t;t3tlN s' UF OHIO

Sup e

rase Nom t^081257

V*. N APP::R(. FRC3M THE HAMILTON i^OU

APPEA

kPPhLLA3w Gs#a NO. w-Q

ORANDUM IN SUPP(.tkT U'r"Ja.IR19f}TCTICJN OF THE

Es,.G,3N`i 5'rir;4;3ii iaR:{

WaEaon+n Gorv^)r' ..v!*T Xe^

D4FcNI)riWT lPr; a„1„Piilt --w.. YN "Ri? ;'s`b

q

Hmlf9ilW6'a&"k GnBSttZJ P7'OsOY'„!.3 Attevrey

00

fiqQt„`snotI§ of`aisa 49202

COUNSE!,. FOR THt°". PP..W7FdTTFFn'rtPP:'LL€"C .,w., STATE C!F i;i'r>!3;"!

230 Losst 9th atrRUt,

h T'.RST

TY

T!'+B3wr. ^^ CINIT#,+

^kPL.^'t41ATIDYd `_:r' WHY THIS CA%: :

INVOL1,`s'" A U,.i`"TAfi,!t°.pAi,. C'e'::T'-e"-,'f.!""0N?k?

SffRTEMw^,tT Or C:AI!i' AND FACTKi,

DEFENDANT WAS Kp'',

g=^>::;5 r

A.? cs*f?ont;°

t;N[°"#L.a LNTEf :iT AND

S,A^tt

Dot%;'etNVn Pttt=hforr' tiv'At F?®E7s at)" !.:An £'own de3?th tf '̀a°.he'y

aw heavy nrsu^:ua^ m ^^.5z3,^$)tw;3!°ey wiR'r`:3i°1 tk$P'a'm 1;;!s';t;

'2 lf^; 91Kt!e! CO2 , Ut{'-`m 5qafe" m{' `?li`K`41 , +,9;X^ y!m?x ont*+f." f.?et

""teqr3me4 ^oT t,srv pwo a f,5a u"qFaoa

9.) Cil^^^rel wev 'n"4taet

'smplied ttc` 90. !:un ueet:

G:o} C*t:€t?nfj1 woe &wMf^'+.^',^r&vr; tep feiltee, -€" w-

`s!'.'ig.Fne4tetoo p'Zb75tr+aJ, ?`P'!a'n':"s} .b*C:;ped g°.' 1:"",fi: fmtlbe:','r,

;i?Lfidt¢#cd3 Qtg''' 2'2{':! 9a9s fiLtp P,Eesad AFa '4Te o1"fa,6°+ih.̂ ". G!f?F"- d':W>p??`Yd^.e [3'^' e(°.€2°'Y`^eg t.`^,^^,}". . C^e.J,.a

^w P ^fJ ^3R14°^t!"^.® ^ì e° .2vi

TH€: 7'R°CAi. f;CTEJQT i,:t7R(;D im C?,1`:RpEII."ims ':mf. vfi_i"i.'P-!t3AM'S'ti M!^?'IqPd TO Tf.tPf='POSS "IS Tr:'Q

h?'ATrMt'MT T" Pt?,.TY'E

T*^^El ^a^'F^FPPT^^ FE?F'_Et^^/^t;Psl^

.t"ht i:.;, 'a'v ^.,'z°,'Lrn; ,̀J"Pl ,3$`;.'i,'`. t.? trPe`.^n ?ialIZ.a"d"tf':`;t ^trUlfr£r '.'.'h""o+l c

mv&nrc9 af€d tHat .5S9Z'oyn 1e18fiF k'.:C%'h 3£"t In tNj tk"7otgn*'z' cgs?)m-0

LAIil P441Pflf^ER THRJE?.wss.^4^.wr.:a.as+»+anv^..a.r,:..aanae^.»zv

THE Tf','T.t?L COURT ERRED TO ['€".t'E::Nt3"cP]T t€% PREJUDICE WHEi:3 T€' 17FNTE.' ; I;Ok!t'3G!:(a tS MOTION

FOF A tlCP!)XtrT i"lF ACQUITTAL, CCFT'T!"?' AND 7LaUFFtt4LIZC17 VE£'Pa`_.".fiiS

O(° GUILTY ldH7inH WIRY n?P,T SflFrPORTED PY C.G°I..F;V6lt]`!' APd?7 (";f;t DTH1_E: EUTt}F'P!(;F.` e 7-0

T.^ìsl1^ PoP.'sEm;''K;€: F'Hh' FEr!17El1:nttsti'u^'3irr:riFr F.....m..§xifR?s.#^.pR4orxw^4.f'.R^v'.IZ.,

Ti?% L`vfO"r.,.u q?4`oz>et5 ?d I3m'otu rrs; .̂.,F> >t?.',fit}tt^"wn ae

dw, .

