.

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Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic

(Paris X, Paris XII, IHPST)

Consensus and higher-order information

How should an agent take into account the probabilistic opinion of other agents in a group ? Thetraditional Bayesian answer would be to use Bayes rule and higher-order probabilities. In the

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80’s, Lehrer and Wagner proposed a different and much simpler model based on the attributionof epistemic weights, which were meant to express degrees of trust. The interest of the modelis to allow for a detailed study of the conditions under which agents may reach consensus (byrepeated updating on each other’s beliefs). However, the absence of a principled justification fortheir update mechanisms casted on some doubts on the significance of the results. In this talk,we will discuss whether such a justification can be given and prove a representation theorem forLehrer and Wagner’s updates with respect to Bayesian updates.

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Olivier Roy

(Munich)

Normativity in Interaction : the Case of Higher-Order Attitudes

In many social situations, in seems that we are under normative pressure to take into account factsabout what others believe about, or expect of us. We can be rationally criticized for overlookingor ignoring such facts. Take for instance the famous scene of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove,when the latter tells the Russian ambassador "The whole point of the Doom’s Day Machine islost... if you keep it a secret ; why didn’t you tell the world, he ? ! ? !". Strangelove is pointingout that building the machine in question makes little sense without making sure that everyoneknows about its existence or, even, without it being common knowledge. This talk will be aboutsuch situations, where we raise normative claims about what should be mutually or commonlyknown, believed or expected, and about how these should bear on actions. Our starting point willbe contemporary epistemic game theory (Brandenburger, 2007) and dynamic-epistemic logic (vanDitmarsch et al. 2007). After explaining how to see "choice rules" (e.g. dominance, maximizationof expected utility, admissibility, maximin) as potential sources of normative statements, we willsurvey known results concerning the sensitivity of these choice rules to perturbations in higher-order attitudes (e.g. Rubinstein 1989, Apt, 2007, Trost, Manuscript), and explain the significanceof theses results from the perspective of a general, normative theory of rational decision makingin social interaction.

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Symétrie, structure et réalisme

Symétrie, structure et réalisme

Elena Castellani - Michael Esfeld - Alexandre Guay

Deux concepts ont particulièrement soulevé l’intérêt des philosophes de la physique au cours desvingt dernières années : le concept de symétrie et celui de structure. Pour les physiciens, ces deuxconcepts sont essentiellement liés à travers leur usage dans les applications à la physique de lathéorie des groupes. Les philosophes, quant à eux, ont abordé ces deux concepts séparément et,généralement, en poursuivant des visées philosophiques différentes dans chaque cas. En simplifiantun peu la situation, on constate qu’aujourd’hui, nous faisons face à deux traditions de recherchequi se recoupent peu. La première porte sur l’usage des symétries en physique et consiste prin-cipalement en travaux indépendants de la question du réalisme. L’autre tradition a pour objetla défense, l’attaque et le développement du réalisme structurel. L’objectif principal du présentsymposium est de réunir ces deux domaines de questionnement philosophique et d’entamer uneréflexion qui visera à obtenir une unification des perspectives qu’ils soulèvent.

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Elena Castellani

Symétrie et réalisme structurel

Les symétries (au sens d’une invariance par rapport à un groupe de transformations) et les struc-tures sont deux notions intimement liées. D’un côté, les relations qui constituent la structured’un ensemble d’éléments sont souvent identifiées sur la base du groupe de transformations quiles laisse invariantes (c’est-à-dire, le groupe de symétrie). De l’autre, les symétries sont parfoisdéfinies comme les transformations qui préservent une structure donnée. Elles sont ainsi classéessur la base du type de structure qu’elles préservent. Voir, par exemple, (Ismael & van Fraassen2003, 378). Il est donc naturel que les symétries, si liées aux structures, aient une importanceconsidérable dans l’approche structurelle des théories physiques. Dans le cas des théories phy-siques ’fondamentales’ (par exemple le Modèle Standard en théorie quantique de champ), le rôleprimordial des symétries est d’autant plus marqué. Par exemple, dans le développement de laversion ’ontologique’ du réalisme structurel, par French et Ladyman, la possibilité de caractéri-ser les particules élémentaires sur la base des représentations irréductibles du groupe de symétriefondamental a joué un rôle central. Voir sur le même sujet, l’article pionnier de Wigner (1939). Demanière plus générale, certains ont soutenu précédemment une approche fondée sur les groupesde la question des objets physiques, par exemple (Cassirer 1944 et 1945 [1979]) et (Born 1998).Pour une discussion générale, voir la section " Objects and Invariance " dans (Castellani 1998).Dans cet exposé, nous examinerons de plus près la relation entre symétrie et structure du point devue d’une approche structurelle des théories physiques. Nous examinerons tout spécialement dansquelle mesure le rôle des symétries physiques est nécessaire pour cette approche, en particulieren ce qui a trait à la version ontologique du réalisme structurel.

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Michael Esfeld

Réalisme structurel et ontologie de la physique quantique

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Symétrie, structure et réalisme

Cette communication cherche à établir un lien entre le réalisme structurel ontologique et lesinterprétations majeures de la physique quantique discutées dans la littérature contemporaine, àsavoir celles d’Everett, de Ghirardi, Rimini et Weber et de Bohm. J’argumenterai que le réalismestructurel ontologique constitue une sorte de cadre général et informatif pour l’interprétation de laphysique quantique dans lequel entrent ces trois interprétations et ce, en dépit de leur différencesontologiques considérables. Afin d’être en mesure de fonctionner comme un tel cadre général,le réalisme structurel doit se baser sur les symétries qu’implémente la mécanique quantique.Finalement, je montrerai comment on peut procéder à une évaluation argumentative de chacunede ces interprétations sur cette base.

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Alexandre Guay

Symétries parfaites et structures

Plusieurs philosophes ont soutenu que l’on pouvait utiliser les symétries pour identifier les sur-plus descriptifs dans les théories physiques (par exemple Nozick 1998). Les symétries pourraientainsi nous permettre de cerner la part " objective " du discours physique. Récemment, RichardHealey (2009) a proposé le concept de symétrie parfaite, soit une symétrie empirique qui reliedes situations qui partagent toutes leurs propriétés intrinsèques. On peut montrer qu’une symé-trie empirique est parfaite si elle peut être expliquée, par un certain argument, à partir d’unesymétrie théorique, soit une symétrie qui relie les modèles de la théorie. La proposition de Healeyest intéressante en particulier du fait qu’elle propose une méthode systématique pour clarifierl’ontologie du discours physique. Dans cet exposé, nous discuterons des deux points suivants :1. Nous montrerons comment les symétries parfaites ne distinguent pas entre symétries interneset externes qui, elles, ont des interprétations ontologiques différentes (Redhead 1988) et, qu’enconséquence, elles affaiblissent la distinction entre propriété intrinsèque et extrinsèque. 2. Nousdiscuterons de l’impact de cet affaiblissement sur le structuralisme en physique et en particuliersur le réalisme structurel.

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Quantum Mechanics . . .

Quantum Mechanics Faces the Location Problem

Jean-Pierre Llored - Michel Bitbol - Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica

We provide a reformulation of the view according to which consciousness derives from a materialfundamental basis by exploring recent quantum mechanics developments. The overall challengeis to assess the classical location problem (Jackson 1998) on radically different grounds : insteadof eliminating or reducing or identifying contents of experience or phenomenological reports tothe structural network of objective science, we will strive towards embedding phenomenologicalreports in a broader relational network, of which the law-like structure of the objective domain isonly a fraction. (Bitbol 2008) In line with Varela (1998) and Van Fraasen (2002), we will ratheradvocate a radical change of stance regarding the consciousness-matter link.

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Jean-Pierre Llored

CREA/Ecole Polytechnique, ULB

Relation between levels of organization : an examination from quantum chemis-try

This survey is about possible connections between the concept of emergence and quantum chemis-try. I first come back to laboratories of research in order to scrutinize how quantum chemists andbiochemists work and contrive their scientific tools for studying molecular transformation. I thencarefully analyze how they tailor languages, iconographic models and mereologies to articulatethe different patterns of organization they currently use. The minimization of molecular energy isa crucial step which intertwines a molecule whole, its parts -whatever their nature should be-andthe surrounding context at the same time. No ontological priority is put forward between levelsbut only relations and entanglements between them. In this respect, modes of access (instrumen-tal or cognitive) are of paramount importance to highlight the codependence of such levels. Toconclude, I will explain how and why this framework may provide philosophers with interestingarguments to face some problems such as emergence, supervenience and the connection of mindand matter.

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Michel Bitbol

CREA

Consciousness and quantum mechanics : a deflationary examination

There are two versions of the putative connection between consciousness and the measurementproblem of quantum mechanics : consciousness as the cause of state vector reduction (Wigner,Von Neumann etc.), and state vector reduction as the physical basis of consciousness (Penrose,Stapp etc.). In this symposium, these controversial ideas will neither be accepted uncritically,nor rejected from the outset in the name of some prejudice about objective knowledge. Instead,their theoretical and philosophical credentials will be examined carefully, and their origin will be

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 Quantum Mechanics . . .

sought in our most cherished (but disputable) beliefs about the place of mind and consciousnessin the world. Might these common beliefs about mind and consciousness arise from reificationof situated first-person experience ? And might the very project of studying the connection ofmind and matter by way of physics be a spurious effect of the ontological projection of both thefirst-person and the third-person standpoints ? These hypotheses will be submitted to scrutinyalong several philosophical lines of investigation.

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Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica

Supernatural Mind and Infinite Decomposability

If the physical is uncontroversial natural, and if the mental is (at least tacitly) accepted asnon- supernatural, why do we find ourselves with the ontological problem of mentality and itssubjective qualitative compound “qualia” on our hands ? What is so special about the subjectivemind that poses a problem in a naturalist view of the world ? Furthermore, if quantum mechanicsapproaches (QM) turn out to be one of the most well-confirmed physical theories ever developedby humans, why then do philosophers develop theories of the mind- brain link as if QM did notexist ? (Q. Smith 2003)

In this paper, I propose to examine one construal of the location problem, i.e. the idea of deter-mining the nature of the deepest level of reality with respect to the mental and the physical. Oneimportant metaphysical issue is to determine whether everything is ultimately mental, physicalor both. But what if there is no such thing as the deepest level because the universe is infinite ?I will argue here against ontological foundationalism and in favour of infinite decomposabilitythesis. (Schaffer 2003, Montero 2006, Nagasawa 2012 forthcoming)

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 La dimension volontaire . . .

La dimension volontaire des croyances collectives

Olivier Ouzilou - Alban Bouvier - Raphaël Künstler

La distinction entre deux types d’états mentaux doxastiques, belief et acceptance, est désormaisusuelle. Le contenu de cette distinction varie cependant fort sensiblement (Cohen, Bratman, VanFraassen, etc.). Cohen oppose ainsi croyance et acceptation (ou " assentiment ") comme un étatpassif (au sens où tout élément de volonté fait défaut : la croyance est foncièrement subie) à un étatactif (au sens où un élément de volonté est présent dans l’assentiment). Cohen distingue, en outre,deux types d’acceptations : l’acceptation pragmatique (ou prudentielle), à laquelle la discussiondes analyses de Cohen s’est souvent cantonnée - et l’acceptation évidentielle (ou épistémique). Co-hen s’est cependant limité lui-même au seul champ des croyances individuelles. Margaret Gilbert,au contraire, a soutenu une conception des croyances collectives qui est également une conceptionvolontariste, fondée sur l’idée de contrat réciproque tacite (joint commitment). Mais Gilbert adénié à peu près toute pertinence aux distinctions de Cohen en ce contexte, suscitant une vivecontroverse (Meijers, Wray, etc.), d’autant que les analyses de Philip Pettit sur les groupes à ob-jectif pourraient être elles-mêmes, semble-t-il, développées à l’aune de ces distinctions. Ces débatsseront examinés sur des exemples pris dans les domaines judiciaire, religieux et scientifique

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Olivier OUZILOU

Croyances collectives, acceptantes collectives et intelligibilité des comportements degroupe

L’originalité de Gilbert (1987) réside, en partie, en sa tentative d’introduire en philosophie socialeune compréhension des notions intentionnelles collectives qui se distingue de ce qu’elle nomme leuracception "sommative". Ainsi, une compréhension sommative du concept de "croyance collective"échouerait à rendre compte de la dimension intrinsèquement collective de cette notion en réduisantles croyances collectives à de simples croyances partagées au sein d’un groupe social donné. Faceà une telle approche, Gilbert propose de distinguer les croyances collectives par le type spécifiquede normativité qu’elles font émerger. Toutefois, la notion de "croyance collective" telle que l’athématisée Gilbert a été soumise à certaines critiques. L’une des objections centrales à sa positionconsiste à dire, comme le fait Wray (2001), que les états mentionnés dans son analyse ne sontpas des croyances mais des " acceptances " et que cette redéfinition permet de saisir le typespécifique de rationalité qui caractérise le comportement " doxastique " des sujets pluriels. Enconcentrant mon propos sur les "groupes à objectif" (Pettit, 2003), j’aimerais montrer commentces sujets pluriels peuvent être en réalité simultanément sensibles à des normes pragmatiques etépistémiques.

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Alban Bouvier

IJN & Aix-Marseille U.

Croyances, acceptions, co-engagements et argumentation en contexte judiciaire etpolitico-religieux

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 La dimension volontaire . . .

Cette contribution se concentre tout d’abord sur l’evidential acceptance en cherchant à mon-trer sa pertinence empirique (phénoménologique) sur l’analyse de cas de " croyances judiciaires" idéal-typiques, que Cohen considère longuement, puis de cas de "croyances religieuses ", queCohen considère rapidement. Je conclue ici que si la belief n’est pas accessible à l’argumentation,l’acceptance, pragmatique comme évidentielle, l’est. La complexité des croyances religieuses, aux-quelles je m’arrête ensuite, révèle très vite que même les distinctions de Cohen sont insuffisantespour rendre compte de la spécificité des croyances collectives (Tuomela, Wray, Meijers). A cettefin, Margaret Gilbert a introduit le concept de co-engagement (joint commitment), proche duconcept de foi conçue comme fides (fidélité). Si les croyances collectives comme agrégation debeliefs individuelles ne sont pas accessibles comme telles à l’argumentation, ni les idées ou re-présentations qui reposent sur la foi, la " foi " elle-même (religieuse ou politique) comme fidesest paradoxalement accessible à l’argumentation au sens particulier où il est parfois possible demontrer que le co-engagement qui la constitue a été brisé par l’un des " co-engagés". L’islam estpris comme exemple.

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Raphaël Künstler

Accepter une théorie que l’on croit fausse

Cohen soutient que l’activité scientifique exige des chercheurs qu’ils s’entraînent à renoncer à toutecroyance théorique, et à se contenter d’une simple acceptation des lois physiques. Il s’agit d’évi-ter que le chercheur ne s’obstine dans une position théorique incompatible avec les découvertesempiriques ou théoriques récentes, et ainsi de préserver la soumission de la pensée du chercheurà une norme de rationalité entendue comme la capacité d’un sujet à réviser ses opinions lorsqueses interactions avec les phénomènes ou autrui lui fournissent des informations nouvelles. Si cetteprescription de Cohen était valable, le chercheur devrait être prêt à accepter des théories qu’ilcroirait pourtant fausses. J’aimerais d’abord montrer que cette formule étonnante ne décrit pasune situation impossible en exposant la manière dont Poisson a été conduit à accepter la théo-rie de Fresnel. En même temps, ce cas met en évidence l’insuffisance de la caractérisation del’activité scientifique sur laquelle Cohen s’appuie : il méconnaît aussi bien la recherche que Kuhnnomme " ordinaire " que les " contextes de poursuite " dont s’est préoccupé Laudan. Cette lacuneme conduira à me demander comment autoriser l’intervention des croyances dans les conduitesscientifiques sans pour autant renoncer au rationalisme.

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Symposia SoPhA - 2012 L’analyse des valeurs . . .

L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées

Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - Andrew Reisner - KristerBykvist - Christine Tappolet - Mauro Rossi - Stéphane Lemaire

Julien A. Deonna et Fabrice Teroni

Université de Genève

From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements

We often pass evaluative judgements as a result of undergoing emotions. John judges that thejoke is funny because he is amused by it, Mary judges the remark to be offensive because sheis angry at its author. It is thus natural to think that emotions often explain, at least in part,our evaluative judgements. This phenomenon we take for granted. Our focus will be on theepistemological role emotions may play in connection with evaluative judgements and in particularon whether justified emotions are apt to justify the judgements they often explain. This problemrequires that we answer the following two questions. First, under which conditions are emotionsjustified ? Second, which epistemological role(s) can justified emotions play in connection withevaluative judgements ? Our starting point consists in motivating the need for an account ofjustified emotions by considering central disanalogies in the respective epistemological roles ofemotions and perceptions vis-à-vis the judgements they explain. Next, we reject an epistemologicalpicture – the idea that emotions are preceded by axiological judgements or value intuitions – thatthese disanalogies may foster but that we perceive as unconvincing. We then put forwards theclaim that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitutean instance of the evaluative property that features in the correctness conditions of this emotion.Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for the justification of evaluative judgementsand that emotions are not epistemologically superfluous.

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AndrewReisner

McGill University

Why the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value is Morally and Metaphysically Im-plausible

Since T.M. Scanlon’s book, What We Owe to Each Other, has revived interest fitting-attitudeanalyses of final value (including the buck-passing analysis), much of the attention of the topic hasfocused on finding analysis that are resistant to counterexamples. In this paper, it is observed thatthe narrow focus on finding a version of the fitting-attitude of buck-passing analysis that avoidcounterexamples has led us not to ask deeper questions about the desirability of such analyses onother grounds. I shall argue that for both metaphysical and moral reasons, we should be scepticalabout these agent-centric analyses. Many moral views, and much that is plausible to say aboutmorality, tells against thinking that we should fundamentally understand evaluative concepts interms of normative (or quasi-normative) claims about agents’ attitudes or actions. This moralconcern closely tracks related metaphysical worries about the reduction of value concepts orproperties to deontic concepts or proprerties.

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§ § §

Krister Bykvist

Oxford University

’They smiled at the good and frowned at the bad.’ A reexamination of the fittingattitude analysis of goodness

We all agree that it seems fitting to favour the good and disfavour the bad. This intuition, almostfeels like a truism. Indeed, it has become increasingly popular to turn this intuition into an explicitdefinition, according to which the good is defined as what it is fitting to favour, and the bad aswhat it is fitting to disfavour. Furthermore, it is often assumed that to say that an attitude isfitting is say something deontic or normative rather than something evaluative. My aim in thispaper is not to add some new objections to the fitting attitude analysis of value (the FA-analysis).I think it is time to take a step back and reconsider the reasons that led people to accept theaccount in the first place. I shall argue that the most important considerations that led peopleto adopt the FA-analysis can in fact be taken into account by value primitivists as well. If thisis correct, then, in light of all the objections to the FA-analysis, one should seriously ask oneselfwhether the FA-analysis is worth the price.

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Christine Tappolet

Université de Montréal

Comment ajuster les attitudes et les valeurs

Les analyses des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées affirment que les concepts de valeurspeuvent être analysés ou élucidés à l’aide du concept d’attitude appropriée. Ces analyses ontrécemment fait l’objet d’un grand nombre de critiques. Une des questions difficiles est celle desavoir quel type de réaction devrait figurer dans l’analysans. Selon Krister Bykvist (2009), ilparaît loin d’être possible de spécifier de manière non circulaire le type de réaction en question.Je soutiendrai que le problème majeur de l’argument de Bykvist est qu’il ne considère pas un typecentral de concept évaluatif. Il s’agit des concepts affectifs, comme amusant, dégoutant, admirable.Comme je le montrerai, les analyses en termes d’attitudes appropriées de ces concepts ne sontpas menacées par les objections de Bykvist. De plus, comme l’argument de Bykvist se focalise surles concepts évaluatifs les plus généraux, il omet de tenir compte des analogies importantes entrebon et coloré. Pourtant ces analogies permettent de voir comment il faudrait traiter les conceptsévaluatifs généraux.

§ § §

Mauro Rossi

UQAM

A fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value

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This paper explores the issue of how a fitting attitude analysis of value can be extended in orderto account for the comparative dimensions of value, i.e. the fact that value comes in degrees,that some things are better than others and that some things are incomparable to each otherin terms of value. More specifically, I focus on two recent accounts (Gert 2005 ; Rabinowicz2008), according to which making a judgment of comparative value is equivalent to making anormative assessment of preference. The central feature of these accounts is the idea that thereare two levels of normativity that are relevant for assessing preferences : rational requirement andrational permissibility. After reconstructing the motivations for introducing this distinction, Iargue against this way of analysing comparative value and propose an alternative account.

§ § §

Stéphane Lemaire

Université de Rennes 1

Pour une approche pratique de l’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appro-priées

The fitting attitude analyses (FAA) of values, and especially of emotional values (admirable,shameful, disgusting, etc.) may be presented as proposing in outline the following analysis : Ois admirable if there is a reason to admire O. Unfortunately, the FAA of values faces the wrongkind of reasons problem. Although there is a reason to admire the demon because he threatensto inflict severe pain on you if you do not admire him, it seems that the existence of such reasonsis irrelevant to the question of whether the demon is admirable. This and similar examples haveled most defenders of the FAA to adopt various epistemic approaches, whose common ground isprecisely to deny systematically that practical reasons are relevant. In this presentation, I arguethat this is the wrong way to go. First, I suggest that in order to determine when an emotion isappropriate, it is necessary to rely on practical reasons. However, for such a practical approach towork, I need to offer a criterion that is able to distinguish among practical reasons, those whichare relevant in the FAA of values. In the second part of the presentation, I therefore propose sucha criterion and defend it against various objections.

§ § §

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Résumés

A - F

Simona Aimar

Oxford University

Aristotelian dispositions

The simplest and most popular analysis of potentialities says : something has a potentiality toΦjust in case if a stimulus s were to occur, then it would Φ. Here "s" and "Φ" each refer to aspecific type of event. But this view does not allow for potentialities that have no stimuli. Mo-reover, even for potentialities that have stimuli, it faces counterexamples : when the stimulus ofa particular potentiality occurs, something may still prevent the occurrence of the manifestationassociated with that potentiality Φ-ing. In Metaphysics Theta 5, Aristotle offers a more sophisti-cated analysis of potentialities. It says that something has a potentiality to Φ just in case, if a setof conditions C were to hold, then x would Φ. Here "C" refers to conditions that are incompatiblewith the obtaining of preventing conditions, i.e. conditions that rule out the manifestation of thepotentiality. I evaluate this account, suggesting that it provides a viable and attractive alternativeto the more popular analysis.

