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2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.0022-4189/2007/8701-0001$10.00

The Role of Mythology in SchellingsLate Philosophy

Louis Dupre / Yale University

A study of Schellings late philosophy of mythology, despite the re-

newed interest it presently enjoys, still needs some justification. Whyshould we spend time and effort on a demanding philosophical textbased on often outdated and inadequate historical information aboutmyths? And why revisit a philosophy that claims to incorporate revela-tion, yet has been criticized for bending revelation to its own preestab-lished concepts, while in the process corrupting the methods of the-ology as well as of philosophy? The answer may be brief. BecauseSchelling (17751854) was among the first to recognize the myth as anindependent form of consciousness, irreducible to rational thought orto a prescientific interpretation of nature or history. For him, mythol-ogy constituted an essentially religious phenomenon, marked by poly-theism but indispensable for the rise of an inclusive monotheism, thatis, to an idea of God that incorporates creation within Gods Being.

Despite the undeniable flaws of his work and the enormous progresssince made in this area, no one has yet surpassed the scope and intel-lectual depth of the two-volume treatise on myth written during thefinal twenty years of Schellings career. Schelling understood that nei-ther mythology nor revelation could be simply juxtaposed to philo-sophical truth. The two had to be integrated or one would inevitablyexclude the other.

A first extensive discussion of mythology appears in the lectures onthe Philosophy of Artdelivered in Jena 18023 and repeated in Wurzburg(18045).1 Following August Wilhelm Schlegels Lectures on Mythology,

1 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, in Sammtliche Werke, ed.K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta Verlag, 185659), vol. 5; in English, ThePhilosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

The page numbers of this translation appear after the references to the German text. Otherworks referred to in this article are Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der Mythologie, in SammtlicheWerke, pt. 2, vol. 1, commonly indicated as vol. 11; Philosophie der Mythologie, pt. 2, vol. 2,indicated as vol. 12; Philosophie der Offenbarung, pt. 2, vols. 3 and 4, or vols. 13 and 14.

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The Journal of Religion

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he limited the subject mainly to Greek myths because of their superior

aesthetic quality (5:392). But the harmony between finite form and

infinite content of Greek mythology weakened its religious significance.

Philosophy eventually took over part of the religious function of the

myth. On this and on several other issues Schelling was to change theviews expressed in the Philosophy of Art. Since our subject is mythology

rather than art, we move directly to the great works that Schelling com-

posed during his final years of teaching. His perspective here is exclu-

sively religious and differs from the vaguely pantheistic philosophy of

identity to which the Philosophy of Art belongs.

In the so-called positive philosophy of his later years, Schelling aban-doned the fundamental principle of his earlier idealism, that the mind

itself contains the Absolute. The philosophical idea of absolute Beingdoes indeed imply an intrinsic necessity. But such an ideal necessity

contains neither real existence nor positive content. A philosophy built

upon it could be no more than negative. Only the Absolute itself is

able to convert the idea of what must be into the reality of what actually

is. Negative philosophy, though indispensable for understanding the

minds relation to the Absolute, merely forms an introduction to the

positive philosophy, according to which the Absolute communicates it-

self in mythology and revelation.

Schelling refers to the God of philosophy as Being itself (ens ipsum).

Such a definition conveys no information about Gods nature or about

Gods relation to other beings. (What complicates Schellings argument

is that he uses the term Being indistinguishably for essence and existence.

The reader is frequently forced to figure out from the context which

one is intended.) But if God is Being itself, all beings must be included

in the idea of God. To close the gap of its ignorance about God, phi-

losophy cannot afford to ignore the content of a possible revelation. It

ought to analyze the concept of revelation as it has historically pre-

sented itself in various religions. The task of positive philosophy con-

sists in seeking to understand the logic of revelation and mythology. It

ought to subject the reports of them to a critical investigation. At least

they reveal the presence of a fundamental human need for an intimate

acquaintance with the Godhead as well as of a belief that this need has

actually been met. The purpose, then, of Schellings philosophy of

myth and revelation is not to prove the existence of God or the su-

pernatural nature of the alleged facts of revelation, but to show theirideal structures.

Has Schelling not left the domain of philosophy altogether and en-

tered that of theology? How could an alleged manifestation of a reality

that lies beyond the reach of the autonomous mind ever become a

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Mythology in Schellings Philosophy

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subject of philosophy? He himself concedes: Most people understand

by philosophy a science which reason purely and simply generates out

of itself. From that standpoint, it is natural enough to consider the

philosophy of revelation an attempt to present the ideas of revealed

religion as necessary, pure truths of reason or to reduce them to those(14:4). To be sure, positive philosophy cannot be justified within the

restrictions traditionally imposed on philosophical thought. But the

question remains whether these restrictions are valid. Why should phi-

losophy not investigate the logic of mythology and revelation, as it

does with other empirical data? Without a positive philosophy, ultimate

metaphysical questions concerning the relation between the Absoluteand that of which it is the ground must remain unanswered.

For Schelling, mythology constitutes part of revelation, even thoughit requires no supernatural intervention. Myths are natural processes

that awaken the mind to full self-consciousness. They also prepare the

minds ability to receive a supernatural revelation. Schellings posi-

tion considerably differs from that of later students of mythology. ToPaul Tillich, for instance, mythical thinking constitutes an early view of

reality, which eventually will break down into a variety of fields: science,

metaphysics, and religion. Rationalist philosophers of the early twen-

tieth century considered mythical thought a defective, prescientific way

of thinking, which contains no truth, but served as an early substitute

for science.

In Schellings view, the myth belongs neither to science nor to phi-

losophy. It is an early but essential stage of the religious consciousness.

