Max Weber-Science as Vocation-

MaxWeber,“ScienceasaVocation”'WissenschaftalsBeruf,'fromGesammlteAufsaetzezurWissenschaftslehre(Tubingen,

1922),pp.524‐55.OriginallydeliveredasaspeechatMunichUniversity,1918.

Publishedin1919byDuncker&Humblodt,Munich.Youwishmetospeakabout 'ScienceasaVocation.'Now,wepoliticaleconomistshaveapedantic custom, which I should like to follow, of always beginning with the externalconditions.Inthiscase,webeginwiththequestion:Whataretheconditionsofscienceasavocation in the material sense of the term? Today this question means, practically andessentially: What are the prospects of a graduate student who is resolved to dedicatehimselfprofessionallytoscienceinuniversitylife?InordertounderstandthepeculiarityofGermanconditionsitisexpedienttoproceedbycomparisonandtorealizetheconditionsabroad.Inthisrespect,theUnitedStatesstandsinthesharpestcontrastwithGermany,soweshallfocusuponthatcountry.EverybodyknowsthatinGermanythecareeroftheyoungmanwhoisdedicatedtosciencenormally begins with the position of Privatdozent. After having conversed with andreceivedtheconsentof therespectivespecialists,he takesupresidenceonthebasisofabookand,usually,aratherformalexaminationbeforethefacultyoftheuniversity.Thenhegives a course of lectureswithout receiving any salary other than the lecture fees of hisstudents. It isup tohimtodetermine,withinhisvenia legendi, the topicsuponwhichhelectures.IntheUnitedStatestheacademiccareerusuallybeginsinquiteadifferentmanner,namely,byemploymentasan'assistant.'Thisissimilartothegreatinstitutesofthenaturalscienceandmedical faculties in Germany, where usually only a fraction of the assistants try tohabilitatethemselvesasPrivatdozentenandoftenonlylaterintheircareer.Practically, this contrast means that the career of the academic man in Germany isgenerallybaseduponplutocraticprerequisites.For it isextremelyhazardousforayoungscholarwithoutfundstoexposehimselftotheconditionsoftheacademiccareer.Hemustbeabletoendurethisconditionforatleastanumberofyearswithoutknowingwhetherhewillhavetheopportunitytomoveintoapositionwhichpayswellenoughformaintenance.IntheUnitedStates,wherethebureaucraticsystemexists,theyoungacademicmanispaidfromtheverybeginning.Tobesure,hissalaryismodest;usuallyitishardlyasmuchasthewages of a semi‐skilled laborer. Yet he begins with a seemingly secure position, for hedrawsafixedsalary.Asarule,however,noticemaybegiventohimjustaswithGermanassistants, and frequently he definitely has to face this should he not come up toexpectations.TheseexpectationsaresuchthattheyoungacademicinAmericamustdrawlargecrowdsofstudents.ThiscannothappentoaGermandocent;onceonehashim,onecannotgetridofhim.Tobesure,hecannotraiseany'claims.'Buthehastheunderstandablenotionthatafter years of work he has a sort of moral right to expect some consideration. He also

Weber,“ScienceasVocation”‐‐ 2

expects‐‐andthisisoftenquiteimportant‐‐thatonehavesomeregardforhimwhenthequestionofthepossiblehabilitationofotherPrivatdozentencomesup.Whether,inprinciple,oneshouldhabilitateeveryscholarwhoisqualifiedorwhetheroneshouldconsiderenrollments,andhencegivetheexistingstaffamonopolytoteach‐‐thatisan awkward dilemma. It is associated with the dual aspect of the academic profession,whichweshalldiscusspresently.Ingeneral,onedecidesinfavorofthesecondalternative.Butthisincreasesthedangerthattherespectivefullprofessor,howeverconscientiousheis,willpreferhisowndisciples. If Imayspeakofmypersonalattitude, Imustsay Ihavefollowedtheprinciplethatascholarpromotedbymemustlegitimizeandhabilitatehimselfwith somebody else at another university. But the result has been that one of my bestdiscipleshasbeenturneddownatanotheruniversitybecausenobodytherebelievedthistobethereason.A further difference between Germany and the United States is that in Germany thePrivatdozentgenerallyteachesfewercoursesthanhewishes.Accordingtohisformalright,hecangiveanycourseinhisfield.Buttodosowouldbeconsideredanimproperlackofconsiderationfortheolderdocents.Asarule,thefullprofessorgivesthe'big'coursesandthedocentconfineshimselftosecondaryones.Theadvantageofthesearrangementsisthatduringhisyouththeacademicmanisfreetodoscientificwork,althoughthisrestrictionoftheopportunitytoteachissomewhatinvoluntary.InAmerica,thearrangementisdifferentinprinciple.Preciselyduringtheearlyyearsofhiscareertheassistantisabsolutelyoverburdenedjustbecauseheispaid.InadepartmentofGerman,forinstance,thefullprofessorwillgiveathree‐hourcourseonGoetheandthatisenough,whereastheyoungassistantishappyif,besidesthedrillintheGermanlanguage,his twelve weekly teaching hours include assignments of, say, Uhland. The officialsprescribe the curriculum, and in this the assistant is just as dependent as the instituteassistantinGermany.OflatewecanobservedistinctlythattheGermanuniversitiesinthebroadfieldsofsciencedevelopinthedirectionoftheAmericansystem.Thelargeinstitutesofmedicineornaturalscience are 'state capitalist' enterprises, which cannot be managed without veryconsiderable funds. Here we encounter the same condition that is found wherevercapitalistenterprisecomesintooperation:the'separationoftheworkerfromhismeansofproduction.'Theworker,thatis,theassistant,isdependentupontheimplementsthatthestateputsathisdisposal;henceheisjustasdependentupontheheadoftheinstituteasisthe employee in a factoryupon themanagement. For, subjectively and in good faith, thedirectorbelievesthatthisinstituteis'his,'andhemanagesitsaffairs.Thustheassistant'sposition is often as precarious as is that of any 'quasi‐proletarian' existence and just asprecariousasthepositionoftheassistantintheAmericanuniversity.InveryimportantrespectsGermanuniversitylifeisbeingAmericanized,asisGermanlifein general. This development, I am convinced,will engulf those disciplines inwhich thecraftsmanpersonally owns the tools, essentially the library, as is still the case to a largeextent inmyown field.Thisdevelopment correspondsentirely towhathappened to the


artisanofthepastanditisnowfullyunderway.Aswithallcapitalistandatthesametimebureaucratizedenterprises,thereareindubitableadvantages in all this. But the 'spirit' that rules in these affairs is different from thehistorical atmosphere of the German university. An extraordinarilywide gulf, externallyandinternally,existsbetweenthechiefoftheselarge,capitalist,universityenterprisesandtheusual full professorof theold style. This contrast alsoholds for the inner attitude, amatter that I shall not go into here. Inwardly as well as externally, the old universityconstitution has become fictitious. What has remained and what has been essentiallyincreasedisafactorpeculiartotheuniversitycareer:thequestionwhetherornotsuchaPrivatdozent,andstillmoreanassistant,willeversucceedinmovingintothepositionofafullprofessororevenbecometheheadofan institute.That issimplyahazard.Certainly,chancedoesnotrulealone,butitrulestoanunusuallyhighdegree.Iknowofhardlyanycareeronearthwherechanceplayssucharole.ImaysaysoallthemoresinceIpersonallyowe it to somemereaccidents thatduringmyveryearlyyears Iwasappointed toa fullprofessorship in a discipline in whichmen ofmy generation undoubtedly had achievedmorethatIhad.And,indeed,Ifancy,onthebasisofthisexperience,thatIhaveasharpeyefortheundeservedfateofthemanywhomaccidenthascastintheoppositedirectionandwhowithin thisselectiveapparatus inspiteofall theirabilitydonotattain thepositionsthatareduethem.The fact that hazard rather than ability plays so large a role is not alone or evenpredominantlyowing to the 'human, all toohuman' factors,whichnaturallyoccur in theprocess of academic selection as in any other selection. It would be unfair to hold thepersonal inferiorityof facultymembersoreducationalministries responsible for the factthat so many mediocrities undoubtedly play an eminent role at the universities. Thepredominanceofmediocrityisratherduetothelawsofhumanco‐operation,especiallyofthe co‐operation of several bodies, and, in this case, co‐operation of the faculties whorecommendandoftheministriesofeducation.A counterpart are the events at the papal elections, which can be traced over manycenturies andwhich are themost important controllable examples of a selection of thesamenature as the academic selection.The cardinalwho is said tobe the 'favorite' onlyrarely has a chance towin out. The rule is rather that theNumber Two cardinal or theNumber Three wins out. The same holds for the President of the United States. Onlyexceptionally does the first‐rate and most prominent man get the nomination of theconvention.MostlytheNumberTwoandoftentheNumberThreemenarenominatedandlaterrunforelection.TheAmericanshavealreadyformedtechnicalsociologicaltermsforthesecategories,anditwouldbequiteinterestingtoenquireintothelawsofselectionbyacollectivewillbystudyingtheseexamples,butweshallnotdosohere.YettheselawsalsoholdforthecollegiatebodiesofGermanuniversities,andonemustnotbesurprisedatthefrequentmistakes that aremade, but rather at the number of correct appointments, theproportion of which, in spite of all, is very considerable. Only where parliaments, as insomecountries,ormonarchs,asinGermanythusfar(bothworkoutinthesameway),orrevolutionary power‐holders, as in Germany now, intervene for political reasons inacademicselections,canonebecertainthatconvenientmediocritiesorstrainerswillhave


