NSA Surveillance LOVEINT

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UNCLA3S I F I EC

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCYt ' i ;N~i 'HAi .s i -x ' i 'Rn'vsr .R\ ' i i " i - ;

OI'IICEOV niR 1NSPRCT0B GKNRRAJ

11 September 2013

Sen. Charles L. Qrawlty

Ranking Member

Comniiltcc on the Judiciary

United Stales Senate

152 Dirksen Setuiie Office Building

Washington. DC 20510

Senator Gnissicy:

I write in response to your letter o f 27 Augu st 201? request ing infnrrndlirm aboutintentional and willful misuse of surveillance million ties.

Since I January 200."!, there ha w been 12 substantiated inslanees of intentional misuse of

the signals intelligence (SIG1NT) authorities o f the Dire ctor of the Natio nal Security Agen cy ,

Ihe NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG ) eurrenllv has two open inve stigations into

alleged misuse ofS1G1N I and is reviewing one allegation for possible investigation.

I. Civi l i an Employee, Foreign Location

In 201 I, before an upc oming reinves tiga tion polygraph , the subject reported thai in 2004.

"out of curiosity." be performed a SICiINIT query of his home telephone number and the

telephone number o f his girlfri end, a foreign national. The SIG1NT system prevented the query

on ihe home number because it was made on a U S person I'he subject vie wed the metadata

returned by the query on his girlfriend's telephone.

The appropriate Of G conducted an inves iig ation. 't he subject's actions were found to be

in violat ion of United Slates Signals Intelligence Di recti ve (USSI I 18' (Legal Compliance and

L'.S. Person Minimization Procedures),

The matter was referred lo Do.l in 2011 ['or possib le viola tions of 18 IjLS.C $H.1

(embezzlement and theft) and IK C.S.C. ^251! {interception and disclosure of electronic

commu nica tion s). In 201 1. Do.l decline d prosecutio n. The subjeel retired in 2


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2. C iv i l i a n Employee. Foreign Location

In 200 ?. (hiring a pre-retirement reinve stigat ion polygra ph and in terv iew, the subjectreported ihat. in 200?. be tasked S K i I N T collection of dte telephone mmiU i of his foreign-

national gtrifncnd without an authorized purpose for approximately one month lo determine

whether she was "involved with any |local j government officials or other activities that might get

| It tin I in trouble."

The N S A O K i determined lhat the subject's actions violated Execu tive Order 12^3^ .

DeO Regu lat ion 524


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5. Civ i l ian Employee, Foreign Loearkia

I he employee's agency discovered that an etuptoyea had misused the SKJINT collectionsystem between 2001 and 2003 hy targeting three female foreign nationals;

The appropriate O K i conducted an investigat ion. I he viola tion s were referred lo Do J.

I he subject resigned before di sci pl ina ry act ion was taken.

6. ( ivilian Employee, Foreign Location

As the result of a polygraph examination, it was discovered that an emplov cc had

accessed the collection ol' communications on two foreign nationals.

The employee's agency concluded its investigation in 2006. mid the subjeei received a

one-year letter of reprimand (prohibiting promotions, awards, and within-grade increases) and a

10 day suspension without pay. ihe subject's pending pormancnt-change -ol-station assignment

was cancelled, and his promotion recommendation was withdrawn.

7. Civi l ian Employ ee, Foreign Location

In 201 I. the N S A OI G was notified thai, in 20 11, the subject had tasked the telephone

number of her lore ign-naiionu! boyfriend and other foreign nationals and thai she rev iewed the

resultant collection. The subject reported this activi ty during an invest igatio n into another ma iler.

The subject asserted that it was her practice to enter foreign national phone numbers she

obtained in social sellings into the SIGINT system lo ensure that she was not talking to "shad>characters" and to help mission.

The appropriate O K i found thai the subject's actions polenliallv violated Executive Order

12333, Part l .7(cHO. and Dot) Regulation 5240.ML. I'rocedure 14.

I he appropriate O K i referred the matter to Did in 2 0 1 I as a possible violation of

IS U.S.C, $25 1! (interception and disclosu re of electron ic commu nica tion s). Ihe subject

resigned before disciplinarv action had been imposed.