He restricted the mythical field to the genealogies of the gods, as re-

corded in civilizations of the Near East. At a first stage of religion, the

sacred is not yet clearly differentiated from the nonsacred. It is followed

by a long period of polytheism, indispensable for preparing the idea

of one God inclusive of all reality. Without mythical polytheism the

mind would never surpass the inclination to oppose God to all other

forms of being, as dogmatic theology still often continues to do.

Schelling assumes that all myths follow a similar course, though not

all complete the entire process. A complete cycle passes through three

stages. Yet some barely move beyond the first. He bases his analysis on

the theory of the three potencies (Potenzen), which dominates his entire

later metaphysics. The potencies are neither palpable realities nor ab-

stract concepts, but real and effective (wirkliche) powers that hold themiddle between concrete and abstract concepts. They are true univer-

sals, yet at the same time full realities (Philosophie der Mythologie, in

Sammtliche Werke, 12:115). In the Einleitung in die Philosophie (1830, but

published only in 1989) Schelling describes them as the conditions of

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Being. They raise fundamental metaphysical questions. What precededBeing? What is needed for Being to be? Negative philosophy is unableto answer those questions. Hegel started his Logic with the concept ofBeing. Positive philosophy commences with the conditions of the pos-sibility of Being.

Schelling distinguishes three such conditions, or, as he calls them,three metaphysical potencies. (A) First is the sheer possibility of Being(das Seinkonnen). This expression becomes intelligible only if one as-sumes, with Fichte and Schelling, that a transcendentwill must precedeactual Being. The first potency consists of a preontological drive thatrenders Being not only possible but imperative: it is that which mustbe (das Sein-mussende). (B) An unconditioned obedience to this call

would give rise to Being without limits. This blind Being would destroyany possibility of being this or that. It would simply overwhelm the re-ceptive A moment in such a way that no differentiation, no particularreality, and no freedom could ever exist. Bwould suppress Aaltogether.For that reason Schelling calls the unrestricted second potency whatought not to be (das nicht-sein-sollende). Hence, for the existence of con-crete reality, a third condition must be fulfilled to limit the impact ofB and render it compatible with A. (C) The third potency, then, con-sists in a capacity of reflection, an ability of the receptive subject to

withdraw into itself and thereby to preserve its freedom to be this andnot that. This third potency restricts Bs undifferentiated power: B stillremains the ground of differentiated reality, but it ceases to obliterate

it. Schelling refers to the outcome of the third potency as das als-solches-Seinkonnende (what can exist as such) or also das als-solches Seiendes,which we might translate as Being within the limits of essence (Wesen).

It is important to remember that the potencies are not moments ofBeing, but conditions. Hence the undifferentiated infinite Being of theBpotency must not be equated with Gods Being. Whereas Gods Beingis endowed with an infinite number of attributes, the second potencyis merely indefinite and blind. The preceding description of the poten-cies appears in the recently published first version of the Philosophy of Revelation (written in 1831). Obscure as it may be, it is still clearer thanany of the later versions.2 The general pattern of the potencies returnsat every stage of the positive philosophy, each time assuming differentfeatures.

In the entire philosophy of revelation (which includes mythology)the theory of the potencies plays a significant part. Schelling denies

2 Friedrich Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung (1831), ed. Walter Erhardt(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992), 2737.

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that a purely logical philosophy (exclusive of revelation) is able to thinkthe transition from undifferentiated Being (B) to concrete, particularBeing (C). Negative philosophy conceives of Being as an empty infinite.

But how can the finite be, if Being can be thought only as infinite? 3

Instead, a positive philosophy, receptive of mythology and revelation,conceives of God as infinite Being endowed with, yet not divided by,determinate attributes revealed in mythology. Without this revelation,Schelling implies, metaphysics is unable to answer its most fundamentalquestion: Why is there Being (as we know it, i.e., differentiated) ratherthan nothing? Parmenides, our first great metaphysician, consistentlyexcluded the possibility of differentiated Being. To him, finitude anddetermination were mere illusions, forms of non-Being. Schelling ar-

gues that, after negative philosophy establishes the undifferentiatedidea of Being, the justification of differentiated reality still requires anidea of the Absolute as including internal determinations, withoutwhich it would not be able to function as grou nd for the existence ofparticular realities. Negative philosophy is unable to provide such anidea. For that reason Schelling declares it inadequate for dealing withthe relation between God and the finite.

Only from the revelation of the Absolute in mythology does philos-ophy learn that the Absolute possesses internal determinations that itexpresses in finite beings endowed with an independent existence. Be-cause all beings remain immanent in the all-encompassing Absolute,

archaic speculation conceives of the Absolute as being itself a plurality.Hence the rise of polytheism. In the mythological process the potencies

present the stages of the minds process toward full God-consciousness,which coincides with full self-consciousness. As the mind gradually dis-covers the notion of a totality of Being, it first imagines this all-em-bracing totality in the primitive picture of a primary god. Schelling callsthis mythical representation a negative concept: it possesses no innertruth and functions as a substitute for the real (i.e., self-differentiated)Absolute. It is what is not (das Nicht-Seiende) and, in its relation to thefirst potency of consciousness, what ought not to be (das nicht-Sein-sollende).

Mythology, in Schellings interpretation, represents the oppositionbetween the multiple finite and the all-comprehensive but indefiniteone as a struggle between gods. The mythical mind seeks reconcilia-tion, but seldom finds it. Whenever it succeeds, it usually presents thereconciliation between the infinite and the finite in the form of a young

3 Friedrich Schelling, Einleitung in die Philosophie (1830), ed. Walter Ehrhardt (Stuttgart:Fromann-Holzboog, 1989), 98100. See Peter Koslowski, Philosophien der Offenbarung(Pader-born: F. Schoning, 2001), 6034.