CC#NCL37 ,1;

^^EPTl.i`Ift?.!'E OF 54.P.ElIt'C

}Z{"PI:.R010vr.timsat^ au..a.maire

0 Gr&j,tf$ tstqir,t".£,$s +snd Ent2'.,v

OF t;F,ra1? t' PURL

"'N'Ct4:2t'•!e

but bi =.i w4..'*^h tfl:acSctrzg an1s

, tNet is: esca€;tly what

Mng e*aar evom 3tiar:w nra os; prowncsutoc^t•s

:SP,SE?;,i en

o^'ra 1`'jw4st $if tNa

;atae?vlstg anna^s through the twotsrto,

F;to.^* t:se i

7"S'#e 00500000M mVttv Phoulc1 6g, „noraviat thmm all,

es^ri tharn usst. ° YNO Go"r2; a^auld n

n s 1ogs

Noma,

fop ^.rhle typm of ,9u^til¢

First Dts.W.rrt and the t?ro€owt^=.v

,

7hot= obould hae mr0^^^^ tt ift^^^ ^rom tS?ic type aP

9 tnna,sY.t to t€am Amev#a;sss ey=stam of 3€arse?..

A.th,

STATEt4ENT OF n€1SC AND FACTS

/vra10„q uh.^oh ^,vo lle-,

3g^ti,;,u'F;:$anz »

robtery at K.o,,,orre in the K^nwa,;€es° Ymra.2g Contpr In Cfpalnnstls ^hjp.

ON PAov 7fih tekr^^ ^^ thm NOmLItaM CoantV ,horiffas Patrol

Headqea^rters.

snlays of ra

r^^ol.amova^ ^^^ mndv

c ,9r„st°^^di^tAeno otsout ;,)

(Tp. 5n42) ® Sesirm tha^oo (3) hvsaea S.o°rer r

D52fv*,'1rjmrt *11efti,R.ed hte inucivear^nt.

Paroth;b!r EzTk,iawt Ire to f,c3mh°av: of *?$P-nwPraa

yo,9rp;r hrott*e Neap.

den$nd throe°^mnfi.ng to r.haav

W£+s aeRm A i: 000 cshe^^^e amoea thR ra1110ea#smt m:ae3o a espmc3 We,

peph'^^^ t

rity ravmmr" ssldmsy^ep::: fis"o",

ac.lvta^e th.ry

ramthocas

deft-doet hs=sr^tsn

9^?APt7'E.+*e "?e:CV..^v"w

s;wo lecxi•€,lanos !`)N4 on Qra

e ®ShMus^ Cmtvi^tiCnoa -w It ehuulcS a€:cept thle agi

to the aocaa:tts

trimtsmn w3d hii eniscr°^pt!,s^ qf eivirming.

01.1,n,"e^e trc:uld pfe.ol'€ivtily

sI

t bsfr^^^ the tora'R ssg: 411"

yv, c"ver.vt4. Th!P only !ahs;alc

ql=:#Ume* rV3na .̂'

, t1l'3hvuqF1 Clf#'l'urs

vpjS#mls Coi°3:'"t:

a=v, Ti

aa17-18) .

DR't'.t"1{:Cli?:.t Wr.::: C'i'g1eCj,;:l,l wip„i i?7ion (1) rount r9f KddikB(.7p°,rg, SBisx^1 (9) d.""2i3ni;i3 of

Ag9rovT*:..d Rmhbot"y, G,'el Fa,rri Degree fiw'lvnkan, and Nl6"et; (9) CR:Lir'.s of R^,'"bbgs,'y in

tha SnrMnct Doc{r.',s. (Td 1 7,°sdictmmnt). The Defen

nuppt ^ss an Novhmbar 29th, 2008 Dnt'andan'i' Was^t tn

-•'t?^iel mal."rgaR., nXrwpt for 't91c;. Kidns:pplag and one coun'°s; of

P.ggreveEgF3 Rabbory, which hex a^^o ecquitted of e;ommitting.