theopportunitiesalltothemselves.No university teacher likes to be reminded of discussions of appointments, for they areseldomagreeable.AndyetImaysaythat inthenumerouscasesknowntometherewas,withoutexception,thegoodwilltoallowpurelyobjectivereasonstobedecisive.Onemustbeclearaboutanotherthing:thatthedecisionoveracademicfatesissolargelya'hazard' is not merely because of the insufficiency of the selection by the collectiveformationofwill. Everyyoungmanwho feels called to scholarshiphas to realize clearlythatthetaskbeforehimhasadoubleaspect.Hemustqualifynotonlyasascholarbutalsoasateacher.Andthetwodonotatallcoincide.Onecanbeapreeminentscholarandatthesame time an abominably poor teacher. May I remind you of the teaching of men likeHelmholtzorRanke;andtheyarenotbyanychancerareexceptions.Now, matters are such that German universities, especially the small universities, areengagedinamostridiculouscompetitionforenrollments.Thelandlordsofroominghousesinuniversitycitiescelebrate theadventof the thousandthstudentbya festival,and theywouldlovetocelebrateNumberTwoThousandbyatorchlightprocession.Theinterestinfees ‐‐ and one should openly admit it ‐‐ is affected by appointments in the neighboringfieldsthat 'drawcrowds.'Andquiteapart fromthis, thenumberofstudentsenrolled isatestofqualification,whichmaybegraspedintermsofnumbers,whereasthequalificationforscholarshipisimponderableand,preciselywithaudaciousinnovators,oftendebatable‐‐ that is only natural. Almost everybody thus is affected by the suggestion of theimmeasurableblessingandvalueoflargeenrollments.Tosayofadocentthatheisapoorteacherisusuallytopronounceanacademicsentenceofdeath,evenifheistheforemostscholarintheworld.Andthequestionwhetherheisagoodorapoorteacherisansweredbytheenrollmentswithwhichthestudentscondescendinglyhonorhim.It is a fact that whether or not the students flock to a teacher is determined in largemeasure, largerthanonewouldbelievepossible,bypurelyexternalthings:temperamentandeventheinflectionofhisvoice.Afterratherextensiveexperienceandsoberreflection,Ihave a deep distrust of courses that draw crowds, however unavoidable they may be.Democracyshouldbeusedonlywhere it is inplace.Scientific training,asweareheld topractice it in accordance with the tradition of German universities, is the affair of anintellectualaristocracy,andweshouldnothidethis fromourselves.Tobesure, it is truethattopresentscientificproblemsinsuchamannerthatanuntutoredbutreceptivemindcanunderstandthemand‐‐whatforusisalonedecisive‐‐cancometothinkaboutthemindependentlyisperhapsthemostdifficultpedagogicaltaskofall.Butwhetherthistaskisorisnotrealizedisnotdecidedbyenrollmentfigures.And‐‐toreturntoourtheme‐‐thisveryartisapersonalgiftandbynomeanscoincideswiththescientificqualificationsofthescholar.IncontrasttoFrance,Germanyhasnocorporatebodyof'immortals'inscience.AccordingtoGermantradition,theuniversitiesshalldojusticetothedemandsbothofresearchandofinstruction. Whether the abilities for both are found together in a man is a matter ofabsolute chance. Hence academic life is amad hazard. If the young scholar asks formy


advice with regard to habilitation, the responsibility of encouraging him can hardly beborne.IfheisaJew,ofcourseonesayslasciateognisperanza.Butonemustaskeveryotherman: Do you in all conscience believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity aftermediocrity,yearafteryear,climbbeyondyou,withoutbecomingembitteredandwithoutcoming togrief?Naturally,onealwaysreceives theanswer: 'Ofcourse, I liveonly formy"calling."'Yet,Ihavefoundthatonlyafewmencouldendurethissituationwithoutcomingtogrief.Thismuch I deemnecessary to say about the external conditions of the academicman'svocation. But I believe that actually you wish to hear of something else, namely, of theinwardcallingforscience.Inourtime,theinternalsituation,incontrasttotheorganizationof scienceasavocation, is firstof all conditionedby the facts that sciencehasenteredaphaseofspecializationpreviouslyunknownandthatthiswillforeverremainthecase.Notonlyexternally,butinwardly,mattersstandatapointwheretheindividualcanacquirethesureconsciousnessofachievingsomethingtrulyperfectinthefieldofscienceonlyincaseheisastrictspecialist.Allworkthatoverlapsneighboringfields,suchasweoccasionallyundertakeandwhichthesociologists must necessarily undertake again and again, is burdened with the resignedrealization that at best one provides the specialistwith useful questions uponwhich hewould not so easily hit from his own specialized point of view. One's own work mustinevitably remainhighly imperfect.Onlyby strict specializationcan thescientificworkerbecome fully conscious, for once and perhaps never again in his lifetime,that he hasachievedsomethingthatwillendure.Areallydefinitiveandgoodaccomplishmentistodayalwaysaspecializedaccomplishment.Andwhoeverlacksthecapacitytoputonblinders,sotospeak,andtocomeuptotheideathatthefateofhissouldependsuponwhetherornothemakesthecorrectconjectureatthispassageofthismanuscriptmayaswellstayawayfromscience.Hewill neverhavewhat onemay call the 'personal experience' of science.Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider; without this passion, this'thousands of years must pass before you enter into life and thousands more wait insilence'‐‐accordingtowhetherornotyousucceedinmakingthisconjecture;withoutthis,youhavenocallingforscienceandyoushoulddosomethingelse.Fornothingisworthyofmanasmanunlesshecanpursueitwithpassionatedevotion.Yetitisafactthatnoamountofsuchenthusiasm,howeversincereandprofounditmaybe,cancompelaproblemtoyieldscientificresults.Certainlyenthusiasmisaprerequisiteofthe 'inspiration' which is decisive. Nowadays in circles of youth there is a widespreadnotion that science has become a problem in calculation, fabricated in laboratories orstatisticalfilingsystemsjustas'inafactory,'acalculationinvolvingonlythecoolintellectandnotone's'heartandsoul.'Firstofallonemustsaythatsuchcommentslackallclarityabout what goes on in a factory or in a laboratory. In both some idea has to occur tosomeone's mind, and it has to be a correct idea, if one is to accomplish anythingworthwhile. And such intuition cannot be forced. It has nothing to do with any coldcalculation. Certainly calculation is also an indispensableprerequisite.No sociologist, forinstance,shouldthinkhimselftoogood,eveninhisoldage,tomaketensofthousandsofquitetrivialcomputationsinhisheadandperhapsformonthsatatime.Onecannotwith