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god who comes to share the lot of suffering humanity and thereby to

redeem the race. In the end he becomes victorious over the oppressive

old god and restores the autonomy of the finite.

In the Philosophy of Mythology, then, Schelling describes the historical

process through which the mind becomes aware of itself and of itstranscendent dimension. Though the process is divinely guided, the

mind must rely entirely on its natural powers. The key to the religious

significance of the myth lies in Schellings concept of monotheism. In

the past some scholars considered archaic religions that possessed no

polytheistic pantheon to be monotheistic. A few even assumed that a

pristine revelation had preceded the spread of polytheism. The myth-ological process thereby came to be seen as a corruption of the pri-

meval divine truth. Contrary to this opinion, Schelling maintained thatpolytheism, rather than implying a decline of the religious conscious-

ness, constituted a necessary phase in the minds ascent to a spiritual

idea of God and to full self-recognition. The alleged monotheism was

either a primitive kind of pantheism, too vague to distinguish betweenthe sacred and the nonsacred, or a theological dualism that conceived

of God as a Being opposed to all other beings. That dualism has sur-

vived in dogmatic theories of the modern age, which envision the link

between God and the finite to be no more than an act of effective

causality. Such a conception conflicts with the idea, admitted by the

same theologians, that God is Being (esse ipsum) and, as such, must in

some way include all that is.

In Schellings view, the idea of God as Spirit, so strongly asserted in

the fourth Gospel, requires a more intimate relation than that of causal

dependence. As Spirit, God must be present in the inmost nature of

His creatures. The intrinsic goal of polytheistic mythologies, then,

served the purpose of reintegrating the multiplicity of creation within

the divine unity. The mythological theogonies, far from being mean-

ingless stories, prepare the mind for the acceptance of a true, that is,

a differentiated monotheism. Still polytheism became necessary only

because the mind had lost its primeval state of innocence. Without an

exodus from the original state of innocence, there would be no history.

Therefore that first step of mankind is the primeval event (13:385).

Originally the potencies maintained a relation of harmonious bal-

ance that the Fall disturbed. In the Fallof its nature we know no more

than about the period that preceded itthe human mind arrogated toitself control over the potencies (13:36061). It thereby disrupted the

minds harmony with itself and with nature. Humans attempting to be-

come like God fell into a condition of Gottentfremdung, which was also

a state ofSelbstentfremdung (alienation from God and from oneself). But

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in accepting this state of alienation humanity would eventually redis-cover the true God. Mythology describes the process of that return.

How did polytheism start? Schelling argues that the original condi-tion of culture was no more monotheistic than polytheistic. One mightdescribe it as pantheistic, were it not that premythical humans lackedthe kind of reflectiveness that pantheism requires. Schelling picturestheir condition as being dominated by the all-absorbing blind realityof the second potency. He refers to it as the reign of Uranos (the sky)

who, according to Hesiod, was the oldest of the Greek gods. In givingthis undetermined religious awareness the name of a Greek god thepoet appears to make it part of a theogony, which it is not. The wan-dering nomads here presented, strangers to themselves and to the lands

through which they passed, recognized no gods, not even the astralbodies that guided them on their ways. The stars merely served as bea-cons of light in an undifferentiated sacred space. Those Sabists, asSchelling calls them, were monotheistic only insofar as their religionrecognized no distinctions. Everything was sacred and hence nothingin particular was.

In the next stageto which Uranos formed the transitionthe (fi-nite) principle of the first potency (A) rebels against this crushing

weight of undifferentiated Being and starts a struggle for survival. Inthe language of theogony, the struggle ends with a weakening of theoppressor. The myth achieves this either by placing a female principlenext to the oppressive male, or by having the male one castrated. Ura-nia is the Greek name Herodotus, the fifth-century BC historian, givesto the goddess who at this point emerges everywhere in the Near East.Schelling describes the time of Urania as mostly one of peaceful co-existence between male and female divinities (13:392). Yet powerfulgoddesses such as Mylitta (in Assyria), Astarte, or Cybele (in Phrygiaand Lydia) gradually deprived the male god of all his power. Eventuallythey achieved a total victory over the male god.

Greek mythology used a more drastic image for the feminization ofUranos. The autocratic god killed all Uranias children as soon as they

were born. Yet Kronos, secretly born, conspired with his mother toemasculate his father. One version of the myth presented an even moreradical account of the feminization. Kronos threw the genitals of hisfather into the ocean and out of the foam arose Aphrodite, a second

female power, which further marginalized the oppressive male. Drivenfrom his central position to the periphery, the autocratic single god isno longer capable of preventing the rise of divine multiplicity. Theintroduction of female deities has opened the door to a new line ofgods. When Kronos, a more reflective representation of Uranoss blind

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power, repeated the habits of his father and devoured his own children,Zeus, the son who had escaped his fathers infanticidal drive, at thenext birth of a sibling swathed a heavy stone in bandages and, in lieuof the infant, fed him to the voracious Kronos.

While the female gods merely weakened the power of the suprememale god in the mythologies of Egypt and Greece, Schelling claims(with insufficient evidence, I think) that in the Assyrian-Babylonian re-ligions the goddesses simply replaced the male god. This dramatic rev-olution did not pass without causing a feeling of guilt in the people forhaving abandoned the old god. Schelling detects a symbol of half-hearted repentance in a selective form of temple prostitution describedby Herodotus. On a day consecrated to Mylitta, the Assyrian goddess,

married women had to surrender themselves, once in a lifetime, to thefirst man who asked them, at any price he offered. Thus the nationattempted to expiate its guilt for allowing itself to be seduced by thenew goddess and thus to break the ancient covenant. Schelling com-pares the motivation of this custom with the charge of adultery by

which the Hebrew prophets denounced Israels turning to foreigngods. In the Book Hosea Yahweh even orders the prophet to marry aprostitute to denounce the peoples adultery with other gods.

