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Politiques urbaines de transitions énergétiques et changements politico-institutionnels

Etudes de cas européennes (Stockholm, Londres, Paris-IDF)

et implications prospectives

Olivier Coutard et Jonathan Rutherford

avec la collaboration de Camille Gillet*

LATTS, Université Paris-Est

(* Elève ENSTA et KTH (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm), stagiaire au Latts)

Lettre de commande 09PVSE005 notifiée le 22 septembre 2009

Rapport pour le programme de recherche « Repenser les villes dans une société post-carbone » de l’ADEME et la Mission Prospective du MEEDDM

Septembre 2010

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Table des matières

1. Locating urban energy transitions* .................................................................................................. 5 1.1. Energy transitions and the politics of systemic sustainability transformation processes: the other half of ‘factor 4’ ..................................................................................................................................... 6 1.2. Focus and research questions .................................................................................................................... 7

2. Stockholm .................................................................................................................................................. 9 2.1. Energy and climate policies in Sweden and Stockholm .................................................................. 9 2.2. Analysis of Interactions Between Energy Transition Policies and Politics in Stockholm ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 18 2.3. The District Heating System in Stockholm ........................................................................................ 29 2.4. Discussion and Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 43

3. Londres .................................................................................................................................................... 47 3.1. It all starts in Woking ................................................................................................................................. 47 3.2. From Woking to London... ........................................................................................................................ 49 3.3. Institutional and national context ......................................................................................................... 55

4. Paris – Ile-de-France ........................................................................................................................... 61 4.1. Le dispositif français énergie-climat depuis les années 2000 ................................................... 61 4.2. La politique énergie-climat en région Île-de-France ..................................................................... 66 4.3. Politiques Energie-Climat régionales : enjeux et tensions .......................................................... 74 4.4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 81

Conclusions et perspectives de recherche ...................................................................................... 84 Bibliographie ............................................................................................................................................. 88

General ...................................................................................................................................................................... 88 Stockholm ................................................................................................................................................................ 90 Paris ........................................................................................................................................................................... 94

Appendix A. The metropolitan areas under study: basic data ................................................. 96 London ...................................................................................................................................................................... 96 Paris - Ile-de-France ............................................................................................................................................ 97 Stockholm ................................................................................................................................................................ 98 Energy and greenhouse gas emissions in Ile-de-France, London and Stockholm .................. 100

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1. Locating urban energy transitions*

―It‘s only when you start doing emissions reductions rather than talking about doing them that the whole politics starts to shift…‖ (Allan Jones, Woking and LCCA).

The idea that we need to shift our energy provision and consumption systems onto more sustainable pathways that take into account the constraints associated with climate change, peak oil, resource security and energy affordability currently has great currency and purchase among both the scientific and the policymaker/practitioner communities. The dominant technological focus of the discussion is increasingly complemented by an interest in how urban, housing and transport policies as well as changes in social practices may contribute to this shift. At stake also is the scale of apprehension of energy issues.

Although energy systems are defined and conceptualised mainly on national and supranational levels, overlapping contexts of liberalised markets, borderless climate change, fiscal crises in the public sector, etc. mean that environmental/energy governance is being consistently rescaled, downwards as well as upwards, within a multi-level governance framework (see Bulkeley 2005; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005). Some work has begun therefore to explore the possible or actual roles that cities and regions can play in this systemic transformation process (Hodson and Marvin 2009; Monstadt 2007). In a policy context where urban areas are often held to be responsible for a high proportion of energy consumption and CO2 emissions (but see Satterthwaite 2008; Dodman 2009), this work has recognised that many city and regional governments are strategically positioning themselves in this policy domain as major actors in ‗energy transitions‘.1

Even a quick perusal of the current urban and environmental policy documents of many European city regions reveals an apparently renewed enthusiasm and engagement of local and regional actors for playing a major part in any transformation of currently unsustainable energy systems.2 It is also clear that as centres of population, business, industry and innovation, cities have strategic ‗value‘ both in terms of their environmental ‗weight‘ and the potential they offer for developing and trialling sustainable solutions. There is then increasing recognition of the need for action at the level of the city/region, a policy level which is closer to users/consumers and more attuned to local conditions, rendering the stakes more pertinent and contextualised, and thereby offering, in theory, the possibility of more effective policies. From an analytical angle, an urban/regional perspective offers the benefit of situating processes and practices of socio-technical change (or resistance to change) in relation to specific, ‗local‘ contexts – even though these contexts are themselves constructed relationally through their links to other, more or less distant, spaces (see Amin and Thrift 2002; Massey 2005). We argue that this perspective can allow for a more ‗co-evolutionary‘ understanding of how the ‗social‘, the ‗technical‘ and the ‗environmental‘ are inherently intertwined through the multiple practices of, and relations between, different actors.