He fi`S.od n timtly appoul a Firc,t Diotrict Court of Itpp€vo1.:., ard th-q

'O':t=i W^ E':tTih?t`Sf^u-d :,`£3 the x.SRi9£i t'Af th4t B.D. rLi'?'F.. T°.e, Court th§"'+`

Ap(5e1.3_tvnt to 24 y.Foe®n. The Appellant R;hen ea.tlgf915;' .Rri2tZv^ tO '8'.s'#'fia C83o.&: t ??;a 'r'i?,m o

delayTd F?3ppe5al, d6..dzt to thCi fact 32n mS^eeLi 'ha fLa.Qng duIIdlB,S3s>.. He missg?.f!'

e4oneilTqa bmrsu^a lie was taeSng hold in °t0 County 0011, anc( wa^, b9ing rn®

sentsssced. Thy Cna.ai.t gxontod 1.-anvo to fA1,n the dal&ynct appeal, cand ^his Rppeol

naw fa3.lvwm»

PROPOSITION C1FLAW NUMBER QNE:DEFENDANT DENZED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF CIIUNSEL:.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REUTEW:Ae ) Cui,9€3k3','l wwEi ,''.§$aff aL"+i'iv, f"ar fR,'s.y lFzO to abjeCi: `fCn, £%T® S.nu6'8eez:, te.14^";'tm£-'̂aRyby D-.te:,etlva PttrNfn.r.e( tisa1, B.B. Gun con cm+s;t Ommch Af they F4q=s Co , r^:^ ^,f

3.hsy are ^s^ravy ^.^?`^+_Iq^a ^:f's uu€$ -gsu e^ blc^dgae€^', when there ws* no ev^,c^^32re thatthe gun In qua :inn ia,^s^°d CO2 , wt^£j mer1s uf n7stay, 13?° w^,% evor uae;d orlntaIR£3od for FPF.3'"e -^F"= n b7 tdd[j5?F;35 .ti.) Counsel w,,giv In«ffectlve for fnillng *o nbjmCet to C, jury :4nest*lacl;a.tsnths4: 'mpl5,ed `ha HO Guri uq^:e3 by th£,°, D€yfwnc9nxat wan, by vvzu^^ a cienr3l.yWoopr;RaC.) OoRZraaF;l weas In°=:ffoctiva for t'€all?,ng to arc0aae for vos°d9c';=r uf ecquittalaFE c..8,l ?.*`.9bb€a:ry s„!oup`ì,;>!, b^igt.§[I un tkde f.E'di5.uy.`t"F S%f ttep atn^'^ "

prsft>?"; ny nv:>ndr€^co •$-s at t€'^" aB Gun uvr^n: 4-n `raan afftnr^ w,Fs capsble +fc€3AHs"J

Ti^O.r E3f t=';yn E?i` i' f.

Y2s 'f'E!T';r'.^ ^` ,̂1€° }F_s

4dh°C,44

tJ"S „dia'•' if $;f>tj

':iL*NF'A,

Am^.?; as1matts

i`

pa.,.e-:3 aa Es^'b^^VOV

t.!";2#lG 50a11? 4SV $ t't^3"i.,^.;

PrQF;4entvdg tm̂v+'.letY$,ut'sv'.J AW1'^

coa.^^^ml. Tt ;S [iOt9OTO udrtJaemw° ti`a`n aRTi1

f&SV€?rufdle

qt~•`^M7 to fi,d3 .=to®

6e

1,n€aLiw R'3

elemen•^ ^^ apc^roveW vobtaer,^y„ F

@

^onv ietAen .t"n°?onco

Ms e6" d̂sL

i`"'usl,.`xa'+#'#ce #? 31tfcn&dSg'!is i hl

fo:t"".'s3

LEd.2d

enP'lai34'^ ti'€at GVdffir V,*'1

'h«3u,iEYg of

t f t9:Yt,:

ap€3d:1a3LLFS the De§ ^nd$;'ii'R X°)f °e,5 a.'.+t°' '.