The female cults of the Near East were closely linked to the seasonsof nature. Still Schelling rejects a naturalist reading of the myth, as ifit merely symbolized fertility processes. Even the celebrations of theseasons had a spiritual significance, he argues. They prepared an aware-ness of God as all-encompassing Absolute. His interpretation follows anearlier, mainly Neoplatonic tradition. In his treatise of the Egyptianmyth of Isis and Osiris, Plutarch wrote: We oppose all those uncouthminds that so readily equate the activities of the gods either with sea-sonal changes in atmosphere, or with harvest, sowing, or labor in thefields. They speak of the burial of Osiris when the seeding grain liesburied in the earth and of the resurrection and reappearance of Osiris

when the seeds begin to sprout (De Iside et Osiri de, 377B).Nonetheless, the link with nature remained strong. As the religious

consciousness advanced, representations of the divine moved up fromlifeless structures (huge boulders or mountains) to animals whose sen-sitive awareness more directly reflects divine life (ibid., 382A). Even thetheologically progressive Egyptian mythology still abounds with animal

symbols. Those primitive forms never disappear completely. The hu-manized Greek mythology continued to preserve sacred mountains,monsters, and hybrids, not to mention Zeuss animal disguises as aswan, a bull, or a serpent.

In areas where the female victory had been less than absolute or

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where it was eventually overcome, a young male, either god or half-god,entered the scene as a liberator of the oppressed. He mediated betweenthe gods and the people. In Greek mythology this mysterious figure,Dionysus, had been at work long before he received a name and aspecific place in the theogony. A similar god appears in Egyptian, Per-sian, and Phoenician mythologies. Their behavior is identical. The

young god first places himself in the service of the old god who, thoughrelegated to the sidelines, retains much power, at least where he hasnot been replaced by divine matriarchies. Soon the old god comes tosuspect him of undermining his authority and tests his loyalty by im-posing dangerous tasks upon him. Such were the works of Heracles (asimilar half-god, possibly of Phoenician origin). The servant survives

his trials and, through the good works he has accomplished, wins thefavor of the humans whose harsh lot he shared. Yet eventually he iskilled and thereby pacifies the old god. When in some way he is broughtback to life, the old god is finally forced to recognize the power of thenewcomer, even though he may not acknowledge his divinity.

Convinced that all myths followed a common pattern, Schellingtended to equate the various mediating gods of the Near East with theGreek Dionysus. He followed Herodotus, who had referred to the Egyp-tian Osiris and to the Phoenician Melkarth as Dionysus. As long as thefirst god, whom we also call the real god, absolutely closes himself to[the newcomer], the young one cannot appear as god, but only as anunintelligible middle-being between god and men. So he appears asthe hidden god, negated and humbled, who must first merit his divin-ity (13:394). To Schelling, this mediating god prophetically announcesthe God-man of revelation (13:34745). In his famous poem Brot und

Wein, Holderlin had in veiled terms compared Christ to Dionysus: hehad come to proclaim the end of the ancient gods, but to comfort usof their absence, had left us his gifts. Schelling also regards the suffer-ing and dying gods, Dionysus, Melkarth, and Osiris, as prophetic figuresof Christ.

Mythology, then, had been indispensable for discovering the truth ofmonotheism. Yet misinterpreting its instrumental role, humans con-

verted the potencies active in the minds response to the Absolute intoindependent, divine substances. By thus turning the internal forces ofthe mind into gods, they actually arrested the process of religious de-

velopment. Most mythologies remained frozen in the struggle betweenthe two first potencies, as if engaged in an unending fight betweendivinities.

In that respect, Mazdaism, the noble religion of ancient Persia, con-stitutes an exception. Schelling judged it to approach monotheism, as

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he understood the term. Unfortunately, being almost entirely reduced

to Greek sources written well after the founding time of the movement

and long before the substantial changes it underwent in the Sassanian

kingdom, he knew little of the origins of Mazdaism. We now know, or

think we know, that Zarathustra, an Iranian sage who lived some nine

hundred years before the present era, in his poems and sermons con-

verted an old Indo-Iranian collection of beliefs and rituals into a sim-

ple, highly moral religion. His doctrine has often been interpreted as

a dualism in which two ultimate principles, Ormuzd the good and Ah-

riman the evil one, were locked in a permanent struggle. In fact, evil

was to be permanently overcome by the one principle of good. Despite

his inadequate sources, Schelling perceived the monotheistic nature of

Zarathustras thought.

After the prophets death, Mazdaism began to slide toward a com-

mon polytheistic religion. At some point, the supreme god, Ahura-

Mazda (the wise Lord), was believed to have had a female consort,

Anahita. Considering the original purity of the Mazda faith, Schelling

surmises that she may have entered the Persian religion under the in-

fluence of nearby Assyrian-Babylonian female cults. In the Hellenistic

age, when Mazdaism began to be called Zoroastrism (after the Greek

name of its prophet), the young god Mithra, not named in the original

sources but mentioned in the Indian Rg-Veda hymns, came to play a

central role in Iranian mythology. His mediating function may be com-

pared to that of Osiris and Dionysus. A god of light, usually represented

with the sun, he was believed to have overcome the opposition betweenOrmuzds kingdom of light and Ahrimans reign of darkness. Eventu-

ally he appears to have merged with Ahura-Mazda himself and, as all-

inclusive Absolute, to have contained both light and darkness.

