Juan Pedro Garces

8/13/2019 Juan Pedro Garces

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1. Introduction

One of the major determinants of a countrys economic welfare is the level of its

education. The most prosperous economies of the world today exhibit the highest rates of

educational attainment (United Nations evelopment !rogramme" #$$%& and the poorest

countries happen to have very low rates. 't is certainly not a coincidence. ducation

provides people with the tools they need to perform ade)uately in the job mar*et and

enhance their productivity. This is well understood by policy+ma*ers and politicians.

,owever" the tas* of providing the right amount of education and ensuring the )uality of

its contents and formats is not an easy one. There are financial" cultural and sociological

problems to be dealt with" and governments dont always have enough political will to

tac*le the issue or at least to give it the priority it deserves.

Not only is the provision of a high+)uality education lin*ed to economic prosperity" but

also the lac* thereof creates a perpetuating state of poverty (!erry et al" #$$- ,anushe*

and /oessmann" #$$%&. Of course" there are many other factors 0 socio+economic"

psychological and historical + to ta*e into account when analy1ing the phenomenon of

poverty. ,owever" there is an overwhelming evidence that" at a personal level" poverty

stri*es hardest on those who are less prepared to depend on themselves for their own

support" those who have less physical and mental capacity" those who have fewer s*ills"

worse health and less education in other words" those with less human capital.

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'n this paper" we basically intend to assess the importance of the different factors that

contribute to the )uality of education. 2nd for that purpose we ta*e the case of 3hile in

the late #$$$s. This is the most recent assessment of the 3hilean experience" which has a

pioneering system of education in the world" as we will explain later. This converts 3hile

into a sort of laboratory in this field. ,ence" the importance of the topic were dealing

with. 't has not been an easy tas*" since many of those factors are )ualitative and hardly

measurable.

The paper contains basically five sections. 'n the first one" we briefly review the existing

literature" topic by topic. The topics are4 the importance of education for developing

countries how education affects human capital and technological growth types of

education needed to affect human development )uantity versus )uality of education" and

institutional factors affecting the )uality of education.

The following sections contain the substance and the contribution of this paper. The third

section identifies the factors that might eventually affect the )uality of education" with

some reference to the literature particular characteristics of the 3hilean educational

system are elaborated in the fourth section" followed by an econometric estimation of

factors affecting the )uality of education in 3hile. /e finish with several tentative

conclusions that the regression results suggest.


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2. What has been said about education and development

/e already *now that education is critical for development. /e also have some

understanding of how it promotes growth. 't certainly contributes to technologicalchange. 't is also apparent that the )uality of education might be more important than the

)uantity. /e are only now" however" beginning to gain an understanding of the factors

that improve the )uality of education. This section highlights the main findings of the

literature on these topics.

5& The importance of education for developing countries

One of the recurrent topics in the development literature is the one about the vicious

circles of poverty" or poverty traps. !erry et al (#$$-& develop this idea" focusing mainly

on how the lac* of human capital has impeded 6atin 2merican economies to reach a

complete development. They propose that the existence or lac* of human capital in a

country can produce virtuous or vicious circles in the process of development. 3ountries

that dont have enough human capital fall into poverty traps that are self+perpetuating"

something li*e a low+income steady state. 6ac* of human capital implies low

productivity" and in turn low economic growth. 2nd low economic growth brings about

poverty. 7ut poverty itself reduces the capacity to absorb new human capital. 2nd the

cycle continues. The cycle is reinforced by the discouraging effect that poverty has on

investment" and therefore on growth.


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'f a lac* of human capital is a main cause of poverty" then the remedy seems

straightforward. 7etter education and better health should be the target of any responsible

government. 7ut" what *ind of education is most appropriate8 /ho will provide it8 ,ow

do we determine the optimal amount of investment in education8 These are the )uestions

suggested by !erry et al (#$$-&. 2nd it is not just a matter of the quantity of education.

9uality ma*es a difference. 'n this paper" we tac*le precisely the )uestion of what factors

influence the )uality of education.

2 vicious circle of the *ind discussed is hard to brea*. 't might ta*e a long time before

the effects of an enhanced education start to become visible. :ew politicians want to start

an educational reform that only implies higher expenditure in the short run with no

political achievements to show. ,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%& estimate that it could

ta*e up to %; years for educational reform policies to exert their full effect over economic

outcomes. This is one of the main practical impediments to educational improvement in

poor countries4 the lac* of political will to brea* the vicious circle" *nowing that others

might reap the benefits of reform.