fl^.7 trds,° r , za h $, E„t ':'€w,

;"!bjet;.rif.,fi t% the

ae€'s nat1e.̀̂ y'

7 t^;y ^:k"34

of ( i;l ) g

p^,'aanp s,i,`̀".'c=4ed

466 U.113r u.+',H, 104 SoCAt

qaoriozresae?Yr

Ixi4'kP`=-S3n

y C.":°..ai8meod t*3 tsr3.'art'n' wla^o#:'

p;:o1`JablIKV

i? it? '&ht oCdto:?mm» .Cn

4P+9 _ i.aM Cd$i.4vE' r, oVGx;?°±+"i.€ ?`tn `s t w € t. ;3Ctlt'3 tzsL4'^3, , but

loodeta{2ntS",.

A "'+amL?tA#laobl€r

80

rC? gua^anaseC3 Defeadenff by

y ^ w pvch sWity w

A.'i Au " no4"x #",iyq9,1liorg

slo4'8

(4)

G'l,vF n l a= .nsc,k ^3f ,^^a! ^v^i^€s. ,w

11igm; E'o43i ^.rz`fy .,r1o f,z,f.d All.`W^adi

n?. oP€tOPC9 ai.9 LtPP+1 ESb t,dyf AqflhiEi R 6G9Q^u^,,,a,^..^r,t. ^. .°^°•- ^ "" r r rM n„atE. 1 L.fil . N;^AN•r ?'G) ^_i T.^r, rN.F_ Il ^.̂ .^^ ^

MOTION TO :.EJPPRE55 HIS TAPED STATEMENT TO PuLZCe`

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEt l t5'

4^¢t ^y i.. p 4

4^^ L•L E-mG= ^'3 Î'̂^^^' .1mu 44f^k L9.^'rj:^.i,'@^ ^.^`.5 .1'i^01 C^.L.^i.>^,^Ut.A luf^f.Ela?. ' n31?I - y ^ ^'•r

p^^ nd,,.,t1s ^tght tq f°P?:?nzsPl Fnfi° t" 3jjev'

( ^!'.gp} v

vvlutfi '.ary

562, EiSi' %c:,2c' 711 , , . ?"iP, C AXtTy,

'si;..'3o 65a 55^3 PJoM, , Co.i.#`?ipb,'aa aJ, (1961),

Wa ._ s ht.d 97;

7. 563, ,.. ut:Gy iSi 0 a

l.,Ct§,:?-i 1037..

In evca? uating tho volura`;tmoy nature Qf rs s€^ ,`^>s^ ^^f ,ho cou4t f fu:: t- con

the tvtal:@.1:y cs"+"' the c1,rcumu1;enaRs. State v. Edwards, 49 0hin S°$;.2d 31, mt 40,

350 N.E.2d 1051, oM' 1059 Wiles, at 81. Sr°:u e .A*:=:;:f: Dickarean v. United StaKa, 530

U.S. a't 434, 120 5.1,1;. a^. 2331. °T^,4 United S?;€atg`:,

cmnfee^simon egairdmt thv roqu.1.reme

d ;no mna

q pr.n.r.tnr;." MllZor v. FenQ°,on (1985),

474 U. S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405. In DS.ck^rean the Court st2tod, HWp

hove gpovex €abRndnned the dun pvocas€, ju*tspaudenc;e, and th€a oxcl,ud.e

r.on1Tor^stans 1;het were obtnlnsd ;kravu3ura1;^rily." Sd. e't 434, 120 S.Ct. at 2331,

147 L.Ed.2d at 413, c:ittng E9a21oy v. Nogcn (1964), 37B U.S. 1, 84 S.M. 1469, 12

L.Erd.2d 653. 7hum €^a ccsnr"aselan mny tiris Involuntnary Pvnra wh.,F^,re Mirane1& wmrntug€a

orff given. fu

d: ..C.AC' NIUMMitT4;={Ev;.L""cCIUFtT Ei2f2C13 T( 6SE3aDltMM PREJUDICE WHEN IT DENIED t:nuNSEL as

R A VERDICT t1i= Ai>QUITTPi_p OMD 4G010 ir!iiFN 3T A.'_:GEpTED AriDvERDSGTS Cdr GI,iXUTY WHICH WERE N®T SUPPORTED 8`! RELE!lANT AND

Es'nDEniCE.