As the cult spread during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, a lux-

uriant pantheon grew around the figure of Mithra. But the core of the

myth, the young god who passes (the transitus) through great pain and

dangers to capture and kill the wild bull, remained remarkably stable.

Some scholars have interpreted this bull as the primeval animal, from

whose body sprang plants, grains, and animals to serve human needs.

Others identify the bull with the zodiac figure Taurus that is visible

during the dark period of the year and in the spring must yield to the

new light. In either case, Mithra appears as a humble god who laborsin the service of humans and, after his full divinization, incorporates

the qualities of all gods within himself. Even in this later mythical form

Mazdaism differs from other mythologies in that it bypasses the struggle

between the older and the younger gods. Mithra does not fight Ahura-

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Mazda; he incorporates him. Not without reason does Schelling regard

Mazdaism as having prepared the religions of the future.

The coming of Dionysus and his Phoenician, Egyptian, and Persiancounterparts introduces the third potency, which reconciles the first

and the second. The struggle between the two former principles has

ended in a defeat of the dominant principle (in Greek mythology rep-

resented by Kronos). The dominant godwhether Kronos or Cybele

being exclusive of all others, lacked the complexity of a spiritual reli-

gion. With the advent of the mediating gods, the celestial kingdomacquired a spiritual, that is, a complex, inclusive quality. The new gods

still remain material substances, but they differ from the old ones in

that they directly prepare a different interpretation of the mythological

process. In them the three potencies remain active at each of the threemoments. The struggle against the dominant principle here ends in a

final reconciliation (13:396401).Three religions completed, each in a different way, the cycle of the

potencies: the Egyptian, the Indian, and the Greek. They directly pre-

pared a spiritual monotheism. The Egyptian strongly emphasized the

struggle between the old and the new gods. Here also Herodotus served

as Schellings principal source of information, though Plutarchs trea-

tise on Isis and Osiris assisted him in perceiving some of the meaningof the historians confused narrative. Typhon, comparable to the

Kronos of the Greeks, was originally the god of the desert, who with

burning winds dried up the fertile land. The benevolent Osiris restores

fertility by inundating it with the Nile. Typhon kills the young god and

disperses the members of his body. Isis, Osiriss sister (or bride), col-

lects and reassembles them. Brought back to life, Osiris defeats Typhon

and, according to one version of the myth, kills him, while Isis, who

here appears as Typhons spouse, laments his death. In another version,

Osiris, now Isiss spouse and brother of Typhon, commits adultery with

Typhons wife Nephtys. Isiss changing role in these different versions

illustrates the ambivalence created by the young gods coming: people

prefer him but still fear the old god. In the end the myth takes a sig-

nificant turn: Typhon merges with his young antagonist Osiris and in

this reconciliation the myth reaches what Schelling considers to be the

third potency.

In the Egyptian myth the gods begin to lose their fixed, substantial

identity and to present the impersonal powers of the religious con-sciousness. When Typhon merges with Osiris, he reveals that he was not

the aboriginal oppressive, undifferentiated substance, but merely a po-

tency of Being confronting another potency and bound to unite with

it in a third one. Osiris also gives up his substantial identity in order

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to become a symbol of spiritual unity. At this final stage, the god, aswell as the one with whom he merges, becomes truly the one who mustbe (der sein sollende). The most significant episode in the story is thedispersion of Osiriss limbs. It symbolizes the plurality that must enterinto the true (i.e., all-inclusive) idea of God. It also suggests that tofulfill their ideal function the gods must lay down their earthly lives.Typhon and Osiris, it now appears, were no more than opposite facetsof the same reality. The tension among the mythical characters wasmerely a means to restore the divine unity. The goal is the reparationof the original unity, of the monotheism that was given with the essenceof man and that had to be raised to a higher level [ aufgehoben] in orderto be recognized not as a potential or material [monotheism], but as

an actual unity of God and consciousness (12:374).The Osiris myth seemed headed for a spiritual idea of God. Yet at

the end Egyptian mythology returns to its earlier, material representa-tions, even though the thinking that had motivated the story had al-ready moved well beyond them. Precisely where the myth seems to at-tain its spiritual conclusion, it exposes its permanent inadequacy.Instead of opening up into a vision of the one God who contains allthings within Himself, the myth once again descends into a coarselymaterial representation of the multiplicity of beings immanent in God.

After the concept was ready to assert the spiritual nature of God, thematerial principle intervenes and breaks up the spiritual unity. Theunity dissolves in an abundance of animals and half-animals. With theseanimal gods the myth regresses to an earlier stage when the gods, afraidof Typhon, hid themselves in animal bodies. But the appearance ofdogs, ibises, and hawks seems singularly inappropriate after the com-pletion of the Osiris myth.

The fact that Egyptian religion retained its mythical form allowed itto celebrate the yearly recessions and expansions of the Nile. Mythsdevelop in time, but they never attain a historical ending. The eventsnever cease to repeat themselves. Even the old gods, suppressed fromthe present, never fully disappear. They still enjoy a modest venerationand remain objects of a vague fear. Next to the large temples dedicatedto Horus, the son of Osiris and Isis, who incarnates the third potencyand the end of the mythical struggle, small ones were erected for Ty-phon. Egypt never abandoned its mythology, but constantly corrected

it.Schelling saw one such correction in the existence of agenne`toi (un-

born), premythical or metaphysical gods who, though presented inhuman forms, are products of thought rather than of the mythicalimagination. Among them was Amun, the Zeus of Thebe (as Herod-

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otus calls him), adored in the huge temple of Karnak. Schelling ranks

them with the Sabist cults of the beginning. But their cult continuing

until the Christian era rather seems to indicate that Egyptian religionresists being compressed within his rigorous mythical interpretation.