impunitytrytotransferthistaskentirelytomechanicalassistants ifonewishesto figuresomething,eventhoughthefinalresultisoftensmallindeed.Butifno'idea'occurstohismind about the direction of his computations and, during his computations, about thebearingoftheemergentsingleresults,theneventhissmallresultwillnotbeyielded.Normallysuchan'idea'ispreparedonlyonthesoilofveryhardwork,butcertainlythisisnot always the case. Scientifically, a dilettante's ideamay have the very same or even agreaterbearingforsciencethanthatofaspecialist.Manyofourverybesthypothesesandinsights are due precisely to dilettantes. The dilettante differs from the expert, asHelmholtz has said of Robert Mayer, only in that he lacks a firm and reliable workprocedure. Consequently he is usually not in the position to control, to estimate, or toexploit the idea in its bearings. The idea is not a substitute forwork; andwork, in turn,cannotsubstitutefororcompelanidea,justaslittleasenthusiasmcan.Both,enthusiasmandwork,andaboveallbothofthemjointly,canenticetheidea.Ideasoccurtouswhentheyplease,notwhenitpleasesus.Thebestideasdoindeedoccurtoone'smindinthewayinwhichIheringdescribesit:whensmokingacigaronthesofa;orasHelmholtz statesofhimselfwith scientificexactitude:when takingawalkona slowlyascendingstreet;orinasimilarway.Inanycase,ideascomewhenwedonotexpectthem,andnotwhenwearebroodingandsearchingatourdesks.Yet ideaswouldcertainlynotcometomindhadwenotbroodedatourdesksandsearchedforanswerswithpassionatedevotion.Howeverthismaybe,thescientificworkerhastotakeintohisbargaintheriskthatentersintoallscientificwork:Doesan'idea'occurordoesitnot?Hemaybeanexcellentworkerandyetneverhavehadanyvaluableideaofhisown.Itisagraveerrortobelievethatthisissoonlyinscience,andthatthings,forinstance,inabusinessofficearedifferentfromalaboratory.Amerchantorabigindustrialistwithout'businessimagination,'thatis,withoutideasoridealintuitions,willforallhisliferemainamanwhowouldbetterhaveremainedaclerkoratechnicalofficial.Hewillneverbetrulycreativeinorganization.Inspirationinthefieldofsciencebynomeansplaysanygreaterrole,asacademicconceitfancies,thanitdoesinthefieldofmasteringproblemsofpracticallifebyamodernentrepreneur.Ontheotherhand,andthisalsoisoftenmisconstrued, inspirationplaysnolessaroleinsciencethanitdoesintherealmofart.Itisachildishnotiontothinkthatamathematicianattainsanyscientificallyvaluableresultsbysittingathisdeskwitharuler,calculatingmachinesorothermechanicalmeans.ThemathematicalimaginationofaWeierstrassisnaturallyquitedifferentlyorientedinmeaningandresultthanistheimaginationofanartist,anddiffersbasically inquality.But thepsychologicalprocessesdonotdiffer.Bothare frenzy(in thesenseofPlato's'mania')and'inspiration.'Now,whetherwehavescientificinspirationdependsupondestiniesthatarehiddenfromus, and besides upon 'gifts.' Last but not least, because of this indubitable truth, a veryunderstandableattitudehasbecomepopular,especiallyamongyouth,andhasputthemintheserviceofidolswhoseculttodayoccupiesabroadplaceonallstreetcornersandinallperiodicals. These idols are 'personality' and 'personal experience.' Both are intimatelyconnected, the notion prevails that the latter constitutes the former and belongs to it.


People belabor themselves in trying to 'experience' life ‐‐ for that befits a personality,consciousofitsrankandstation.Andifwedonotsucceedin'experiencing'life,wemustatleast pretend to have this gift of grace. Formerly we called this 'experience,' in plainGerman, 'sensation'; and I believe that we then had a more adequate idea of whatpersonalityisandwhatitsignifies.Ladiesandgentlemen.Inthefieldofscienceonlyhewhoisdevotedsolely totheworkathandhas'personality.'Andthisholdsnotonlyforthefieldofscience;weknowofnogreatartistwhohaseverdoneanythingbutservehisworkandonlyhiswork.Asfarashisartisconcerned, evenwith a personality of Goethe's rank, it has beendetrimental to take thelibertyoftryingtomakehis'life'intoaworkofart.Andevenifonedoubtsthis,onehastobeaGoetheinordertodarepermitoneselfsuchliberty.Everybodywilladmitatleastthismuch:thatevenwithamanlikeGoethe,whoappearsonceinathousandyears,thislibertydidnot gounpaid for. In politicsmatters are not different, butwe shall not discuss thattoday. Inthe fieldofscience,however, themanwhomakeshimself the impresarioof thesubject towhichhe shouldbedevoted, andstepsupon the stageandseeks to legitimatehimself through 'experience,' asking:How can I prove that I am something other than amere'specialist'andhowcanImanagetosaysomethinginformorincontentthatnobodyelse has ever said? ‐‐ such a man is no 'personality.' Today such conduct is a crowdphenomenon, and it alwaysmakes a petty impression and debases the onewho is thusconcerned. Instead of this, an inner devotion to the task, and that alone, should lift thescientisttotheheightanddignityofthesubjecthepretendstoserve.Andinthisitisnotdifferentwiththeartist.In contrastwith thesepreconditionswhich scientificwork shareswithart, sciencehasafate that profoundly distinguishes it fromartisticwork. Scientificwork is chained to thecourseofprogress;whereasintherealmofartthereisnoprogressinthesamesense.Itisnottruethattheworkofartofaperiodthathasworkedoutnewtechnicalmeans,or,forinstance, the laws of perspective, stands therefore artistically higher than awork of artdevoidofallknowledgeof thosemeansand laws‐‐if its formdoes justiceto thematerial,that is, if its object hasbeen chosen and formed so that it couldbe artisticallymasteredwithoutapplyingthoseconditionsandmeans.Aworkofart,whichisgenuine'fulfilment,'isneversurpassed; itwillneverbeantiquated. Individualsmaydiffer inappreciatingthepersonalsignificanceofworksofart,butnoonewilleverbeabletosayofsuchaworkthatitis'outstrippedbyanotherworkwhichisalso'fulfilment.'In science, each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten,twenty,fiftyyears.Thatisthefatetowhichscienceissubjected;itistheverymeaningofscientificwork, towhich it is devoted in a quite specific sense, as comparedwith otherspheresofculture forwhich ingeneral thesameholds.Everyscientific 'fulfilment'raisesnew 'questions'; itasks tobe 'surpassed'andoutdated.Whoeverwishes to servesciencehas to resign himself to this fact. Scientific works certainly can last as 'gratifications'becauseoftheirartisticquality,ortheymayremainimportantasameansoftraining.Yettheywillbesurpassedscientifically‐‐letthatberepeated‐‐foritisourcommonfateand,more,ourcommongoal.Wecannotworkwithouthopingthatotherswilladvancefurtherthanwehave. Inprinciple, thisprogressgoesonad infinitum.Andwith thiswecome to


inquire into themeaning of science. For, after all, it is not self‐evident that somethingsubordinate to such a law is sensible andmeaningful in itself.Why does one engage indoingsomethingthatinrealitynevercomes,andnevercancome,toanend?One does it, first, for purely practical, in the broader sense of the word, for technical,purposes: in order to be able to orient our practical activities to the expectations thatscientific experience places at our disposal. Good. Yet this has meaning only topractitioners.Whatistheattitudeoftheacademicmantowardshisvocation‐‐thatis,ifheisatall inquestofsuchapersonalattitude?Hemaintainsthatheengages in 'scienceforscience's sake' and not merely because others, by exploiting science, bring aboutcommercial or technical success and can better feed, dress, illuminate, and govern. Butwhat does he who allows himself to be integrated into this specialized organization,runningonadinfinitum,hopetoaccomplishthatissignificantintheseproductionsthatarealwaysdestinedtobeoutdated?Thisquestionrequiresafewgeneralconsiderations.Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process ofintellectualization which we have been undergoing for thousands of years and whichnowadaysisusuallyjudgedinsuchanextremelynegativeway.Letusfirstclarifywhatthisintellectualistrationalization,createdbyscienceandbyscientificallyorientedtechnology,meanspractically.Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall, have a greaterknowledgeoftheconditionsoflifeunderwhichweexistthanhasanAmericanIndianoraHottentot?Hardly.Unlessheisaphysicist,onewhoridesonthestreetcarhasnoideahowthecarhappenedtogetintomotion.Andhedoesnotneedtoknow.Heissatisfiedthathemay 'count'onthebehaviorof thestreetcar,andheorientshisconductaccordingtothisexpectation;butheknowsnothingaboutwhatittakestoproducesuchacarsothatitcanmove.Thesavageknowsincomparablymoreabouthistools.WhenwespendmoneytodayIbetthateveniftherearecolleaguesofpoliticaleconomyhereinthehall,almosteveryoneofthemwillholdadifferentanswerinreadinesstothequestion:Howdoesithappenthatone can buy something for money ‐‐ sometimes more and sometimes less? The savageknowswhathedoesinordertogethisdailyfoodandwhichinstitutionsservehiminthispursuit.Theincreasingintellectualizationandrationalizationdonot,therefore,indicateanincreasedandgeneralknowledgeoftheconditionsunderwhichonelives.Itmeanssomethingelse,namely,theknowledgeorbeliefthatifonebutwishedonecouldlearnitatanytime.Hence, itmeansthatprincipallytherearenomysteriousincalculableforces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things bycalculation.Thismeansthattheworldisdisenchanted.Oneneednolongerhaverecoursetomagicalmeans in order tomaster or implore the spirits, as did the savage, forwhomsuch mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service.Thisabovealliswhatintellectualizationmeans.Now,thisprocessofdisenchantment,whichhascontinuedtoexistinOccidentalcultureformillennia, and, in general, this 'progress,' towhich science belongs as a link andmotiveforce,do theyhaveanymeanings thatgobeyond thepurelypracticaland technical?You