.=.:a:Jl.lE PREAEi!aED FOR REVIEW:Thp evlde,?'tU'o pT,'Fz,.ax%A'e"°.°;C7 h6^3TC,w btE3v d"?8elaf'fiiclzd3i::, es a ftt-::t°5+,.'.:vr of law, `L,:o

,=.•;i;txl l.:;d3i3 t^€,,.a€;#3i^sA a t" g

° "tpz"sl's "al', r v',4°;.'x ri £$t .',aY°C

b,Fts.C'.gh5ng

d*e^rvcj ^^ pro3t' hovei tzeers atspl?ed„

7.

Tq&e E3oeEk' a= rY:ust

evi

mine^ of °d,`he Bo lit ?aoyrPn€^ a VOt^SUMMIR daatkrtg ix,e 00,U; t iWt- 4 du;=v

^^^^aree Dai'mnetont { o Ma^'^v5:ct¢#^

M,.r, 2d 43K

FStt`tbm}`7Ctarvy : ttDnFPA..r','`i,ld'

v Elmy (1976)

a via.'^ottv the t^sO»^^^ moc4 s';^^^^,^

in A wka°E^'̀atp (9970) 387 US 35r-

2d 368 and 3ackson v V

2ri 56f?,

t ; l, i£ ? g 3 Y,' U° .E ^-> z'

^^ bi3ppwn a gltll",`; os°i

4t °a'090('i98'7J :91 Ohio st> 3i 173# 510 N.C. 2d 143.

:* p"a.'L.mm4'Pt 6@+7§.7fAtaY'Stl2^t oVt£3ance whi£"d,`L tco'4ild ConVinqw

ax

M&A13^^oPtiml Iv.§,dOMC,M

i7^^WWan4 5 a guilt. Ftir that ^

monv9.ettone lamee9le^aly.

to a

307, 99 5ot 2711, s'sK t

11

'0$

(€3)

CONCLUSION

Th=s Defgnr€ns^t did nat re: efi.ve s 01q triml OV s just rmmoaZt Isa tPaU ir:stw.,

cam. The refcsse1 of o rms:^^nob1n conti€auavar.m ti paamit mither retairsod or

aopoinieet counsal °i.ea edmq€a^taly C^rope:°a fsar tt°in&, oaho€° t:ns!; ,+ii^.^l

in .'i..4(3ply$.F°3Ll F,4A.q[^; l.tT.'v r VA:l..d thi: D;f..st°=.i fikt t59;=

rounsel. Den'.sJ .9f t?^ uilpPX.:':G° r vu^(ra'v,:t.£3 4 w,^, ^sU,^ _ ,'„n'4"e"^tI â C ':,^,£^:) t;"s"',

blk,3 arjo htcrjS$ly

UN t3 t£':e C' F€a3T4S.Sa¢:ttt% c`'s63vis,m:;-n t .'S.efF:t° se:c:;,

R•,x4,sttf"l.'=.v 10n,U0

4r € €it r:;";;y , DO# 59" 6610'

L^.C;.1:. A• V'^.1, ;?ix 5;

1, si`isl.'b > O,>.... 4506•00K

CERT'!'C'rf:!1TE rlr `;i.-:R'Jr".`.

I sham Grsy 4aoret,y c..._t,..fy tia:wt r a,r,;.;vil BY^e wF xr1-s.".

6d€3Fd us2o;9 f°Srb1ok,•dad vlE*. FiS'z3t C?a."3.^ U.S. N!a'l "i "g[.t{7W^`dit

dmy L#f Ap:,;;'l< 2010.

t°C°!tnnc^ .̂,.'.. nr g,hi;s

f °°-Y9,"

._.,.C.". a. P.D. ozt,; _;

I

(9)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATI OF OHIO, . APPEAL NO. C-081257TRIAL NO. B-0803615

Plaintiff-Appellee,OPINION

vs.

SHAWN GRAY,

Defendant-Appe] t ant.

Criminal Appeal From: Itamilton County Court of Coimnon Pleas

Judginent Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, Appellant Dischargedin Pait, and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment F.ntry ori Appeal: November 6, 2009

.Iosehh T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott D^I Heenara,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee,

Elizabeth E. Agar, for Appellant.