Schelling regards Vedic mythology also as complete. Its gods rep-

resent all three potencies. Yet, according to the Philosophy of Mythology,

they remain independent of each other and thereby fail to resolve the

tensions that divide them. Brahma, the passionate, rash, and blind god

(12:448), whom Schelling compares to Typhon, has been completelyrelegated to the past. Virtually no temples are dedicated to him, and

he receives little cultic attention. Shiva, the destroyer who replaces him,

never became more than a destructive principle. The religious mind,

dissatisfied with these negative deities, simply moved on to a third, spir-itual godhead, Vishnu, the god of Being (Sattwa) and of light, who

incarnates the third potency but has little to do with the other two godsof the supreme triad.

In Schellings presentation, Indian mythology developed in a direc-

tion opposite to the Egyptian and the Greek. Both continued to main-

tain a cult for the god of the beginning, while Indian religion, aban-

doning the original principle altogether, shifted without transition to

a spiritual principle. It thereby lost the foundational principle, theground of the entire process (13:403). The abrupt move to a spiritual

unity may have satisfied a spiritual elite, but not the ordinary believer.

Indian mythology could not have survived in such a thin spiritual atmo-

sphere, and people reverted to more material gods.

Schellings purely mythological and overly simplistic treatment of

Hinduism fails to account for much in Indian religion that was barely

connected with the three gods. Nor does the alleged independence of

the three principal gods explain the unique status of Hinduism. In fact,

by Schellings own account, a very real relation does exist between

Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu. The balanced, differentiated power of

Vishnu could not exist without Shivas destruction of Brahmas auto-

cratic monism. A text quoted from the Puranas (mostly written be-

tween the first and the tenth century AD) describes their intimate re-

latedness: As light shows a difference, greater or less, according to its

nearness or distance from fire, so is there a variation in the energy of

Brahman [the Absolute, distinct from Brahma, the supreme god].

Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva are his chief energies. . . . Vishnu is thehighest and most immediate of all the energies of Brahman. On him

this entire universe is woven and interwoven: from him is the world and

the world is in him; and he is the whole universe (Vishnu, 1:22).

Let us assume, however, that the link between Vishnu and the other

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two gods is too weak to support Vishnus spiritual piety. Does that ex-

plain why he becomes fragmented into an infinite number of avatars,

as Schelling maintains? In the Puranas Vishnu appears in the guise of

the young shepherd Rama, center of numerous epic compositions, or

of Krishna, the god of the Mahabharatas war and of the epiphany ofthe Bhagavad Gita. The theory of the potencies provides little assistance

for understanding this fragmentation. As for the Vedanta, the mystical

completion of the Veda, it is not so much an interpretation of Indian

mythology as an attempt to free the religious mind of myth altogether.

An even more forceful rejection of mythology appears in Buddhism.

The early, practical Theravada as well as the later, more metaphysicalMahayana abstained from any kind of theogony, as Schelling duly notes.

Was Buddhism a twig of the mythically sober Iranian religion to whichit, particularly in South India, appears close, or did it originate in the

ascetic and/or mystical trends of the Vedanta? In either case it remains

far from the structural principles of the Philosophy of Mythology, although

not more so than Chinese religion, which, by Schellings own admis-sion, possesses neither autochthonous myths nor gods! Rather than at-

tempting an artificial explanation to save his elusive schema, the author

proposes an ingenious hypothesis to account for this absence.

Myth, he had often asserted, requires the conscious identity of a peo-

ple. But the inhabitants of the gigantic Chinese Empire never regarded

themselves as a people, but rather as humanity itself. Their enormous

territory and superior institutions presented no occasion for comparing

themselves with others. Schelling maintains that only with the begin-

ning of a national consciousness do people abandon the primitive state

that precedes mythology. This requires that they reject the exclusive

dominance of the all-encompassing sacred. China followed a different

direction: its people never developed a theogonic rebellion. Instead

they transferred their traditional religious expressions of respect and

submission to the Empire. Not even the idea of heaven, so prominent

in Chinese culture, refers to a transcendent power: it constituted an

integral part of the social universe. Their religio astralis in rem publicam

(12:531) allowed the emperor to rule by the heavenly motions. This

civil religion, in which the secular became sacred, prevented Chinese

culture from passing through a theogonic process to reach self-

consciousness.

Finally, Schelling turns to Greek mythology, the one that had pro-vided the model for his theor y since the early Philosophy of Art. He

regards it as the most spiritual because it immediately prepares the

transition to the true idea of God. He notes that Greek mythology,

more than any other, displays a certain rationality. Hesiods history of

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the gods raised theogony into an intelligible system. A concern for ra-

tionality appears also in Herodotus, who claimed that the Greeks first

gave names to the gods. Yet the religious reason never became abstract.

At every stage, the Greeks recurred to images and often earthy repre -

sentations for expressing an ideal content. This balance between ma-

terial form and spiritual significance gave Greek myths a natural apti-

tude for being turned into poetry. Indeed, they formed the original

content of Greek poetry.

The story of the gods starts with Chaos, an ideal concept as well as a

physical one. From Chaos Hesiod moves directly to Gaia (the Earth),

the first female principle and the source of the mythical process. She

bears Uranos, but also the mountains, the sea, and the Titans, among

them Kronos and Rhea, his future wife. In a second generation, Gaia

bears the Cyclops, whom Zeus later used in his battle against the Titans.

