Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of …...Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of...

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Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of Information Forensics Include joint research with Wei-Hong Chuang, Adi Hajj-Ahmad, Ravi Garg, Hongmei Gou, Shan He, K.J. Ray Liu, Christine McKay, Hui Su, Ashwin Swaminathan, Wade Trappe, Avinash Varna, Jane Wang, Chau-Wai Wong, and Hong Zhao. M Mi in n W Wu u Media and Security Team (MAST) ECE Department / UMIACS University of Maryland, College Park http://www.ece.umd.edu/~minwu/research.html A Decade+ of Research on Info. Forensics ! Our life and work are forever changed By advances in electronics, computing, communications, sensing, and signal processing ! So much multimedia info and content right at our hand Keep us entertained Used as important evidences & records ! Gather traces of evidence Origin, history, integrity, etc. A broad range of applications Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 2 Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era 1. Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out " Who leaked the info? Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 3 Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era 1. Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out " Who leaked the info? 2. Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web " Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera? 3. When/Where: an audio clip with incriminating words showed up " were its content and recording time true as claimed? Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 4

Transcript of Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of …...Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of...

Page 1: Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of …...Seeing the Invisibles: A Backstage Tour of Information Forensics Include joint research with Wei-Hong Chuang, Adi Hajj-Ahmad, Ravi

Seeing the Invisibles:

A Backstage Tour of Information Forensics

Include joint research with Wei-Hong Chuang, Adi Hajj-Ahmad, Ravi Garg, Hongmei Gou, Shan He, K.J. Ray Liu, Christine McKay, Hui Su, Ashwin Swaminathan, Wade

Trappe, Avinash Varna, Jane Wang, Chau-Wai Wong, and Hong Zhao.

MMiinn WWuu

Media and Security Team (MAST) ECE Department / UMIACS

University of Maryland, College Park

http://www.ece.umd.edu/~minwu/research.html

A Decade+ of Research on Info. Forensics

!  Our life and work are forever changed … –  By advances in electronics, computing, communications, sensing,

and signal processing

!  So much multimedia info and content right at our hand … –  Keep us entertained

–  Used as important evidences & records

!  Gather traces of evidence –  Origin, history, integrity, etc.

–  A broad range of applications

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 2

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 3

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

3.  When/Where: an audio clip with incriminating words showed up

" were its content and recording time true as claimed?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 4

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Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

3.  When/Where: an audio clip with incriminating words showed up

" were its content and recording time true as claimed?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 5

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

3.  When/Where: an audio clip with incriminating words showed up

" were its content and recording time true as claimed?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 8 8 8

White House

Satellite Image

Alice

Bob

Carl

w1

w2

w3

Leak

Example: Replacing the Last Bit of Pixels

Replace LSB with Pentagon s MSB

UM

CP

EN

EE

631

Slid

es (

crea

ted

by M

.Wu

© b

ased

on

Res

earc

h Ta

lks

98-

04)

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 13 Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 15

Robust Watermarking via Spread Spectrum Embedding

◆  Embedding domain tailored to media characteristics & application requirement

10011010 …

© Copyright …

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Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 16

Fingerprinting Topographic Map

–  Traditional protection: intentionally alter geospatial content –  Embed much less intrusive digital fingerprint for a modern protection

•  9 long curves are marked; 1331 control points used to carry the fingerprint

1100x1100 Original Map Fingerprinted Map

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 17

Collusion-Resistant Fingerprinting: Examples

2-User Interleaving Attack 5-User Averaging Attack

. . .