* Les différentes sections de ce rapport sont rédigées tantôt en anglais, tantôt en français, selon le rédacteur principal.

1 In the literature (summarized by Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), this relevance is postulated on the basis of four main arguments: (a) cities are large energy consumers and big emitters of CO2 and waste, (b) policymakers in cities have already been generally quite enthusiastic and able in acting on energy and climate issues, (c) local authorities are major players in the coordination of action among all partners in cities (population, public actors, private actors), (d) they have the means or levers of action, particularly with regard to urban or regional planning, transport, waste management and energy (see also Alber and Kern ‗Governing Climate Change in Cities: Modes of Urban Climate Governance in Multi-level Systems‘ (41449602.pdf)).

2 See for example the Paris municipality‘s Climate Plan (Mairie de Paris 2007), the Mayor of London‘s Energy Strategy (Mayor of London 2004), or the City of Stockholm‘s Action Plan against Greenhouse Gases (City of Stockholm 2003).

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1.1. Energy transitions and the politics of systemic sustainability transformation processes: the other half of ‘factor 4’

The ongoing evolution and transformation in energy policy at different scales has been a recurring focus for research (see for example Lovell 2008; Verbong et al 2008; Raven and Verbong 2007; Jacobsson et al 2004; Elliott 2006). Some of this work has adopted a socio-technical transitions perspective to understand and analyse the complex, interacting conditions under which various new or ‗niche‘ technologies and techniques are (or might be) diffused throughout society (cf. Schot and Geels 2008). Although questions of agency, power and governance have consistently been an important element in socio-technical transitions research (see Smith et al 2005; Voss et al 2006), the politics of transitions have been argued by some authors to have been understated. Two main critiques have been developed.

First, it has been argued that the dynamics and practices associated with socio-technical transitions are overly portrayed as cosily consensual, elite-driven, and with few, if any, visibly negative externalities, implications or consequences for wider social groups outside the process (see Shove and Walker 2007). Some recent work on systemic socio-technical change has begun to draw out the politics and inter-actor power relations, which, almost inevitably, underpin (and more often than not obstruct or slow down) transition processes (see Meadowcroft 2009; Avelino and Rotmans 2009; Scrase and Smith 2009).3 Meadowcroft offers a convincing critique of transition management from a politically framed perspective and argues that it is actually the political nature and implications of the choices and directions involved in societal change which link together or mediate the different components of change. Reminding us that ‗transitions‘ in general, and energy transitions in particular, imply not just a starting point and a complex, dynamic process, but also an ‗arrival‘ at a ‗new equilibrium‘, he argues that ―this image of a decisive switch may exaggerate the potential for closure in what is likely to be a very messy and open ended process‖ (Meadowcroft 2009, 328).

Second, and more importantly, there has been a quite fundamental divergence of opinion over where boundaries should be drawn in relation to stakeholders in transition processes. Discussions of the governance or ‗management‘ of socio-technical transitions have more often than not been considered exclusively within the quite narrow boundaries drawn loosely but identifiably around the set of (regime) actors participating actively in steering the desired transformation process. The impacts of this exercise of power on stakeholders and social groups outside these boundaries have been less deserving of attention, as has any debate and dissent surrounding what desirable change (i.e. the goals and objectives of sustainable policy-making) might (and might not) be. As Shove and Walker put it: ―our concerns about the ‗winners and losers‘ in transition processes relate not to businesses who do or do not emerge as leaders of the pack, but rather to the very many social actors and bystanders whose lives and interests are wrapped up in processes of transition-managed sociotechnical change‖ (Shove and Walker 2008, 1012).

In short what is argued is that the politics of transitions have been insufficiently addressed. In this report we would like to contribute to the (re)politicising of transitions research through a change of focus. The report examines and discusses energy transition policies, which can be defined as the policies aimed at fostering radical/systemic change to sustain energy-climate objectives, e.g. so-called ‗factor 4‘ policies.4 We share the commonly-held view, among policy makers in particular,

3 In contrast, many current dominant discourses on sustainable development evacuate politics, conflict and the diversity of positions and viewpoints in favour of an eternal search for consensus and unanimity. For example, in the conclusions to a European Commission seminar on the post-carbon society it is argued that ―Effective action depends upon shared normative visions of the future and agreement about the means to get there‖ (European Commission 2007, 47).

4 The original concept of ‗factor 4‘ proposed a dramatic increase in resource efficiency/productivity to sustain greater levels of energy production while using/consuming half the resources (see von Weizsacker et al 1997). It has

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that energy transitions at whatever scale (European, national, regional, local) cannot in fine just be concerned with bringing about a socio-technical transition within the energy sector, whether it be, for example, increasing the market share of photovoltaic electricity or biomass, or promoting a ‗hydrogen economy‘. Social practices and the structural factors and policies which shape these practices (forms of urban organisation, ‗green taxes‘, housing and transport policies...) are central to how energy transitions play out in any given context. They are, in this regard, the other half of ‗factor 4‘ policies, as without action aimed at these elements there is little chance of radical change taking place whatever the time scale.