These primitive creatures populated the earth before it became civi-

lized. The Greeks despised them yet never forgot them. They moved

them to the past, but that past remained vitally linked to the present

and even to the future. Thus Kronos, the horrible ancestor, was still

needed to understand Dionysus, the latest of the gods.

In Schellings view, the many gods owed their origin to the disinte-

gration of the one homogeneous reality principle. As Kronos, who pre-

sented that principle, started losing his power, it broke down into a

number of increasingly more spiritual principles, which together

formed a harmonious universe. Greek mythology consists in the soft

death, the true euthanasia of the real principle which, after its depar-ture and demise, still leaves a beautiful, fascinating world of appear-

ances in its place (13:405). The ambiguous figure of Demeter therein

occupies a central position. She stands between the real world of the

past, dominated by the oppressive power of Kronos, and the ideal world

of the future (12:631). Still, the memory of the simple life of the age

of Kronos (in Latin, Saturnus) continued to evoke nostalgia in the

Greek mind. It was remembered as the golden age, a time when no

border stones divided the fields and when the earth was recognized to

be a common possession.

Surprisingly, it was Demeter, the remembrance of the past, who in-

troduced people to agriculture, the beginning of higher civilization.

Indeed, this is how she was commonly remembered. Yet she was muchmore than a seasonal goddess. The Greek mysteries revolved around

her. Obviously, agriculture requires no foundation in mysteries. Nor

was her daughter Persephone, abduc ted to the under world, a mere

image of the seed buried in the ground to reemerge after six months

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as a living plant. While distressedly seeking her daughter, Demeter is,

in Schellings view, looking for the lost god of the beginnings.

The Eleusinian mysteries enact the goddesss erring search, her res-

ignation, and, at last, the advent of her son Dionysus. This god of the

future concluded the mythical cycle, even though at an earlier stageDionysus had very much been part of the polytheistic struggle. He even

had been killed. Yet he had risen to new life and in the end was to

survive all gods. His mother, Demeter, symbolized the transition from

the dominion of the old god, the one who should not be ( der nicht sein

sollte), to the higher potency of the new god who ought to be (der seinsollte) (12:634).

Persephone plays hereby a significant role. The myths relating to

Persephone contain the key to the entire mythologya key providedby mythology itself. . . . The origins of mythology present in the Per-

sephone doctrine move into the innermost depths of human existence

(12:181). She represents the dangerous odyssey of freedom as it begins

to assert itselfwith tragic consequences and eventual compromises.Her life begins in a state of innocence, yet she is vaguely aware of her

ability to move out of this primeval state. As she tests her freedom by

wandering off on her own, the god of the under world abducts her to

his kingdom of darkness. In response to the pleas of her mother, Hades

allows her to spend half a year above ground and half a year with him

in the underworld. Beyond the obvious seasonal reference of the myth

lies a profound awareness of the destiny of freedom, which moves from

innocence to fall to rebirth. Consciousness has to die to its natural life

in order to attain spiritual awareness.

Yet a third god plays a major part in the Eleusinian mysteries: Dio-

nysus. In Greek mythology he appears in three different impersona-

tions. First as the chthonian Zagreus, the wild son of Zeus and Per-

sephone, still very much a figure of the rustic, primitive age. The

second Dionysus, the so-called Theban Bacchus, son of Zeus and the

nymph Semele, incarnates the joy and revelry that accompanies the

liberation from the old god. In his murder (similar to Osiriss) by rag-

ing maenads who tore the limbs off his body, Schelling sees a symbol

of the fragmentation into many gods. It is, however, the third Dionysus,

Iakchos, the son of Zeus and Demeter, who stands central in the mys-

teries (see 13:46583). Iakchos assumes some features of the first and

the second Dionysus. The hierophant still referred to him as Zagreus,and the suffering and death of Bacchus played a considerable part in

the holy ritual. Yet, as we shall see, his significance lies elsewhere. He

is the god of the future.

The mysteries form the transition from mythology to revealed reli-

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gion: in them the esoteric meaning of the myth becomes revealed. De-meter, reconciled to her fate, the loss of Persephone and of the oldgod, resolves the existential tensions represented by the strugglinggods. The dramatic presentation of the mysteries forced the partici-pants to confront the initial terror that lay hidden in the mythical nar-ratives. Yet in the end the initiation promised lasting beatitude afterdeath. The reliving of Persephones descent to Hades concluded in anencounter with the god of life. Hades and Dionysus are one, Plutarchhad cryptically written. While reenacting the mythical events, the mys-teries liberated the initiates from the endless continuance and oppres-sive materiality of the mythical process.

The initiation into the mysteries has often been compared with an

introduction to philosophy. In the Phaedrus, Plato likens the goal ofphilosophy to that of the mysteries, namely, to move from the materialto a spiritual realm where death has no more power over life. Still themysteries contain no philosophy. They have more in common with theGreek tragedy, which was believed to have originated in songs that com-memorated the suffering and death of Dionysus. The classical dramastill began with a sacrifice to the god of the mysteries. All that evokedpity and fear in the tragedy, human fate with its unpredictiveness andinevitable end, the initiates intensely experienced while participatingin the trials of the suffering god.