=> Can survive combination attacks of collusion + print + scan and detect fingerprint from hard copies

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 18

Joint Coding-Embedding via Anti-Collusion Codes

Extracted fingerprint code ( -1, 0, 0, 0, 1, …, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 )

Collude by Averaging Uniquely Identify User 1 & 4

Embed fingerprint via HVS-based spread spectrum embedding

16-bit ACC for detecting up to 3 colluders out of 20

User-1 ( -1,-1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1, …, 1 ) ( -1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, …, -1, 1, 1, 1 ) User-4

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Applications: From Government to Hollywood

Insert special signals to identify recipients –  Deter leak of proprietary documents

–  Consider imperceptibility, robustness, traceability

White House

Satellite Image

Alice

Bob

Carl

w1

w2

w3

Leak

Rights management by copyright industry ($500+Billion ~ 5% U.S. GDP)

!  Successfully catch media pirates => Wide adoption now –  Alleged Movie Pirate Arrested by FBI – Oscar screening copies (Jan. 2004) –  Track down illicit sharing of digital TV access – Daqing, China (Nov. 2007):

found and convicted perpetrator

Carmine Caridi Russell friends … Internet w1 Last Samurai

Hollywood studio traced pirated version

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Explore More …

!  Information Forensics: An Overview of the First Decade, by M. Stamm, M. Wu, K.J.R. Liu, invited article for inaugural issue, IEEE Access, May 2013.

–  Joint Coding and Embedding; fundamental tradeoffs

–  Large scale video fingerprinting; special media type such as maps

–  Group based fingerprinting; behavior forensics

!  Recent directions: probabilistic fingerprint/tracing code

!  Industry R&D: by movie industry (e.g. Technicolor R&D, MovieLab) and printing/marketing (e.g. Digimarc Inc.)

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 20

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics

Metadata in header can be forged #

22

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 23

!  Break down the info. processing chain into individual components

!  Identify algorithms and parameters employed in major components of a digital device or processing system

!  Concept extensible to general info proc. chain beyond multimedia

Exploit Intrinsic Fingerprints via Component Forensics

Color Filter Array (CFA)

Color Interpolation

White Balancing

Real world scene Digital image Camera Components

… Sensors …

Intrinsic Traces Representing Group Properties

!  Digital / software components of device or processing system

!  Ensemble properties of analog components: e.g. statistical noise profile of sensors

CFA Interpolation

R ?

? ?

R ?

? ?

R ?

? ?

R ?

? ?

? ?

? ? Candidate

CFA pattern

24 Digital photograph Scanner model 1 Scanner model 2

Fitting error

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 24

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Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 26

Photography vs Computer Graphics?

*Photorealistic image source – Columbia univ. database

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

PF

PD

PF – prob. of false alarm (% of photographic images misclassified)

PD – prob. of correct decision (% of computer generated images classified correctly)

Intrinsic Traces Link to Individual Devices

!  Individual variation from analog part of sensors –  Unreproducible properties due to manufacturing variability

!  Challenges to overcome –  Picture content variability, post-processing, anti-forensics, etc.

27 LG VX9700 #1 LG VS9700 #2 Canon SX230

43 -7 12 -36

-9 -10 65 51

71 -9 40 101

53 -13 54 74

-14 -27 -5 -42

65 37 56 63

95 68 41 -11

61 40 2 -51

-123 -106 -34 16

63 -11 -4 39

60 59 16 -15

-83 64 7 -20

Note: PRNU pattern amplified by a factor of 42,500

Matching Sensor Noise via Correlation Metrics

!  Measure similarity by normalized cross-correlation (NCC) –  NCC gives a sharp peak at the right alignment of right match

–  May include weights from measurement reliabilities

!  Robust peak measurement –  Normalize with ambient

correlation values (Fridrich et al.)

match

mis-match

30 Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 31

Tampering Detection !!

Explore intrinsic fingerprints left by various processing modules –  To infer the algorithms and parameters employed in various components of the

digital device and processing systems

–  New traces or vanished old traces suggests potential post-camera operations

Estimated coeff.

From direct camera output

After post- camera filtering

Color Interpolation

Color Sensors

Scene Optical Lens System CAMERA

Other Software Processing

A Tampering

/ Stego

B

Black: Sony P72; White: Canon Powershot S410 Grey: Classified as other cameras with low confidence

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Explore More …

!  Early years’ research:

Special Issue on Digital Forensics by IEEE Signal Processing Magazine (March 2009) Edited by E. Delp, N. Memon and M. Wu

and a concurrent special issue in IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine

!  Information Forensics: An Overview of the First Decade, by M. Stamm, M. Wu, K.J.R. Liu, IEEE Access (invited), May 2013.