§ § §

Cristina Amoretti 1* & Nicla Vassallo 2*

1* 2*University of Genoa, Italy

Women and medicine : Some epistemological notes on gender-specific medicine

This paper aims to provide analysis of a quite recently developed branch of medicine, that isgender-specific medicine, in order to assess whether it may be well grounded from an epistemo-logical point of view. Even if gender-specific medicine has some important merits that cannot bedisregarded, we also think that it still needs to be analyzed in deeper details, examining the roleof women as subjects of knowledge and as objects of knowledge in medicine. In both cases, wewould like to prove not only that the two notions of sex and gender cannot be detached fromother notions, such as race, ethnos, social class, age, religion, etc., but also that further empiricalresearch is necessary in order to evaluate both women’s role in medicine and the real effectivenessof gender-specific medicine. As a conclusion, we wish to point out that gender-specific medicinemay be weakened by two crucial flaws. First, we believe that it embraces, explicitly or not, the

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Résumés SoPhA - 2012 A - F

stereotypical dichotomy between male and female, man and woman ; second, it may support theidea of an intrinsic dichotomy between male/female, man/woman, and eventually strengthen oldand unjustified sex and/or gender based stereotypes and prejudices.

§ § §

Basak Aray

Philosophies contemporaines (PHICO) Université Paris I

L’empirisme logique comme une perspective politique sur le langage : la pédagogied’Otto Neurath

Cette intervention a pour objet la contribution d’Otto Neurath à la philosophie analytique duCercle de Vienne. Son activité dans le Musée de la Société et de l’Economie de Vienne et dansl’institut ISOTYPE (International System of Typographic Picture Education) sera présentéedans le cadre de la perspective collective du Cercle sur la dimension politique de la conceptionscientifique du monde. Celle-ci développe une philosophie du langage optimisée pour la pédagogieet adaptée à la popularisation, tout en s’opposant au renfermement idéologique, disciplinaire ouacadémique. Le langage visuel ISOTYPE, développé par l’équipe de Neurath pour la visualisationdes données statistiques pour le grand public, sera présenté comme un exemple pratique de laphilosophie politique du langage pratiquée par le Cercle de Vienne. Nous soutenons que les valeursépistémologiques comme l’intersubjectivité, la clarté et le réductionnisme empirique indiquent undésir de renouvellement du langage philosophique dans la direction d’une popularisation de lapensée critique.

§ § §

Margherita Arcangeli

Imagination and Memory : a New Content Account

The sensory-like experiences we undergo through imagination and memory are very similar, inso-far as they are faded and lack the feeling of presence involved in genuine perceptual experiences.Still in most cases we can say whether we are imagining or remembering. What are the markersof sensory imagination and episodic memory ? In the current literature three accounts of the mar-kers of imagination and memory have been put forward : the mental image account, the contentaccount, and the epistemological account. Firstly, I shall review the three approaches. FollowingByrne, the upshot will be that neither the mental image nor the content accounts are useful inorder to distinguish imagination and memory. However, according to Byrne the epistemologicalaccount is appealing. Against Byrne, I argue that there is more to the content account. Secondly,following some insights from situation theory and in particular its interpretation by Recanati,I shall argue that if one takes into account a broad notion of content, the content account isstill a valuable alternative. Moreover, I shall try to show that once we have acknowledged thecomplexity of the relevant notion of content, the epistemological account can be seen as a naturaldevelopment of the content account.

§ § §

Vicent Ardourel

IHPST

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La sous-détermination des théories physiques chez Newton-Smith

La thèse de la sous-détermination des théories par les données empiriques occupe une placeprépondérante au sein des débats sur le réalisme scientifique. Selon une version forte de cettethèse, il est à jamais impossible de trancher entre plusieurs théories rivales sur la base des donnéesempiriques. Malgré le peu de crédit que l’on peut accorder à cette thèse énoncée de manièregénérale, Newton-Smith soutient l’existence d’une sous-détermination forte entre deux théoriesphysiques sous certaines conditions particulières : lorsque les deux théories reposent, l’une surl’hypothèse d’un temps continu et l’autre sur celle d’un temps simplement dense.

Dans cette présentation, je commencerai par présenter la stratégie adoptée par Newton-Smithpour défendre sa thèse. Il s’appuie notamment sur l’exemple d’une théorie fictive, ‘la théorie deNotwen’ dont il cherche à montrer qu’elle ne peut être empiriquement discriminée de la mécaniquede Newton. Le propos de Newton-Smith est cependant insuffisamment convaincant, notammentparce qu’il est illustré par une théorie seulement fictive. Je propose ici une nouvelle stratégiepour défendre la thèse de Newton-Smith. Celle-ci s’appuie cette fois non plus sur une théoriefictive mais sur une reformulation récente de la mécanique classique représentant le temps demanière discrète et qui par conséquent permet d’illustrer de manière plus détaillée la possibilitéd’une sous-détermination forte entre deux théories physiques, l’une représentant le temps commecontinu et l’autre le représentant comme simplement dense.

§ § §

François Athané

IUFM Paris

Outils de philosophie analytique pour l’étude de la circulation économique

Le mot "échange" a des usages très variés : on parle d’échanges de gaz, d’échanges de regards,d’échanges de services, d’échanges d’un bien contre de l’argent. Seules ces deux dernières expres-sions dotent le mot " échange " d’un sens proprement économique, car seules elles impliquentune structure déontique : c’est-à-dire des droits sur des biens, et des devoirs, par exemple deverser la contrepartie. L’échange de biens implique en outre, par nécessité logico-conceptuelle,l’existence de droits de propriété, sous une forme ou une autre, sur ces biens. Il s’avère donc quece sont les implications déontiques d’un terme qui lui donnent son sens proprement économique.Il découle de là deux perspectives de recherche. Premièrement, l’échange est-il la seule façon detransférer la propriété ? Nous montrerons que non, et que l’analyse conceptuelle des termes dulangage courant permet d’identifier et de définir les quatre principales manières de transférer unbien, ou un droit sur un bien, à autrui. Cette typologie se trouvant confirmée par les donnéesfournies par l’ethnologie, l’histoire et les sciences économiques. Deuxièmement, qu’en est-il de lapropriété, nécessaire pour qu’il y ait échange au sens économique de ce terme ? Nous montreronsen quel sens la propriété est également une structure déontique. Mais celle-ci est toujours relativeà une communauté que le chercheur se donne comme communauté de référence, ce qui doit êtrecompris et explicité afin de ne pas confondre un phénomène déontique et institutionnel avec unphénomène naturel.

§ § §

Valérie Aucouturier 2, * , Bruno Gnassounou 1, *

2 : Centre Leo Apostel (V.U.B., Bruxelles) Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - Flandres

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1 : Centre Atlantique de Philosophie, Université de Nantes

Les vertus et les limites de la doctrine du double-effet

La doctrine du double-effet s’appuie sur une distinction entre ce qu’un agent a l’intention de faireet les effets collatéraux de son action, qu’il prévoit mais n’a pas l’intention de réaliser : si un actea deux effets, l’un bon, l’autre mauvais, il est permis de l’accomplir si (1) l’effet mauvais n’est pasvisé intentionnellement, (2) le bon effet n’est pas produit par le truchement du mauvais et (3) lebon effet " surpasse " le mauvais effet. Nous voudrions évaluer deux aspects de cette doctrine :1) Quand, dans un acte d’auto-défense, je tue quelqu’un, en quoi est-il légitime de dire que j’aivoulu me défendre et que la conséquence, non voulue, en était la mort de la personne, plutôt quede dire que j’ai voulu le tuer comme moyen de sauver mon existence ? Cette distinction entreresponsabilité et culpabilité semble aussi essentielle qu’artificielle. 2) Y-a-t-il un sens à dire queparmi les effets possibles d’une action, nous " choisissons ", en " dirigeant notre intention " sur lespremiers et non sur les derniers, ceux qui entreront dans l’action intentionnelle à titre de moyenet de fin, et ceux qui seront de simples effets collatéraux ?

§ § §

Emmanuel Baierlé

Département de Philosophie, Université de Fribourg

Is Our Phenomenology Libertarian ?

It is pretty common in the free will literature to declare that before doing philosophy one nor-mally starts as a libertarian. In recent years, there have been some attacks against this claim.On the one hand, experimental philosophers have tried to show that the lay person has compa-tibilist intuitions and on the other hand Horgan et al. have tried to show that it is a mistaketo think that our phenomenology has libertarian veridicality conditions. I will try to show thatour phenomenology is indeed libertarian, i.e. we experience ourselves as free and undetermined.I argue that to experience oneself as undetermined means having an experience the content ofwhich is incompatible with being determined. I propose an analysis of the content of a paradig-matic case of free decision and try to establish its incompatibility with the agent’s decision beingdetermined.

§ § §

Aude Bandini

Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN)

La dérive de la croyance

Avec la notion de " dérive cognitive ", l’anthropologue T. Luhrmann, dans Persuasion of theWitch’s Craft (1989) entend rendre compte de la manière dont des individus rationnels peuventen venir à entretenir des croyances irrationnelles, en l’occurrence en la sorcellerie. Au travers ducas d’acrasie épistémique qu’elle décrit, on montrera que le fait que des facteurs non-épistémiquespuissent intervenir dans le processus de formation et de fixation de la croyance n’implique pasque l’on doive renoncer au principe déontologiste selon lequel " on ne doit croire que p, que si etseulement si p est vrai ". En établissant que le concept de croyance peut être pris dans un sens

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descriptif et/ou évaluatif, on s’efforcera de défendre l’idée que les croyances sont des attitudesgouvernées par des normes proprement épistémiques, mais auxquelles nous pouvons nous plierou non, volontairement. Rendre compte du phénomène de la dérive de la croyance permettrad’asseoir la thèse selon laquelle nous avons des devoirs épistémiques, parce que les croyances sontbien, quoi qu’en un sens qu’il faudra spécifier et qui ne s’applique pas aux actions, des attitudesvolontaires.

§ § §

Christophe Béal

Enseignant dans la secondaire. Doctorat soutenu à Paris 1, Nosophi

Le positivisme juridique inclusif

Les commentaires suscités par la théorie du droit de H.L.Hart ont profondément renouvelé laréflexion sur le positivisme juridique. On a ainsi vu apparaître l’hypothèse d’un positivisme ju-ridique inclusif qui, tout en maintenant la thèse de la séparation entre le droit et la morale,reconnaît la possibilité d’introduire des critères moraux dans les règles de reconnaissance qui per-mettent d’identifier le contenu du droit et qui fixent les conditions de validité des règles juridiques.Notre contribution vise à présenter cette version du positivisme juridique et à faire le point surles diverses critiques dont elle a fait l’objet. Deux questions majeures se posent. Le positivismejuridique inclusif est-il encore positiviste et peut-il être vraiment distingué de certaines versionsdu droit naturel ou de théories qui remettent en cause les principes du positivisme ? Doit-onadmettre, à la suite de Joseph Raz, qu’une théorie positiviste conséquente ne peut-être qu’exclu-sive ? Le problème qui est ainsi soulevé est de savoir comment une règle secondaire peut inclureune norme morale sans pour autant que l’ordre juridique soit subordonné à des normes moralesextra-juridiques.

§ § §

Delia Belleri 1, & Michele Palmira 2

1 : University of Bologna

2 : University of Modena and Reggio Emilia

The Accuracy View of Disagreement

The recent debate on Truth Relativism has shed light on a variety of disagreements. But whathas Relativism done for the notion of disagreement tout court ? Not much ‚Äì one would betempted to answer. Until now, the acknowledgment of several kinds of disagreements by Relativistshas been mostly a strategic move purported at a defence of Relativism itself. The variety ofdisagreements that has emerged so far has not yet been addressed as interesting in its own right.In this paper, we wish to focus on disagreement as a category in its own right. The questionto be faced is whether there is something like disagreement tout court, over and beyond themany disagreements on which Relativists have attracted our attention. We shall argue that somenotions that have been introduced by Relativists can be fruitfully employed to this end. Ourpurpose is that of taking advantage of some notions typically introduced by Relativists, such asthe notion of "accuracy", strip them off of their Relativistic presuppositions and use them in orderto address the independent question of whether there is an overarching and interesting notion ofdisagreement.

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§ § §

Sandy Berkovski

Bilkent University

Welfare, subjectivity, and attitudes ; On approval

Many theorists taking part in the debate over personal welfare engage with the idea that thewelfare of an individual must, in a certain way to be specified, be subjective : it must reflect theapproving or disapproving ‘attitudes’ of that individual. Some theorists are attracted by this idea.Others, while eventually coming to reject it, accept it as a legitimate and coherent alternative.The purpose of this talk is to question the coherence of subjectivism. I ask whether there isa concept of approval suitable for the subjectivist’s purposes. I argue that the only concept ofapproval employable by a theory of welfare is one which fits hedonism. However, hedonism shouldnot be counted among subjectivist theories.

§ § §

Anja Berninger

University of Tübingen

The Ontology of Emotion and Perception

The so-called perceptual theories of emotions have become increasingly popular in recent years.One of the central claims these theories make is that there is a close structural similarity betweenemotions and perceptions. In my talk I explore this claim from an ontological perspective. Thequestion I ask is whether emotions and perceptions belong to the same ontological category.Following Helen Steward I distinguish three categories : states, events and processes. I thenexplore the descriptions of emotions offered in perceptual theories of emotions. When theoristssay that emotions are similar to perception they usually mean ‘perception’ in the sense of ‘patternrecognition’. I show that within these theories emotions and this form of perception are usuallyseen as either states or events. I then go on to show that the way that emotions unfold through timemakes it much more plausible to see them as processes. I conclude that emotions and perceptionsshould be placed in different ontological categories and that this poses a serious problem forperceptual theories of emotions.

§ § §

Alexandre Billon

STL - Université Lille 3

Happiness for dummies

There is a long tradition, in philosophy, of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only wewere more rational, it is claimed, we would lead happier lives. I argue that such an optimismis misguided and that paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot both be happy andrational.

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§ § §

Delphine Blitman

Institut Jean Nicod

La notion d’innéité est-elle scientifiquement pertinente ?

La notion d’innéité est très critiquée dans la philosophie des sciences contemporaine. Aux yeux denombreux chercheurs, c’est une notion préscientifique, qui doit être éliminée. L’objet de cet articleest de défendre la pertinence scientifique de la notion d’innéité tout en prenant acte des critiquesjustifiées qui lui sont faites. En premier lieu, je reviens sur les critiques de la notion d’innéité. Ledébat contemporain est en partie confus, mêlant des arguments différents. L’analyse de celui-cipermet de regrouper les arguments avancés sous trois grands problèmes distincts : au niveaude la génétique, le problème de l’interactionnisme ; au niveau du cerveau, celui de la plasticitécérébrale ; enfin, au niveau du comportement, celui du développementalisme. Pour chacun deces problèmes, je montre dans quelle mesure la critique de la notion d’innéité est justifiée. Ensecond lieu, j’argumente cependant pour soutenir que ces critiques n’ôtent pas tout sens au débatinné/acquis. Je propose d’abord que la notion d’innéité doit être définie, de manière relative etparticulière, à chacun de ces niveaux, et j’explique ensuite pourquoi une interprétation causaledes liens entre ces différents niveaux me semble à même de sauvegarder la cohérence de la notiond’innéité.

§ § §

Roland Bluhm

TU Dortmund

Linguistic Corpora in Philosophical Analyses

Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour and with it the belief in theprimary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in theirvarious endeavours philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds makereference to the use and/or meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, theymost commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions (in the sense of their active knowledgeof the object language). Not uncommonly, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplementedby reference to dictionaries. In recent times, internet search engine queries on expressions ofinterest have become quite popular. Apparently, the attempt is to surpass the limits of one’s ownlinguistic intuitions by appeal to experts or to factual uses of language. I will argue that thisattempt is recommendable but that its execution is wanting. Instead of appealing to dictionariesand/or internet queries, philosophers should employ computer-based linguistic corpora in orderto confirm or falsify hypotheses about the factual use of language. This also has some advantagesover methods employed by experimental philosophy. If the importance of ordinary language isstressed, the use of linguistic corpora is hardly avoidable.

§ § §

Thomas Boyer

MSH de Lorraine (USR 3261 CNRS / Université de Lorraine), Archives Henri Poincaré (UMR7117 CNRS / Université de Lorraine)

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L’unité d’un domaine de recherche scientifique, d’un point de vue pratique : uneproposition

Je m’intéresse ici à l’unité de la science au sein d’un domaine de recherche, et non pas entre desdomaines de recherche différents. Par exemple, il s’agit de caractériser en quoi la mécanique desfluides, ou la mécanique quantique, constituent chacun des champs de recherche unis. Cette unitén’est pas étudiée de façon théorique (auquel cas il s’agirait de montrer si les différents modèlesutilisés, ou les différentes hypothèses théoriques employées, peuvent former un tout cohérent)mais en prenant en compte la pratique scientifique : on s’intéresse par exemple au langage em-ployé, aux questions considérées comme significatives, aux méthodes expérimentales adoptées,etc. L’objectif de cette présentation est de caractériser de façon générale les conditions sous les-quelles on considère qu’un domaine de recherche est uni d’un point de vue pratique. Pour cela, jeconsidère tout d’abord un concept d’unité proposé par Kitcher (1993), qui repose sur l’existenced’une pratique scientifique consensuelle dans le domaine de recherche. J’étudie ensuite les limitesauxquelles cette analyse fait face. Je propose enfin un nouveau concept d’unité, qui repose sur lapossibilité de réutiliser des travaux scientifiques en dépit d’une diversité des pratiques scientifiquesadoptées.

§ § §

Anne-Sophie Brueggen

Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum

The content of imaginings and the "Multiple Use Thesis"

Many authors endorse (implicitly or explicitly) the so-called Multiple Use Thesis of imagination.This thesis claims that the same mental image can serve different imaginative projects. So e.g.imagining a suitcase and imagining a suitcase totally obscuring a cat behind it involve the samemental image. But the Multiple Use Thesis raised several questions, among others the following : Ifthe same mental image can be used in different imaginative projects, what is the intrinsic contentof the "neutral" mental image ? Based on this criticism I will reconsider MULT in this paperand offer an alternative account to construe imaginative content. I will argue that an activelyproduced visual imagining intrinsically settles all imaginative content. So there are no "neutral"mental images, which can be used for different purposes. Additionally I will suggest that MULTis based on a misguided analogy to perception.

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Evan Thomas Butts

Slim is In : A Narrow Account of Abilities in Epistemology

Ability is a key notion in much contemporary, externalist epistemology. Various authors haveargued that there is (at least) an ability condition on knowledge (Sosa 2007 ; Greco 1999, 2007.2009 ; Millar 2010 ; Pritchard 2010, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). Moreover, epistemic justifica-tion is also argued to be tied to ability (at least by Greco 2007). Yet, there is not total agreementamongst the interested parties about the conditions under which subjects possess abilities, northe conditions under which a subject who possesses an ability exercises or manifests it. I willargue in favor of what Millar (2010) dubs the "narrow" account of abilities, and against the"broad" account. My argument proceeds by identifying basic constraints on accounts of ability,

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and then arguing that the broad account of abilities (advocated by Millar [2010] and Greco [2009])runs afoul of these constraints. The narrow account (advocated by Sosa and Kallestrup & Prit-chard) will be seen not to have this problem. A possible out for Greco will be considered, beforeconcluding in favor of the narrow account.

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Jacques Cabaret

INRA and Tours University

Disease concepts in domesticated animals : the role of deduction, induction andabduction

Disease concept in humans is threefold : what you feel (sick : personal concept), what your doctordiagnosed (disease : biomedical concept), what society reckon about your disease (ill : sociologicalconcept).These concepts fit also to animal diseases but they will be mediated through the owner,the vet and the health insurance company. The owner will base its sick category on the fact thatthe animal behave differently (it does not eat, is rejected by the others etc.) ; after these alertingsigns, the owner may well have deepen his analysis : does the animal present fever, anaemia etc..Induction and possibly abduction will be the major reasoning tools. The vet will be indicatedwhich animal is behaving differently and will try to construct a diagnostic, alone or with theaid of the laboratory, and then will propose control of the disease either in a sole animal or ina group : the deduction will be the major tools.. The insurance expert, based on vet or otherhealth experts, will then decide to reimburse the cost of treatments or not. The ill concept will beconstructed from deduction (the vet/laboratory diagnosis), induction (farmers/owner view) andparticularly abduction.

§ § §

Marta Campdelacreu

University of Barcelona

Do we need two notions of constitution ?

In this paper I present and analyse Robert Wilson’s arguments against the following traditionallyheld position. The relation between objects like a statue, a dollar bill or a person and the object(s)from which they are made like a piece of marble, a piece of paper or an organism, is a relationnot of identity but of constitution. Moreover, there is just one relation of constitution. Wilsonargues against this last point and defends that there are two different relations of constitution.In this paper I argue that Wilson’s arguments for the existence of two notions of constitution areincorrect. In my argumentation I crucially use the existence of principles of existence‚ persistence,which constitutionalists, Wilson among them, usually accept. I also use a slightly modified versionof Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of constitution.

§ § §

Elena Casetta

Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST)

LabOnt (Torino)

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Arguing for a Pluralistic Species Concept in the Assessment of Biodiversity

It seems fairly obvious to tie in some way biodiversity to species. But, because of the so-calledspecies problem, and in particular the persistent disagreement on species counting, several al-ternative proposals have been advanced to assess biodiversity without resorting to the speciesconcept, such as measuring higher taxa, phylogenetic diversity, or genetic diversity. In this talkI will argue that although species are not the (only) units of biodiversity, a pluralistic speciesconcept is nonetheless a useful tool to assess biodiversity. After having enlighten the differencebetween units of biodiversity and indicators of biodiversity, I take as a case study the shift froma non phylogenetic species concept to a phylogenetic one and I argue that disagreement aboutspecies counts is not a practically insurmountable obstacle ; rather, it could provide conservationplans with useful criteria for making better choices. Hence — as far as an indicator of biodiver-sity is concerned — pluralistic species concept can do the job. Finally I give three more reasonsspeaking in favor of species (and against the majority of alternative proposals), in spite of thedifficulties.