Please note: This casc has been removec3 fi•om the accelerated caleudar.

OIIIO FIRST DIS'I'RICT COURT OF APPEALS

SYi,vrA S. HENDON, Presiding Judge.

{111} In a taped statement to police, defendant-appellant Shawn Gray

admitted to robbing a IU-oger's grocery store, three Walgreen's pharmacies, a Ic-

Mart store, a Sunoco gas station, a Kentuclry Fried Chicken restaurant, a

Marathon gas station, and a Donato's pizza parlor. Gray told police that he had

connnitted the robberies using a BB gun that he had modified to look like a real

gun. The state subsequently charged Gray with, ainong other things, nine counts

of aggravated robbery and nine counts of robbery. On each aggravated-robbery

charge, Gray's indictment alleged that, while committing the robberies, Gray had

had "a deadly weapon on or about his person "*'", to wit: A BLUDGEON

AND/OR BB GUN." Gray's BB gun was never recovered.

{1[2} Following a jury trial, Gray was found guilty of eight counts of

aggravated robbery and nine counts of robbery. Before sentencing, the trial court

merged eight of the robbery couuts with their respective aggravated-robbery

counts. For these eights counts of aggravated robbery, and for one unmerged

count of robbery, Gray was sentenced to a total of 43 years in prison. This appeal

followed.

1. The Jury was Properly Instructed

{1[3) In his first assigninent of error, Gray initially argues that the court's

jury instructions misled the jury into presuming that a BB gun was per se a

deadly weapon. Since Gray failed to objec:t to the instructioris at trial, he has

waived all but plain error.l An erroneous jury instructiori does not constitute

Crim.R. 3o(A).

2

O1110 FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

plain error urnless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly woiild have

been otherwise .2

{14} Gray takes issue with the following instruction: "Before you can

find defendant guilty, you rnust find beyond a reasonable doubt that *** the

defendant while purposefully comniitting or attempting to commit a theft offense

* X. or in fleeing immediately thereafter had a deadly weapon on or about his

person or under his control and displayed, brandished, indicated that he

possessed, or used the weapon, specifically a BB gun."

{115} We are not convinced that this wording created an impermissible

presumption. And even if it did, a single jury instruction should not be vicwed in

artificial isolation bnt, rather, in the context of the overall charge.3 The trial court

in this case went on to properly instruct the jury on the legal definition of "deadly

weapon." 'I'he court also stated that a°deadly weapon" determination was a

question of fact for the jury to decide. lteading the instructions in their entirety,

we hold that the trial court's charge contained a proper and complete statement

of the law.4 Gray therefore can not dcmonstrate error, plain or other-wise. 'fhis

argument has no merit.

II. The Sufficiency and Relevance of Pitchford's Testimony

{116} Gray also claims in his first assignment of error that the trial court

erred by admitting the testimony of state's witness Detective Brian Pitchford.

Pitchford testified concerning the deadliness of BB guns in general. Becanse our

,^ State ii. Coley, 93 Ohio St.;3d 253, 2ooi-Ohio-1340, 754 N.E.2d 1129; State U. Underwood(1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.s State u. Price (1979), 6o Ohio SL.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syIlabus; Siate V.

Hobbs (May 25, 2oox), v' Dist. No. C-ooo5i6.4 State u, Corrien (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 2o6, 553 N.F.2d 640, paragraph two of the syllabus; Stateu. MaCrmy ist DisC. No. O-o8o860, 2oo9-Ohio-4390; see, also, Strde v. Brown (1995), ioi OhioApp.3d 784, 656 N.E.2d 741.

3

OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

analysis of Pitchford's testimony is central to resolving Gray's fourth assignment

of error, we address these assignments of error together.

{¶7} In his fourth assignment of error, Gray challenges the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. When reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this court's function

is to exatnine the evidence admitted at trial to detern7ine whether such evidence,

if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.s The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential clemcnts of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.6 In

this case, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's

finding that Gray's BB gun was a deadly weapon. There was, accordirtgly, no

basis in law for Gray's eight aggravated robbety convictions.

Deadly Weapon?

{118} Iii relevarrt part, the elements of aggravated robbery include

committing a theft offense while displaying a deadly weapon.7 R.C. 292 ;.r1(A)

defines a "deadly weapon" as "any instrtunent, device, or thing capable of

inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for usc as a weapon, or

possessed, carried, or tlsed as a weapon."