will findthisquestionraised inthemostprincipledformintheworksofLeoTolstoy.Hecametoraisethequestioninapeculiarway.Allhisbroodingsincreasinglyrevolvedaroundtheproblemofwhetherornotdeathisameaningfulphenomenon.Andhisanswerwas:forcivilizedmandeathhasnomeaning.Ithasnonebecausetheindividuallifeofcivilizedman,placed into an infinite 'progress,' according to its own imminent meaning should nevercometoanend;forthereisalwaysafurtherstepaheadofonewhostandsinthemarchofprogress.Andnomanwhocomestodiestandsuponthepeakthatliesininfinity.Abraham,orsomepeasantofthepast,died'oldandsatiatedwithlife'becausehestoodintheorganiccycleoflife;becausehislife,intermsofitsmeaningandontheeveofhisdays,hadgiventohimwhat life had to offer; because forhim there remainednopuzzleshemightwish tosolve;andthereforehecouldhavehad'enough'oflife.Whereascivilizedman,placedinthemidst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems,maybecome 'tiredof life'butnot 'satiatedwith life.'Hecatchesonly themostminutepartofwhatthelifeofthespiritbringsfortheveranew,andwhatheseizesisalwayssomethingprovisional and not definitive, and therefore death for him is ameaningless occurrence.And because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very'progressiveness'itgivesdeaththeimprintofmeaninglessness.ThroughouthislatenovelsonemeetswiththisthoughtasthekeynoteoftheTolstoyanart.What stand should one take? Has 'progress' as such a recognizable meaning that goesbeyond the technical, so that to serve it is ameaningful vocation?Thequestionmustberaised. But this is no longermerely the question ofman's calling for science, hence, theproblemofwhatscienceasavocationmeanstoitsdevoteddisciples.Toraisethisquestionistoaskforthevocationofsciencewithinthetotal lifeofhumanity.What isthevalueofscience?Here the contrast between the past and the present is tremendous. You will recall thewonderfulimageatthebeginningoftheseventhbookofPlato'sRepublic:thoseenchainedcavemenwhosefacesareturnedtowardthestonewallbeforethem.Behindthemliesthesource of the light which they cannot see. They are concerned only with the shadowyimages that this light throwsupon thewall, and theyseek to fathomtheir interrelations.Finally one of them succeeds in shattering his fetters, turns around, and sees the sun.Blinded,hegropesaboutandstammersofwhathesaw.Theotherssayhe is raving.Butgraduallyhelearnstobeholdthelight,andthenhistaskistodescendtothecavemenandto lead themto the light.He is thephilosopher; thesun,however, is the truthofscience,whichaloneseizesnotuponillusionsandshadowsbutuponthetruebeing.Well,whotodayviewsscienceinsuchamanner?Todayyouthfeelsratherthereverse:theintellectual constructions of science constitute an unreal realm of artificial abstractions,whichwiththeirbonyhandsseektograsptheblood‐and‐the‐sapoftruelifewithoutevercatchingupwithit.Buthereinlife,inwhatforPlatowastheplayofshadowsonthewallsofthecave,genuinerealityispulsating;andtherestarederivativesoflife,lifelessghosts,andnothingelse.Howdidthischangecomeabout?Plato'spassionateenthusiasminTheRepublicmust,inthelastanalysis,beexplainedbythefactthatforthefirsttimetheconcept,oneofthegreattoolsofallscientificknowledge,had


beenconsciouslydiscovered.Socrateshaddiscovereditinitsbearing.Hewasnottheonlyman in theworld todiscover it. In Indiaone finds thebeginningsof a logic that isquitesimilartothatofAristotle's.Butnowhereelsedowefindthisrealizationofthesignificanceof theconcept. InGreece, for the first time,appearedahandymeansbywhichonecouldput the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come outwithout admittingeitherthatheknewnothingorthatthisandnothingelsewastruth,theeternaltruththatnever would vanish as the doings of the blind men vanish. That was the tremendousexperiencethatdawneduponthedisciplesofSocrates.Andfromthis itseemedtofollowthat if one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the good, or, for instance, ofbravery,ofthesoul‐‐orwhatever‐‐thatthenonecouldalsograspitstruebeing.Andthis,inturn,seemedtoopenthewayforknowingandforteachinghowtoactrightlyinlifeand,above all, how to act as a citizen of the state; for this question was everything to theHellenicman,whosethinkingwaspoliticalthroughout.Andforthesereasonsoneengagedinscience.Thesecondgreat toolof scientificwork, therationalexperiment,made itsappearanceatthe side of this discovery of the Hellenic spirit during the Renaissance period. Theexperimentisameansofreliablycontrollingexperience.Withoutit,present‐dayempiricalscience would be impossible. There were experiments earlier; for instance, in Indiaphysiologicalexperimentsweremadeintheserviceofasceticyogatechnique;inHellenicantiquity,mathematicalexperimentsweremadeforpurposesofwartechnology;andintheMiddleAges,forpurposesofmining.ButtoraisetheexperimenttoaprincipleofresearchwastheachievementoftheRenaissance.Theywerethegreatinnovatorsinart,whowerethe pioneers of experiment. Leonardo and his like and, above all, the sixteenth‐centuryexperimenters in music with their experimental pianos were characteristic. From thesecircles the experiment entered science, especially through Galileo, and it entered theorythrough Bacon; and then it was taken over by the various exact disciplines of thecontinentaluniversities,firstofallthoseofItalyandthenthoseoftheNetherlands.What did science mean to these men who stood at the threshold of modern times? ToartisticexperimentersofthetypeofLeonardoandthemusical innovators,sciencemeantthepathtotrueart,andthatmeantforthemthepathtotruenature.Artwastoberaisedtotherankofascience,andthismeantatthesametimeandabovealltoraisetheartisttotherank of the doctor, socially and with reference to the meaning of his life. This is theambitiononwhich,forinstance,Leonardo'ssketchbookwasbased.Andtoday?'Scienceasthe way to nature' would sound like blasphemy to youth. Today, youth proclaims theopposite: redemption from the intellectualismof science inorder to return toone'sownnatureandtherewithtonatureingeneral.Scienceasawaytoart?Herenocriticismisevenneeded.Butduringtheperiodoftheriseoftheexactsciencesoneexpectedagreatdealmore.Ifyourecall Swammerdam's statement, 'Here I bring you the proof of God's providence in theanatomy of a louse,' you will see what the scientific worker, influenced (indirectly) byProtestantismandPuritanism,conceivedtobehistask:toshowthepathtoGod.Peoplenolonger found this path among the philosophers, with their concepts and deductions. Allpietisttheologyofthetime,aboveallSpener,knewthatGodwasnottobefoundalongthe