!erry also suggests that the reproduction of patterns of education across generations

might be causing the vicious circle and it would be interesting to investigate more into

the cause of this particularly pervasive poverty trap. 'n more traditional societies" in

which social mobility is very low" there is no great incentive for the poor to ac)uire more

education" or in most cases not even the opportunity (due to lac* of access to long+term

credit&. This is something inconceivable in a country li*e the United


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One possible economic explanation for the above phenomenon is the fact" mentioned by

!erry et al (#$$-&" that returns to schooling tend to increase with the level of education. 'n

this case" there are perverse incentives to under+invest in education by the poor. 2nd the

only way out would be a =big push (ma*ing the analogy with the >osenstein+>odan

?5@ABC concept& in the form of large subsidies for the poor to surpass the education

threshold. ,owever" not everyone agrees on this argument. !sacharopoulos and !atrinos

(#$$#& finds that returns to education are higher in low and middle income countries"

where educational attainment is typically lower.

The idea of the =poverty trap has been invo*ed before in the literature. 7arham"

7oadway" Darchand" and !estieau (5@@;& had already referred to a specific =poverty trap

with regards to education. They construct an overlapping+generations (O6E& model in

which individual wealth is related to educational attainment. 6i)uidity constraints operate

to force children (or their parents& to invest a sub+optimal amount of resources in their

education. The stationary state implies that children of poorer families are caught in a

poverty trap because they cannot finance their education.

'n general" we can say that !erry et al (#$$-& and all these studies focus more on the

microeconomic benefits of education" with little consideration of externalities and effects

over productivity" which enhance the growing capacity of the economy. The micro

literature on the subject mostly follows the tradition of the path+brea*ing study by Dincer

(5@%A&" who was the first to propose a micro+econometric model of the returns to

education. /e will deal in detail with more macro aspects below" to fully assess the

importance of the provision of )uality education for developing countries.

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7ut for technological change to occur" countries need to engage in either of two activities

that produce it4 innovation or imitation. 7oth imitation and innovation re)uire the use of

human capital as an input" the latter more than the former one.

2bramovit1 (5@H-& points out that the differences in productivity levels among countries

tend to create a =strong potential for subse)uent convergence of levels" but this

convergence can only be achieved by the less advanced countries if they have a =social

capability that enables them to absorb the more advanced technologies. ,e reaches this

conclusion after carrying out the historical study of several O 3 countries in the 5@ th

and #$ th centuries.


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enrolment rates and test scores. ,e finds that an additional year of schooling raises the

growth rate by $.AAJ a year. 't must be said though that this study is mainly an empirical

one" and doesnt distinguish between the effects of human capital as a main determinant

of the )uality of labour and as a determinant of technological growth.

Frueger and 6indhal (#$$5& have a critical view of the 7arro+type analysis" since it fails

to account for differences in the influence of education on growth between different

countries.


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:irst" there is the )uestion as to whether all types of spending on education are e)ually

effective in reducing poverty. Gha" 7iswal and 7iswal (#$$5&" using panel data techni)ues

with data for fourteen 'ndian states" find that expenditure on higher" university" technical"

adult and vocational education" as opposed to elementary and secondary education" is

more effective. 7ut 2hmad (#$$B&" using household panel data for 7angladesh" finds that

social benefits for primary education are high" and both private benefits and costs are

rather low" compared with the ones of secondary and higher education" although he is not

referring to returns of education in the sense of Dincer (5@%A&. Theres no clear+cut

general answer to this issue it is probably context+specific.

,owever" one thing seems to be clear. 'n order to have a successful tertiary education"

both primary and secondary education have to be of the highest possible )uality. 't would

ma*e no sense to devote a great amount of resources to higher education while

disregarding the previous stages.