X. Mil i t ary Member, ( O N U S Site

In 20115. the N S A OIG was notified thai, on the sub jec t's first day of access to theSIOINI collection system, lie o,ueried six e-mail addresses belonging to a former girlfriend, a

U.S. person, wilh out author i/m ion . A site review o fSI G I N T audit discovered Ihe queries four

dtivs after thev had occur red .


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The subject testified that he warned to practice oh die system and had decided to use this

former girlfriend's e-mail addresses. Me also te stilicri thai he received no information as a r emit

of his queries and had not read 80$ I .S. persons e-mail.

the NSA OICi concluded that the subject's actions violated I SSI!) 18. IxeCLilivc Order

12335. 5 C F R&26M.7G4. and Dot) Regulation 5240.1-R.

The O K I report was forwarded to the site command and the O G O As a result of a

I !inform Code of Military Justice Article 15 proceeding, ihe subject received a reduction in

gnidc. 45 davs restriction. 45 days of extra duly, and half pa) for two months, li was

recommended that ihe subject nol be given a securi ty clearance.

9. Ci v i l i an Employee, C O N US Site-

In 2006. the Office of Oversight and Compliance within N S A ' s Signals Intelligence

Directorate informed NS A O K i that, between 2005 and 2006 . the subject had withoutauthorization queried in two SIGIN'T svsteius the telephone numbers of two foreign nationals,

one of wh om was his girlfr iend , f >n one occas ion, the subject performed a text query o f his own

name in a SIC i lNT system.

Ihe O K I investigation found that the subject queried his girlfriend s telephone number on

main occasions and her name on [wo. Me testified that he received only one "hit" from Ihe

queries on the girlfri end. Another number he queried, that of a foreign national language

instructor, returned "insignificant information.'"

The subject claimed thai he queried his name to see i f anyone was discussing his travel

and the lelephnne numbers lo ensure that there were no security problems

Ihe O K i concluded that Ihe suhjeci's actions violated Executive Order 12333. 5 C.I-.R.

S2635.704. DoD Regulatio n 5240.1 -R. and N S A CS S PMM , < 'hapier 36d i General Principles foi

on the job conduct; 1 ;se of Government Resources, and insubordinat ion).

1 he Agency has been unable lo locale records as to whether a referral was made lo DoJ.

Hi e subject resigned from the Agency hel brc ihe proposed dis cip lin e of remo val had been

administered.

1(1. Ci v i l i an Employee, ( O N U S Site

In 200S. Ihe N S A O l d was notified lhal a SIGINT audii had discovered a possible

v iolation ofUSS1D IX. An investigation revealed that, while reviewing the communications of avalid intelligence targe;. Ihe subject determined that the intelligence target had a relative in the

U.S. I he subjeei queried the SIGIN I system for the e-mail address of the intelligence target in

200S! and used other search terms In obtain information about the target's relative.

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The DIG concluded thai the subject's actions violatedI SSID i s . Executive order 12333.

and DoO Regulation S240.I-R.

! he OIG report was Forwarded lo N S A ' s OGO. 1 he suhjeci received a whiten reprimand.

II. Mil i t ary Member , Foreign Location

In 2i)W. Ihe N S A Old wa s notified that, in 20UV. a BtiuUf) member assigned Ui a

military laetiea! intelligence unit queried ihe communications of his wife, who' was also a

mil i ian niemher Stationed in a foreign location. Ihe misuse was discovered hv a review o f

SIGINT audi! lugs. The investigation I J J his miliian. unit substantiated the misuse.

I hrnugh a I inform Code ofM il i i a n lustice Article I 5 proceeding, the memher received

a reduction in rank. 45 days extra duty, an d hall" pay tor two months. The member's access lo

classified information was revoked.

In 2iW-> this matterwas referred lo DoJ.

!2 . M i l i t a ry Member, Foreign Location

In 20(1'). a militar> unit at a foreign location notified the N S A O K I that, in 2Wl>. a

inililarv member hadqueried a country's telephone numbers to aid in learning that country's

language, the misuse was discovered b> a re\ iew o fSIGINT audit logs

The appropriate branch of the military determined that the analyst's queries were not in

support ofhis official duties and \ iolated U SSI D [

The member's database access an daccess to classified information were suspended.

I hope that this information satisfies > our request.

Sincerely.

|>r. George Ml ard

Inspector General

cc: Sen. Patrick I eah\

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NSA Surveillance LOVEINT

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