1919} The record is replete with evidence that Gray had displayed a.BB

gun "as a weapon" during the robberies at issne. But the state relied solely on

Pitchford's testimony to prove that Gray's BB gun had been "capable of inflicting

death." On this issue, Pitchford testified as follows: "BB guns, pellet gu11s which

s Slaie v. Jen7cs (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus,e Id.

R.C. 291 7 .01(A)(1).i

4

OHIO FIRST I)ISTILICT COUIaT OF APPEALS

are fired off with a C02 cartridge, they can cause death just like a firearm could.

If it's a heavy type of BB gun or pellet gun, they cot.ild be used as a bludgeon-type

instrument hitting someone in the head causing injury and death as well." On the

basis of State v. Browu,s we hold that Pitcliford's testimony was insufficient to

prove that Gray's BB gtm was "capable of inflicting deatli."

(¶10} In Brown, we reversed the defendant's conviction for felonious

assault after determining that the stated had failed to prove that Brown's BB gun

had been "capable of inflicting death," as set forth in R.C. 2923.1i(A). The BB

gun in that case, as here, had never been recovered. The only description of it

was that it was long and had a pump. In reversing the defendant's conviction, we

reasoned that there had been "no evidence adduced concerning the particular BB

gun's capability of inflicting death, either as a bludgeon or otherwise."9 Likewise,

in this case, there was no evidence demonstrating how Gray's particular P,B gun

was capable of inflicting death. There was no evidence that his BB gun was heavy

enough to be used as a deadly bludgeon. And even if we assume that a "BB gun"

and a "pellet gun" are the same thing, there was no evidence that Gray's BB gun

had a C02 cartridge.

{¶11} We are aware of cases from this district where a BB gun or a toy gun

has been held to be a deadly weapon. 'I'his case leaves those holdings

undisturbed. In those cases, there was evidonce that the attributes of the BB gun

or toy gun at issue made it capable of inflicting deadly harm.10 No such evidence

was presented here.

B(1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 784, 656 N.l?.2t1741.ld. at 789, 656 N.L':2d 741.

"o See State v. Barnes (Oct. 23, 1996), I st llist. Nos. C-950784 and G950785 (jury could reasonably inferthat BB gun was capable of inflicting death as a 6ludgeon where state introdueed into evidence large,heavy, meted BB gun), State v. I3o+vier (1997) 119 Ohio App.3d 815, 694 N.E.2d 125 (toy gun made of

5

OkIdO FIRST I)ISTI3ICT COURT OF A.I'PLALS

Pitchford's Testimony was Irrelevant

{1112} Not only was Pitchford's testimony insufficient to prove that the BB

gun was a deadly weapon, but it was also irrelevant since it did not tend to prove

or disprove that Gray's BB gun was capable of inflicting death.11 lrrelevant

evidence is inadmissible.12 We therefore sustain that par-t of Gray's first

assignment of error challenging Pitchford's testimony. Our holding is largely

based on the fact thai: Pitchford testified after all of the victinis had testified. And

the victims' testimony did not provide a basis for concluding that Gray's BB gun

was heavy enough to be used as a deadly bludgeon, or that it had a C02 cartridge.

The lack of relevance in Pitchford's testimony, therefore, should have been

readily apparent.

{¶13} But we caution that there is nothing inherently improper about

testimony concerning thc deadliness of a weapon that has never been recovered.

Indeed, to hold otherwise woiild destroy the state's ability to effectively prosecute

"deadly weapon" cases where no weapon has been found. But to sustain a

conviction, there must be an evidentia>.y linlc between a weapon's capacity to

inflict death and its particular characteristics or attributes.

{¶14} We note that Gray presents other challenges to the strength of the

prosecutor's evidence in the balance of his fourth assignment error. They are

without merit. Gray confessed to committing nine robberies.'3 And while Gray

presented a version of events that, if believed, may have exonerated him, there is

metal admitted into evidence, and state pres-ented testimony that the toy coul(I have bludgeoned a victim todeatli)" Evid.R. 401; cf. State v. Ga.s•Idns, 9ttt Dist. No. 06CA0086-M, 2007-Ohio-4103; State v. Boone, lOtli

Dist. No, 65AP-565, 2006-Ohio-3809.2 Evid.R. 402." See Jen7rs, suprtl.