's public spending on education a pro+poor policy8 's it efficient for attac*ing the

problem of poverty8 Or could there be substantial lea*s towards more affluent groups of

society8 This is the )uestion posed by 6anjouw" !radhan"


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discriminatory practices against women in some countries" which =prevent the efficient

exploitation of well+educated females in the formal labour mar*et. Duch of the

undervaluation of female education might come just from misunderstandings" lac* of

information or discrimination. :or example" a study of Tr1cins*y and >andolph (5@@5& in

Dalaysia only analy1es the role of male educational attainment in explaining income

differentials however this is due to the fact that the authors only had data about male

educational attainment available to them. To this respect" ,ill and Fing (5@@;& ma*e a

review of some empirical research that analy1es the benefits of female education" and

argue that education enhances labour productivity and income growth for both men andwomen. They argue that educating women also has some additional effects on social

well+being (positive externalities& that are not always measured by the mar*et. >ising

levels of education +they continue+ can improve womens productivity in the home"

which in turn increases family health" child survival and the investment in childrens

human capital. The social benefits from womens education would range from fostering

economic growth to increasing the life expectancy of the population.

A& 9uality versus 9uantity of ducation

One of the most important issues of this type of analysis should be the distinction

between )uantity and )uality of education.


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the period 5@-;+5@@;. ,e finds that educational attainment (at the secondary and higher

level& is certainly very important in explaining economic growth" but that educational

)uality" measured by international test scores (particularly math and science&" has a

higher explanatory power.

2 very complete study on this issue is the one provided by ,anushe* and /oessmann

(#$$%&. They carry out some research on ;$ countries for which there exists reliable data

on school attainment and results of an internationally recogni1ed test on cognitive ability

(the 'nternational 2dult 6iteracy


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Table 1: ducation as a !eterminant of "ro#th in Income per Capita$ 1%&'(2'''

E ! per capita

5@-$Kears of schooling

5@-$ Dean of test score 3onstant > # (adjusted&r5 +$.B%@ $.B-@ #.%H; $.#;#

?A.#AC ?B.#BC ?%.A5Cr# +$.B$# $.$#- 5.@H +A.%B% $.%#H ?;.;AC ?$.BAC [email protected]#C ?;.;AC

5e"endent varia6le is avera&e annual &ro!t% rate in G5P "er ca"ita,1304-2444't-statistics in "arent%eses.7a8 re&ression includes / re&ional du##ies' 768 sa#"le contains only countries

# jumps from a very low level to a significantly high level as soon as

you include the )uality of education among the explanatory variables.

,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%& also in)uire into the effect of educational )uality over

individual incomes" following Dincer (5@%A&. They use the same 'nternational 2dult

6iteracy


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'n the light of these data" ,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%& conclude that there is =strong

evidence that the cognitive s*ills of the population +rather than mere school attainment+

are powerfully related to individual earnings" to the distribution of income" and to

economic growth. 't is a certainly a very compelling statement. They complete their

study by providing some data showing how far most developing countries stand in

relation to their developed counterparts with regard to educational )uality standards.

ducational )uality is not just a matter of resources" as ,anushe* L /oessmann (#$$%&

argue. Once you have reached an indispensable minimum to get the educational system

going" in terms of buildings" materials" teachers and infrastructure in general" additional

resources might just be absorbed by the system in a very inefficient way" when not

destined to unjustified overpayments or simply corruption.


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to be the most important tas* to improve the )uality of education. 't should be a structure

that gives the right incentives to the operators of the educational system" because

performance responds to incentives. The system of incentives must include rewards and

penalties.

The institutional structure that ,anushe* L /oessmann (#$$%& propose is based on three

pillars4

a& choice and competition

This means that parents and beneficiaries should be able to choose the school they

wish to attend. This will trigger the necessary competition among educational

establishments.

b& decentrali1ation and autonomy of schools

The schools must be autonomous to ma*e their own decisions regarding what

they will offer to students (curriculum" schedules" etc&.

c& accountability

ducators must be held responsible for the performance of their students and"

therefore" receive the corresponding rewards or penalties.

2t first glance" it may seem that these goals can only be achieved by private schools" and

that they would be ta*en for granted in a private educational system. ,owever" this is not

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necessarily true. 3ompetition is not a characteristic of many private schools" especially in

more traditional societies. On the other hand" public systems of education can really

produce competition among schools if the right incentives are provided" as ,anushe* and

/oessman (#$$%& point out.

,anushe* and /oessman (#$$%& thin* that it is important to reali1e also that successful

reforms need to address all these aspects as a whole. :or example" it would be

unconceivable to implement free choice and competition" if there isnt some sort of

system of accountability in place. The results could be disastrous" the authors argue. 2s

for the types of incentives that would wor*" it seems that monetary incentives have been

)uite efficacious in some countries of the world" most notably 'srael and ngland. 7ut

they conclude that this does not exclude other possibilities (promotion" recognition" etc&.