Why were the mysteries secret? The stories of Demeter and Dionysuswere universally known. Their images appeared everywhere, poets hadsung their adventures, and playwrights had presented them on thestage. So, how could what was publicly known be kept secret? Schellinglinked the secret to Dionysuss third impersonation. Iakchos, thethird Dionysus, popularly depicted as a child at Demeters breast, wascalled the god who comes, the god of the future. That future had toremain secret, for the promise it held of the god who was to bring thetheogonic process to an end threatened not only the national gods butalso the state itself, which rested on them. The mystery was revealedonly to the initiates. Even the gods should not hear about it. It was tobe shown, not told. Whoever betrayed it risked capital punishment.Even Aeschylus, the great dramatist, narrowly escaped death becausehe allegedly had revealed the secret of the mystery when, through themouth of Prometheus, in the play that bore his name, he had predicted

that Zeus would lose his throne.Such was Schellings interpretation of the still unsolved problem of

the secrecy of the mysteries. Today it impresses us as highly speculativeand probably incorrect. The mysteries almost certainly contained noprophecy of future monotheism. At most they may have suggested that

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Dionysus, the god of the future, would bring the ruling divine hierarchy

to an end. Schelling was undoubtedly right, however, about the con-

solation the mysteries brought to the deep-seated melancholy that, de-spite an exuberant vitality, possessed the Hellenic mind. Even in its

most confident creativityindeed, there particularlyone senses a sad

awareness of the irredeemable finitude of existence. The mysteries

promised a better life after death.

Schellings exclusively religious interpretation of the myth has found

scarce approval among contemporary scholars. Indeed, for some, suchas Claude Levi-Strauss, religion has hardly anything to do with myth: it

consists in symbolic models of social structures employed by the savage

mind to justify the existing ones or to promote alternative ones. Levi-

Strausss theory has introduced new elements, but it has left out thereligious significance of myths, which most scholars (particularly Mir-

cea Eliade) continue to recognize in one way or another. Whether ornot the primary significance of the myth is religious does not affect

Schellings thesis, that it constitutes a necessary stage in the minds

development toward transcendence. It prepares the idea of a God who,

rather than excluding finite beings, includes them within Himself.

Schellings decision to build a general theory of myth on the limited

basis of Near Eastern and Greek mythologies, while omitting Oceanian,Germanic, and Slavic ones, is indefensible. Yet what has been most se-

riously attacked from the beginning is the philosophical scheme, in-

sufficiently supported by empirical evidence, within which he has com-

pelled all myths. He thereby weakened the success of his intended

project, namely, to explore the internal logic of the myth.

In his Philosophy of RevelationSchelling attempted to show that Chris-

tianity, the only revelation he considered, was the ultimate goal of my-

thology and the fulfillment of promises implicit in the mysteries. In

that profound but controversial work, he applied the theory of the po-

tencies to Christian monotheism and, once again, gave that theory a

different, trinitarian interpretation. The history of polytheistic religion

is no more than an episode in Gods intratrinitarian drama. It consti-

tutes the first act of the Sons attempt to return humanity to its divine

destination. Before appearing in visible form the Son directs humanity

in its mythical search for a spiritual monotheism. The potencies, which

in various mythologies stood in opposition to one another, thereby

gradually move toward integration and unity. God does not interferewith this essentially natural process, but acts as its natural moving

power. To the ancient Christian claim that the Old Testament prepared

Israel for the appearance of the Messiah, Schelling adds the one that

pagan mythology induced the nations to wait for the god who comes.

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In most mythologies he detects a longing for liberation from a blind,oppressive power. What paganism interpreted as the crushing power ofan ancient god he compares to Luthers wrath of God and to BoehmesUnwill.

To some Romantics, Christianity itself appeared to be no more thana continuation of the myth of the liberating god and Christ a new im-personation of Dionysus. But according to Schelling, one fundamentaldifference separates the Christian revelation from the myth: whereasmyth is entirely a product of the creative imagination, revelation restson a historical basis (14:22933). Sagas and legends may have embel-lished its historical core. But they could do so only because the historypossessed an extraordinary significance. Schelling does not define the

extent to which legend and mythology could infiltrate the sources ofrevelation without jeopardizing the message itself. He admits the pres-ence of mythical elements in the Old Testament. The prophets foughtan unceasing battle against the influence of the myths of the Near East.But he draws a sharp line between the Christian Gospel and the con-tinuing presence of myth in the Hellenistic culture. His unqualifieddefense of the historical truth of Christianity made his theory vulner-able to the attacks of David Friedrich Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and RudolfBultmann.

Contemporary philosophers have objected to Schellings method.Thus Walter Schulz, in a classic study,4 claims that Schellings positivephilosophy remained essentially idealist and as negative as Fichtes

and Hegels. What Schelling ascribes to divine revelation has in factbeen predetermined by the philosophical structure of his own theory.The allegedly real God of revelation still remains the God of philoso-phy. Schelling would probably reply that positive philosophy is indeedphilosophy, but philosophy mediated by faith. Viewed from that per-spective, his positive philosophy might not be essentially differentfrom Anselms fides quaerens intellectum. Still, it would be hard to denythat the theory of potencies, which Schelling imposes upon revelation,basically determines the nature of its content. What at the beginningstill appears to be a method for understanding the content of mythol-ogy and revelation soon turns into the content itself. Symptomatic ofthis domination by philosophy is that Schelling unreservedly equatesthe Christian idea of reconciliation with the philosophical category of

mediation.Our final judgment on the Philosophy of Mythology, then, must remain

4Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der S patphilosophie Sc hellings (Pful-lingen: Neske, 1975).

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a conditional one. To the extent that Schellings theory assumed a gen-uinely receptive attitude with respect to myth and revelation, ratherthan predetermining it by philosophical categories, we may regard itas legitimate. But the traditional name of such an enterprise has beentheology, not philosophy. To the extent that philosophy a priori definesthe limits of mythology and revelationas it definitely did in the theory

of the potenciesit was indeed philosophy, but not positivephilosophy.

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