roadbywhichtheMiddleAgeshadsoughthim.Godishidden,Hiswaysarenotourways,His thoughts are not our thoughts. In the exact sciences, however, where one couldphysicallygraspHisworks,onehopedtocomeuponthetracesofwhatHeplannedfortheworld. And today?Who ‐‐ aside from certain big children who are indeed found in thenatural sciences ‐‐ still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, orchemistry could teach us anything about themeaning of theworld? If there is any such'meaning,'alongwhatroadcouldonecomeuponitstracks?Ifthesenaturalsciencesleadtoanything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the'meaning'oftheuniversedieoutatitsveryroots.And finally, science as a way 'to God'? Science, this specifically irreligious power? Thatscience today is irreligious no onewill doubt in his innermost being, even if hewill notadmit it tohimself.Redemptionfromtherationalismandintellectualismofscienceisthefundamentalpresuppositionoflivinginunionwiththedivine.This,orsomethingsimilarinmeaning, is oneof the fundamentalwatchwordsonehears amongGermanyouth,whosefeelings are attuned to religion orwho crave religious experiences. They crave not onlyreligiousexperiencebutexperienceassuch.Theonly thing that is strange is themethodthatisnowfollowed:thespheresoftheirrational,theonlyspheresthatintellectualismhasnotyettouched,arenowraisedintoconsciousnessandputunderitslens.Forinpracticethisiswherethemodernintellectualistformofromanticirrationalismleads.Thismethodofemancipationfromintellectualismmaywellbringabouttheveryoppositeofwhatthosewhotaketoitconceiveasitsgoal.AfterNietzsche'sdevastatingcriticismofthose'lastmen'who'inventedhappiness,'Imayleave aside altogether the naive optimism in which science ‐‐ that is, the technique ofmastering lifewhich rests upon science ‐‐ has been celebrated as theway to happiness.Who believes in this? ‐‐ aside from a few big children in university chairs or editorialoffices.Letusresumeourargument.Under these internalpresuppositions,what is themeaningof scienceas a vocation,nowafteralltheseformerillusions,the'waytotruebeing,'the'waytotrueart,'the'waytotruenature,'the'waytotrueGod,'the'waytotruehappiness,'havebeendispelled?Tolstoyhasgiven the simplest answer, with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives noanswer to ourquestion, theonlyquestion important forus: "What shallwedo andhowshall we live?" That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The onlyquestionthatremainsisthesenseinwhichsciencegives'no'answer,andwhetherornotsciencemightyetbeofsomeusetotheonewhoputsthequestioncorrectly.Todayoneusuallyspeaksofscienceas'freefrompresuppositions.'Istheresuchathing?Itdepends upon what one understands thereby. All scientific work presupposes that therulesoflogicandmethodarevalid;thesearethegeneralfoundationsofourorientationinthe world; and, at least for our special question, these presuppositions are the leastproblematic aspect of science. Science further presupposes that what is yielded byscientificworkisimportantinthesensethatit is 'worthbeingknown.'Inthis,obviously,are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientificmeans. It canonlybe interpretedwith reference to itsultimatemeaning,whichwemust


rejectoracceptaccordingtoourultimatepositiontowardslife.Furthermore, the nature of the relationship of scientific work and its presuppositionsvaries widely according to their structure. The natural sciences, for instance, physics,chemistry, and astronomy, presuppose as self‐evident that it isworthwhile to know theultimatelawsofcosmiceventsasfarassciencecanconstruethem.Thisisthecasenotonlybecausewithsuchknowledgeonecanattain technical resultsbut for itsownsake, if thequestforsuchknowledgeistobea'vocation.'Yetthispresuppositioncanbynomeansbeproved.Andstilllesscanitbeprovedthattheexistenceoftheworldwhichthesesciencesdescribeisworthwhile, that ithasany 'meaning,'orthat itmakessenseto live insuchaworld.Sciencedoesnotaskfortheanswerstosuchquestions.Considermodernmedicine, a practical technology that is highly developed scientifically.The general 'presupposition' of themedical enterprise is stated trivially in the assertionthatmedicalsciencehasthetaskofmaintaininglifeassuchandofdiminishingsufferingassuch to the greatest possibledegree. Yet this is problematical. Byhismeans themedicalmanpreservesthelifeofthemortallyillman,evenifthepatientimploresustorelievehimof life, even if his relatives, to whom his life is worthless and to whom the costs ofmaintaining his worthless life grow unbearable, grant his redemption from suffering.Perhapsapoorlunaticisinvolved,whoserelatives,whethertheyadmititornot,wishandmustwishforhisdeath.Yetthepresuppositionsofmedicine,andthepenalcode,preventthephysicianfromrelinquishinghistherapeuticefforts.Whetherlife isworthwhile livingandwhen‐‐thisquestion isnotaskedbymedicine.Natural sciencegivesusananswer tothequestionofwhatwemustdoifwewishtomasterlifetechnically.Itleavesquiteaside,orassumesforitspurposes,whetherweshouldanddowishtomasterlifetechnicallyandwhetheritultimatelymakessensetodoso.Consider adiscipline such as aesthetics. The fact that there areworksof art is given foraesthetics.Itseekstofindoutunderwhatconditionsthisfactexists,butitdoesnotraisethequestionwhetherornot therealmofart isperhapsarealmofdiabolicalgrandeur,arealm of this world, and therefore, in its core, hostile to God and, in its innermost andaristocratic spirit, hostile to the brotherhood of man. Hence, aesthetics does not askwhetherthereshouldbeworksofart.Consider jurisprudence. It establishes what is valid according to the rules of juristicthought,whichispartlyboundbylogicallycompellingandpartlybyconventionallygivenschemata. Juridical thought holds when certain legal rules and certain methods ofinterpretationsarerecognizedasbinding.Whetherthereshouldbe lawandwhetheroneshouldestablishjusttheserules‐‐suchquestionsjurisprudencedoesnotanswer.Itcanonlystate:Ifonewishesthisresult,accordingtothenormsofourlegalthought,thislegalruleistheappropriatemeansofattainingit.Consider the historical and cultural sciences. They teach us how to understand andinterpretpolitical,artistic,literary,andsocialphenomenaintermsoftheirorigins.Buttheygiveusnoanswer to thequestionofwhether theexistenceof theseculturalphenomenahavebeenandareworthwhile.Andtheydonotanswerthefurtherquestion,whetheritis


worth the effort required to know them. They presuppose that there is an interest inpartaking, through this procedure, of the community of 'civilizedmen.' But they cannotprove 'scientifically' that this is the case; and that they presuppose this interest by nomeansprovesthatitgoeswithoutsaying.Infactitisnotatallself‐evident.Finally, letusconsider thedisciplinesclose tome:sociology,history,economics,politicalscience, and those typesof culturalphilosophy thatmake it their task' to interpret thesesciences.Itissaid,andIagree,thatpoliticsisoutofplaceinthelecture‐room.Itdoesnotbelongthereonthepartofthestudents.If,forinstance,inthelecture‐roomofmyformercolleagueDietrichSchaferinBerlin,pacifiststudentsweretosurroundhisdeskandmakean uproar, I should deplore it just as much as I should deplore the uproar which anti‐pacifist students are said to havemade against Professor Forster,whose views inmanywaysareas remoteas couldbe frommine.Neitherdoespolitics,however,belong in thelecture‐roomon thepartof thedocents.Andwhen thedocent is scientifically concernedwithpolitics,itbelongsthereleastofall.Totakeapracticalpoliticalstandisonething,andtoanalyzepoliticalstructuresandpartypositionsisanother.Whenspeakinginapoliticalmeetingaboutdemocracy,onedoesnothide one's personal standpoint; indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one'sdamnedduty.Thewordsoneusesinsuchameetingarenotmeansofscientificanalysisbutmeansofcanvassingvotesandwinningoverothers.Theyarenotplowsharestoloosenthesoil of contemplative thought; they are swords against the enemies: such words areweapons.Itwouldbeanoutrage,however,tousewordsinthisfashioninalectureorinthelecture‐room. If, for instance, 'democracy' is under discussion, one considers its variousforms,analyzestheminthewaytheyfunction,determineswhatresultsfortheconditionsof life the one form has as compared with the other. Then one confronts the forms ofdemocracy with non‐democratic forms of political order and endeavors to come to apositionwherethestudentmayfindthepointfromwhich,intermsofhisultimateideals,hecan takea stand.But the true teacherwillbewareof imposing fromtheplatformanypoliticalpositionuponthestudent,whether it isexpressedorsuggested. 'To let the factsspeak for themselves' is the most unfair way of putting over a political position to thestudent.Why should we abstain from doing this? I state in advance that some highly esteemedcolleaguesareoftheopinionthatitisnotpossibletocarrythroughthisself‐restraintandthat, even if it were possible, it would be a whim to avoid declaring oneself. Now onecannot demonstrate scientificallywhat the duty of an academic teacher is. One can onlydemandof the teacher thathehavethe intellectual integrity tosee that it isonethingtostate facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure ofculturalvalues,whileitisanotherthingtoanswerquestionsofthevalueofcultureanditsindividualcontentsandthequestionofhowoneshouldactintheculturalcommunityandinpoliticalassociations.Thesearequiteheterogeneousproblems.Ifheasksfurtherwhyheshouldnotdealwithbothtypesofproblemsinthelecture‐room,theansweris:becausetheprophetandthedemagoguedonotbelongontheacademicplatform.Totheprophetandthedemagogue,itissaid:'Goyourwaysoutintothestreetsandspeak