-& The factors that determine )uality

2s we have seen" the )uality of education is a complex phenomenon. :irst of all" we want

to determine whether private schools tend to provide a higher )uality than public schools

or not. The main reason why one thin*s they should is not so much the amount of

resources that they devote" but rather the institutional structure" supposedly based on the

=pillars suggested by ,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%&.

,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%& remind us that it was :riedman (5@-#& who first

proposed a system of vouchers to introduce choice and competition in the educational

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system. Di1ala and >omaguera (#$$$& and >ouse (5@@H& have found some evidence of

very positive results of voucher experiences in 3hile and Dilwau*ee.

Elomm and >avi*umar (5@@#& build an overlapping+generations model in which

investment in human capital through formal schooling is the main determinant of growth.

They find that private education yields higher income per capita in the long run" but it can

also lead to higher income ine)uality. ,owever" this last conclusion is not very relevant

for our purposes" since they are assuming that beneficiaries pay the full cost of private

education" while they wouldnt if they attended public schools. This asymmetry distortsthe real benefits of private education.

Di1ala and >omaguera (#$$$&" in a cross+section analysis with more than 5$$$

observations in 3hile (unit of analysis is the school&" find stri*ing differences in the

performance of students of the same educational level across different types of school.

/hether education is privately or publicly provided seems to ma*e a difference" but

controlling for family characteristics the difference seems to get smaller. Di1ala"

>omaguera and :arren (#$$#&" using the production+frontier techni)ue and data+

envelopment analysis on a sample of #$$$ schools in 3hile" conclude that it is not just

resources that ma*e the difference between efficient and low+performing schools. 't has

to do with incentives. Di1ala and >omaguera (#$$#& find that the school plays a

significant role in students performance" although they cannot identify the precise

characteristic of the school that is directly responsible.

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odrigue1 (5@HH& and Dc wan L 3arnoy (#$$$ ). Most of them conclude that

private subsidized schools tend to perform better than the public ones.

). Characteristics of the Chilean educational system

'n order to assess the results of any exercise on the measurement of the )uality of

education in 3hile" we need to *now how the educational system wor*s there. There are

basically three types of schools. The most numerous ones are the public schools" which

are run by the municipalities in a decentrali1ed way (indirectly funded by the central

government&. The second type is the private schools subsidi1ed by the central

government" which are managed completely by private corporations and compete for the

subsidies of the state. 'n practice" both the municipal schools and the private subsidi1ed

ones compete for the same subsidies. :inally" there are the fee+paying private schools"

which dont receive any financial support from the government.


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The voucher system is a particular one termed =follow+the+student. The amount of the

voucher is around M;$ per student per month. This amount is not given to the parents or

the students" but to the school that manages to attract the student. 'n 3hile" parents can

send their children to the school of their choice" regardless of residential districts. That

introduces competition amongst all types of schools" which can attract students from

relatively distant localities.

3uriously enough" there seem s to be more competition between public and subsidized

private schools than amongst private ones or between private ones and the other two

types. One sign of this phenomenon is the amount of advertising that is observed at the

beginning of each academic year; higher among public and subsidised schools than

among private ones. The reason seems to be that attendance to private schools is

dictated more by considerations of status and tradition than by concerns about quality.

rivate schools perform! in some sense! li"e private e#clusive clubs. The $hilean society

is a very traditional one! and high levels of segregation persist through generations! in

spite of the economic emergence of the middle class over the last thirty years. Schools!

clubs! hospitals and many other social institutions separate! in a very subtle and almost

unnoticeable way! the types of individuals and families they receive. Of course! there is

also the monetary factor %prices)! which segregates by purchasing power.