!  New DARPA “MediFor” program

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 32

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone7 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 34

Role Play as Sherlock Holmes in our Digital Era

1.  Leak: A proprietary image sent to 10 people got leaked out

" Who leaked the info?

2.  Source: Picture of a heavily guarded xPhone6 prototype showed up on web

" Is it a real photo or a graphic rendition? Who in the company took it using his/her camera?

3.  When/Where: an audio clip with incriminating words showed up

" were its content and recording time true as claimed?

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 35 Min Wu (UMD): ENF for Media Information Forensics

Ubiquitous Forensic Fingerprints from Power Grid

$  Electric Network Frequency (ENF): 50 or 60 Hz nominal   Change'slightly'due'to'demand1supply'

  Main'trends'consistent'in'same'grid'

37 Source: US Grid image is from InTech online

49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5

100

200

300

400

500

Frequency (in Hz)

Tim

e (in

sec

onds

)

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

Power ENF signal

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Min Wu (UMD): ENF for Media Information Forensics

Ubiquitous Forensic Fingerprints from Power Grid

49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5

100

200

300

400

500

Frequency (in Hz)

Tim

e (in

sec

onds

)

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Time frame lag

Cor

rela

tion

coef

ficie

nt

$  Electric Network Frequency (ENF): 50 or 60 Hz nominal   Change'slightly'due'to'demand1supply'

  Main'trends'consistent'in'same'grid'

$  ENF can bee “seen” or “heard” in sensor recordings   Power'grid'influences'electronic'sensing'(E/M'interference,'vibra@on'etc)'

  Help'determine'recording'@me/loca@on,'detect'tampering,'etc.'

ENF matching result demonstrating similar variations in the ENF signal extracted from video and from power signal recorded in India

Video ENF signal Power ENF signal Normalized correlation

9.6 10 10.4 10.8

100

200

300

400

500

600

Frequency (in Hz)

Tim

e (in

sec

onds

)

-150

-140

-130

-120

-110

-100

-90

-80

38

Tampering Detection

!  Adding a clip into original video leads to discontinuity in ENF –  Clip insertion can also be detected by comparing the video ENF

signal with the power ENF at corresponding time

160 320 480 640 800 960

10

10.1

10.2

10.3

Time (in seconds)

Freq

uenc

y (in

Hz)

ENF signal from Video

160 320 480 640 800

49.9

50

50.1

50.2

Time (in seconds)

Freq

uenc

y (in

Hz)

Ground truth ENF signal

Inserted clip

39 Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics

“Forensic Binding” of Audio and Visual Tracks

$  High'correla@on'of'ENFs'in'audio'&'video'captured'at'same'@me'=>'can'extend'to'synch'mul@ple'media'streams'

'

''

'''''

$  An@1Forensic'Study:''possible'to'remove'narrow1band'ENF;'but'much'harder'to'tamper/transplant'a'valid'ENF'w/o'being'caught''

'

  '' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ''' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' '

40 Min Wu (UMD): ENF for Media Information Forensics

From Time Stamps to Location

!  Match with ENF references over times + grids –  Verify or exhaustively search for

the matching location on grid level

41

What if no concurrent references available? –  Explore overall characteristics

of ENF in a grid

–  Also reduce computation of exhaustive search

Source: US Grid image is from InTech online

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Freq

uenc

y E

stim

ates

(H

z)

Freq

uenc

y E

stim

ates

(H

z)

Time (secs) Time (secs) Time (secs)

Freq

uenc

y E

stim

ates

(H

z)

Explore Machine Learning to Infer Location

!  Inter-Grid location-of-recording estimation from sensing signals containing ENF traces

–  Identified useful features for average 94% accuracy on audio

LEBANON INDIA Eastern US

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 42

From Time Stamps to Location

!  Match with ENF references over times + grids –  Verify or exhaustively search for

the matching location on grid level

43

What if no concurrent references available? –  Explore overall characteristics

of ENF in a grid

–  Also reduce computation of exhaustive search

Can we determine where within a grid? –  E.g. DC or NYC in US East?