openlytotheworld,'thatis,speakwherecriticismispossible.Inthelecture‐roomwestandopposite our audience, and it has to remain silent. I deem it irresponsible to exploit thecircumstancethatforthesakeoftheircareerthestudentshavetoattendateacher'scoursewhile there isnobodypresent toopposehimwithcriticism.The taskof the teacher is toserve thestudentswithhisknowledgeandscientificexperienceandnot to imprintuponthemhispersonalpoliticalviews.Itiscertainlypossiblethattheindividualteacherwillnotentirelysucceedineliminatinghispersonalsympathies.Heisthenexposedtothesharpestcriticismintheforumofhisownconscience.Andthisdeficiencydoesnotproveanything;other errors are also possible, for instance, erroneous statements of fact, and yet theyprove nothing against the duty of searching for the truth. I also reject this in the veryinterestofscience.Iamreadytoprovefromtheworksofourhistoriansthatwheneverthemanof science introduces his personal value judgment, a full understanding of the factsceases.Butthisgoesbeyondtonight'stopicandwouldrequirelengthyelucidation.Iaskonly:HowshouldadevoutCatholic,ontheonehand,andaFreemason,ontheother,in a course on the forms of church and state or on religious history ever be brought toevaluate these subjects alike? This is out of the question. And yet the academic teachermust desire and must demand of himself to serve the one as well as the other by hisknowledge and methods. Now you will rightly say that the devout Catholic will neveraccepttheviewofthefactorsoperativeinbringingaboutChristianity,whichateacherwhoisfreeofhisdogmaticpresuppositionspresentstohim.Certainly!Thedifference,however,lies in the following: Science 'free from presuppositions,' in the sense of a rejection ofreligiousbonds,doesnotknowofthe'miracle'andthe'revelation.'Ifitdid,sciencewouldbeunfaithfultoitsown'presuppositions.'Thebelieverknowsboth,miracleandrevelation.Andscience 'free frompresuppositions' expects fromhimno less ‐‐ andnomore ‐‐ thanacknowledgment that if the process can be explained without those supernaturalinterventions, which an empirical explanation has to eliminate as causal factors, theprocesshas tobeexplainedthewayscienceattempts todo.Andthebelievercandothiswithoutbeingdisloyaltohisfaith.Buthasthecontributionofsciencenomeaningatallforamanwhodoesnotcaretoknowfacts as such and to whom only the practical standpoint matters? Perhaps scienceneverthelesscontributessomething.The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize 'inconvenient'facts ‐‐ Imean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every partyopinionthereare facts thatareextremely inconvenient, formyownopinionno lessthanfor others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if hecompels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. I would be soimmodestaseventoapply theexpression 'moralachievement,' thoughperhaps thismaysoundtoograndioseforsomethingthatshouldgowithoutsaying.ThusfarIhavespokenonlyofpracticalreasonsforavoidingtheimpositionofapersonalpoint of view. But these are not the only reasons. The impossibility of 'scientifically'pleadingforpracticalandinterestedstands‐‐exceptindiscussingthemeansforafirmlygivenandpresupposedend‐‐restsuponreasonsthatliefardeeper.


'Scientific' pleading ismeaningless in principle because the various value spheres of theworldstand in irreconcilableconflictwitheachother.TheelderMill,whosephilosophyIwillnotpraiseotherwise,wasonthispointrightwhenhesaid:Ifoneproceedsfrompureexperience, one arrives at polytheism. This is shallow in formulation and soundsparadoxical,andyetthereistruthinit.Ifanything,werealizeagaintodaythatsomethingcanbesacrednotonlyinspiteofitsnotbeingbeautiful,butratherbecauseandinsofarasit isnotbeautiful. Youwill find thisdocumented in the fifty‐third chapterof thebookofIsaiahandinthetwenty‐firstPsalm.And,sinceNietzsche,werealizethatsomethingcanbebeautiful, not only in spite of the aspect inwhich it is not good, but rather in that veryaspect.Youwill find thisexpressedearlier in theFleursdumal, asBaudelairenamedhisvolumeofpoems.Itiscommonplacetoobservethatsomethingmaybetruealthoughitisnotbeautifulandnotholyandnotgood.Indeeditmaybetrueinpreciselythoseaspects.Butalltheseareonlythemostelementarycasesofthestrugglethatthegodsofthevariousorders and values are engaged in. I do not know how one might wish to decide'scientifically'thevalueofFrenchandGermanculture;forhere,too,differentgodsstrugglewithoneanother,nowandforalltimestocome.We live as did the ancientswhen their worldwas not yet disenchanted of its gods anddemons,onlyweliveinadifferentsense.AsHellenicmanattimessacrificedtoAphroditeandatothertimestoApollo,and,aboveall,aseverybodysacrificedtothegodsofhiscity,sodowestillnowadays,onlythebearingofmanhasbeendisenchantedanddenudedofitsmysticalbutinwardlygenuineplasticity.Fate,andcertainlynot'science,'holdsswayoverthesegodsandtheirstruggles.Onecanonlyunderstandwhat thegodhead is for theoneorderorfortheother,orbetter,whatgodheadisintheoneorintheotherorder.Withthisunderstanding,however,thematterhasreacheditslimitsofarasitcanbediscussedinalecture‐roomandbyaprofessor.Yetthegreatandvitalproblemthatiscontainedthereinis,of course,very far frombeingconcluded.But forcesother thanuniversity chairshavetheirsayinthismatter.What man will take upon himself the attempt to 'refute scientifically' the ethic of theSermonontheMount?For instance, thesentence, 'resistnoevil,'orthe imageof turningthe other cheek? And yet it is clear, in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic ofundignifiedconduct;onehastochoosebetweenthereligiousdignitythatthisethicconfersand thedignityofmanly conductwhichpreaches somethingquitedifferent; 'resist evil‐‐lestyoubeco‐responsibleforanoverpoweringevil.'Accordingtoourultimatestandpoint,theoneisthedevilandtheothertheGod,andtheindividualhastodecidewhichisGodforhimandwhichisthedevil.Andsoitgoesthroughoutalltheordersoflife.The grandiose rationalism of an ethical and methodical conduct of life that flows fromevery religiousprophecyhasdethroned thispolytheism in favorof the 'one thing that isneedful.' Faced with the realities of outer and inner life, Christianity has deemed itnecessarytomakethosecompromisesandrelativejudgments,whichweallknowfromitshistory.Todaytheroutinesofeverydaylifechallengereligion.Manyoldgodsascendfromtheir graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. Theystrivetogainpoweroverourlivesandagaintheyresumetheireternalstrugglewithone