,aving characterised the educational system in 3hile" we have all the information that is

needed to proceed to an empirical estimation of the determinants of the )uality of

education in 3hile

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Table 2: ,ames and description of the variables to be used in the analysis

Name Description L it average performance of students of school i in year t F i t family characteristics of students of school i in year t (any other than the

socio+economic level& S i t average characteristics of students of school i in year t (character" ability"

health" etc& A i t characteristics of teachers of school i in year t (education" experience" etc& I i t characteristics of school i in year t (basically institutional features&

-IMC score specific regression variable indicating the average score (in mathematicaland verbal abilities& obtained by the students of a particular schoolsubsidised private specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether a sc%ool is a

"rivate su6sidis ed one or not (5 yes $ no&fee(paying private specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether a school is a private

fee+paying one or not (5 yes $ no&urban specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether a school is an urban

one or not (5 yes $ no&socio(economiclevel medium(lo#

specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether the average socio+economic level of the students in a particular school is medium+low or not(5 yes $ no&

socio(economiclevel medium

specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether the average socio+economic level of the students in a particular school is medium or not

(5 yes $ no&socio(economiclevel medium(high

specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether the average socio+economic level of the students in a particular school is medium+high or not(5 yes $ no&

socio(economiclevel high

specific dummy (binary& variable indicating whether the average socio+economic level of the students in a particular school is high or not (5 yes$ no&

number of pupils specific regression variable indicating number of stu dents in a &ivensc%ool (proxy for si1e of school&

number of teachers specific regression variable indicating number of teachers in a given school(alternative proxy for si1e of school&

pupil teacher ratio ratio of students to teachers in a given schoolgirls only specific regression variable indicating whether the school is for girls only

(dummy variable& (5 yes $ no&boys only specific regression variable indicating whether the school is for boys only(dummy variable& (5 yes $ no&

urban(private interaction dummy (binary& variable indicating whether the school is fee+ paying private and urban (5 yes $ no&

urban(subsid is ed interaction dummy (binary& variable indicatin & !%et%er t%e sc%ool issu6sidis ed private and urban (5 yes $ no&

pupil teacherprivate

interaction variable which indicates whether the fact of being fee+paying private has any influence on the effect of the pupil teacher ratio

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would probably be more irrelevant in our study" which deals with high school

performance.

The main innovation is that we use a better variable for controlling for unobserved

characteristics. 'nstead of using the scores of the same grade the last time the test was

ta*en" we use the scores of the same group of students for the last time they too* the


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The institutional factors given by the school characteristics are not something easy to

measure. 0owever! we propose that some of it is reflected in the type of management

%whether private or public). 5urther research is needed in this area! and could constitute

a refinement of this paper.

The specific variables are grouped in the following catego ries %e#pected signs of

coefficients in parenthesis)>

F it 4 the socio+economic dummies (P&

S it > the :girls7only and :boys7only dummies %?) I it 4 the dummies for type of school (P&" the =urban dummy (P&" number of pupils (8&"

number of teachers (8&" the pupil+teacher ratio (+&

L it 4 the lagged


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appears )uite significant" as will happen in all the regressions. This comes as no surprise"

as there is a high correlation between this independent variable and the resulting score we

are measuring it is basically the same group of people. The relevance of this variable can

be assessed by running a regression without it4 we did it" and the > # drops to half the

previous level. 't is also interesting to note that the coefficients of the


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'n regression #" we have the full model" with all the interactions. The purpose is similar to

that of regression 5" but now we want to test the joint performance of all the interactions.

The main finding here is that being urban doesnt add to the effects of private schools

over scores nor to the effect of subsidi1ed private schools. Doreover" in this case" the

type+of+school dummies become insignificant and with the wrong sign (we are expecting

private schools to add value over public schools and not to decrease it&. Neither does

being private or subsidi1ed add to the effect of the pupil teacher ratio over scores. This

ratio remains insignificant anyway. 2long the same lines" the fact of being urban does not

affect the non+influence of the student teacher ratio. The > #

of the second e)uation is notgreater than the one of the first e)uation" confirming that the interactions are not jointly

significant.

The rest of the regressions provide robustness chec*s on our main findings about the

private+public divide and the influence of the socio+economic level. /e never eliminate

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added the socio+economic dummies" and retain the type+of+school variables. The fee+

paying private dummy becomes insignificant due to the inclusion of the socio+economic

levels. 7ut the subsidised private one remains highly significant. This implies that" after

controlling for socio+economic levels" fee+paying private schools offer no higher )uality

education than public schools. The reason for which parents still send their children to

fee+paying private schools is discussed further ahead in the paper.