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Bertrand Cassegrain

Université de Genève, Département de science politique et relations internationales

Obligation politique et autorité : une critique de la théorie des principes multiplesde George Klosko

Il existe aujourd’hui une vaste littérature sur l’obligation politique, c’est-à-dire sur l’obligationd’obéir à l’Etat qui nous gouverne. En revanche, plus rares sont les discussions à propos del’autorité, qui est pourtant considérée comme étant l’autre face de la même pièce. Or, l’étude del’autorité peut apporter des éléments nouveaux au débat concernant l’obligation politique. Dansun premier temps, je proposerai une description particulière de l’autorité, qui fera appel à lathéorie Hohfeldienne des droits ainsi qu’à certains éléments de la philosophie du langage. Dansun deuxième temps, je montrerai en quoi une telle description peut nous être utile pour réfléchirà la justification ou à la légitimation de l’autorité et, in fine, à la justification de l’obligationpolitique. Je le ferai en examinant la théorie des principes multiples de Georges Klosko et jetenterai de montrer que, si nous avons peut-être de bonnes raisons d’obéir à l’Etat, ces raisons nelégitiment pas pour autant son autorité. J’espère ainsi permettre une meilleure compréhension desconditions de justification et de légitimation de l’autorité ainsi que de l’obligation politique.

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Jean-Marie Chevalier

Chaire de métaphysique et de philosophie de la connaissance Collège de France

L’unité du raisonnement !

Dans The unity of reasoning ? (2009), John Broome propose une conception cognitiviste du rai-sonnement pratique, selon laquelle ce que l’analyse du raisonnement théorique dit des croyancespeut être dit des intentions dans le cadre de l’analyse du raisonnement pratique. Cela lui permetde défendre la thèse supposée non intuitive de l’unité du raisonnement, c’est-à-dire de l’homo-généité des raisonnements pratique et théorique. Une partie de l’article consiste à répondre à

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l’objection du "just too cognitive" (Bratman 2009) : bien que peu plausible, cette proximité desformes de raisonnement n’est pas un argument contre la théorie. J’examine l’objection inverse, du"not entangled enough". En effet, rien ne semble justifier que les raisonnements pratique et théo-rique soient hétérogènes, sinon une tradition philosophique qui d’Aristote à Anscombe a souhaitédévelopper l’autonomie du domaine pratique. L’intuition du sens commun serait bien plutôt que,dans le cas des intentions et des croyances, nous mettons en jeu des processus similaires. Soucieuxde ne pas passer pour un cognitiviste extrême en défendant sa conception "épistémique" du rai-sonnement pratique, Broome a omis de considérer certaines corrélations profondes entre les deuxtypes de raisonnement.

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Daniele Chiffi & Silvia Gaio

The Knowability Paradox in the Light of Logic for Pragmatics

Fitch’s Knowability Paradox shows that from the reasonable assumptions that all truths areknowable in principle and that there is at least an unknown truth (i.e., we are non-omniscient)follows the undesirable conclusion that all truths are in fact known. Several diagnoses of theparadox have been proposed. We focus, in particular, on the Intuitionistic revision, which aimsat avoiding the paradoxical conclusion. However, Percival argues that the Intuitionistic revisionincurs a further paradox, the so-called Undecidedness Paradox of Knowability, which states thatthere are no undecided statements. Our proposal is to provide a Pragmatic revision of the Un-decidedness Paradox, that is a revision based on the Logic for Pragmatics. Unlike the treatmentof the Undecidedness Paradox of Knowability in Intuitionistic Logic, our argument avoids anycontradiction and paradox as it merely shows that there are undecidable sentences. Since in dif-ferent fragments of the Logic for Pragmatics classical and intuitionistic arguments are valid, ourapproach sheds new light on the Paradox of Knowability, preserving its gains but avoiding someof its paradoxical consequences.

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Eric Clémençon

La théorie causale de la référence à l’épreuve de la nomenclature biologique

Les exemples de termes de sortes pris par Kripke et Putnam sont majoritairement pris dansle vocabulaire des langues naturelles. Du fait des conséquences épistémologiques tirées par cesauteurs et leurs épigones, il est légitime de se demander si la TCR s’applique aux lexiques scien-tifiques. Nous confrontons cette théorie sémantique aux Codes Internationaux de Nomenclaturebiologiques qui régulent la construction et la validité des noms des taxons. Cette confrontationse fait à deux niveaux : 1) Nous comparons les hypothèses sociolinguistiques du "baptême" et de"la division sociale du travail linguistique" à la méthodologie effective des naturalistes de terrainet des taxinomistes. 2) Nous présentons les Codes de Nomenclature du point de vue de la fixationde la référence des termes systématiques, et les rapportons à la thèse de la TCR selon laquelleun terme peut être "introduit soit par ostension, soit par une description". Nous dégageons leprincipe sémantique des Codes et analysons particulièrement leur outil méthodologique central,"le type porte-nom". Celui-ci est obligatoirement constitué par 1) la présence matérielle d’un spé-cimen du taxon, 2) le nom scientifique donné par le découvreur de l’espèce, et 3) une descriptiondu taxon, la "diagnose". Sur la base de ces deux ensembles, nous évaluons la pertinence de laTRC dans le contexte de la nomenclature scientifique.

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Damir Cicic

Central European University

A New Version of the Manipulation Argument for Incompatibilism

The Manipulation Argument is one of the most influential arguments for the incompatibility ofmoral responsibility and causal determinism. It is an argument to the effect that if causal de-terminism is true we cannot be morally responsible for our actions because there is no relevantdifference between causal determinism and responsibility-undermining manipulation. In my pre-sentation I will try to answer two questions concerning this argument. The first is whether it ispossible to manipulate someone in a way that the person is not responsible, without deprivingher of the abilities or characteristics that one could have regardless of the truth or falsity of de-terminism. In other words, I will inquire whether it could turn out that everyone is the victim ofresponsibility-undermining manipulation. The second question I will examine is whether the merefact of being manipulated by another person could account for the lack of one’s responsibility. Iwill present my own manipulation examples developed on the basis of Derk Pereboom’s examples,which, in my view, strongly suggest the affirmative answer to the first question and the negativeanswer to the second question. Thus, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe thatcausal determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible.

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Roberto Ciuni & Carlo Proietti

Supervaluations, Subvaluations and indeterminism

Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, and as a consequence of this, statementsabout the future may be neither true nor false. Here we explore the novel and quite different viewthat the future is abundant : statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but mayinstead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that (1) the logic resulting from this“abundance of the future” is a non-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluations,which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it, while no formula like "A and not-A" is satisfiable (though both "A" and "not-A" may be true in a model) ; (2) The peculiarbehaviour of abundant logical consequence has a meaningful interesting parallel in probabilitylogic ; (3) abundance preserves some important features of classical logic (that supervaluationismdoes not preserve) when it comes to express those important retrogradations of truth which arepresupposed by the argument de praesenti ad praeteritum.

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Nicola Claudio Salvatore

University of Edinburgh

Wittgensteinian epistemology and cartesian skepticism

In this paper, I present and discuss a number of current anti-skeptical strategies directly influencedby Wittgenstein’s remarks on hinge propositions. I aim to show how these proposals, both as

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viable interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and especially as anti-skeptical strategies, areultimately unconvincing. Furthermore, I compare and contrast these approaches with anotherWittgenstein-inspired position, according to which we should consider "hinge propositions" as"rules of grammar". I argue that this account represents a more viable solution (or, perhapsbetter, dissolution) of Cartesian-style skepticism.

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John Cook

St. Francis Xavier University

Semantic Deference and the Case of Malapropisms

Donald Davidson (1986) has argued that the ubiquity of malapropisms, and the ease with whichwe are able to interpret those who utter them, shows that speaking as others do, and meaningthe same thing by our words as others in our linguistic community, are not essential features ofsuccessful linguistic exchanges.This argument has been challenged in many ways, but most recently by appealing to the pheno-menon of linguistic deference.Reimer (2004), for instance, argues that it is a necessary condition that a speaker is deferentialto the linguistic conventions prevailing in the community, otherwise, her words lack semanticcontent. Predelli (2010), on the other hand, argues we are able to preserve our widely-shared as-sumptions about communication because the appeal to what he calls “syntactic deference” meansthat speakers who utter malapropisms do not “employ expressions” that violate the conventionsof the linguistic community.In this paper we argue that these appeals to deference do not in fact avoid the problem posed byDavidson. Although it is certainly true that many speakers acknowledge these deferential inten-tions in speaking, the appeal to linguistic deference is no help in explaining how we understandspeakers who are non-deferential.

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Damiano Costa 1* & Alessandro Giordani 2*

1 : University of Geneva

2 : Catholic University of Milan

Events as kind instantiations

The present paper aims at assessing two of the problems characterizing contemporary metaphy-sics, i.e. (i) the problem of the individuation of events ; (ii) the problem of the persistence ofobjects and events, i.e. whether they perdure or endure. We put forward a theory of kinds thatoffers an elegant solution to both problems and highlights the connection between the identitycriteria of events and their way of persistence.Ad (i), every criterion of identity for events proposed so far turned out to be problematic. It hasbeen argued that an effective criterion should position itself at a level of intermediate granularitybetween that of Kim and that of Quine. In this contribution we shall show how a theory of kindsof events allows formulating a criterion that positions itself at the requested intermediate level.Ad (ii), we shall show how kinds of objects and events have structurally different characteristics,

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and how these differences allow deducing that events perdure and objects endure. Besides that,these considerations are interesting for a twofold reason : (a) they link together the topics ofpersistence and identity ; (b) they allow to approach the endurance/perdurance debate at a levellogically deeper than the one of temporal parts.

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Florian Cova

Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences


"I couldn’t have done otherwise"

Les commentaires suscités par la théorie du droit de H.L.Hart ont profondément renouvelé laréflexion sur le positivisme juridique. On a ainsi vu apparaître l’hypothèse d’un positivisme ju-ridique inclusif qui, tout en maintenant la thèse de la séparation entre le droit et la morale,reconnaît la possibilité d’introduire des critères moraux dans les règles de reconnaissance qui per-mettent d’identifier le contenu du droit et qui fixent les conditions de validité des règles juridiques.Notre contribution vise à présenter cette version du positivisme juridique et à faire le point surles diverses critiques dont elle a fait l’objet. Deux questions majeures se posent. Le positivismejuridique inclusif est-il encore positiviste et peut-il être vraiment distingué de certaines versionsdu droit naturel ou de théories qui remettent en cause les principes du positivisme ? Doit-onadmettre, à la suite de Joseph Raz, qu’une théorie positiviste conséquente ne peut-être qu’exclu-sive ? Le problème qui est ainsi soulevé est de savoir comment une règle secondaire peut inclureune norme morale sans pour autant que l’ordre juridique soit subordonné à des normes moralesextra-juridiques.

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Mikaël Cozic 1* & Brian Hill 2*

1 : Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques CNRS

2 : GREGHEC

Les théorèmes de représentation

L’une des caractéristiques saillantes de la théorie de la décision, telle qu’on la pratique depuis laseconde guerre mondiale, est le style axiomatique dans lequel elle se développe. Le travail axioma-tique culmine dans des résultats qu’on appelle des théorèmes de représentations. Von Neumannet Morgenstern, dans la Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944/1947) et Savage dansles Foundations of Statistics (1954/1972), ont montré la voie en proposant deux théorèmes dereprésentation pour le critère d’espérance d’utilité. Soixante après ces travaux pionniers, une partconsidérable de la recherche théorique en sciences de la décision est toujours structurée par l’éla-boration de tels théorèmes de représentation. Pour certains, c’est parce qu’ils fournissent des «fondements » aux concepts des modèles de décision concernés (par exemple, ceux d’utilité ou deprobabilité subjective pour le modèle d’espérance subjective d’utilité). Notre communication sepropose de discuter et d’évaluer cette idée, en la confrontant aux conceptions contemporainesde la signification des termes théoriques et en particulier à celles que l’on rattache à Carnap età Lewis. Nous montrerons que l’indispensabilité des théorèmes de représentation est difficile àjustifier de ce point de vue.

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Marie Darrason


Esquisse d’une théorie génétique mécaniste de la maladie

Le concept de maladie génétique s’est considérablement élargi au point qu’on a pu affirmer dansla littérature biomédicale contemporaine que toute maladie pouvait être considérée comme géné-tique . Cette affirmation a généralement été interprétée comme une tentative de gène centrisme,qui consacrerait la prédominance du rôle des gènes dans l’explication causale de la maladie audétriment des facteurs non génétiques. Comme il a été démontré que le gène centrisme est à la foisscientifiquement injustifié et éthiquement discutable, cette affirmation devrait être rejetée. Il noussemble pourtant qu’à condition de bien vouloir cesser de mesurer l’influence causale des gènes etde l’environnement dans l’explication des maladies, c’est à dire à condition de sortir du problèmede la sélection causale, il est possible de donner une interprétation pertinente de cette affirmation.Nous proposons en particulier de nous appuyer sur la théorie génétique des maladies infectieusesqui prétend unifier les maladies infectieuses en mettant au jour des mécanismes génétiques com-muns à cette classe de maladies. A partir de cet exemple d’une théorie génétique mécaniste d’uneclasse de maladie, nous chercherons à esquisser les fondements d’une théorie génétique mécanistede la maladie en général.

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Sandrine Darsel

Archives Poincaré, UMR 7117, CNRSUNIVERSITE DE NANCY 2

Le paradoxe de l’art conceptuel

On attend de l’art conceptuel qu’il possède une valeur cognitive élevée. Cela tiendrait à sa spé-cificité : l’œuvre d’art comme résultat est mise entre parenthèse au profit de l’action artistiqueentendu comme processus intellectuel. Toutefois, on peut douter du rôle cognitif qui est attribué àl’art conceptuel ou à tout le moins, reconsidérer sa teneur épistémique. En ce sens, je souhaiteraisdévelopper l’argumentation suivante. La faiblesse cognitive de l’art conceptuel ne tient pas à unmanque de contenu propositionnel mais à ses conditions logiques de réception : l’art conceptueln’appelle pas à une expérience sensible d’un quelque chose ayant des propriétés esthétiques. Or,la valeur cognitive essentielle et spécifique de l’art repose sur la performance réussie du spectateurattentif à l’œuvre (laquelle mobilise perception aspectuelle fine, effort de l’imagination, émotionsajustées et aventure conceptuelle). Ainsi, quelque soit son contenu propositionnel, le rôle cognitifde l’art conceptuel n’est ni intrinsèque ni spécifique. A l’inverse, l’art « traditionnel » sous sesdiverses formes peut posséder une telle valeur cognitive.

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Michael De

Utrecht University

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Two ways of meeting the Humphrey objection on the objector’s turf

One serious objection to Lewisian modal realism, in particular counterpart theory without overlap,is that it violates important adequacy conditions on an analysis of modality. One such constraint,call it Aboutness, is that de re possibilities for an individual s be genuinely about s. What the“genuinely” qualification is intended to rule out are analyses according to which de re possibilitiesfor s may be given without attributing (in the analysans) a property intrinsic to s herself. Krip-ke’s well-known “Humphrey objection” is precisely the objection that Lewis’ counterpart theoryviolates Aboutness. Lewis responds by claiming that what is important in an analysis of de repossibilities concerning an individual such as Humphrey need not be genuinely about Humphreyas long as the analysis involves an individual that suitably represents Humphrey.

Lewis’s response is clearly not going to convince anyone wedded to Aboutness. I argue, however,that there are two responses faithful to counterpart theory that embrace Aboutness. One of themundermines an assumption Lewis holds concerning the temporal structure of possible worlds,while the other concerns the nature of ordinary and transworld individuals.

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Nicolas Delon

The moral status of animals

I defend a contextual approach in animal ethics. A common core assumption of the main theories(utilitarianism, deontology, rights, contractualism, capabilities) is that the implications of moralstatus of an entity are exclusively determined by its intrinsic properties (esp. capacities). I consi-der, and rebut, several attempts to correlate status with intrinsic properties (moral individualism,degree-theories), and I put forth a theory that avoids such oppositions as speciesism/impartialism,particularism/universalization. It rests on (i) a species norm account that does not lead to crudespeciesism and allows relevantly to adapt an animal’s status to its nature ; (ii) a contextualaspect which refines corresponding obligations as a function of salient parameters. Moral indi-vidualism and degree-theories lead to both epistemic and practical dead-ends, and the cost oftheir counterintuitive implications outweigh their benefits. But even more moderate approachessuch as Nussbaum’s can only evade the objections at the cost of revising the aforementionedcore assumption. I address the objections from the appeal to commonsense intuitions and frompartiality, and show that my approach is actually robust and compatible with a certain form ofimpartialism.

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Natalja Deng


An Interpretation and Defense of Fine’s ’Argument From Passage’

I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine’s "Argument from Passage", which issituated within his reconstruction of McTaggart’s paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoreticapproaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory.I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclinesus towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the

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picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed factsnot being "oriented towards" one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others whoadvance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart’s paradox to indicate neither the need fora more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is notto be had : Fine’s "non-standard realism" amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. Butinstead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannotdeliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passagethat simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender.

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Esa Diaz-Leon

University of Manitoba

Social Kinds and Conceptual Analysis : Defending the Semantic Strategy

My main question in this paper concerns the methodology of the study of social kinds. In particu-lar, I want to focus on the role of two possible kinds of considerations in order to assess accountsof race and gender : conceptual analysis, on the one hand, and normative considerations, onthe other. Some philosophers have recently argued that conceptual analysis is irrelevant, or atleast seriously limited, when it comes to answering the main philosophical questions about thenature of gender and race. For instance, Sally Haslanger has argued that the main question inthis debate is not what our ordinary concept is, but rather what our ordinary concept should be,and furthermore, that even when we are concerned with our ordinary concept, this is not reallyconstrained by ordinary speakers’ intuitions. Similarly, Ron Mallon has argued that the mostsignificant question in the race debate is the question of whether we should keep or eliminateracial terms (and this is independent of what our ordinary concept of race is, or what it actuallyrefers to). In response, I will argue that conceptual analysis has a significant role to play in thecontext of philosophical debates about race and gender.

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Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim

Université Rennes 1

Le monisme de la constitution matérielle et l’objection de l’indiscernabilité

Le monisme à l’égard de la constitution matérielle soutient que la coïncidence permanente (CP)entre un objet et le morceau de matière qui le constitue entraîne leur identité. Son défi estd’expliquer comment il peut y avoir identité dans les cas de CP en dépit de propriétés modalesdifférentes. À cette fin, les monistes adoptent une stratégie dite « abélardienne » d’après laquellela différence de prédication modale ne reflète pas une différence quant aux propriétés modales,articulées en termes de relations de contrepartie. Mon intervention discute une objection récenteque Jim Stone adresse à l’encontre du monisme : si celui-ci défend qu’il y a indiscernabilitémodale dans les cas de CP, alors il doit aussi le faire dans les cas de coïncidence temporaire(CT), s’empêchant ainsi d’expliquer la divergence des carrières temporelles. Je montrerai que,pace Stone, la théorie des contreparties a suffisamment de ressources pour rendre compte du faitqu’il y a bien une différence modale dans les cas de CT sans différence modale dans les cas deCP. Je soutiendrai que ceci ne sauve cependant pas le monisme de l’objection dans la mesure oùil est incapable d’expliquer la différence de propriétés sortales dans les cas de CT.

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Mareile Drechsler

London School of Economics (LSE)

Three Types of Uncertainty

Using Savage’s framework, this paper proposes a distinction between three types of uncertainty :ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space uncertainty. Under ambiguity the agent cannot as-sign a unique subjective probability to each state. The results of Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment tendto be explained by ambiguity aversion. Option uncertainty refers to the case where the state spaceis insufficiently fine-grained. Then consequences of acts at particular states are not unique ; theagent can envisage several possible consequences at every state. This paper argues that this typeof uncertainty is separate from, and cannot be reduced to, ambiguity. The empirical phenomenonof status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991) is predicted by option uncertainty aver-sion. State space uncertainty is the most severe case of uncertainty, where the agent does not haveaccess to an exhaustive state space and unforeseen contingencies can occur. Subjective expectedutility maximisation is no longer feasible. The paper analyses the characteristics of these types ofuncertainty and argues that they are normatively and descriptively distinct.

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Julien Dutant


The Normative Sceptical Paradox and its Practical Solution

In a nutshell, the normative sceptical paradox is this. If you know what you had for lunch, youcould bet your mother’s life on it. But you could not bet your mother’s life on it. So you do notknow what you had for lunch. But that is crazy, you do know it. The paradox is at the heart ofthe recent "pragmatic encroachment" literature. Main existing diagnoses lay the blame on someassumption about knowledge : that we have it, that it is not sensitive to stakes, or that it warrantsaction. We defend a diagnosis that lays the blame on some assumption about normative reasons.p is not a sufficient reason to bet your life on p for a small gain. Hence knowing p does notmake it rational for you to bet your life on p for a small gain. The diagnosis requires some ruleutilitarist-like reconsideration of the way in which decision problems are commonly framed.

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Matthias Egg

Université de Lausanne

The Role of Common Sense in the Debate on Scientific Realism

In the debate on scientific realism, realists and antirealists often seem to share a certain realismabout the objects of common sense, disagreeing only about the status of scientific entities. Ho-wever, this paper analyzes an argument (by Stathis Psillos) in favour of scientific realism, whichseems to contradict common sense realism. I will show that there is a tension between Psillos’s

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criticism of common sense and his factualist (as opposed to fundamentalist) conception of scienti-fic realism. The paper concludes with a proposal on how to reconcile these two conflicting aspectsof Psillos’s philosophy.

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Patrik Engisch

University of Fribourg

Singular Thought and the Acquaintance Principle

What I will call the Standard Account of singular thought can be summarized with the help ofthe following three theses :

(i) One can think about a particular either via a description or directly.(ii) The correct explanation of that fact is that descriptive thoughts have general propositions ascontent while non-descriptive thoughts have singular propositions as content.(iii) In order to hold a singular thought, i.e. a thought that has a singular proposition as content,one must be acquainted with its constituents.

As it is well-known, Russell defended a very strong version of (iii), restricting heavily the classof singular thoughts. But his notion of acquaintance has since been supplanted by more or lessstrong versions of it, both in the neo-Russsellian and in the neo-Fregean camp. Recently, however,some authors have proposed a very different way to account for the phenomenon of the singularityof thought. In my talk, I intend to examine critically a position advocated by Robin Jeshion ina recent series of papers in which she casts doubt on both (ii) and (iii) while trying to argueindependently for (i).

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Yuval Eylon

The Open University of Israel

Blaming and Knowing

What is the rule governing the speech-act of blaming ? One necessary condtion is knowledge, or atleast justified belief : blame S fo A iff you know S acted wrongly without a valid excuse. But this isnot sufficient : when the blamer himself is guilty of committing the same wrong, the speech0act isinfelicitous. I will argue that we should look for further conditions to the knowledge-ruke. Insraed,we should understand knowledge as entailing motivation (internalism), and view understandingof others as involving identification (and reject theory-theory views).