another.What is hard formodernman, and especially for the younger generation, is tomeasureuptoworkadayexistence.Theubiquitouschasefor 'experience'stemsfromthisweakness; for it isweakness not to be able to countenance the stern seriousness of ourfatefultimes.Our civilization destines us to realizemore clearly these struggles again, after our eyeshavebeenblindedforathousandyears‐‐blindedbytheallegedlyorpresumablyexclusiveorientationtowardsthegrandiosemoralfervorofChristianethics.Butenoughof thesequestionswhich lead faraway.Thoseofouryouthare inerrorwhoreacttoallthisbysaying, 'Yes,butwehappentocometolecturesinordertoexperiencesomethingmorethanmereanalysesandstatementsoffact.'Theerroristhattheyseekintheprofessorsomethingdifferentfromwhatstandsbeforethem.Theycravealeaderandnota teacher.Butweareplacedupontheplatformsolelyasteachers.Andthesearetwodifferent things, as one can readily see. Permit me to take you once more to America,becausethereonecanoftenobservesuchmattersintheirmostmassiveandoriginalshape.TheAmericanboylearnsunspeakablylessthantheGermanboy.Inspiteofanincrediblenumberofexaminations,hisschoollifehasnothadthesignificanceofturninghimintoanabsolutecreatureofexaminations,suchastheGerman.ForinAmerica,bureaucracy,whichpresupposes the examination diploma as a ticket of admission to the realm of officeprebends, is only in its beginnings. The young American has no respect for anything oranybody, for tradition or for public office‐‐unless it is for the personal achievement ofindividual men. This is what the American calls 'democracy.' This is the meaning ofdemocracy,howeverdistorteditsintentmayinrealitybe,andthisintentiswhatmattershere.TheAmerican'sconceptionoftheteacherwhofaceshimis:hesellsmehisknowledgeandhismethodsformyfather'smoney, justasthegreengrocersellsmymothercabbage.Andthatisall.Tobesure,iftheteacherhappenstobeafootballcoach,then,inthisfield,heisa leader.But ifhe isnot this (or somethingsimilar inadifferent fieldof sports),he issimply a teacher and nothingmore. And no young Americanwould think of having theteacher sell him aWeltanschauung or a code of conduct. Now, when formulated in thismanner, we should reject this. But the question is whether there is not a grain of saltcontained in this feeling, which I have deliberately stated in extreme with someexaggeration.Fellowstudents!Youcometoourlecturesanddemandfromusthequalitiesofleadership,andyoufailtorealizeinadvancethatofahundredprofessorsatleastninety‐ninedonotand must not claim to be football masters in the vital problems of life, or even to be'leaders' inmatters of conduct. Please, consider that aman's value does not depend onwhetherornothehasleadershipqualities.Andinanycase,thequalitiesthatmakeamananexcellentscholarandacademicteacherarenotthequalitiesthatmakehimaleadertogive directions in practical life or, more specifically, in politics. It is pure accident if ateacher also possesses this quality, and it is a critical situation if every teacher on theplatform feels himself confrontedwith the students' expectation that the teacher shouldclaimthisquality.Itisstillmorecriticalifitislefttoeveryacademicteachertosethimselfupasa leaderinthelecture‐room.Forthosewhomostfrequentlythinkofthemselvesas


leadersoftenqualify leastas leaders.But irrespectiveofwhethertheyareorarenot, theplatform situation simply offers no possibility of proving themselves to be leaders. Theprofessorwhofeelscalledupontoactasacounselorofyouthandenjoystheirtrustmayprovehimselfamaninpersonalhumanrelationswiththem.Andifhefeelscalledupontointerveneinthestrugglesofworldviewsandpartyopinions,hemaydosooutside, inthemarketplace,inthepress,inmeetings,inassociations,whereverhewishes.Butafterall,itis somewhat too convenient to demonstrate one's courage in taking a stand where theaudienceandpossibleopponentsarecondemnedtosilence.Finally, you will put the question: 'If this is so, what then does science actually andpositivelycontributetopracticalandpersonal"life"?'Therewithwearebackagainattheproblemofscienceasa'vocation.'First, of course, science contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculatingexternalobjectsaswellasman'sactivities.Well,youwillsay,that,afterall,amountstonomorethanthegreengroceroftheAmericanboy.Ifullyagree.Second, science can contribute something that the greengrocer cannot: methods ofthinking, the tools and the training for thought. Perhaps you will say: well, that is novegetable, but it amounts tonomore than themeans forprocuringvegetables.Well andgood,letusleaveitatthatfortoday.Fortunately,however,thecontributionofsciencedoesnotreachitslimitwiththis.Weareinapositiontohelpyoutoathirdobjective:togainclarity.Ofcourse,itispresupposedthatwe ourselves possess clarity. As far as this is the case, we can make clear to you thefollowing:Inpractice,youcantakethisorthatpositionwhenconcernedwithaproblemofvalue‐‐forsimplicity'ssake,pleasethinkofsocialphenomenaasexamples.Ifyoutakesuchandsuchastand, then,according toscientificexperience,youhave tousesuchandsuchameans inordertocarryoutyourconvictionpractically.Now,thesemeansareperhapssuchthatyoubelieve you must reject them. Then you simply must choose between the end and theinevitablemeans.Doestheend'justify'themeans?Ordoesitnot?Theteachercanconfrontyouwiththenecessityofthischoice.Hecannotdomore,solongashewishestoremainateacherandnot tobecomeademagogue.Hecan,ofcourse,also tellyouthat ifyouwantsuch and such an end, then youmust take into thebargain the subsidiary consequencesthataccordingtoallexperiencewilloccur.Againwefindourselvesinthesamesituationasbefore.Thesearestillproblemsthatcanalsoemergeforthetechnician,whoinnumerousinstances has to make decisions according to the principle of the lesser evil or of therelativelybest.Onlytohimonething,themainthing,isusuallygiven,namely,theend.Butassoonastruly'ultimate'problemsareatstakeforusthisisnotthecase.Withthis,atlonglast,wecometothefinalservicethatscienceassuchcanrendertotheaimofclarity,andatthesametimewecometothelimitsofscience.Besideswe can andwe should state: In terms of itsmeaning, such and such a practicalstandcanbederivedwithinnerconsistency,andhenceintegrity,fromthisorthatultimate


weltanschauliche position. Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamentalposition, or maybe from several, but it cannot be derived from these or those otherpositions.Figurativelyspeaking,youservethisgodandyouoffendtheothergodwhenyoudecidetoadheretothisposition.Andifyouremainfaithfultoyourself,youwillnecessarilycometocertain finalconclusions thatsubjectivelymakesense.Thismuch, inprincipleatleast, can be accomplished. Philosophy, as a special discipline, and the essentiallyphilosophicaldiscussionsofprinciplesintheothersciencesattempttoachievethis.Thus,ifwe are competent in our pursuit (which must be presupposed here) we can force theindividual,oratleastwecanhelphim,togivehimselfanaccountoftheultimatemeaningofhis own conduct. This appears tome as not so trifling a thing to do, even for one's ownpersonallife.Again,Iamtemptedtosayofateacherwhosucceedsinthis:hestandsintheserviceof'moral'forces;hefulfilsthedutyofbringingaboutself‐clarificationandasenseofresponsibility. And I believe he will be the more able to accomplish this, the moreconscientiouslyheavoidsthedesirepersonallytoimposeuponorsuggesttohisaudiencehisownstand.Thisproposition,which I presenthere, always takes its point of departure from theonefundamentalfact,thatsolongasliferemainsimmanentandisinterpretedinitsownterms,itknowsonlyofanunceasingstruggleofthesegodswithoneanother.Orspeakingdirectly,theultimatelypossibleattitudestowardlifeareirreconcilable,andhencetheirstrugglecannever be brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice.Whether, under such conditions, science is a worthwhile 'vocation' for somebody, andwhether science itself has an objectively valuable 'vocation' are again value judgmentsaboutwhich nothing can be said in the lecture‐room.To affirm the value of science is apresuppositionforteachingthere.Ipersonallybymyveryworkanswerintheaffirmative,andIalsodosofrompreciselythestandpointthathatesintellectualismastheworstdevil,asyouthdoestoday,orusuallyonlyfancies itdoes. Inthatcasethewordholdsfortheseyouths:'Mindyou,thedevilisold;growoldtounderstandhim.'Thisdoesnotmeanageinthesenseof thebirthcertificate. Itmeansthat ifonewishestosettlewiththisdevil,onemustnottaketoflightbeforehimassomanyliketodonowadays.Firstofall,onehastoseethedevil'swaystotheendinordertorealizehispowerandhislimitations.Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the service of self‐clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers andprophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of thecontemplation of sages and philosophers about themeaning of the universe. This, to besure,istheinescapableconditionofourhistoricalsituation.Wecannotevadeitsolongasweremaintruetoourselves.AndifTolstoy'squestionrecurstoyou:assciencedoesnot,whoistoanswerthequestion:'Whatshallwedo,and,howshallwearrangeourlives?'or,inthewordsusedheretonight:'Whichofthewarringgodsshouldweserve?Orshouldweserve perhaps an entirely different god, and who is he?' then one can say that only aprophetorasaviorcangivetheanswers. If there isnosuchman,or ifhismessage isnolongerbelievedin,thenyouwillcertainlynotcompelhimtoappearonthisearthbyhavingthousandsofprofessors,asprivilegedhirelingsof thestate,attemptaspettyprophets intheirlecture‐roomstotakeoverhisrole.Alltheywillaccomplishistoshowthattheyareunaware of the decisive state of affairs: the prophet forwhom somany of our younger