'n regressions ; through H" we omit the public private divide dummies" in order to assess

the strength of the other variables" particularly the socio+economic levels. >egression ;tries only the socio+economic dummies along with the


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'n the seventh regression" we test only for the effects of the pupil teacher ratio. :inally"

the sign is the expected one4 the higher the ratio" the lower will be the students

performance. Unfortunately" the coefficient is not statistically significant. >egression H

tests this same variable" but now including the socio+economic levels" and the coefficient

reverts again to the wrong sign. omaguera were measuring

educational )uality in A th grade" and our study is for 5$ th grade" and that might explain this

pu11ling result. The pupil+teacher ratio seems to be less important for higher levels ofeducation.

>egressions @ through 5- eliminate the gender variables" which have proved to be rather

significant" and the =pupil teacher private and =pupil teacher subsidi1ed interaction"

which have proved to be non+significant. >egressions @" 5B" 5A and 5- concentrate on the

public private divide variables" which are the ones of most interest to us. 'nterestingly

enough" the fee+paying private dummies become significant (and have the expected sign&

in three of these regressions" but only when the socio+economic levels are not present.

The coefficients of the subsidised private schools are always positive and significant"

unless the interaction between urban and subsidised is included" indicating the persistent

advantage of urban subsidised schools over public ones. The coefficients of the urban+

subsidised interaction are always large and positive (although not significant probably

due to the existence of multicollinearity&. 'n regressions 5$" 55" 5# and 5;" we test

basically the strength of the socio+economic variables" and they are all consistently

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significant" both in magnitude and statistically. 'n all of these regressions" none of the

interactions is significant or has the expected value (although urban7subsidised always

has the expected sign& and the urban dummy continues to be completely insignificant.

The salient features of the whole set of regressions are the following4

5&


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ependent variable4


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A& !erhaps the most stri*ing feature of all these regressions is that the pupil teacher

ratio has a positive coefficient in most of them in other words" a higher

pupil teacher ratio would lead to better


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3. Conclusions

:rom the previous results" we can draw some simple tentative conclusions. :irst andforemost" what appears to be always significant and relevant in our results is the family

bac*ground" represented by the socio+economic level. 2nd this means that in a stagnant

social structure" the poor have little chance of emerging into higher levels of economic

welfare. /hen you come from a poor family in a developing country" your educational

performance will tend to be low and be transmitted in that way to your offspring. 't is

important for public policy to find ways" through redistribution of educational resources"

to brea* these patterns of reproductive cycles from generation to generation.

The si1e of the school is not an issue in determining the )uality of education. 2 similar

conclusion can be drawn from the results for the urban variable. 7eing urban doesnt

seem to add anything to the )uality of education.

'n general" we can conclude that private subsidised schools do better than public schools.

'f ,anushe* and /oessmann (#$$%& are correct" this implies that private schools seem to

incorporate better the elements of choice" competition and accountability that we have

mentioned before. The results for the private subsidised schools seem to be more robust

to the inclusion of socio+economic variables" when other distractive variables are not

present. The reason for the relative superiority of private subsidi1ed schools is still to be

determined. ,owever" it is )uite li*ely that it has to do with the fact that these schools

have to compete for the public subsidies of the state along their municipal counterparts.


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The pu11le about fee+paying private schools could be explained by a phenomenon of

segregation" as we explain below.

3ertainly the characteristics of choice" competition and accountability are not a monopoly

of private schools. 'n 3hile" public schools have become more efficient through

decentrali1ation and a certain degree of competition. This can be clearly observed when

loo*ing at the evolution of


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explanation ()uite li*ely for someone who *nows the 3hilean reality& is that fee+paying

private schools offer connections to get high+paying or influential jobs. /hat they lac* in

)uality is returned to the students via connections.

Of course monetary compensation will be an important factor in producing motivation"

which will eventually lead to a better teaching )uality. 7ut it is perhaps not the most

important one. /e would li*e to propose (and this is a matter of a deeper study& that

accountability" competition (even within the school& and wor* atmosphere will probably

matter most. 2nd this is the responsibility not only of national educational authorities" butmainly of parents and school directors.


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objectives. 2nd this clearly transcends the traditional division between public and private

schools. 'n 3hile" public schools have become relatively efficient by decentrali1ation" by

being allowed to be independent and autonomous in their decisions" competing openly

with their counterparts in the system. The )uantification of the effects of these

institutional factors remains the tas* of further research on this issue.

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9eferences

2bramovit1" D. (5@H-&. 3atching up" forging ahead" and falling behind. The @ournal of

8conomic 0istory! &/ ($#&" BH;+A$-.

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