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Carlo Filotico

Université de Parme, Département de Langue et Littérature Italiennes

Relativism and the Norms of Assertion

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According to many contemporary versions of relativism, at least some propositions are suchthat we can assign to them a truth value only relatively to a further parameter, which mayrepresent the standards of evaluation of the person involved in the truth-judgement. Some

contemporary relativist philosophers hold also that accounts of truth as a relative notion arereliable because they are strong enough to justify the thesis that belief and assertion are

governed by norms in which the concept of truth is supposed to play a role : namely, the normsthat we aim to make true assertions and that we should believe a proposition only when thatproposition is true. In my work I will focus mainly on John MacFarlane’s account of norms forassertion (MACFARLANE (2005) and I will try to show that MacFarlane’s notion of relative

truth, as it stands, cannot play a genuine normative role because it requires some furthertheoretical clarifications, still to be provided by relativist philosophers.

Martin Fischer 1* & Johannes Stern 1*, 2*

1 : MCMP, LMU Munich

2 : Université de Genève

Paradoxes of interacting modal predicates

Conceiving of modal notions as predicates has been around since the very beginning of formalphilosophizing. For almost as long we know that the constitutive modal ptinciples lead to in-consistency, if modalities are treated as predicates. This suggest that our basic linguistic andphilosophical intuitions with respect to these notions have to be reconsidered. Before doing so itseems helpful to be aware of the different options available and thus to analyze and systematizethe modal principles with respect to their joint consistency and inconsistency. Where this hasbeen done to a certain extent with respect to modal principles of single modal notions nothingof the like has been done for the setting of multiple modalities where several modal predicatesare allowed to interact. This is even more pressing as further, unexpected paradoxes might arisein this setting. In our presentation we shall make some first steps towards a systematization ofthe paradoxes arising from the interaction of modal predicates and, more specifically, propose todistinguish between paradoxes which in a certain sense are reducible to the paradoxes of singlemodal predicates and those that are genuine, crucially depending on the interaction of the modalpredicates.

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Denis Fisette

Université du Québec à Montréal

Brentano et les théories néo-brentaniennes de la conscience

Je m’intéresse aux discussions récentes autour de Brentano et de ce qu’il est maintenant convenud’appeler les théories néo-brentaniennes de la conscience. La théorie de la conscience élaborée parFranz Brentano dans sa Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique suscite actuellement beaucoupd’intérêt dans la philosophie de l’esprit et dans les sciences cognitives. Certains ont souligné lecaractère novateur de sa conception de la conscience tandis que d’autres, tels les défenseurs d’unethéorie auto-representationelle de la conscience, se réclament explicitement de Brentano dans le-quel ils voient un précurseur de leur propre théorie. Ce retour est-il pertinent à la lumière des

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débats actuels sur la conscience, et plus précisément sur ce qu’on appelle la conscience phénomé-nale ? Plusieurs adversaires de Brentano estiment que sa conception de la conscience et de l’esprits’apparente à ce qu’on appelle depuis G. Ryle le théâtre cartésien (i.e. à un ensemble de propriétésattribuées à la res cogitans de Descartes) et qu’elle n’est donc d’aucune utilité pour résoudre leproblème "difficile" de la conscience. Je voudrais montrer que le programme de Brentano peutrépondre à la plupart de ces objections et que, moyennant quelques modifications, il conservetoute sa pertinence dans le contexte actuel des débats sur la conscience.

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Ide Fouche

Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes

Le dilemme d’Euthyphron et la critique du modèle légal en métaéthique

Un des arguments avancés en philosophie de la religion par les tenants de la réponse volontaristeau " dilemme d’Euthyphron " (les objets possèdent-ils leurs propriétés morales indépendammentde toute pro/con-attitude des agents, et de Dieu lui-même, ou en raison d’un décret libre deDieu ?) tire de la thèse de la souveraineté divine l’impossibilité de considérer Dieu comme obéis-sant à des lois, fût-ce à des lois de la raison pratique, et la nécessité de faire de lui la source detoute moralité et des obligations morales auxquelles il n’est pas lui-même soumis. Un problèmeposé par cet argument est qu’il repose sur une conception " légale " de l’éthique partagée parces volontaristes et par un certain nombre de leurs adversaires objectivistes ou réalistes. Une cri-tique de cette conception métaéthique ( par l’argument de l’inconsistance et de l’insatisfaisabilitédes commandements portant sur les fins bonnes ) permet de tenter une solution du dilemme,fondée sur une théorie alternative, internaliste, et définissant la bonté comme une propriété ex-trinsèque possédée par les objets en relation avec les agents et leurs attitudes subjectives ou leursdispositions.

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Florent Franchette


Hypercomputation and Verification

Alan Turing has devised the Turing machine, which is in logic the formalization of the notion ofa computable function. Nevertheless, Turing showed it was possible to devise an another modelnamed "O-machine", which is able to compute more functions than the Turing machine. The pos-sibility of computing more functions than the Turing machine is today called "hypercomputation".Although many hypercomputation models have been devised, the notion of hypercomputation isnot fully accepted by scientists and philosophers. More precisely, the debate concerns the followingclaim that I will call "hypercomputation thesis" : it is possible to physically build a hypercompu-tation model. In this presentation, I will explain one problem raised against the hypercomputationthesis, namely the "verification problem" : if we assume that we have a hypercomputation modelphysically built, it would be impossible to verify that this model is able to compute a functionwhich is not computable by a Turing machine. I will propose an analysis of this problem in orderto show that it does not explicitly dispute the hypercomputation thesis.

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Résumés SoPhA - 2012 G - N

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Guillaume Fréchette

Université du Québec à Montréal

Dispositional higher-order acts. A Brentanian account

What makes my seeing of a red patch a conscious act ? Is it a second-order act or is it a build-in fea-ture of all mental acts ? Regarding the first question, we might ask further : is the second-orderact itself conscious ? Or are these acts unconscious acts ? Higher-Order-Theories of perceptionand thought (HOT-theories) usually answer the first question affirmatively. In order to avoid theinfinite regress of second-, third-, etc. order of conscious-making acts, they usually argue thatsecond-order acts are not conscious. Franz Brentano’s theory is generally seen as an interestingalternative to HOT-theories with (unconscious) higher-order acts, since it gives an account ofinner consciousness in terms of conscious-making acts without acknowledging the existence ofunconscious acts. But does he really succeed in avoiding the infinite regress ? In the followingpaper, I express some doubts about his success. In order to make sense of his theory, I arguethat we have to choose between one of the two alternatives : either by allowing for some form ofunconscious consciousness or by showing that his theory is really an identity theory of conscious-ness and mental acts despite some of the HOT features it has. My choice will go for the firstalternative, but following a dispositional understanding of the adjective ‘unconscious’.This un-derstanding of dispositions and its adaptation in the framework of Brentano’s theory of innerconsciousness would lead to a higher-order theory where for an intentional act A to be consciousit is necessary for A (among other things) to be triggered by a disposition to A. I will proposesome support for this kind of theory.

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Akiko Frischhut


The viciousness of McTaggart’s regress

McTaggart (1927) thought that temporal passage is incoherent because it leads into an infinitevicious regress. I shall present a limited defence of McTaggart, arguing that his notion of passagedoes indeed lead into a regress. I shall also argue however that the regress is not vicious in thesense McTaggart thought it was.

My argument is based on the following three premises :(1) If we follow McTaggart in regarding tenses as properties, then A-properties must be relationalproperties and change in terms of them must be merely relational change.(2) Relational changes necessarily depend on non-relational changes to bring them about.(3) There is no non-relational change that can bring about the changes that constitute McTag-gart’s temporal passage.

After arguing for each of the premises, I conclude that temporal passage, as McTaggart conceivesof it, is impossible.

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G - N

Mattia Gallotti

Jean Nicod Institute - Centre d’Epistémologie et d’Ergologie Comparatives

Internalism and the Mystery of the We-Mode

The theory of collective intentionality is an invaluable tool for exploring a wide range of issuesin social ontology and cognition. One classic argument proposed by John Searle holds that themark of collective intentionality lies in the representational mode in which collective mentalstates are held in the head of individuals. So, for a state to be shared people need to access therelevant mental content in the same "we-mode.’ Despite its commonsensical appeal, Searle’s viewhas often been discarded as somewhat mysterious. According to relational theories of collectiveintentionality, granted that a state is social insofar as it is represented as such, it is unclear howsociality can be construed as an intrinsic property of individual brains. It follows that collectiveintentionality excludes internalism. In this paper I shall question the clarity and significance ofthe relational view, by proposing a newer interpretation of internalist collective intentionalitythat builds upon, while trying to settle some of the controversies about, Searle’s theory of socialontology.

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Benoit Gaultier

Collège de France, chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance

La valeur de la connaissance et la nature de la croyance

Nous estimons intuitivement qu’il est préférable de savoir que p plutôt que simplement croirevéridiquement que p. Comment rendre compte de cette intuition ?Je voudrais montrer qu’on ne peut espérer rendre compte de la supériorité épistémique de laconnaissance sur la simple croyance vraie en se demandant en quoi peut bien consister, et dequelle propriété peut bien provenir, cette valeur qui, s’ajoutant à celle de sa vérité, fait qu’uneconnaissance est supérieure à une simple croyance vraie. Il faut au contraire partir de la valeurindivisible de la connaissance, c’est-à-dire (minimalement) du fait d’atteindre le vrai de façonnon chanceuse, et juger du succès de nos croyances en fonction du degré auquel il se trouve ainsiatteint.Je voudrais montrer ensuite que savoir que p n’est pas valorisé parce que le fait d’être dans cet étatépistémique satisferait une aspiration quelconque que nous aurions en formant nos croyances. Lasupériorité de la connaissance découle constitutivement de la nature de la croyance, de sorte qu’ilest inconcevable d’imaginer des êtres dotés de croyances qui n’attribueraient pas de supérioritéépistémique à la connaissance.Je voudrais montrer enfin qu’il ne s’ensuit cependant pas que lorsque je forme la croyance que p,le fait de savoir que p est ce qui m’importe et doit m’importer. La connaissance n’est ni le but,ni la norme de la croyance.

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Martin Gibert

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Neurophilosophie, Université McGill

Voir son steak comme un animal mort (et l’imagination comme une vertu épisté-mique)

Imaginer un animal mort lorsque je vois un steak dans mon assiette peut-il constituer un gain épis-témique ? Selon une certaine tradition rationaliste, l’imagination est une faculté dont on devraitse méfier lorsqu’il s’agit de connaître la réalité. Cependant, plusieurs auteurs ont cherché à iden-tifier une " imagination morale " et à valoriser son rôle en éthique. Dans ce papier en psychologiemorale, je me démarque moi aussi de la tradition rationaliste. Je considère plus particulièrementle rôle de l’imagination dans notre perception morale, c’est-à-dire dans l’étape de prise de connais-sance d’une situation, préalable nécessaire à la formation de tout jugement moral. Je soutiens quel’imagination peut enrichir notre perception morale et que nous avons par conséquent des raisonsde la voir comme une vertu épistémique. J’établis ce point en mobilisant les notions de pertinencemorale et de saillance perceptive. Et je crois que mon explication est consistante avec ce que laphilosophie de la psychologie nous a récemment appris de l’imagination.

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Ephraim Glick

University of St Andrews

Know-How and Linguistic Analysis

One welcome consequence of recent interest in know-how has been the recognition of the literatureas providing an excellent case study in how considerations about language might yield insighton philosophical issues elsewhere. Appealing to linguistic theories of questions and knowledge-whconstructions, D.G. Brown provided an early defence of the view that know-how is a kind ofknowledge-that. After Brown’s strategy was adopted and updated with contemporary syntax andsemantics by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, a number of critics expressed reservationsabout the methodology. How could linguistics possibly establish substantive conclusions aboutthe relationship between two sorts of mental states ? In the present paper I (i) reconstruct thecentral argument of Brown / Stanley and Williamson, (ii) review extant criticisms of the linguisticstrategy and argue that they fail to refute the central argument, and (iii) compare the debateover know-how with several other issues to draw a general methodological moral : there is noin-principle problem with using linguistics to identify type/sub-type relationships among non-linguistic phenomena, provided those phenomena can be characterised in a certain way.

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Bernd Goebel

Theologische Fakultät Fulda

Was Anselm really an immanent realist ?

There still is much disagreement as to the nature of Anselm of Canterbury’s solution to theontological problem of universals. Anselm has recently been taken to be saying that a universalisstrictly immanent to its corresponding particulars. The chief evidence cited for Anselm’s all egedimmanent realism is his theory of original sin. The main part of my paper will be devoted to

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demonstrate that Anselm’s theory of original sin does not support any interpretation of thiskind. The immanentist reading draws upon by his remark that "the whole human nature" (totahumana natura) was in Adam and "nothing of it" (nihil de illa) outside of him. Despite Anselm’suse of the mereological preposition de, this has been taken to mean that Adam’s sin affected otherpersons through their human nature, because human nature in its entirety was in Adam. Thatis, not only was the reno part of human nature outside of Adam, but also did human nature notexist anywhere else. Yet all it really means is that the substantial universal "human nature’ waswholly, rather than partially instantiated in him. From these and other considerations, it turnsout that Anselm was no immanent realist.

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Martin Grajner

TU Dresden

A Two-Factor Theory of Epistemic Justification

In this talk I outline and defend a theory of immediate or foundational justification that I call"phenomenal reliabilism". This theory incorporates elements from Huemer’s theory of phenomenalconservatism and Comesana’s indexical reliabilism. The basic idea of the theory I propose is thatcertain mental states contribute in a twofold way to the epistemic justification of beliefs, namelydue to the way they determine how things seem to a subject and due to the fact that they areactually reliable indicators of the truth of their contents. The first component allows this theoryto accommodate internalist intuitions. The second component allows it to foster the connectionbetween justification and truth without being subject to the counterexamples that plague simpleor unqualified reliabilist theories. I also try to show that this theory is superior to rival theoriesthat have been proposed in the literature, like Huemer’s theory itself (2001) or a process-reliabilisttreatment of foundational justification as in Goldman (2008a).

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Marie Guillot

Institut Jean Nicod

Understanding the Concept "I" as a Phenomenal Concept

I defend the view that the concept "I" functions as a phenomenal concept. (By the concept"I" I mean here the ordinary, non-theoretical individual notion that each subject uses to storeinformation specifically about themselves.) What is special about phenomenal concepts is thatthey cannot be acquired before one has some phenomenal experience (e.g. as of a certain shadeof red, or a certain ache). The felt quality of that experience is used as a label to be put onfurther encounters with experiences of the same kind. I propose that, in the case of the I-concept,the felt quality used as a "label" for all that falls under the concept is what some have called"mineness" or "me-ishness" : that quality of all of my experiences that identifies them as mine. Ishow how this hypothesis can ground a model of the concept "I" that sheds light on some aspectsof the epistemology of first-personal thoughts, including the form of authoritativeness attachedto first-personal reports of such thoughts, and immunity to error through misidentification. Thismodel may also help solve some issues related to personal identity, like the "Why it matters"problem.

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Ghislain Guigon

Département de Philosophie, Université de Genève

La question spéciale sur l’explication

Let the Special Explanation Question be the following : (SEQ) when is it true that ‚àÉx such thatx explains why p is the case ? The traditional answer to SEQ is the rationalist one : it is impossibleto give conditions under which there is a truth that explains p, because, necessarily, for all p, sometruth explains why p is true. The rationalist answer to SEQ is based on the Principle of SufficientReason according to which, necessarily, for all p, there is something that explains why p is true.This principle has long been regarded as a basic philosophical principle ; and so AR has longbeen regarded as an undisputable answer to SEQ. The most recent and most important challengeto the rationalist answer to SEQ is the Bennett-van Inwagen argument according to which thePSR should be rejected because it yields an incredible claim, namely that necessitarianism istrue. In my talk I shall first explain why the premises of the Bennett-van Inwagen argument yielda genuine rationalist paradox. Then, after having dismissed proposed replies to the rationalistparadox, I shall offer an original defence of the rationalist answer to SEQ.

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Jean-Baptiste Guillon

Centre Atlantique de Philosophie, Université de Nantes

Held Hostage, the Epistemological Objection to Libertarianism

In this presentation, I want to consider an objection against Libertarianism, understood as theconjunction of an incompatibilist conception of freedom and the claim that we actually havesuch a freedom. In a nutshell, the objection goes as follows : if free will requires well-locatedindeterminism, then we cannot presently claim to know that we are free, for we cannot presentlyclaim to know that there is well-located indeterminism. Therefore, the libertarian stance cannotbe warranted. Fischer (1999) dramatized this situation saying that, if incompatibilism were true,then our view of ourselves would be "held hostage to an esoteric scientific discovery". This kindof reasoning is quite rarely worked out or even spelled out, though it is, I believe, an importantmotivating element in many an anti-libertarian doctrine. In this presentation, I try to give anexplicit version of this objection, emphasizing its fundamentally epistemological nature. Then Iargue that the objection can be successfully rebutted. My conclusion is that an incompatibilistfree will, if it is conceivable, is also knowable, and therefore, the libertarian can be warranted inhis claim that we have (incompatibilist) free will.

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Marion Haemmerli


The Case for Perspectival Representations of Space

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In both the philosophical and the psychological literature there is a consensus as to the existenceof two different types of representations of space within the human brain. Human beings representspace both egocentrically and absolutely. Egocentric representations present space from the parti-cular view point of the observer ; absolute representations comprise both map-like representationsinvolving no particular view point and intrinsic representations (also called object-centred repre-sentations) involving the view point of an object different from the observer. I present a case fora new type of dichotomy, different from the distinction between egocentric and absolute repre-sentations, distinguishing between perspectival and detached representations of space. Under thereading I propose, perspectival representations of space comprise intrinsic and egocentric repre-sentations, whereas detached representations comprise solely map-like representations of space.My argument will run in two steps. I will first show that the current distinction between ego-centric and absolute representations yields an incomplete account of intrinsic representations ofspace ; I will then show that the dichotomy between egocentric and absolute representations givesrise to a slightly mistaken philosophical interpretation of what is involved in the different typesof spatial representation.

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Michael Hertig

University of Lausanne

Self-confidence and practical reason in Aristotle

In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle enquires the moral character of akrasia (inconti-nence) and associates it with a defect in the agent’s knowledge of what is best to do (1147a10-18).In a recent article, David Charles associates rightly this epistemic defect with lack of confidence(pistis). In this talk, I first argue that lack of confidence concerns not only akrasia, but enkra-teia (continence) and phronêsis (practical wisdom) as well. Phronêsis, akrasia and enkrateia aredistinguished by a proper degree of confidence, which makes of confidence an essential featureof practical thinking. I then show that the strength or weakness of confidence depends on theamount and appropriateness of reasons to act the agent considers when he is inferring a practicalconclusion. According to my reading of Aristotle, reasons to act can be either the practical end(s)the agent is seeking to realize, or the particular circumstances of the action as perceived by theagent.

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Salim Hirèche


For a Weaker Form of Compositionality in Natural Languages

While most people agree that natural languages are compositional, they often disagree on the par-ticular form of compositionality that these languages exhibit. The aim of this paper is precisely toaddress that issue. First, I argue that a plausible version of compositionality should be consistentwith how complex expressions are actually formed and interpreted — that it should, in particular,meet the following two criteria : (i) consistence with the flexibility of natural languages and (ii)consistence with their systematicity and productivity. The idea is that compositionality shouldbe both weak enough to meet (i) and strong enough to meet (ii). Then, I sketch four versions

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of compositionality, ranging from the strongest to the weakest : total compositionality ; strongcompositionality, which corresponds to the "standard" version of compositionality (roughly : themeaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of its constituents and by itssyntactic structure) ; weak compositionality ; and zero compositionality. After briefly consideringthe two extremes, total compositionality and zero compositionality, I conclude that the formerclearly fails to meet (i), while the latter clearly fails to meet (ii). Finally, I argue that strongcompositionality does not meet (i), whereas weak compositionality meets both criteria.

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Frank Hofmann

University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

The Generality Constraint - vertical, not horizontal

The Generality Constraint (Evans) has been proposed as a demarcation criterion for conceptualcontent, and there has been extensive debate about whether perceptual representation satisfiesit or not. The debate is ill-advised, since it rests on taking the Generality Constraint in a hori-zontal way. That is, according to this horizontal reading, the Generality Constraint requires thata subject can re-combine subject concepts and predicate concepts more or less freely. Taken inthis way, it becomes impossible to make progress on the issue of whether perceptual representa-tion is non-conceptual, since all depends on whether one accepts that perceptual representationallows for object representation (singular representation). In contrast, I propose to interpret theGenerality Constraint in a vertical way. Concepts allow for the generation of representations ofthe same thing (redness, happiness etc.) with varying semantic roles (such as subject role andpredicative/attributive role). Arguably, perceptual representation is restricted to the predica-tive/attributive role and, thus, is non-conceptual.

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Cyrille Imbert

Archives Poincaré

Collective science : How to describe, measure and study collective understanding ?

This talk is devoted to trying to clarify under which conditions a scientific group can be said tohave scientific understanding of an item of knowledge. In the first part of the talk, I argue thatthe possession of scientific understanding is a specific problem for collaborative science, even ifit has so far been largely ignored by philosophers of science and social epistemologists. In thesecond part, I argue that the understanding possessed by groups can be studied by focusing uponwhich sets of understanding-denoting questions they can answer and I show that this instrumentalapproach is compatible with most approaches about understanding. In the final part of the talk, Ihighlight typical situations of distribution of scientific knowledge and abilities within groups andanalyze which set of understanding-denoting questions the corresponding groups can answer ineach case.

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Vincent Israel-Jost

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Iterative empiricism and scientific observation

In this paper, I develop an account of observation that respects the empiricist demand thatobservation sentences have a particularly high epistemic authority, while acknowledging that theirformulation relies on previously held beliefs (or more generally a ’view’ : beliefs, concepts, theories,etc.) This dependence does not permit to see the epistemic authority of observation sentences asarising from their epistemic autonomy, as has been traditionally done in empiricism. My defensethen, is based on a full recognition of the interdependence between observation sentences and aview. This in turn leads to an evolutive model of empirical enquiry, in which the subject’s viewis under constant change while experiential judgments can vary depending on the views held bydifferent subjects or by the same subject at two different times. Despite this apparently shakyepistemic situation, I show that investigators have the means to stabilize their material, conceptualand doxastic frameworks as they undertake various experiments. I provide several argumentsin favor of the possibility to stabilize an investigation inspired by works in history of science,philosophy of experiment and epistemology. I also link observation to stabilization and I showthat stabilization is enough to defend the epistemic authority of observation sentences.