generationyearnsimplydoesnotexist.Butthisknowledgeinitsforcefulsignificancehasneverbecomevital for them.The inward interestofa trulyreligiously 'musical'mancanneverbeservedbyveilingtohimandtoothersthefundamentalfactthatheisdestinedtoliveinagodlessandprophetlesstimebygivinghimtheersatzofarmchairprophecy.Theintegrityofhisreligiousorgan,itseemstome,mustrebelagainstthis.Nowyouwillbeinclinedtosay:Whichstanddoesonetaketowardsthefactualexistenceof'theology' and its claims tobea 'science'?Letusnot flinchandevade theanswer.Tobesure, 'theology' and 'dogmas' do not exist universally, but neither do they exist forChristianity alone. Rather (going backward in time), they exist in highly developed formalsoinIslam,inManicheanism,inGnosticism,inOrphism,inParsism,inBuddhism,intheHindusects,inTaoism,andintheUpanishads,and,ofcourse,inJudaism.Tobesuretheirsystematic development varies greatly. It is no accident thatOccidental Christianity ‐‐ incontrast to the theologicalpossessionsof Jewry ‐‐hasexpandedandelaborated theologymoresystematically,orstrivestodoso. In theOccident thedevelopmentof theologyhashadbyfarthegreatesthistoricalsignificance.ThisistheproductoftheHellenicspirit,andalltheologyoftheWestgoesbacktoit,as(obviously)alltheologyoftheEastgoesbacktoIndianthought.Alltheologyrepresentsanintellectualrationalizationofthepossessionofsacredvalues.Noscienceisabsolutelyfreefrompresuppositions,andnosciencecanproveits fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions. Every theology,however,addsafewspecificpresuppositionsforitsworkandthusforthejustificationofitsexistence.Theirmeaningandscopevary.Everytheology,includingforinstanceHinduisttheology, presupposes that theworldmust have ameaning, and the question is how tointerpretthismeaningsothatitisintellectuallyconceivable.It is the same as with Kant's epistemology. He took for his point of departure thepresupposition: 'Scientific truth exists and it is valid,' and then asked: 'Under whichpresuppositions of thought is truth possible andmeaningful?' Themodern aestheticians(actuallyorexpressly,asforinstance,G.V.Lukacs)proceedfromthepresuppositionthat'worksofartexist,'andthenask:'Howistheirexistencemeaningfulandpossible?'As a rule, theologies, however, donot content themselveswith this (essentially religiousandphilosophical)presupposition.Theyregularlyproceedfromthefurtherpresuppositionthat certain 'revelations' are facts relevant for salvation and as such make possible ameaningful conduct of life. Hence, these revelations must be believed in. Moreover,theologies presuppose that certain subjective states and acts possess the quality ofholiness,thatis,theyconstituteawayoflife,oratleastelementsofone,thatisreligiouslymeaningful.Thenthequestionoftheologyis:Howcanthesepresuppositions,whichmustsimply be accepted bemeaningfully interpreted in a viewof the universe? For theology,these presuppositions as such lie beyond the limits of 'science.' They do not represent'knowledge,'intheusualsense,butrathera'possession.'Whoeverdoesnot'possess'faith,ortheotherholystates,cannothavetheologyasasubstituteforthem,leastofallanyotherscience.Onthecontrary, inevery 'positive' theology, thedevoutreachesthepointwheretheAugustiniansentenceholds:credononquod,sedquiaabsurdumest.Thecapacityfortheaccomplishmentofreligiousvirtuosos‐‐the'intellectualsacrifice'‐‐is


thedecisivecharacteristicof thepositivelyreligiousman.That this isso isshownby thefact that in spite (or rather in consequence) of theology (which unveils it) the tensionbetween the value‐spheres of 'science' and the sphere of 'the holy' is unbridgeable.Legitimately,onlythediscipleoffersthe'intellectualsacrifice'totheprophet,thebelieverto thechurch.Neverasyethasanewprophecyemerged (and I repeatheredeliberatelythis imagewhichhasoffendedsome)bywayoftheneedofsomemodernintellectualstofurnishtheirsoulswith,sotospeak,guaranteedgenuineantiques.Indoingso,theyhappentorememberthatreligionhasbelongedamongsuchantiques,andofallthingsreligioniswhattheydonotpossess.Bywayofsubstitute,however,theyplayatdecoratingasortofdomestic chapel with small sacred images from all over the world, or they producesurrogates through all sorts of psychic experiences to which they ascribe the dignity ofmystic holiness, which they peddle in the book market. This is plain humbug or self‐deception. It is, however, no humbug but rather something very sincere and genuine ifsomeoftheyouthgroupswhoduringrecentyearshavequietlygrowntogethergivetheirhumancommunitytheinterpretationofareligious,cosmic,ormysticalrelation,althoughoccasionally perhaps such interpretation rests onmisunderstanding of self. True as it isthat every act of genuine brotherliness may be linked with the awareness that itcontributes something imperishable to a super‐personal realm, it seems to me dubiouswhether the dignity of purely human and communal relations is enhanced by thesereligiousinterpretations.Butthatisnolongerourtheme.Thefateofourtimesischaracterizedbyrationalizationandintellectualizationand,aboveall,by the 'disenchantmentof theworld.'Precisely theultimateandmostsublimevalueshaveretreatedfrompubliclifeeitherintothetranscendentalrealmofmysticlifeorintothebrotherlinessofdirectandpersonalhumanrelations.Itisnotaccidentalthatourgreatestartisintimateandnotmonumental,norisitaccidentalthattodayonlywithinthesmallestand intimate circles, in personal human situations, in pianissimo, that something ispulsatingthatcorrespondstothepropheticpneuma,whichinformertimessweptthroughthegreatcommunitieslikeafirebrand,weldingthemtogether.Ifweattempttoforceandto 'invent' amonumental style in art, suchmiserablemonstrosities are produced as themany monuments of the last twenty years. If one tries intellectually to construe newreligionswithoutanewandgenuineprophecy,then,inaninnersense,somethingsimilarwill result, but with still worse effects. And academic prophecy, finally, will create onlyfanaticalsectsbutneveragenuinecommunity.To the personwho cannot bear the fate of the times like aman, onemust say:may herather return silently,without the usual publicity build‐up of renegades, but simply andplainly.Thearmsoftheoldchurchesareopenedwidelyandcompassionatelyforhim.Afterall, theydonotmakeithardforhim.Onewayoranotherhehastobringhis 'intellectualsacrifice'‐‐that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebuke him. For such anintellectual sacrifice in favor of an unconditional religious devotion is ethically quite adifferentmatterthantheevasionoftheplaindutyofintellectualintegrity,whichsetsinifone lacks the courage to clarify one's ownultimate standpoint and rather facilitates thisdutybyfeeblerelativejudgments.Inmyeyes,suchreligiousreturnstandshigherthantheacademic prophecy, which does not clearly realize that in the lecture‐rooms of theuniversitynoothervirtueholdsbutplainintellectualintegrity.Integrity,however,compels


ustostatethatforthemanywhotodaytarryfornewprophetsandsaviors,thesituationisthesameasresoundsinthebeautifulEdomitewatchman'ssongoftheperiodofexilethathasbeenincludedamongIsaiah'soracles:He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? The watchman said, Themorningcometh,andalsothenight:ifyewillenquire,enquireye:return,come.Thepeopletowhomthiswassaidhasenquiredandtarriedformorethantwomillennia,andwe are shakenwhenwe realize its fate. From thiswewant to draw the lesson thatnothingisgainedbyyearningandtarryingalone,andweshallactdifferently.Weshallsettoworkandmeetthe'demandsoftheday,'inhumanrelationsaswellasinourvocation.This,however,isplainandsimple,ifeachfindsandobeysthedemonwhoholdsthefibersofhisverylife.

Max Weber-Science as Vocation-

Documents

Transcript of Max Weber-Science as Vocation-