6

01110 FIRST DISTRICT COllItT OF APPEALS

no indication that the ju>,y "so lost its way" in choosing to believe the state's

version of events as to warrant a new trial.14

{T,15} In sum, Gray's first and fourth assignment of error are sustained in

part and overruled in part.

III. No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{9(161 In his second assigim>_ent of error, Gray claims ineffective

assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a claim, Gray rnust demonstrate that his

counsel's perforinance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was

prejudicial.la Our review is highly deferential, and we indulge a strong

presutnption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.16

{¶17} Here, Gray asserts that counsel (i) should have objected to

Pitchford's BB-gun testimony; (2) should have cross-examined Pitchford about

his BB-gun testimony; (3) should have objected to the jury instructions; and (4)

should have argued for an acquittal based on the state's failure to present

snffic.ient evidence on the issue of the deadliness of Gray's BB-gun. Nonc of these

argumertts has merit.

{9118} We have already determined that the jury was correctly charged.

Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for failing to object to the court's

instruction. Alid while in hindsight, counsel's decision not to challenge

Pitchford's BB-gun testitnony may not have been the best choice, we will not

second-guess counsel's performance in this regard. Gray's main claim at trial was

" See State v. Thoenphins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541; State v. Adartin (1983),20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E: 2d 717." Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; State v. I3radley (1989), 42 Ohio

St3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus.1" Strichland at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

7

01110 FIRST DISTRICT COUlt'T OF APPEALS

that his confession had been coerced, and that he did not commit the crimes

charged. His defense had focused on drawing out the inc:onsistencies between his

confession and the victi>.ns' testimony. Counsel's decision not to challenge the

"deadliness" of the BB gun could have, therefore, been a trial tactic.17 'Phe same

reasoning supports counsel's decision not to focus his Crim.R. 29 argument on

this issue. We find no error. Gray's second assignrnent of error is overruled.

IV. Gray's Motion to Suppress

(^19} In his tllird assignment of error, Gray contends that the trial court

erred when it overruled his tnotion to suppress his confession. Appellate review

of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.1$

We must accept the trial court's findings of fact as true if they are supported by

competent and credible evidence.19 With respecl to the trial court's conclusions of

law, however, we apply a de novo standard of review and decide whether the facts

satisfy the applicable legal standard.20

tl[20} A confession is subject to suppression if it was involuntarily

induced tlirotigh "coercive police activity."21 To malce this determination, a court

must consider the totality of the circumstances, including "the age, mentality, and

prior crintinal experience of the acctlsed; the length, intensity, and frequency of

interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or tnistreatrnent; and the

existence of threat or induceinent."22

"Cf. State v. Marshall, 175 Ohio App.3d 488, 2008-Oltio-955, 887 N.E.2d 1227, ¶86.^R State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St3d 152, 2003-Ottio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶8.19 State v. Fanning (1982), J Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583.20 Rvrnside, supra.2 ' Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515." State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated inpart on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3147.

8

®FIlO T'IRST I)ISTIdICT COUIt'P OF APPEALS

{¶21} Gray claims that police coerced his confession through a lengthy

interrogation process that included a "relay" of questioning officers, combined

witli an implicit threat that (iray's brother would be criminally charged if Gray

did not confess. '1'he trial court found, however, no undne influence or coercion.

The court pointed out that, on the recording of the confession, Gray had stated

that no threats or promises had been made to him, and that Gray iiad sounded

calm and responsive. 1'lle court also found that Gray was "an adult who has

experience with the criminal justice system by his own account." All of these

findings were supported by the competent, credible evidence. And applying the

applicable law, we hold that the trial court correctly denied Gray's motion to

suppress. Gray'sthird assignment of error is overruled.

V. Conclusion

{1122} Gray's aggravated robbery convictions are reversed, and Gray is

discharged from further prosecution for those offenses. But the findings of guilt

on the robbeiy cotmts, and the one conviction for robbery, are affirmed. This

case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the eight remaining robbery

counts.

Judgment accordingly.

DINREI,ACI^R and MALLORY, JJ., concur.

Please Note:The court has recorded its own entiy on the date of the release of this

decision.

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