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Lydia Jaeger

Institut Biblique de Nogent

Un miracle viole-t-il les lois de la nature ?

Hume définit un miracle comme une violation des lois de la nature. Mais il existe des auteurs(C.S. Lewis par exemple) qui refusent cette définition. L’exposé explore des conceptions rivales dela définition humienne du miracle : Dans quelle mesure la force des arguments avancés dépend-elle de la conception de loi favorisée ? Des présupposés métaphysiques sont-ils impliqués dans ledébat ? Dans le cas de lois probabilistes et de lois ceteris paribus, rien ne semble pouvoir comptercomme une violation de ces lois. Cela implique-t-il qu’aucun miracle n’est alors possible ?L’exposé mettra aussi en parallèle le rapport entre miracles et lois d’un côté, et celui entre espritet corps de l’autre. Le physicalisme non réductionniste est parallèle à une conception du miraclesans violation des lois. Je montrerai que le physicalisme non réductionniste est incohérent. Seull’abandon du physicalisme permet de maintenir une conception satisfaisante de l’esprit. De même,quand on considère qu’un miracle ne peut se constater que quand les lois de la nature ont étéviolées, on utilise une conception réductionniste de l’action intentionnelle : celle-ci relèverait detout ce qui est contraire aux lois.

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Marta Jorba-Grau

Logos‚ University of Barcelona

Do We Think Outside The Stream Of Consciousness ?

According to some authors, the ’cognitive phenomenology thesis’ is the idea that there is aspecific cognitive phenomenology for conscious thought, different from sensory and emotional

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phenomenology. Recently, there has been a line of resistance against cognitive phenomenologybased on the idea that mental states of thought are not the kind of things suited for havingphenomenal character. Soteriou (2007) and Tye & Wright (2011), relying on some observationsof Geach (1969), argue for the conclusion that the mental states of conscious thought do notand cannot enter into the stream of consciousness, except insofar as they are clothed sensorily oremotionally. And thus there cannot be such thing as cognitive phenomenology. This conclusionrelies on these two premises : (i) anything that figures in the stream of consciousness must unfoldover time and (ii) thoughts are states, and as such, they do not unfold over time. I first arguethat this specific requirement is not warranted and, second, that even if we accept this condition,conscious thought can satisfy it.

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François Kammerer

Rationalités Contemporaines Université Paris-Sorbonne - Paris IV

Le problème de la disponibilité du contenu : une critique des théories représenta-tionnalistes de la conscience phénoménale

Les théories représentationnalistes fortes et réductives de la conscience phénoménale (Dretske,1995 ; Tye, 1995, 2000) prétendent identifier les états mentaux phénoménaux à des états repré-sentationnels, et le contenu phénoménal de ces états à une forme de contenu représentationnel.Une objection importante a pu être soulevée contre ce type de théories : l’objection de la démarca-tion (Kriegel, 2002 ; Seager, 2003 ; Stoljar, 2007). Celle-ci consiste à remarquer que, pour pouvoirréduire la conscience phénoménale à une activité de représentation, le représentationnaliste doitêtre en mesure de rendre raison de la démarcation entre les états représentationnels phénoménauxet non-phénoménaux ; or, il n’est pas sûr que les théories représentationnalistes soient en mesured’opérer une telle démarcation. Une réponse notable à cette objection consiste à affirmer que c’estla disponibilité, pour le système cognitif central, du contenu de certains états représentationnels,qui rend ceux-ci phénoménalement conscients (Tye, 2003). Dans cette présentation, nous désironsproduire une analyse la notion de " disponibilité " afin de montrer que celle-ci n’est pas en mesurede remplir le rôle que les représentationnalistes voudraient lui voir jouer, et ne constitue donc pasun critère de démarcation pertinent pour séparer les états représentationnels phénoménaux desétats représentationnels non-phénoménaux.

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Philipp Keller

University of Geneva

Representation - relational, but intrinsic

How is it that some items of the world say, mean or represent others ? What grounds this primafacie very surprising property to stand (in) for something else ? In my talk, I argue that somehelp may come from perhaps an unexpected corner : seeing why, and how, the intrinsic/extrinsicand the relational/non-relational distinctions in the metaphysics of properties crosscut, may helpus understand representational properties as an intrinsic, but relational, while intentionality isextrinsic, but non-relational.

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David Kirkby

Durham University

Frege’s Context Principle and Proper Names

Applying Frege’s Context principle to proper names, as he himself thought it should be, defusesthe debate about their semantics. I advance this claim with particular reference to the recentrevival of predicative accounts of proper names, arguing that this revival is not motivated.

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Jérémie Lafraire

IEM, Nonconceptual Content and Semantic Relativism

Nonconceptual mental contents have sometimes been defined as contents that do not exhibitsubject-predicate structure. It has been argued that it follows that such contents cannot be im-mune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). In this paper, I claimthe opposite. I argue for an account of certain nonconceptual contents inspired by Recanati’s(2007) Strong Moderate Relativism. This relativist account explains how such contents can beimmune. But any relativist theory of mental contents faces a difficulty raised by what cogni-tive scientists have described as "shared representations" based on "mirror mechanisms". Suchrepresentations seem to violate an essential requirement on the applicability of the relativist fra-mework : the invariance condition. My main point in this paper is that this objection is based ona confusion between two distinct invariance conditions, a strong and a weak one, that a relativistmay appeal to when considering whether a certain mental content is relative. I show that thevariability shared representations display is perfectly consistent with the satisfaction of the weakinvariance condition. I then sketch what a detailed relativist account of immune nonconceptualstates based on this idea should look like.

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Jean-David Lafrance

FQRSC Postdoctoral Fellow, Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford

The Bundle of Universals Theory of Material Objects

The bundle of universals theory of material objects claims that objects are identical to fusions ofuniversals (of the ones, as we would ordinarily say, that they instantiate). It says, moreover, thatan object instantiates a universal P just in case P is a part of the fusion of universals to whichthe object is identical. The transitivity of the part-whole relation poses a problem for the bundletheory. It follows from the latter that any universal instantiated by an object’s spatiotemporalpart is also a part of the fusion of the object’s universals. And that is clearly wrong ; the propertiesof an object’s parts may be different from the object’s properties. I argue that a simple solutionto this problem takes a ternary part-whole relation as a mereological primitive, and modifies thebundle theory so that it claims that objects are fusions of universals at some region or other.Furthermore, I argue that the resulting bundle theory is not committed to a controversial versionof Leibniz’s Indiscernability of Identicals, unlike the typical bundle theory.

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Julia Langkau

Reflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples

At first glance, reflective equilibrium seems to reduce to a trivial and uncontroversial claim aboutphilosophical methodology : we aim to take into account all information available to build a co-herent theory. I argue that reflective equilibrium entails two substantive methodological claims.First, we ought to assign equal initial plausibility to intuitions and theories. Second, in the case ofa conflict between an intuition and an accepted theory, we have two options to regain coherence :we either drop our intuition or adjust our theory. I show that the first claim is substantive atleast on the view originally defended by John Rawls. In order to show that the second claim issubstantive, I discuss how the method applies to our current practice of debating thought expe-riments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. I conclude that reflective equilibrium doesnot correspond with our current practice, especially as carried out by experimental philosophers.Whereas reflective equilibrium has been discussed mainly in normative ethics and political phi-losophy, my focus lies on thought experiments in areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, orphilosophy of language, where the subject matter under investigation does not consist of moralor similar norms.

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Federico Lauria


Fit, Fit, Fit, and Fit. On Direction of Fit

As a matter of fact, some things fit each other, while others don’t. For instance, Cinderella’sfoot fits her shoe, while Mary’s foot doesn’t. Moreover, some things fit each other in a distinctway than others do. For instance, beliefs are supposed to fit the world, while the world itselfis supposed to fit our desires. But what does that mean ? In this talk, it is defended that fitis the function of satisfaction, i.e. a kind of correspondence which consists in the obtaining ofcontent. Its relata are facts and bearers of content. Directions of fit of conative and cognitiverepresentations then are distinguished by a formal difference in the norm for satisfaction. Whereascognitive representations are the subject of the norm for satisfaction, the world itself is under arequirement for satisfaction of conations to occur. It is finally claimed that this contrast is betterunderstood by paying attention to the respective modes under which content is represented. Inthe case of desire, content is represented as what ought to/should obtain, while in the case ofbeliefs content is represented as being the case. The direction of fit then relies on the presence orabsence of the deontic operator.

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Baptiste Le Bihan

Philosophie des Normes, Université de Rennes I

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Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects

Ted Sider (1993) argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysical pos-sibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is flawed. I shall describe one kind ofnihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of the things we usually encounter donot exist. That is, I take talk of macroscopic objects and macroscopic properties to refer only tosets of fundamental properties, which are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. This viewis a kind of nihilism : it rules out the existence of objects ; that is, from an ontological point ofview, there are no objects. But unlike the moderate nihilism of Mark Heller (1990), Peter vanInwagen (1990) and Trenton Merricks (2002) that claims that most objects do not exist, I endorsea radical nihilism (following Mark Heller (2008)) according to which there are no objects in theworld, but only properties instantiated in space-time. As I will show, radical nihilism is perfectlycompatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk. It is also compatible with the epistemicpossibility that we actually live in a gunk world. The objection raised by Ted Sider applies onlyto moderate nihilism that admits some objects in its ontology.

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Stephan Leuenberger

University of Glasgow

Relations intrinsèques

Caracterisées de manière informelle, les propriétés intrinsèques sont celles dont l’exemplificationpar un individu dépend uniquement de la manière d’être de cet individu, et non pas de ce quise passe en "dehors’ de lui. De façon analogue, les relations intrinsèques sont celles dont l’exem-plification par des relata dépend uniquement de la manière d’être de ces relata. Tandis que lespropriétés intrinsèques font le sujet d’un vif débat, les relations intrinsèques - à distinguer desrelations internes ‚Äì ainsi que la portée métaphysique de la distinction même entre intrinsèque etextrinsèque dans ce contexte ont été négligées. Je ne connais qu’une seule analyse proposée, cellede David Lewis. J’affirme qu’elle échoue, cependant, et que son défaut est irréparable. Malgré tout,la notion de relation intrinsèque est suffisamment claire pour illuminer plusieurs débats portantsur les propriétés intrinsèques. J’en donne deux exemples : le débat sur les analyses combinatoiresdes propriétés intrinsèques, et celui sur l’impossibilité prétendue de leur connaissance.

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Annabelle Lever


Discrimination and Appearance : What Does Equality Require ?

Is it wrong to discriminate against people based on their physique, dress and grooming and, if itis wrong, should the law seek to prevent it ? On the one hand, appearance discrimination seemsto be one of the ways in which other forms of discrimination operate. So, when we discriminateagainst people because of their race, religion, class or sex we often do so via a hostile or dispara-ging response to their physique, dress, grooming and demeanour. On the other hand, there doesseem to be something troubling about the idea that employers should have to treat employeesequally, regardless of their clothing, hairstyles and general appearance. So, on the face of it, there

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seems to be a normatively important difference between laws prohibiting discrimination based oncharacteristics such as race or sex over which we have little, if any, control, and discriminationbased on our clothes, grooming and general appearance, where we have more scope for choice.However, equality can require us to protect people’s choices and to ignore their unchosen circum-stances, as opponents of luck-egalitarianism have noted. But if that’s the case what, if anything,is wrong with appearance discrimination ?

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Nicolas Liabeuf

Méta-métaphysique expérimentale (MME) et "défi de l’intégration" : Que font réel-lement les métaphysiciens ?

Selon le « défi de l’intégration » (Peacocke, 1999), « nous devons réconcilier une explication plau-sible de ce qui est impliqué dans la vérité des énoncés d’un genre donné avec une explicationcrédible de la manière dont nous pouvons connaître ces énoncés, quand nous les connaissons »[nous soulignons]. Une telle réconciliation de la métaphysique et de son épistémologie est envi-sageable en adoptant une stratégie « expérimentale méta-métaphysique » (MME) qui étudieraitl’intuition métaphysique, indépendamment des résultats avancés par des métaphysiques qui seproclament descriptives ou normatives. Nous allons voir dans notre exposé que la prémisse d’unetelle étude revient à supposer que l’intuition métaphysique est « la chose du monde la mieuxpartagée ».

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David Liggins

University of Manchester, UK

Unpropositional attitudes

The most familiar arguments for the existence of propositions rest on the well-known relationalanalysis of attitude ascriptions. Tobias Rosefeldt (2008) has argued against the relational analysisby showing that we should not regard "that’-clauses appearing in attitude ascriptions as singularterms. Rosefeldt is not concerned with ontology and is happy to presuppose that propositionsexist. I claim that Rosefeldt’s work can be used to undermine standard arguments for the existenceof propositions. In this paper I show how.

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Franck Lihoreau

Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Are Normative Reasons Evidence for Obligations ?

In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to doan act simply are evidence that one ought to do this act, and suggest that "evidence" in thiscontext is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.

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Roberta Locatelli

Philosophies contemporaines (PHICO) Paris I

Disjunctivism and the puzzle of phenomenal characters

In the present talk I try to elucidate what phenomenal disjunctivism (typically propounded byMike Martin) is committed to. I point out a tension or even a contradiction between its use of thenotion of phenomenal character (which, I will argue, seems to make a proper sense only withinan internalist framework) and the externalist aim professed by disjunctivists. Then, I attempt tospell out the reasons for this tension and show how phenomenal disjunctivism is committed to anuntenable view, which inscribes the ontological commitment to the mind-independent world inthe phenomenal character through a question-begging argument. I will then diagnose the motiveswhy a disjunctivist may be willing to embrace such a view : such motives are connected with theattempt to dispel the skeptical threat. I will then exploit these results to show that an account ofhallucinations consistent with naïve realism does not require phenomenal disjunctivism, providedone properly understands naïve realism and dismisses the skeptical threat.

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Arturs Logins


Phenomenal Conception of Evidence and Pragmatic Factors

Evidentialism, a popular theory about epistemic justification, states that what justifies our beliefs(and other doxastic attitudes) is the set of our (total) evidence. According to one Evidentialistvariety, namely the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence (PCE) Evidentialism, evidence itself isfixed by our non-factive mental states, i.e. mental states that do not entail truth of their content.Traditionally, Evidentialism has adopted an Intellectualist view about epistemic justification, ac-cording to which only truth-connected (or theoretical) elements can justify a belief. Recently, ithas been forcefully argued that also factors of pragmatic nature play a role in epistemic justifica-tion of a belief (Practicalism). I argue, first, that Evidentialists who adopt PCE are committedto abandon Intelectualism. And, second, that a conjunction of Practicalism, PCE Evidentialismand a plausible principle about the constraints on the normativity of action leads to absurdconsequences."

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Françoise Longy


Why do we have hybrid concepts ?

Paul Bloom argues in "Water as an artefact kind" (2007) that there is one sense of "water" thatdoes correspond to H2O" and another one that corresponds to an artefact kind. That shows,according to him, that the concept of water is hybrid and that "we naturally think about many

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categories, including water, as both natural kinds and artefact kinds". And he claims that theexistence of such hybrid concepts is "a natural solution to a difficult learning problem". I arguethat Bloom is right about the existence of hybrid concepts which refer at least to two differentkinds, one of which is a natural/real kind, but I claim that (a) the analysis he proposes isunsatisfactory as a general account of hybrid concepts (in particular, since it suggests that onlyone reference can be a natural/real kind) ; and (b) our possession of such hybrid concepts is notsimply the consequence of having to cope with a difficult learning problem, but is epistemologicallyjustified as a means for enhancing our knowledge of the world. I will defend these claims usingthe concept of biological species as a case study.

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Philippe Lusson

New York University, Philosophy department

Joint actions

Philosophers who examine collective actions have for the most part concentrated their effortson related concepts, such as shared intentions, participatory intentions or team reasoning. It isnot always clear how their arguments shed light on collective actions. I will argue that a fruitfulview should not be constructed out of related concepts, but from the ground up. The concept ofcollective action has a role to play in some explanations of coordinated behavior, when multipleagents achieve more with coordinated actions than they would have on their own. Coordinatedbehavior sometimes is an achievement of the participating agents. When some or all of them canget some or all of the others to act in specific (relevant) ways, their group displays some form ofintegrated planning towards a goal. It is a distinctive kind of explanation for their coordinatedbehavior, which delineates an interesting concept of collective action. I argue that it makes for amore convincing picture than concepts derived from shared intentions, participatory intentions orteam reasoning. In particular, it connects paradigmatic philosophical examples, like painting thehouse together, with other examples, like the actions of hierarchies or the group hunts of somepopulations of chimpanzees.

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Christophe Malaterre

IHPST

On the distinctness of causal variables

Distinctness of causal relata plays a crucial role in causation, either when construed as a conse-quence of causation (when it is claimed that distinct causal relata bestow different causal powers- e.g. Achinstein 1974, Amrstrong 1978, Shoemaker 1984), or when defined as a foundationalassumption for causation (e.g. Hausman 1998). The aim of this contribution is to make senseof "distinctness" within Woodward’s manipulationist account of causation (2003) : in this ac-count, distinctness appears in the definiens of causal clauses, yet is nowhere explicitly defined.I explore two approaches : first, a reductive approach with a view to explicating "distinctness"with concepts that are not causal ; and second, a non-reductive approach with the objective ofconstruing distinctness with the help of manipulationist causal concepts (yet avoiding boots-trapping concerns). I show that both approaches lead to sufficient conditions for distinctness.

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Yet identifying necessary conditions proves more difficult and points to the need to underpinmanipulationism with stronger foundational clauses than current.

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Alexandre Marcellesi

Invariance and Explanatory Depth

According to the account of causal explanation developed by James Woodward and Christ Hit-chcock, a generalization Y = f(X) contributes to causally explaining an event y = f(x) if and onlyif it is invariant under at least one conceptually possible testing intervention. Together with thisaccount comes an account of explanatory depth, i.e. an account of the criteria we rely on whenmaking comparisons of explanatory quality between generalizations describing causal relations.According to this account, a generalization permits deeper causal explanations the "greater" therange of interventions it is invariant under. There are several ways to understand the "greater"in this account. I present three interpretations, a purely quantitative one, a purely qualitativeone, and one according to which it is the variety of interventions a generalization is invariantunder that is crucial. I argue that Woodward and Hitchcock’s account of explanatory depth isinadequate under all three interpretations. I argue, in particular, that it conflicts with the ideathat good causal explanations should cite causes which are proportional to their effects, an ideadefended by many authors, including Woodward himself. I conclude by examining three possibleobjections to the argument I develop.

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Angela Martin

Institut d’éthique biomédicale, Université de Genève

Some Thoughts On Vulnerability in Health Care

I argue that a common distinction concerning the scope of the concept "vulnerability" in contem-porary bioethics does not pose a real problem but rather a pseudo-problem which appeared dueto a lack of thorough conceptual analysis. Firstly, I formally analyze the concept "vulnerability"and its rules of application, thereby distinguishing i) the reasons why a being can be ascribedvulnerability ; ii) the circumstances of manifestation of vulnerability ; and iii) the manifestationsof vulnerability. Secondly, I define those as vulnerable who have interests i) which concern theirwelfare ; or ii) which are of moral relevancy ; and iii) which potentially can be ignored, frustratedor wronged by the individuals themselves, the circumstances or other living beings. Finally, Ishow that not all manifestations of "vulnerability" can or should be prevented in applied areassuch as health care : only those manifestations of "vulnerability" are morally condemnable forwhich a moral agent is directly or indirectly responsible insofar as he did not take the claimsof those concerned into just consideration. In order to clarify this, I outline the differences andoverlaps between harm and wrong, and delineate the kind of claims one has towards the healthcare system.

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Peter Marton

Clark University, Worcester, MA, US

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Calling the Skeptic’s Bluff : Brains, Vats, and Irrelevance

Arguably, the argument based on the brains-in-a-vat (BIV), or similar scenarios, is less part ofthe skeptical tradition than of the dogmatist practice. The argument is a test case or challenge fordogmatists to show the strength of their theories of knowledge. The central claim of the presentessay is that this "argument" does not deserve our attention. The essay will first offer a formalargument (the Inconsistency Thesis) to show that the possibilities of empirical knowledge andscenarios, like the BIV, are inconsistent. If so, the BIV-skeptic (or the dogmatist, using it) mustmake the case why to prefer the BIV-scenario over the possibility of empirical knowledge. I willargue that the BIV-skeptic cannot rely on any selection principle (as e.g. conceivability) to selecther scenarios over the possibility of empirical knowledge ; neither can she successfully make theclaim that such principle is unnecessary for her project. We will also consider whether or not theskeptic can succeed with challenging the Inconceivability Thesis, arguing that even if the skepticacknowledges the possibility of empirical knowledge, her scenario cannot be salvaged. The essaywill conclude with considering the morals of the above argument for the dogmatist (or simply,epistemological) endeavor.

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Claudio Mazzola

University of Sydney

Symmetry, Foresight, and Understanding

The problem of determining the logic of scientific explanation is central in contemporary philo-sophy of science. Stephen Toulmin’s contribution to this topic is included, to a large extent, inhis 1961 book Foresight and Understanding : according to his model, scientific theories are ins-pired by "ideals of natural order", i.e. paradigmatic patterns of behavior, which are regarded asboth natural and perfectly intelligible ; scientific explanations accordingly consist in showing hownatural phenomena could deviate from those paradigms. The notion of ideals of natural order,however, has been fiercely criticized, either for being tacitly committed with a Aristotelian view ofnatural phenomena, or because of its historical variability. I outline a revised version of Toulmin’smodel, which abandons the notion of ideals of natural order in favor of the more widely accep-ted and less troublesome notion of symmetry. The resulting account is shown to overcome themajor difficulties of Toulmin’s proposal, though preserving all of its virtues. In addition to this,the model so obtained discloses the possibility of unifying the fundamental intuitions underlyingthe principal competing models, including the deductive-nomological, the unificationist, and thecausal-mechanical ones.

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Mark McCullagh

University of Guelph

Distributed assertion

Sometimes in making an assertion, one has reason to flag some words for interpretation as ifuttered by another. It is an error to try to pigeonhole this either as *using* the flagged words oras *quoting* them. In this talk I consider this phenomenon, which I call "distributed assertion".