–  Look at subtle traces in ENF

–  Relate ENF correlation with distance

Source: US Grid image is from InTech online

Can ENF Pinpoint to Locations Within a Grid?

!  Main trend of ENF is known to be the same in a grid

!  Microscopic traces –  Aggregated effect of local events and propagations from elsewhere

!  Our multi-location studies in U.S. east and west grids –  Relate pairwise ENF correlations between query and anchor points

with geographic and wireline distances

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 44 (a) ENF signals from different locations of US

Eastern grid (b) Correlation between ENF signals

after high-pass filtering

ENF in Historical Recordings

!  Two ENFs may appear in digitized tape recordings 1) original ENF; and

2) ENF at time of digitization

=> Provide digital preservation guidelines to better utilize invisible traces

!  Distortions and artifacts –  Drifting; low SNR; etc.

!  Ongoing: create a historical ENF database –  Timestamp recordings of

historic importance

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Digitized Kennedy White House recording (1962 Cuban missile crisis)

NASA audio from Apollo 11

(1969 1st moon-landing)

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/16 ACM – Immersive Multimedia 2014: ENF Signal for Video Synchronization

Speed Restoration: ENF as Intrinsic Freq. Reference

NASA Apollo 11 Mission recording Before Restoration After Restoration

Spectrogram

Estimated ENF Estimated ENF

/16 ACM – Immersive Multimedia 2014: ENF Signal for Video Synchronization

Immersive Media: Synch Streams via ENF in Audio

Demo-2: Videos at different locations of Lab Building

Video after synchronization 2 synched stopwatches (as ground truth)

Demo-1: Videos in Gym

(different viewing angles)

ENF Research & References

Min Wu (UMD): ENF for Media Information Forensics 59

Estimate ENF Signal (instantaneous freq.): Robust, high resolution;

Exploit harmonics

SPL’13. APSIPA ’12, ACM MM’11, TIFS’13

Visual Modality: Handle aliasing – exploit rolling shutters;

Handle motion

TIFS’13, ICIP’14, ACM MM’14 Immersive Media

Modeling & Analysis: Statistically modeling of ENF signals;

Anti-Forensics.

WIFS’12, CCS’12, twoTIFS’13

Novel Applications: Location & integrity; Stream alignment;

Digital humanity (historic audio) ICASSP’12-13, WIFS’13 / TIFS’15, iConf’14, ACM MM’14 Immersive

Information Forensics: An Overview of the First Decade, by M. Stamm, M. Wu, K.J.R. Liu, IEEE Access, invited article for inaugural issue, May 2013.

MediFor: Newly Launched DARPA Program on media forensics aiming at restoring “Seeing is Believing”

See also Special Issue on Digital Forensics by IEEE Signal Processing Magazine (March 2009) Edited by E. Delp, N. Memon and M. Wu; and a concurrent special issue in IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 61

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63

THANKS to many who paved ways …

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics 64

Include joint work with collaborators: K.J. Ray Liu, Wade Trappe, Jane Wang, Hong Zhao; Kari Klaus, Douglas Oard.

Min Wu (UMD): Multimedia Information Forensics

65

Include joint work with graduate & undergrad students Wei-Hong Chuang, Ravi Garg, Hongmei Gou, Adi Hajj-Ahmad, Shan He,

Christine McKay, Hui Su, Ashwin Swaminathan, Avinash Varna, Chau-Wai Wong.

Min Wu: Info Forensics & Media Security •  Provide assurance for proper use of content

–  Answer who has done what, when and how.

•  Cross-disciplinary and balancing theory & practice –  Analytic modeling for fundamental understanding –  Design effective and efficient algorithms with synergy

from signal proc., comm, machine learning, crypto …

Tracing leaked documents

Device & environment fingerprints Learn more from this

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