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A speaker makes a distributed assertion when she indicates (often using quotation marks) thatsome of her words are to be interpreted as if produced by another speaker. Standard Kaplaniansemantics, surprisingly, is able to handle this sort of thing rather smoothly, as long as each of theseparately-performed parts is evaluatable semantically in such a way that the resulting semanticvalues admit of combination. In such cases, interpretation involves intra-sentential shift both inthe context of utterance *and* in the semantic theory being used. I compare this approach tosuch cases to the approaches proposed by François Recanati, Robert Brandom, Yitzhak Benbaji,and (most recently) Daniel Gutzmann and Eric Stei. I then consider what reasons one might haveto make a distributed assertion. I distinguish between a need for semantic deferral and a need forjustificatory deferral. And in closing I consider what implications there are for our conception ofassertion.

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Conor McHugh

Philosophy, University of Southampton

Control of Belief and Intention

The "symmetry view’ about belief and intention says that belief has an essential connection totruth, and intention has a corresponding essential connection to "to-be-doneness’, and that thisexplains certain parallels between our control of belief and intention respectively. In particular,it explains why we cannot form a belief or intention merely because it would be desirable tohave that belief or intention. I distinguish three versions of the symmetry view : a metaphysicalversion, a normative version and a teleological version. I argue that we should prefer a (modified)teleological version. One can form a particular intention in order to make up one’s mind, evenwhen one’s reasons favour only weakly, or not at all, the action thereby chosen. By contrast, onecannot form a particular belief in order to make up one’s mind, when one’s evidence favours onlyweakly, or not at all, the proposition thereby believed. This prima facie problem for the symmetryview can and should be dealt with, I suggest, by holding that belief’s essential connection is toknowledge rather than truth. This move is easily accommodated by the teleological version of thesymmetry view, but causes trouble for the normative and metaphysical versions.

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Phillip Meadows

University of Manchester

Holey Naive Realism, Batman ! Look At The Air ! !

Naive Realism holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is constituted bythe mind-independent world and the properties they possess. I will argue that it is possible tohave two perceptual experiences, (i) an experience of a landscape from a particular point of viewthrough a glazed window and (ii) an experience of the same landscape from the same point of viewthrough an unglazed window, such that the phenomenal character of each experience is identical.By appealing to this possibility, together with the fact that constitution is a one-one relation,I will present an argument against Naive Realism that has the advantage over the argumentfrom illusion that it precludes the currently popular disjunctivist claim that in the case of eachexperience there is no common kind. This is because neither case can plausibly be construed as

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a case of illusion. The strongest response available to this form of argument will be to deny thatwe see the glass in the glazed window case or the air in the unglazed window case : consequently,I provide an argument that we do see the glass and the air in each of these cases !

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Jacques Mégier

Institut Jean Nicod , Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

Conscience, circularité, régression infinie, et conscience de soi

Qu’est-ce qui rend conscient un état mental ? Un état mental est conscient si ... nous en sommesconscients, dit D. Rosenthal, qui convient qu’il existe un fort sens intuitif de l’auto-référence de laconscience, mais il le requalifie en faveur d’une théorie méta-représentationnelle selon laquelle unereprésentation mentale devient consciente si elle est l’objet de l’ intentionnalité inconsciente d’unautre état mental, dans certaines circonstances appropriées. Les théories méta-représentationnellesproposent une explication réductive de l’état de conscience par la " rencontre " intentionnelled’états inconscients, mais soulèvent d’importantes difficultés, d’ordre intuitif, logique, ou épisté-mique. Si l’on prend au sérieux l’intuition d’auto-référence de la conscience, un schéma remplaçantla méta-représentation par l’auto-représentation devient plausible. La conscience n’est plus unepropriété extrinsèque, dérivant de certaines relations de représentation, mais intrinsèque, dueà la structure d’auto-représentation de certains états mentaux. Il faut montrer que ce schémaest intelligible, que le risque de régression à l’infini dans les capacités représentationnelles de laconscience n’existe pas, et que de robustes intuitions sont ainsi éclairées, comme la structurationde la conscience entre premier plan et arrière plan, et le lien entre arrière plan et conscience desoi.

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Anne Meylan


Solving the problem of doxastic responsibility. Why non-volitionalism does not help

The problem of doxastic responsibility concerns the question of whether we can be responsiblefor our beliefs, despite the fact that we cannot control them in the way that we can control ourbodily movements. According to the non-volitionalist solution, which is a popular solution tothis problem, we can be responsible for our beliefs because our beliefs are attitudes for which wecan appropriately be asked our reasons for having them. This article’s goal is to cast doubt onthis solution. This objection proceeds in two steps. First, I explain why our reasons for believingthings, i.e. our epistemic reasons, has to be identified to motivating reasons in order for the non-volitionalist solution to work. The volitionalist solution cannot explain why the fact that I canbe asked my epistemic reasons for believing something is sufficient to make me responsible forthis belief if our epistemic reasons cannot be identified to motivating reasons. Second, I try toshow that two conceivable ways of defending the claim that our epistemic reasons are motivatingreasons both fail.

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Sebastian Miguel

Logos, University of Barcelona ; NYU

Consciousness and Theory of Mind : a Common Theory ?

According to Higher-Order theories, phenomenally conscious states are those that are the objectsof some kind of higher-order process or representation. There is something higher-order, a meta-state, in the case of phenomenal conscious mental states, which is lacking in the case of otherkind of states. According to these theories, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind.

A Theory of Mind, is the ability of humans to identify their own mental states and attributemental states different from their owns to others. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, bedecomposed into another two : mindreading and metacognition.

In this paper I ague that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for our mindreadingability. This observation jeopardizes theories that maintain that phenomenal consciousness is aby-product of our mindreading ability.

My objection might be extended to other HOR theories on the reasonable assumption that me-tacognition depends on mindreading. To press on other HOR theories, I argue that HOR theoriescannot endorse the view that metacognition and mindreading are independent cognitive mecha-nisms. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the plausibility of a functionalexplanation of the evolution of metacognition. I offer some reasons to doubt that such an expla-nation will be provided.

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Andreea Mihali

Wilfrid Laurier University

Toward a Cartesian Epistemic Rule Consequentialism

This paper proposes a reading of the Meditations as the tortuous trajectory toward a rule conse-quentialist epistemology ; the Meditations tell the story of the meditator’s passage from an un-reflective to a reflective stance which contains three levels : rule-extraction , rule-adoption, 2ndnature rule-compliance. Noa Naaman-Zauderer’s deontological reading of Descartes maintainsthat the C&D rule is binding because it is experienced as stemming solely from us, not becauseof the value of a further goal. Contra Naaman-Zauderer, I show that for Descartes at least part ofthe bindingness of the rule stems from the value of the goal (i.e. truth) ; blame is about improperlyarrived at results. This alternative account of the C&D rule brings to light Descartes’ reliance andemphasis on results. Having both a methodological and an adaptive feedback function, results areneeded for the discovery of the C&D rule ; once this rule is in place, results serve to buttress therule’s bindingness and to confirm compliance with it. Only after having become versed in applyingthe C&D rule can the meditator dispense with the double-checking of the outcomes of his acts ofassent and move into something resembling Naaman-Zauderer’s "deontological" phase.

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Luis Fernandez Moreno

Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Madrid

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Kripke on Mill’s Theory of Natural Kind Terms

In a famous passage of the third lecture of Naming and Necessity Kripke summarizes the core ofhis criticism to the description theory of natural kind terms, taking into account the theory ofgeneral terms proposed by Mill, insofar as it is applied to natural kind terms, as a paradigmaticversion of that sort of theory. The aim of this paper is to argue that Mill’s generic theory ongeneral terms does not coincide with his theory concerning the type of general terms that naturalkind terms are and that the main thesis of the latter is not subject to Kripke’s objections putforward in the aforementioned passage.

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Franziska Müller

Université de Fribourg

Phenomenology of Minimal Actions

According to a standard theory, an action consists of two parts : a mental part (an intention)that causes a bodily movement. Following this, Wegner and other authors claimed that oursense of agency is derived from an experienced correspondence of the two elements. Againstthis view, several authors raised the argument from minimal action (Pacherie, Bayne, Proust).This phenomenological argument is based on the claim that in most of our everyday activities,we do not experience any intention that accompanies or proceeds the action even though wedo experience these activities as ours. The standard reply to this argument is to say that weneed a more sophisticated account of intentions. This stance claims that those minimal actionslack any higher order intention proceeding the action, but they do contain a lower-level intention,something like Searle’s intention-in-action. In the development of these accounts, authors typicallyrely on empirical findings about the mechanisms that underly action generation. I argue that ifwe understand the sense of agency as a representational state and start from the underlyingmechanism to understand what the phenomenology of agency is like, we will not arrive at aconvincing solution to the initial problem of minimal action.

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Michael Murez

Institut Jean Nicod

Self-Location and Prospective Control

The conjunction of the simple view of belief (as a relation between a subject and a proposition)and the simple view of propositions (as individuated by their truth-conditions) is traditionallythought to face the problem of self-locating belief, i.e. that it fails to explain famous cases inwhich subjects believe and desire the same propositions but are not disposed to act similarly.Popular responses reject the simple view of belief by introducing a new term into the belief re-lation, or the simple view of propositions by adopting finer grained contents. I propose a novelapproach, which requires neither. What is needed is only an independently motivated extensionof the list of attitudes contributing to action. Self-locating "belief", I argue, is actually a psy-chologically more complicated phenomenon than has been supposed, combining belief and whatI call prospective control‚ roughly, the attitude we have towards what feels within our power to

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Résumés SoPhA - 2012 O - Z

bring about. Introducing this notion allows for a solution to the problem of self-location, whichinterestingly connects our capacity to self-locate with a distinctive feature of our experience asagents, the systematic link between where we locate ourselves and which possibilities feel directlywithin practical reach.

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Robert Myers

York University ; Toronto

Smith’s Practicality Requirement : A Friendly Amendment, Then a Problem

According to Michael Smith’s practicality requirement, if an agent judges that there is reasonfor her to Φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to Φ in C or she is practicallyirrational. As a number of critics have noted, however, it is far from clear that this is correct,for if an agent’s normative judgements have often proven unreliable before, or seem otherwisesuspect now, it is not always clear what practical rationality demands of her. I therefore beginby proposing a friendly amendment to Smith’s requirement, one that makes it much easier todefend. I then go on to argue that this requirement is actually much harder to satisfy than Smiththinks it is, and in fact that there is good reason to doubt that it could be satisfied if desireswere nothing more than the purely functional states that Smith claims they are. I finish by brieflysketching a different account of what desires are and briefly explaining why I think it puts us ina better position to satisfy the practicality requirement.

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Andrei Nasta

Logical or Alogical Words ?

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Drawing on some important linguistic results of the last few decades, I start, mainly for expo-sitory purposes, by emphasizing the differences between the semantics of logical terms as theyappear in natural language and their first order logic counterparts. The logical terms treated hereare the quantifiers and some connectives, with focus on negation. I show that we have to accept,crudely put, several levels of meaning (for the natural language logical terms) and that first orderlogic cannot adequately represent them. Then I present the broad outlines of a proper seman-tics/pragmatics for logical terms which is flexible enough to unify these diverse levels of meaning.I end by making salient what I take to be the "economical" feature of the semantic/pragmaticprocesses described.

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Francesco Orsi

Tartu University

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Moral obligations and rational desires

In a recent article Michael Smith argues that his dispositional theory of value and reasons hasa rather definite normative upshot. From the mere concept of a fully rational agent we canderive two agent-relative moral obligations : an obligation not to interfere with people’s exerciseof rational capacities, and an obligation to do what we can to make sure that people possessrational capacities. In my paper I explain Smith’s reasoning, and raise three objections to it.First, Smith can plausibly account for obligations to do things we cannot desire to do only atthe price of positing a mismatch between our motivational abilities and those of our rationalcounterparts, something that Smith’s "advice’ model would not welcome. Second, it is far fromclear that the obligations thus derived must be agent-relative rather than agent-neutral. Third,since the other-regarding desires of our rational counterpart are simply required by consistency,it is not clear how they can generate genuine moral reasons for us.

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Marcello Ostinelli

Scuola Universitaria Professionale della Svizzera Italiana

Libéralisme politique et républicanisme classique sont-ils compatibles ? Une compa-raison de deux modèles de l’éducation à la citoyenneté

Récemment le rapport entre libéralisme et républicanisme a fait l’objet d’un débat philosophiquetrès animé. Dans Political Liberalism Rawls déclare que libéralisme politique et républicanismeclassique ne sont pas des positions politiques incompatibles puisqu’il n’y a pas entre eux une "opposition fondamentale " (Rawls, 2005). Pour mettre au point leur compatibilité je choisis unpoint de vue insolite pour un philosophe politique en confrontant les modèles de l’éducation à lacitoyenneté qui peuvent être extraits de la théorie de Rawls et de la tradition du républicanismeclassique. Mon exposé vise à discuter en premier lieu la question posée par Rawls de la com-patibilité entre libéralisme politique et républicanisme classique. En même temps mon analyseprocède par une comparaison des modèles de l’éducation à la citoyenneté pour aborder la ques-tion de l’extension légitime de l’éducation politique des citoyennes et des citoyens. Mon exposé setermine avec la réfutation de la thèse de Viroli selon laquelle le libéralisme est un républicanismeappauvri, ou incohérent.

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Elisa Paganini

Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano

A defence of common currency names

Hawthorne and Lepore (forthcoming) defend a sceptical attitude towards what Kaplan (1990)called common currency names (from now on, cc-names). If they are correct, the belief thatthere are such entities is ungrounded. I argue instead that they provide no reason to contend theexistence of cc-names. Hawthorne and Lepore’s argument may be summed up as follows. Theyassume the following conditional : (A) If a cc-name exists, then its possible occurrences havesomething in common in order to belong to the same cc-name. They argue that there are reasonsto believe that : (B) name occurrences do not have something in common in order to belong to

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the same cc-name. They conclude that it is reasonable to suppose (applying modus tollens to (A)and (B)) that (C) cc-names do not exist. I will argue that, contrary to what they claim, there isat least one good reason to assume that (B) is false and, as a consequence, it is not reasonableto suppose that cc-names do not exist (i.e. it is not reasonable to suppose (C)).

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Fabrice Pataut

Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST) Paris 1

Anti-realism and the self-ascription of attitudes

In a nutshell, semantic antirealism is the doctrine that if a statement is true, then it must bepossible, at least in principle, to determine that it is true. Consider the particular case of self-ascriptions of attitudes such as beliefs and desires, i.e. statements of the form "I Φ [that] p",where Φ ranges over propositional attitude verbs and p provides the content of whatever is Φdby the self-ascriber. Should we be semantic antirealists about these when the putative bearer ofthe attitude is the only individual who may retrieve a warrant in favour of his Φing that p ? Wecan’t have a good grasp of the question unless we’re clear about (i) whether or not the "at least inprinciple" clause is too weak, and (ii) what kind of role, if any, should the referents of that-clausesplay in the delivering of warrants in favour of such self-ascriptions by way of introspection. Thustwo issues : strict finitism on the one hand and intentionality on the other. I shall argue thatrecent views defended by Peacocke and Pryor are found wanting with respect to both.

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Graham Peebles

Université de Fribourg

Deflationism about Temporal Perception

Using simple resources, representationalism about perception and a conceptual claim about whatour notion of change is, I argue for a deflationary account of the experience of temporal change.Instead of requiring a standard memory theory or a retentional or extensional specious presenttheory, I argue that a paradigm case of experience of temporal change, namely motion, can beaccounted for in terms of subsequent perceptions with linked representational contents.

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Maël Pégny

Philosophies Contemporaines Paris-1

Calculer avec des algorithmes, calculer avec des machines : un problème philoso-phique

La thèse de Church stipule que toute fonction calculable est calculable par une machine deTuring. En distinguant, à la suite de nombreux auteurs, une forme algorithmique de la thèsede Church, portant sur les fonctions calculables par un algorithme, d’une forme empirique de

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cette même thèse, portant sur les fonctions calculables par une machine, il devient possible deposer une nouvelle question : les limites empiriques du calcul sont-elles identiques aux limitesdes algorithmes ? Ou existe-t-il un moyen empirique d’effectuer un calcul qu’aucun algorithmene permet d’effectuer ? Je tâcherai de montrer la pertinence philosophique de cette question,notamment pour l’étude du statut épistémologique du calcul. S’il existait une fonction calculablepar une machine sans être calculable par un algorithme, il existerait un problème calculatoire quiserait soluble par un dispositif empirique, sans être soluble par aucune méthode mathématique apriori. En ce sens, la coïncidence de la calculabilité par des machines avec la calculabilité par desalgorithmes fonde ainsi le caractère a priori de la connaissance obtenue par le calcul.

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Christoph C. Pfisterer

University of Zurich

Predication in Perception

In Origins of Objectivity Tyler Burge develops a theory of perception advocating the philosophicalbenefits of perceptual psychology. The central task of his monograph is to investigate the constitu-tive conditions for objective representation. He diagnoses the syndrome of "over-intellectualizing"perception. The core assumption of the syndrome is the requirement that for an individual torepresent the world as it is, it has to represent the conditions for representation, too. Burgeargues that objective empirical representation can stand on its own and does not require beliefs,concepts, or language. Central to Burge’s argument is the notion of "perceptual attribution’ ; i.e. akind of predication that occurs in perceptual reference, without making perception propositional.In my presentation I shall give a critical examination of this notion. In contrast to Burge’s anti-intellectualism I am prepared to argue that perception requires propositional capacities.

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Demetris Portides

University of Cyprus

Idealization and Scientific Models : Reducing the Information Content

In this paper I focus on the character of idealization, particularly regarding its use in scientificmodels. More specifically, I try to analyze the ways idealization enters in scientific modelingfrom the perspective of the reasoning process involved. I argue that the core feature of thereasoning process behind scientific modelling is the systematic omission of information, whichleads to reduction of information content in models. By relying on an analysis of the reasoningprocess as omission of information regarding the characteristics of target systems, three generalways by which information content is reduced are distinguished : idealization by undelimitation,idealization by isolation and idealization by decomposition. These three kinds of idealizations areexplained and an attempt is made to demonstrate their usefulness in making sense of a varietyof characteristics exhibited by models.

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Carlo Proietti & Frank Zenker

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Lund University

Pluralistic Ignorance and Informational Cascades : an approach in Dynamic DoxasticLogic

A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of thegroup thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the othermembers of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena insocial psychology, such as the familiar situation where every student in a class refrains from askingfor clarification, wrongly assuming that all the others have understood the lecture ; or to explainwhy bystanders refrain from acting on behalf of victim of an emergence. Our main purpose is toshed light on the nature of PI states - their structure, internal consistency and opacity - using theformal apparatus of Dynamic Doxastic Logic, and also to study the sense in which such statesare "fragile”, i.e. to identify plausible conditions under which a PI state dissolves into a state ofshared belief as the result of a public announcement. Our plan is to (1) define pluralisticignorance in a DDL formalism and show its (model-theoretical) consistency. We shall then(2) call attention to the close connection between PI and Moore’s paradox which reveals theprecise sense in which PI states are epistemically opaque to the group members themselves. Wewill further show that (3) a singular public announcement by some agent does not have thecharacteristic cascading effect that dissolves PI but that this effect can be obtained by a series ofannouncements triggered by perceived collective belief (to be distinguished from the notionof shared belief defined above).

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Paula Quinon

Department of Philosophy, Lund University

The Number Concept : Human Cognition and Philosophy of Mathematics

In this paper is proposed a conceptual analysis of natural numbers. This analysis results in aplausible picture of number concept formation, proposing an explanation of the relationship bet-ween numbers as understood by cognitive scientists studying number concept in little childrenand natural numbers used by mathematicians in model-theoretical framework. A designed pic-ture is three-folded. Firstly, research of cognitive scientists is reminded, and concepts of coreknowledge and innate cognitive numerical systems are discussed. Secondly, still with respect tocognitive scientists research, the necessity of ability to language use in order to apprehend numberconcept. Claims that "number words" and "counting routine" is necessary in order to "saturated"number concept to arise, are explored and an interpretation in mathematical language proposed.Finally, descriptive methods used by mathematicians to define concept of number and concept ofcomputability are explored.

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Julien Rabachou

Caphi (Centre atlantique de philosophie)

Les implications métaphysiques d’une acceptation de la relativité de l’identité

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Le but de cette contribution est de défendre la thèse de la relativité de l’identité, dans la versionassumée par Peter Geach, et surtout de tirer les conséquences métaphysiques et ontologiques deson acceptation. La stratégie la plus intuitive de réfutation de la thèse, adoptée par exemple parWiggins, consiste à soutenir que la relativité de l’identité est vraie mais triviale lorsqu’il s’agit del’identité sous un prédicat quelconque, et qu’elle s’avère fausse dans le cas où il s’agit d’identitésous un prédicat sortal. Nous soutiendrons par conséquent que l’acceptation de la relativité del’identité implique a contrario, pour répondre à cette stratégie " essentialiste " de réfutation,le rejet de la distinction entre prédicats sortaux et prédicats ordinaires. Puis nous montreronsque ce rejet de l’essence ne fait difficulté que si l’on présuppose que la relation d’identité est unprincipe réel d’unité des individus. Nous considérerons au contraire que l’identité est une relationseulement logique et que l’individualité des êtres existe concrètement et antérieurement à toutesnos procédures d’identification. La conséquence est dès lors que la distinction entre prédicatsessentiels et accidentels ne s’impose plus, et que la thèse de la relativité de l’identité n’apparaîtplus problématique.

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Athanasios Raftopoulos

University of Cyprus

Late vision : perceptual or though-like ?

In earlier work, I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a pre-attentional visual stage unaffectedby top-down conceptual modulation. I have related the content of the states of early vision withthe nonconceptual content of perception. I also underlined the distinction between early andlate vision. The latter is cognitively penetrated and involves the modulation of processing byattention. In this paper, I examine the processes that occur in late vision and discuss whetherlate vision should be construed as a perceptual stage or as a thought-like discursive stage. Iargue that late vision, its (partly) conceptual nature notwithstanding, does not consist in purethoughts, that is, propositional structures that are formed in the cognitive areas of the brain andparticipate in discursive reasoning and inferences. Using Jackendoff’s (1989) distinction betweenvisual awareness, which characterizes perception, and visual understanding, which characterizespure thought, I claim that the contents of late vision belong to visual awareness and not to visualunderstanding. Although late vision implicates beliefs, either implicit or explicit, these beliefsare hybrid visual/conceptual constructs and not pure thoughts. Distinguishing between thesehybrid representations and pure thoughts lays the ground for examining the conceptualization ofperceptual content and the way concepts modulate it affecting either its representational or itsphenomenal character.

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Marion Renauld

Archives Poincaré

What is make-believe ? A critical path through theories of fiction

The concept of "make-believe" turned out to be central to any definition of fictionality, notablythose of G.Currie, P. Lamarque or K. Walton, to the extent that it provides a good explanationof the nature and functioning of works of fiction, when in large part characterized out of semantic

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notions like truth or reference. Generally, it is said that the content of a fictive story is to bemake-believed by the audience, who participates in such a game of pretended actions or "madeup" worlds. Regardless to the peculiarities of each theory, this propositional attitude is regardedto be the kind of appropriate response to the fictionality of novels, fairy tales, films, not to saysculptures or paintings as well. It is also used to give a more precise account of the activity ofimagining, a well-designed object for cognitive sciences or anthropology to look at. But how arewe supposed to get what it really means ? How does it help us to understand what is at stakewith "fictional" narratives or representations ? And, finally, is it a specific feature, strong enoughto distinguish between fiction and non-fiction in an absolute way ?

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Sébastien Richard

Centre de recherche en philosophie (PHI)

Les deux voies de l’ontologie formelle analytique

Dans cette conférence, nous distinguons d’un point de vue critique deux projets d’ontologie for-melle au sein de la métaphysique analytique. Le premier, que nous qualifions de naïf, a étéprincipalement défendu par Nino Cocchiarella et consiste à résoudre les problèmes ontologiquestraditionnels au moyen des outils de la logique formelle contemporaine. Nous opposons à ce pre-mier projet relativement traditionnel dans la métaphysique occidentale une deuxième conceptionplus substantielle de l’ontologie formelle. Celle-ci consiste à affirmer l’existence de relations etpropriétés ontologico-formelles qui ne se réduisent pas à celles de la logique. Dans la version qu’ena proposée Barry Smith, une telle ontologie formelle devrait être formulée dans un langage di-rectement dépictif utilisant des diagrammes représentant uniquement la complexité ontologique,afin d’éviter toute immixtion de la logique. Néanmoins, ce projet nous semble souffrir de plusieursdéfauts, dont les moindres ne sont pas la projection de structures spatiales dans une théorie qui nedevrait concerner que les structures ontologiques valant pour tout objet en général et un préjugéen faveur de l’effectivité contraire à la neutralité ontologique, dont devrait jouir toute ontologieformelle.

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Vincent Richard

Université Paris 1, Equipe Philosophies contemporaines

The internal nature of meaning

In this talk I will argue for an internalist account of meaning and propositions. Language isnot a meaningless bearer of meaning. Syntax itself contributes to the determination of meaning.Especially, I’ll argue that the notion of proposition does not concern content but structure. I willfirst investigate the ways syntax constrains interpretation. I will show that syntactic structureshave semantic effects, and so that the interpretation must follow this syntactic paths. In otherwords, there is a structural part of meaning that is irreducibly syntactic and internal. I willthen argue that the internal part is responsible for most of our semantic notions, such as theone of proposition. It is not because we have the semantic intuition that syntax should conformto a definite kind of structure ; on the contrary, it is because syntax generates a definite kindof structure that we have some definite intuitions, apparently semantic, but actually syntactic

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in nature, on the completeness of utterances. A propositional structure is a structure that issyntactically complete.

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Davide Rizza

University of East Anglia

Applied Mathematical Concepts

Philosophers of science have standardly understood the application as the bridging of an empiricalstructure and a mathematical structure by means of mappings. The mathematical structure isthe model of the empirical structure and the inferences that rely upon its properties can be usedin order to gain information about the empirical structure. In this paper I claim that this picturedoes not provide a general account of applications : in some important cases the application ofmathematics can be entirely resolved into the introduction of concepts and arguments that actdirectly on the elements of the empirical problem at hand. No resort to mappings is required orpertinent. The representational approach does therefore illustrate only one possible way in whichmathematics is applied. I illustrate this conclusion by examining several related results in socialchoice theory.

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Fanny-Elisabeth Rollet

Nosophi, de PhiCo Philosophies Contemporaines, Paris 1

L’agent et ses excuses en droit pénal : De l’intention criminelle aux dispositionscoupables

Notre projet est d’examiner les standards de la responsabilité et de l’irresponsabilité criminelledu point de vue de l’agentivité, à la lumière de concepts tirés de la philosophie de l’action (D.Davidson) et de théories de l’excuse formulées par des philosophes du droit anglo-saxons contem-porains (H. L. A. Hart, G. Yaffe et R. Duff). On s’intéressera ici au problème de la caractérisationcriminelle (i.e. au fait de savoir ce qui doit compter comme crime) sous l’angle du rapport qu’en-tretient cette qualification pénale avec les catégories de l’action imparfaite ou incomplète, et plusprécisément avec la reconnaissance d’excuses dans le langage juridique. On commencera par s’in-terroger sur la nature de l’excuse juridique au regard de la norme d’agentivité qu’elle sous-tend,pour se demander ensuite comment l’excuse juridique, dans ses mutations contemporaines, tend àêtre comprise en termes dispositionnels, alors même que certaines dispositions de l’agent revêtentune valeur juridique équivoque (aggravante et non atténuante de responsabilité).

Le problème de la nature de l’excuse et des limites de la criminalisation de l’intention peutainsi conduire à une réflexion plus large propre à réinscrire l’ontologie pénale dans un cadre dephilosophie politique : l’incrimination par des catégories pénales telles que celle de dangerosité(des dispositions ne valant plus que comme circonstances aggravantes) met en exergue la relationavec le modèle social et politique que cette ontologie est susceptible de promouvoir.

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Christian Sachse

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Is there metaphysical free will ?

Probably not. There is a strong argument that we are token-identical with something physical andit seems that the "space" in our physical world does not suit sufficiently our intuitions about freewill since we face the following dilemma : in a deterministic world, we are not the ultimate originof our acts and therefore hardly free ; this is the consequence argument against compatibilist po-sitions. On the other hand, it seems problematic to base our free will on indeterministic processessince it then could not be distinguished from chance ; this is the matter of chance argument.Still, this paper spells out a possible solution to the matter of chance argument : 1) I discuss thenotion of autonomy of special science’s properties within a conservative reductionist frameworkand thereby some kind of independency and robustness of psychological properties. Against thisbackground, 2), it is possible to focus in more detail on the possible adaptive functions of noise /indeterministic brain processes if combined with particular constraints and/or feedback mecha-nisms in the brain. The upshot of this consideration is a possible distinction between free will andchance within indeterminism but without contradicting neither ontological nor epistemologicalreductionism.

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Laura Saller


The Case for a Stimulus Account of the Senses

In this presentation I shall give a reason for taking seriously a certain position regarding thequestion how to distinguish our senses. This position, called stimulus account, claims that thesenses are distinguished by the physical stimuli that are responsible for the relevant perceptionsand by the sense-organs that are involved in the production of these perceptions. In order tovindicate this position, I will take a close look on the cases that are used as arguments in thedebate regarding the question how to distinguish the senses. These cases, i.e. human echolocationand an instrument called TSSV, are commonly held to speak for one of the two standard positionsin the philosophy of perception. These positions are the position that senses are distinguishedby the properties that we perceive by them and the position that the senses are distinguishedby the qualia of the perceptions. I am going to show that these examples, in contrast to what iscommonly thought, are best explained by the not very popular stimulus account of the senses. Iwill then take a look at this account, indicate the difficulties for such a position and show howwe could try to avoid them.

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Sebastian Sanhueza

University College London

The Realist and the Vulgar : Hume on the Objects of Perception

By the vulgar opinion, David Hume means one form the belief in the continuous and distinct exis-tence of bodies takes in the human mind. The vulgar opinion is often taken to capture something

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close to what we would nowadays call a direct realist account of perception and its objects : inbroad lines, a view according to which there is a mind-independent external world, the objects ofwhich are directly or immediately perceived by subjects of perceptual experiences. In this piece,however, I make a small case against this wide-spread assumption : specifically, I suggest thatthe core-content of the vulgar opinion might be closer to Berkeleyan Idealism ‚Äì that is, a viewon which the objects of the external world have the same or a similar kind of existence as thoseobjects perceived by the human mind. The motivation for pursuing this very specific goal is thatHume’s views on the topic of skepticism regarding the senses is apparently shaped by his rejectionof the vulgar and the philosophical opinion ; thus, one way of understanding Hume’s enigmaticstance about this brand of skepticism (I take it) consists in clarifying what view he was rejecting,and what such a rejection amounted to.

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Maria Serban

On functions and mechanisms in the investigation of cognitive capacities

One influential tradition in philosophy of psychology holds that explanations of cognitive sys-tems such as working memory and stereopsis proceed by showing that these complex capacitiesare made up of simpler sub-capacities organized together so that they exhibit the explanandumphenomenon. This sort of explanation is usually referred to as functional analysis. In contrast,contemporary views about the nature of neuroscientific explanation maintain that good neuros-cientific explanations describe mechanisms which reveal the causal structure of the world. In thepresent paper I defend the hypothesis that functional analysis is a form of mechanistic explanation.More precisely, I take it that functional analysis is a mechanism sketch which omits various detailsabout the mechanisms under study, but which turns into a complete mechanistic explanation oncethese details are appropriately filled in. I argue against the received view about the relationshipbetween psychological and neuroscientific explanations by showing that neither the distinctness,nor the autonomy thesis can face the challenges raised against them. I conclude that while bothfunctional analyses and neuroscientific mechanisms are explanatory relevant, the former are bestunderstood as elliptical mechanistic explanations. The proposed solution suggests a frameworkfor integrating psychological and neuroscientific accounts of cognitive capacities.

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Fabien Schang

Laboratoire d’Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie - Archives Henri Poincaré (LHSP)Université Nancy II

Quelle logique pour les itératifs ?

L’exposé qui suit propose une réflexion en philosophie du langage à propos des verbes itératifs :quelles sont leurs règles de signification, et quelle logique moderne serait susceptible d’en établirles règles ? La réflexion s’articulera en trois étapes. (1) Une étude empirique des itératifs dansla langue française Une interprétation logique de ces constructions naturelles consiste à faire duverbe itératif une fonction appliquée sur un argument propositionnel ; ce schéma fonctionnel seretrouve dans la famille des logiques modales telles que la logique épistémique. (2) Nous exa-minerons dans un second temps de l’exposé la question suivante : à quelle(s) condition(s) une

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itération fait-elle sens ? Nous porterons l’attention sur un cas particulier d’itératif : douter. Notreconclusion aboutira à un rapprochement entre itération et auto-référence. (3) Pour conclure cetexposé, nous insisterons sur le caractère performatif des itératifs et privilégierons ainsi une ana-lyse logique illocutoire de ces verbes. Le cas singulier du doute itératif met en évidence une classespéciale de verbes au sein de la théorie des actes de discours : les anti-performatifs, dont l’effetsur l’interlocuteur est contraire à celui énoncé par le locuteur.

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Livio Simeone

Laboratoire Théories du Politique Université Paris VIII ; Université Catholique de Louvain

Qu’est-ce que le problème de la non-identité ?

Certaines actions et certains choix nous semblent moralement condamnables à l’égard de per-sonnes qui existeront dans le futur car ils sont la cause de dommages à ces derniers. C’est lecas par exemple des parents qui décident volontairement d’avoir un enfant handicapé sans avoirsuivi le traitement prescrit. Pourtant, une objection simple nous dit que ces intuitions devraientêtre rejetées. En effet, l’existence d’une personne dépend de la rencontre particulière entre unspermatozoïde et un ovule et peut être altérée entre autres par le moment exact de la concep-tion. En l’absence de l’acte incriminé, la prétendue victime n’existerait donc pas du fait queles parents auraient procédé à la conception plus tard en raison du traitement. Le concept dedommage n’est donc pas applicable à la condition de la victime, car tenter de prévenir le mal afatalement pour conséquence de prévenir l’existence de cette dernière. Le problème dit de la non-identité (PNI), formulé initialement par Derek Parfit dans Reasons and Persons (1984) consisteen l’inacceptabilité de cette objection pour nos jugements moraux. Cette présentation se donnepour but d’expliquer ce problème et de préciser ses conséquences pour la philosophie morale etpolitique.

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Joulia Smortchkova

Institut Jean Nicod

Arguments for the rich content view of perceptual content

What kinds of properties enter into the experiential contents of perception ? Do only low-levelproperties (such as being blue, square, etc.) enter into perceptual experiences (poor content view)or do high level properties (such as being an agent, a banana, being sad, etc.) enter into expe-riential content as well (rich content view) ? I focus on the arguments for the rich content view. Ifirst critically examine the division between low-level properties and high-level properties whichthey presuppose. I then underline the limitations of a method recently proposed to argue for therich content view : the phenomenology first method. I suggest one way to improve the methodis by checking its predictions against the experimental data provided by psychological researchon visual agnosia and perceptual adaptation. My aim in so doing is not simply to imply that themethods used by psychology are the right ones : taken on their own they do not cut finely enoughbetween competing possible interpretations of certain data. Instead, I outline how a combinationof approaches might positively impact future research on such issues.

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Pietro Snider


A Role That Functional Beauty Does Not Occupy in our Aesthetic Experience

G. Parsons and A. Carlson recently put forward the notion of Functional Beauty as a sort ofaesthetic appreciation that accords a "central role to [the knowledge of] function" (FunctionalBeauty, OUP 2008, p.228. my emphasis). I question their claim that the knowledge of functionoccupies a "central and primary place" in our aesthetic experiences (p.234) by evaluating whe-ther it is true that Functional Beauty is always the most important component in our aestheticappreciation of an object. By means of a few examples, I show that this is not the case, i.e. thatthere are at least a number of cases in which the overall aesthetic character of an object is notinfluenced more by our appreciation of its fitness for function than by its "immediate" sensoryproperties. I conclude that Parsons & Carlson are wrong in suggesting that Functional Beautyoccupies a central and primary place (the most important one) in all of our aesthetic experiences.I claim that the role that Functional Beauty plays in aesthetic appreciation, although possiblysignificant, is not always more important than the role of the immediate sensory beauty of anobject.

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Michael Sollberger


Introspecting Other Minds

The main issue that I shall discuss in this paper is whether it is possible to introspect someoneelse’s mind as the mind of someone else. This question lies at the heart of the epistemologicalproblem of other minds : how do I know that others have mental lives that are very much likemy own ? If I can inspect my own mental states but never those of others, what justifies mybelief in the mental states of others ? Contrary to received philosophical wisdom, I shall arguethat it is, indeed, theoretically possible to have introspective access to another’s mental stateas her mental state. To support this, admittedly controversial, claim, I shall dwell on cases ofinserted thoughts in schizophrenia and stress the key distinction between the owner and authorof a thought. I shall apply this distinction to the epistemological problem of other minds andhighlight that under certain theoretical conditions, one can be said to truly introspect another’smentality as the mentality of another. The result will be that there is no a priori bar to our havingintrospective knowledge of the inner lives of other human beings.

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Patrice Soom

Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf

Réductionnisme et élimination

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Le débat contemporain relatif à la réductibilité des sciences spéciales s’est recentré autours dequelques questions parmi lesquelles figure premièrement celle de la réalisation multiple. L’or-thodoxie actuelle veut que la réalisabilité multiple des propriétés des sciences spéciales (MRT)soit garante de leur irréductibilité, mais aussi de leur indispensabilité scientifique. Ceci soulèvedeuxièmement la question des implications métaphysiques de la réductibilité ou de l’irréductibi-lité de ces propriétés. Il est ici communément admis que l’irréductibilité des sciences spécialesleur confère autonomie méthodologique et épistémique, alors que leur réductibilité entraineraitinévitablement leur élimination. Nous nous proposons premièrement dans le cadre de cette com-munication de montrer que l’interprétation anti-réductionniste de MRT conduit à un dilemmeinconfortable, entre éliminativisme et épiphénoménalisme à l’égard des propriétés des sciencesspéciales. Ce dilemme est engendré par l’assomption selon laquelle les prédicats des sciences spé-ciales sont des désignateurs rigides. Or, pour peu que l’on abandonne cette assomption, il estpossible de construire une position réductionniste compatible avec MRT. Se pose alors la ques-tion de savoir si une telle position implique, comme le veut l’orthodoxie standard, l’éliminationdes sciences spéciales. Nous montrerons que MRT, une fois reconsidérée, peut être alors conçuecomme garantissant l’indispensabilité scientifique des sciences spéciales, y compris dans un cadreréductionniste, ce qui nous permettra finalement d’examiner la question des implications norma-tives de la thèse réductionniste.

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Marta Spranzi

Université de Versailles, CERSES

Moral distress, reasons and context : a plea for moderate moral intuitionism

Intuitionism is a controversial meta-ethical stance today. It is both supported by work in evolu-tionary and moral psychology, and attacked on factual and normative grounds. In this paper, Iwould like to argue in favor of a "moderate intuitionism". By analyzing the example of doctors’intuitions about end-of-life actions, I will show that genuine moral intuitions exist and that theyare important both for understanding our moral experience and for changing practices. Indeed,moral, as opposed to psychological, distress signals the violation of a moral principle which un-derlies genuine moral intuitions. In order to answer important objections to classical approaches,a "moderate" form of intuitionism provides a role both for reason (to weed out genuine from spu-rious intuitions and to identify the normative rule underlying genuine intuitions) and for context(moral intuitions do not hold universally, but have to be consistent across similar contexts).Thus moral intuitions are only prima-facie justified, whereas genuine moral intuitions need to bebacked-up by reason in order to have normative import.

§ § §

Christian Steiner


The Problem of a Definition of Life

The task of defining life poses a serious philosophical problem. For, although it seems to be obviouswhat the characteristics of living beings are, they are either not shared by all living beings oralso shared by non-living beings. In this paper, I will ask how we should interpret the lack of an

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analytic definition of life and discuss two possible answers : (a) that the notion of a living beingis a family resemblance concept,and (b) that it is a formal concept. I will argue in favour of (b)by showing why (a) might be wrong.

§ § §

Arthur Sullivan

Memorial University of Newfoundland

Semantically-Driven Interpretive Processes

There is a prevalent notion that there is no tenable middle ground between minimalism andcontextualism (in the sense of these terms in which they designate sorts of positions on thesemantics-pragmatics interface). Minimalists are prone to argue that any attempts to define anintermediate position will inevitably collapse into contextualism. (Cases in point include Borg,Stanley, and Cappelen & Lepore.) From the other direction, contextualists are also dubious aboutthe tenability of attempted intermediate options. (Examples include Carston and Recanati.) Theaim of this paper is to work toward developing a way to rebut this prevalent notion. I will arguethat it rests on a false dilemma, which results from unhelpfully broad senses of, respectively,"semantics" (within the minimalists’ camp) and "pragmatics’ (on the part of contextualists). Tothe contrary, provided that a coherent and significant notion of what I will call "semantically-driven interpretive processes" can be discerned as distinct from both austere semantic interpretiveprocesses on the one hand and paradigmatically pragmatic interpretive processes on the other,then there is a firm and principled resting ground between minimalism and contextualism.

§ § §

Piotr Szalek

Catholic University of Lublin, Poland/University of Cambridge, UK

The Minimal Theory of Goodness

The paper aims to propose and examine a modest extension of the minimal theory of the truthpredicate, according to which this minimalist strategy (or tendency) might be applied also to thepredicate “x is good”. Considering the domain of moral language, it seems promising to distinguishbetween devices which express approval or rejection of actions performed by (moral) agents. Thepredicate “x is good” might be understood as a kind of generalised concept working over actionswhen one expands the scope of particular actions to its generalised class.

§ § §

Daniela Tagliafico

Università degli studi di Torino

Episodic Memory, Imagination and the Notion of a Memory Trace

In my talk I will criticize the theory of episodic memory that has been proposed by Alex Byrne(2010). According to Byrne a state of episodic memory does not imply the preservation of the

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knowledge of the once experienced event ; all is required in order to distinguish episodic memoryfrom imagination is the cognitive contact that the agent had with the event and that allowsher to undergo a recalling process. I will claim that this requirement is not enough because, ifsomeone is not able to recall any veridical fact or detail about a certain event, then she is onlytrying to recall, but she fails. In other words, if she remembers, of that event, that it occurred,but does not remember one veridical detail about it, then we can attribute to the subject onlya piece of semantic memory, but not a memory of the episodic kind. Moreover, I will show thatthe notion of a memory trace that is implicitly presupposed by Byrne can help him to distinguishmemory from imagination only at the price of giving up its essential property (that of preservingcontent).

§ § §

Gabriel Tarziu

Faculty of Philosophy University of Bucharest

Mathematics and the World : A Solution to the Problem of Applicability

One of the most interesting and puzzling features of mathematics is its utility to science. Re-cently, this feature came to occupy a central place in the philosophy of mathematics as Platonistsdiscovered a very ingenious argument in support of their doctrine that starts exactly from thefact that mathematics is applicable in science. What is the problem of applicability ? The formu-lation that I have in mind is the one given by the physician Eugene Wigner who, in an articlepublished in 1960, expresses his surprise about "the appropriateness of the language of mathe-matics for the formulation of the laws of physics" and he offers an argument for the idea thatthis appropriateness is a miracle starting from the premise that mathematics arises from somesort of aesthetic impulse in humans. In this paper I will be concerned with providing an answerto Wigner’s problem. My strategy will be to show that the aesthetic factor doesn’t play the rightkind of role in mathematics for Wigner’s argument to work. I will argue that mathematics is notessentially developed, as so many tend to think, with aesthetic considerations in mind.

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Nicolas Tavaglione

Dpt de science politique, Université de Genève

Séquestrer son patron : une forme de légitime défense sociale ?

Il s’agira ici de se demander si, dans certaines circonstances, séquestrer son patron en cas de conflitsocial peut être justifié par la logique de la légitime défense classique. Cette dernière impose, àtoute action défensive, des conditions strictes : (i) la défense doit être nécessaire ; (ii) elle doitrépondre à une attaque imminente ; (iii) elle doit être proportionnelle à cette dernière ; (iv) elle doitviser un agresseur injuste. Certaines séquestrations de patron satisfont-elles ces conditions ? Oui.Et il apparaît donc que, si on accepte la légitime défense classique, on doit admettre que certainesséquestrations de patron ne méritent pas la désapprobation sans faille que ce type d’acte s’attirehabituellement. Bien entendu, cette conclusion est limitée à certains contextes uniquement : lesFermetures d’Usine Sauvages. Et elle suppose qu’on abandonne certaines idées répandues, maisfragiles, sur la liberté absolue des propriétaires de faire ce qu’ils souhaitent de leur propriété.Heureusement, nous le verrons, il existe de bons arguments philosophiques et juridiques en faveurd’un tel abandon.

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§ § §

Enrico Terrone

Università degli studi di Torino (UNITO)

The Fictional World Viewed. The Ontological Foundation of Narrative Cinema

When we see a narrative film, we perceive a series of pictures and sounds that provide us withinformation about a fictional world. On one hand, the supporters of the "impersonal imaginingthesis" (Currie 1995, Gaut 2004) argue that the spectator uses sights and sounds as prompts forthe imaginative construction of a fictional world, but this account does not fit well with the realexperience of films. On the other hand, the supporters of the "imagined seeing thesis" (Levinson1996, Wilson 1997) argue that the film spectator imagines to perceive the fictional events in afirst-personal way, but in order to do this, the spectator must first imagine being in the fictionalworld, with some paradoxical consequences. I claim that these opposing theses bear upon the sameontological fallacy, that of conceiving a fictional world as a possible world, causally disconnectedfrom the real one. Conversely, I will argue that fictional worlds are artifactual, that is, essentiallycreated and therefore essentially connected to the real world. I will show that this ontologicalaccount allows us to preserve the benefits of the "imagined seeing thesis" without its paradoxicalconsequences.

§ § §

Iulian Toader

University of Notre Dame

Phenomenological Intuitions and Intuitionistic Grounds

In the philosophy of mathematics, one has recently contended that it is unjustified to believe,as for example Hermann Weyl did, that a defeat of intuitionism would entail a rejection of thephenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention is that some typesof phenomenological intuition could allegedly ground parts of mathematics which go beyondintuitionistic mathematics (see Mancosu and Ryckman 2002). In my paper, I shall argue thatthis contention is false : if intuitionism is defeated, in the way Weyl thought it was, then oneshould also reject a phenomenological approach to mathematics. My argument is based on theclaim, which I defend, that Mancosu and Ryckman have misinterpreted Weyl’s actual reasons forbelieving that a defeat of intuitionism would entail a rejection of the phenomenological approachto mathematics. A thorough analysis of these reasons shows that, according to Weyl, intuitionismhas been defeated, but only if victory is measured with respect to scientific objectivity, rather thanwith respect to mathematical belief and understanding, and thus the phenomenological approachis defeated only as an approach to scientific objectivity, but is in fact indispensable as an approachto mathematical belief and understanding.

§ § §

Silvia De Toffoli 1*, Valeria Giardino 2*

1 : Berlin Mathematical School, Technische Universität 2 : Departamento de Filosofia y Logica yFilosofia de la Ciencia, Universidad de Sevilla

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Visualization in topology : illustrations vs diagrams

In this article, we want to draw attention to the visual material involved in the practice ofmathematics (e.g. figures, illustrations, diagrams, etc.) in order to analyze their ‘forms’ and theirepistemic and cognitive roles. In particular, we will focus on diagrams, one of our aims beingto contend the segregation of diagrammatic reasoning to the domain of pure heuristics. We willintroduce knot theory as a case-study in order to evaluate a specific mathematical practice. Knottheory is a branch of topology which is a surprisingly rich source of examples and will be anexperimentation ground to develop an analysis of the role of space and action in diagrammaticreasoning. We will propose a characterization and a classification for the diagrams used in knottheory based on their dynamic nature. Our hypothesis is that knot diagrams, differently fromillustrations, are not static but convey a set of (more or less explicit) rules that regulate their movesin the space they live in, thus triggering a form of manipulative imagination which is nurturedby expertise. In our conclusions, we will hint at possible generalizations of our results.

§ § §

Giuliano Torrengo

Logos University of Barcelona

Metaphysical Explanations

Lately, it has been suggested that metaphysics should not be confined to the ontological inquiryabout what exists, but it should aim at telling a story about the fundamental features of realityand how they relate to each other and to what is derivative. There are of course many differencesbetween those projects, but roughly the underlying idea is that the philosophical inquiry shouldfocus on what are the fundamental aspects of reality and how they relate with what is derivative.Often, this idea is fleshed out in terms of a explanatory link between : the relation of grounding.However, explanations in metaphysics often take the form of reduction or elimination of theexplanandum. Therefore, a generic notion of metaphysical explanation is not a reliable guide tocharacterize grounding relations between fundamental and derivative entities. A somewhat moremodest aim is worth pursuing though : spelling out a generic notion of metaphysical explanation,which has grounding, reductionist and eliminativist explanations as its species. I will show therelevance of my approach for the issue of genuine disagreement in metaphysics.

§ § §

Silvia Tossut

Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele Milano

A Cooperation-Based Account of Social Scientific Knowledge

Scientific research is a group activity, characterized by cooperation between agents which collec-tively pursue the goal of knowledge production. I summarize the veritistic account of the socialdimension of scientific knowledge proposed by Bird (2010) and present some remarks on thefunctionalist approach he endorses. I argue that social relations affecting scientific research, inparticular membership in a research team, have epistemic relevance in virtue of a shared intentionmaintained by the individuals involved in cooperative scientific research and common knowledgeof this intention. More precisely, following Bratman’s (1993) analysis, shared intention includes an

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intention toward the efficacy of other agents’ actions, and so cooperation entails a disposition tohelp the other members in realizing their intentions. Since the common goal in scientific researchis knowledge production, each agent is committed to tell the truth to facilitate the other membersin their research. Common knowledge of this commitment provides each agent with good reasonsto rely on others’ testimonies, and thus it affects knowledge attributions. The social aspects ofscientific research can be accounted for in a way such that they turn out not to affect the truthorientation of scientific knowledge.

§ § §

Alexandra (Sasha) Vereker

Universal Reasons, Universal Constraints

There are at least two rival conceptions of normative reasons : Humean and anti-Humean. Hu-means hold, and their opponents deny, that normative reasons depend on our desires. It mayseem that the Humean thesis poses a problem : if normative reasons depend on our desires, then,when we argue about normative reasons, we are arguing about reasons-relative-to-my-desires andreasons-relative-to-your-desires, in which case we cannot disagree. I argue that this is not so : Hu-means can allow for disagreement by distinguishing between normative reasons and constraintson them. They can accept that constraints on normative reasons are not relative to our desires,and so we can disagree, even if normative reasons themselves are relative to our desires.

§ § §

Claudine Verheggen

York University, Department of Philosophy

In Defence of Austere Non-Reductionism

Hannah Ginsborg has recently developed and defended a new account of meaning and rule-following which, she maintains, avoids the pitfalls of both dispositionalism and anti-reductionism.Contra dispositionalism, she tries to accommodate the ineluctably normative aspect of meaning.But, contra anti-reductionism, she wants to do this by proposing a kind of normativity, whichshe calls primitive, which, though it is not to be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, isnonetheless to be applied to states or facts that are not fully intentional or contentful in thatthey are "below the level" of meaning facts. Ginsborg calls "austere" the kind of non-reductionismshe targets, in contrast to her own partial reductionism. I argue, against Ginsborg, that the realproblem with dispositionalism is that dispositions cannot provide standards of correctness forthe applications of linguistic expressions. Ginsborg’s primitive normativity, because it is quasireductive, cannot accomplish that task either. I share, however, Ginsborg’s dissatisfaction withthe austere non-reductionist claim that nothing philosophically illuminating can be said abouthow people’s use of expressions may amount to meaning. But I argue that her proposal fails toshed any light because, again, it is cashed out in quasi reductionist terms.

§ § §

Marion Vorms

University College Londres

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La notion de modèle chez Ernest Nagel (1961) : les théories scientifiques sont toujoursdéjà interprétées

Je me propose d’examiner dans le détail la manière dont Ernest Nagel (1961), considéré commel’un des derniers représentants de l’empirisme logique, introduit la notion de modèle dans lareconstruction qu’il propose des théories scientifiques. Je m’efforcerai de montrer que, présentéecomme un infléchissement mineur de la conception " orthodoxe " des théories formulée par Carnap(1956, 1966), l’introduction de la notion de modèle implique en fait un renoncement au projetformalisateur de l’empirisme logique. Elle marque en effet la reconnaissance du fait qu’on nepeut faire abstraction, dans l’étude du contenu des théories, de la compréhension qu’en ont leursutilisateurs. J’espère par là contribuer à la fois à éclairer un épisode important de l’histoire de laphilosophie analytique des sciences, et apporter un éclairage utile sur les débats actuels autourde la notion de modèle et, plus largement, des représentations théoriques. La plupart des sensde la notion de modèle telle qu’elle est utilisée aujourd’hui, et des problèmes soulevés par cettepolysémie, sont en effet déjà présents dans le texte de Nagel.

§ § §

Sam Wilkinson

University of Edinburgh

Dennett’s Personal/Subpersonal Distinction in the Light of Cognitive Neuropsychia-try

I emphasise the importance of Dennett’s personal/subpersonal distinction for the empirical studyof the mind and brain. However, there are two versions of the distinction within Dennett’s work.The earlier one, which is (unsurprisingly) closer to Ryle’s view, is to be found in Consciousnessand Content (1969). The later version, published in Brainstorms (1978), comes hand-in-hand withhis intentional stance. My aim is to clarify and adjudicate between these two views. Reflectionon recent work in cognitive neuropsychiatry, especially on delusional disorders, suggests that it isDennett’s earlier distinction that is more useful.

§ § §

Juhani Yli-vakkuri

University of Oxford Faculty of Philosophy

The Semantic Argument (also known as the "Operator Argument") for Relativism derives theconclusion that propositions vary in truth value along some nonmodal parameter from the claimthat there are sentential operators which "shift" the parameter, together with some further as-sumptions. I show that, if sound, Semantic Argument applies to variable-binding operators, andthat, so applied, Semantic Argument shows that the truth value of a proposition is relative to avariable assignment. This leads to an absurdly fine-grained, orthographic conception of proposi-tions, which both Relativists and their opponents presumably reject.

Why the Semantic Argument for Relativism Fails

§ § §

Julia Zakkou

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Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

Semantic Relativism for Metaontology

In my paper I revive the nowadays rather unpopular thesis that ontological claims are not ab-solutely but only relatively true. My line of reasoning to this conclusion runs as follows : In thefirst part, I’ll introduce what was taken in the past few years to be the core intuition motivatingso-called “metaontology”, the intuition that ontological disputes don’t have a unique substantiveanswer. In the second part, I’ll present one currently discussed way to do justice to this intuition,so-called “verbalism”. First I’ll outline two ways to explicate this view. Then I’ll show that bothof them are confronted with serious problems. In the third part, I’ll present an alternative wayto accommodate the metaontological intuition. Its core thesis is that ontological claims are onlyrelatively true. I’ll spell it out in more detail and argue that by avoiding its problems and savingits merits it can accommodate the intuition far better than verbalism.

§ § §

Josko Zanic

Department of Linguistics, University of Zadar, Croatia

Externalism and the Transcendental Situation of Semantics

The paper analyses the conditions of possibility of empirical investigation of meaning as a basis fora critique of semantic externalism. There are two basic ways of doing semantics : the denotationaland the conceptualist way. Whatever the approach chosen, the sematicist cannot avoid assumingthe omniscient position, seeing our words/concepts and things "from the outside". Externalismis treated here as a specific, philosophical interpretation of denotational semantics. The basicexternalist thesis is formulated thus : the reference of (some of) our terms is determined by theenvironment by way of causal contact between the cognitive system and the environment. Thecritique of externalism focuses on three points : the alleged causal links are too many ; or not thereat all ; or not the right ones. It follows that causal links are neither necessary nor sufficient tofix reference. We can be said to refer successfully, but this cannot be accounted for by the causallink story. The externalist thinks he can just point to the links that purportedly fix the referenceof (some of) our terms, but he is actually privileging certain links in order to ensure the "fixingof reference". Externalism is therefore an abuse of the omniscient observer position.

§ § §

Dan Zeman

Institut Jean Nicod

Temporal Binding in the Event Analysis

In this paper I investigate one answer to the so-called "argument from binding" for locationsconsisting in quantification over events instead of quantification over locations. The particularview I will focus on is Cappelen and Hawthorne’s "event analysis". After a brief presentation ofthe view and of how it answers the argument from binding, I provide some examples of temporalbinding that show the need to modify the account. I then envisage some ways the account couldbe modified in order to deal with the examples given, and conclude with a more general discussionof what kind of views could benefit from the event analysis.

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Informations pratiques

HOTELS

5ème arrondissement

• Auberge de jeunesse - BVJ

44 rue des Bernardins 75005 Paris

Tél 01 53 00 90 90

Dortoir de 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 lits, selon disponi-bilité et ordre d’arrivée, avec petit déjeu-ner

29 euros/personne en dortoir

31 euros/personne en chambre double

• Young and Happy Hostel

80 rue Mouffetard, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 45 35 09 53

[email protected]

Dortoir de 4 à 5 lits, avec petit déjeuner :24 euros/personne

Chambre à deux lits, avec petit déjeuner :28 euros/personne

• HOTEL MARIGNAN

13 rue du, Sommerard, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 54 63 81

www.hotelmarignan.com

[email protected]

Simple (WC et douche sur le pallier) :50 euros

Simple avec WC : 65 euros

Simple avec WC et douche : 75 euros.

Double (WC et douche sur le pallier) : 35euros/personne

Double avec WC : 40 euros/personne

Double avec WC et douche : 45 eu-ros/personne

3 lits avec douche et WC, avec petit dé-jeuner : 36,5 euros/personne

4 lits avec WC, avec petit déjeuner : 31euros/personne

4 lits avec douche et WC, avec petit dé-jeuner : 34 euros/personne

• HOTEL DU BRESIL**

10, rue Le Goff, 75005 - Paris

Tél : 01 43 54 76 11

Fax : 01 46 33 45 78

www.hoteldubresil.fr

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Informations pratiques SoPhA - 2012 HOTELS

[email protected]

Chambre 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : de 82 à 89 euros

Chambre double avec salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : 45 euros/personne

Chambre 3 lits avec salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : de 41 à 44 eu-ros/personne

+ 6 euros /personne pour le petit déjeu-ner

• HOTEL DE SENLIS**

7-9 rue Malebranche, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 29 93 10

[email protected]

Chambre double avec douche et WC,sans petit déjeuner : de 44 à 55 euros

Chambre à 1 lit avec douche et WC, sanspetit déjeuner : de 80 à 96 euros

+ 7euros/personne petit déjeuner

• HOTEL DES NATIONS ST GER-MAIN **

54 rue Monge, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 26 45 24

[email protected]

Chambre double avec douche, WC etclimatisation, sans petit-déjeuner : 54,5euros/personne. (Avec petit-déjeuner : 62euros/personne)

Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC et cli-matisation, sans petit déjeuner : 99 euros.(Avec petit déjeuner : 113 euros).

• HÔTEL DES CARMES**

5 rue des carmes, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 29 78 40

Chambre à 2 lits avec douche, WC : de47,5 à 55 euros/personne

Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC : de 85à 100 euros

+ 6 euros le petit déjeuner

• HÔTEL DES GRANDES ECOLES***

75, rue du Cardinal Lemoine, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 26 79 23

[email protected] www.hotel-grandes-ecoles.fr

Chambre double salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : de 58 à 70 eu-ros/personne

Chambre à 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : 115 euros

+ petit déjeuner : 8 euros

• HÔTEL ELYSA ***

6, rue Gai-Lussac, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 25 31 74

www.elysa-parishotel.com

Chambre double avec douche, WC, avecpetit déjeuner : 64,5 euros

Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC, avecpetit déjeuner : 129 euros

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• BEST WESTERN -PANTHEON***

71 rue Monge, 75005 Paris

Tél : 01 43 31 25 64

www.my-parishotel.com

Chambre à 2 lits avec salle de bains,WC, sans petit déjeuner : de 63 à 83 eu-ros/personne

Chambre à 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,sans petit déjeuner : 148 euros

+ 13 euros le petit déjeuner

• SELECT HOTEL ***

1, place de la Sorbonne, 75005 Paris

01 46 34 14 80

www.selecthotel.fr

Chambre double avec salle de bains, WC,avec petit déjeuner : à partir de 98 euros/personne

Chambre à 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,avec petit déjeuner : à partir de 195 euros

• HOTEL DES 3 COLLEGES

16, rue Cujas, 75005 Paris

01 43 54 67 30

www.3colleges.fr

Chambre 1 personne avec douche : 85/89euros

Chambre 1 personne avec bain (ou grandedouche) : 109/114 euros

Chambre double avec douche : 106/111euros

Chambre double avec bain (ou grandedouche) : 109/114 euros

Chambre twin avec bain (ou grandedouche) : 109/114 euros

• ALBE HOTEL ***

1, rue de la Harpe, 75005 Paris

01 46 34 09 70

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Chambre single : à partir de 102 euros

Chambre double avec bain ou douche : àpartir de 132 euros

Chambre twin : à partir de 132 euros

Chambre triple : à partir de 182 euros

Chambre « deluxe » : à partir de 182 euros

Suite Junior : à partir de 242 euros


• HOTEL DES CANNETTES **

17, rue des Cannettes, 75006 Paris

01 46 33 12 67

www.parishotelcanettes.com

Chambre single : autour de 100 euros

Chambre double : autour de 120 euros

Chambre twin : autour de 130 euros

Chambre triple : autour de 200 euros

Chambre quadruple : autour de 220 euros

• HOTEL PERREYVE **

63 rue Madame

Paris 75006

+33 (0) 145 483 501

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124, rue de Rennes, 75006 Paris

01 45 48 03 75

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Chambres à partir de 140 euros

112

Informations pratiques SoPhA - 2012 RESTAURANTS

RESTAURANTS

Voici quelques bonnes adresses pour manger de la bonne cuisine française à des prix assez (etparfois même très) raisonnables.


• Le Verre à Pied

118, rue Mouffetard, 75005 Paris

01 43 31 15 72

• Le Café de la Nouvelle Mairie

19, rue des Fossés-Saint-Jacques, 75005Paris

01 44 07 04 41

• Café Panis

21 Quai Montebello, 75005 Paris

01 43 54 19 71

• L’Écurie

2, rue Laplace, 75005 Paris

01 46 33 68 49

• Le Café D’Avant

35, rue Claude Bernard, 75005 Paris

01 43 31 30 46

• La Fourmi Ailée

8, Rue Fouarre, 75005 Paris

01 43 29 40 99

• La Tourelle

5, rue Hautefeuille 75005 Paris

01 46 33 12 47

• Le Pré Verre

19, rue Sommerard, 75005 Paris

01 43 54 59 47

• BistroY. . . Les Papilles

30, rue Gay Lussac, 75005 Paris

01 43 25 20 79

• Ribouldingue

10, rue Saint Julien le Pauvre, 75005 Paris

01 46 33 98 80

• Louis Vins

9, rue Montagne Sainte Geneviève, 75005Paris

01 43 29 12 12

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Informations pratiques SoPhA - 2012 RESTAURANTS


• Au Pied de Fouet

3 Rue Saint Benoit, 75006 Paris

01 42 96 59 10

• Le Petit Vatel

5, rue Lobineau, 75006 Paris

01 43 54 28 49

• Bouillon Racine

3, rue Racine, 75006 Paris

01 44 32 15 60

• Le Bistrot d’Henri

16, rue Princesse, 75006 Paris

01 46 33 51 12

• Fish La Boissonnerie

69, rue de Seine, 75006 Paris

01 43 54 34 69

• Chez Fernand

127 bvd Montparnasse, 75006 Paris

01 43 27 47 11

• Le Caméléon

6, rue de Chevreuse, 75006 Paris

01 43 27 43 27

• Kitchen Galerie Bis

25, rue Grands Augustins, 75006 Paris

01 46 33 00 85

114

Informations pratiques SoPhA - 2012 PLANS

PLANS

Ecole Normale Supérieure, 45, rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris

Pour se rendre à l’ENS :RER : ligne B, arrêt LuxembourgBus : lignes 21 et 27, arrêt Feuillantine ; lignes 84, 89, arrêt Mairie du 5ème – Panthéon ; ligne38 arrêt Auguste CompteMétro : ligne 10, arrêt Maubert-Mutualité

115


De la rue d’Ulm à RU Mabillon

14/02/12 21:4545 Rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris à Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon - Google Maps

Page 1 sur 2http://maps.google.fr/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=ENS,+45+rue…ls&ie=UTF8&t=m&z=15&layer=c&ei=28c6T-HYDpD3jAfw3Km7Cg&pw=2

Itinéraire vers Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon

3 Rue Mabillon, 75006 Paris - 01 43 25 66 231,6 km – environ 6 mn

Chargement en cours...

©2012 Google - Données cartographiques ©2012 Google -

Pour se rendre au Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon :RER : ligne B, arrêt Saint MichelMétro : ligne 10, arrêt Mabillon ; ligne 4, arrêt Saint Germain des PrésBus : ligne 63 et 86, arrêt Saint Germain des Prés ; ligne 70, 87 et 96 arrêt Seine-Buci

116


De la rue d’Ulm à la Place du Panthéon

14/02/12 21:4445 Rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris à Place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris - Google Maps

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Itinéraire vers Place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris

800 m – environ 3 mn

Chargement en cours...

©2012 Google - Données cartographiques ©2012 Cybercity, Google -

Pour se rendre à l’Université Sorbonne, Place du Panthéon :RER : ligne B, arrêt LuxembourgBus : lignes 21, 27 et 38 arrêt Luxembourg ; lignes 84, 89, arrêt Mairie du 5ème – PanthéonMétro : ligne 10, arrêt Odéon ou Maubert-Mutualité

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Immeuble France, 190 Avenue de France, 75013 Paris

Pour se rendre à l’immeuble France

RER : ligne C, arrêt Bibliothèque François MitterandMétro : ligne 14, arrêt Bibliothèque François Mitterand ; ligne 6, arrêt Quai de la gareBUS : ligne 89, arrêt Bibliothèque François Mitterand - Avenue de France

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Informations pratiques SoPhA - 2012 Numéros utiles

Numéros utiles

SAMU 15Police-Secours 17Pompiers 18Général 112

Taxis G7 : 3607 ou 01 47 39 47 39Taxi Bleus : 3609 ou 0 891 70 1010Radio Alpha : 01 45 85 85 85Taxis parisiens : 06 24 59 64 83

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SoPhA - 2012

L’équipe d’organisation

Alexandra Arapinis

Samir Blakaj

Isabelle Drouet

Paul Egré

François Kammerer

Max Kistler

Pascal Ludwig

Francesca Merlin

Antonine Nicoglou

Frédéric Pascal

Hélène Richard

Émile Thalabard

Document réalisé par Samir Blakaj sous LATEX

SoPhA | SoPhA - 7S4L%...extended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider...

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