This change in focus from socio-technical to energy transitions implies that the policy issues at stake are also changed. Energy transition policies may include, for example, the promotion of energy efficiency in existing or new buildings, the articulation between transport and land use, as well as the coordination and ‗division of labour‘ between all kinds of institutions. Thus, the key actors, processes, priorities, conflicts and issues involved in this ensemble of policies differ to a significant extent from those involved in, for example, technological niche management aimed at promoting the diffusion of geothermal technologies. Radical transformations and innovations are required across social, economic, political, and cultural, as well as technical domains (Giddens 2009). In light of this, we conceptualise energy transitions as political processes in/through which ideas and interests diverge, socio-technical choices can never be unanimous, and the policies which are decided upon and implemented always necessarily produce ‗losers‘ as well as ‗winners‘. In this regard, it is notable that much of the recent work promoting more systemic understandings of energy transitions has also been focused on change at, or from the perspective of, the urban/regional level (Hodson and Marvin 2009; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Rohracher and Späth 2009). This focus may well be one way of moving between socio-technical transition and energy transition perspectives, thus going beyond concern for technological innovation and diffusion to concentrate on the socio-economic and political factors at play in systemic sustainability transformation processes.

1.2. Focus and research questions

In a European context, increasing recognition of the need for action in the energy and climate domain is apparent in many metropolitan regions. In recent years, a host of urban/regional actors and institutions have identified that transformation of (regional) energy systems onto a more sustainable track is both desirable and necessary. Medium to long term goals have been set for reducing CO2 emissions (e.g. 75% reductions by 2030 from the 1990 level in Ile-de-France (Région Ile-de-France 2008); 60% reductions by 2025 from the 1990 level in London (Mayor of London 2010); 44% reductions by 2015 from the 1990 level and a ―fossil fuel free city‖ by 2050 in Stockholm (Stockholms Stad 2010)), and increasing the share of renewables in regional energy mixes (e.g. in Ile-de-France towards the 20-25% target for 2020 set by the Grenelle de l'Environnement in 2007; a 25% share for low/zero carbon decentralised energy in London‘s energy supply by 2025 (Mayor of London 2010); a 50% share for biofuels in district heating production in Stockholm by 2015 (Stockholms Stad 2010)). Yet, in spite of these ambitious goals, in many regions it is striking that actual material energy policy actions are so far very limited in their approach and reach. This gap or deficit between discourse and action raises questions about the capacities of urban/regional policymakers to work concretely towards realising these goals, where their work is actually located in policy circles, and how it intersects with the (diverging) positions and practices of other actors (e.g. among local authorities themselves, with national government, or with private sector interests). Thus, by analysing the forms and implications of

been adapted in policy circles, notably in France, to refer to policies which aim for a fourfold division of greenhouse gas emissions (1990 levels) over coming decades (generally to 2050).

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energy-related policy change (proposed or actual) on an urban/regional level and the tensions between actors involved in or concerned by these policies, the aim of this report is to explore the different socio-political geographies through which systemic transformations such as energy transitions are filtered, and how these comprise differing understandings of what sustainable urban/regional development should or could be.

Our research explores the overarching question of how and to what extent urban energy transition processes affect and at the same time are affected by political and institutional changes.

To engage with this question, we study three dimensions:

How energy and climate issues and policy responses have influenced political and institutional change

How political and institutional change has affected energy transition policies

The changing variety of tools, instruments and administrative organization measures that have been and are being used to implement energy transition policies

In looking across the three metropolitan regions, we will highlight the prospective implications of this ―politicisation‖ of energy transition processes. In particular, we will consider: (a) whether energy transition and climate change issues are producing a new reference point for collective action, thus guaranteeing stability of actions in spite of institutional changes and political vicissitudes, and (b) the extent to which particular modes of action, tools and priority targets appear either relatively vulnerable or relatively resistant to political and institutional fluctuations.

The three metropolitan regions chosen are London, Paris/Ile-de-France and Stockholm. These are three fairly distinct urban regions in terms of institutional architecture, socio-political configurations, and collective concern for environmental issues.

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2. Stockholm*

2.1. Energy and climate policies in Sweden and Stockholm

2.1.1. Swedish National Context

General Organisation – Multi Level Decision Making

The Swedish decision-making system is a three-level system with two dominant levels which are the state and the municipalities. In between there is the regional scale which is much weaker when it comes to power and to foreign investments (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15).

At the national level the Swedish people are represented by the parliament (Riksdag), which has a legislative power. The Government implements decisions taken by the parliament and is assisted in its work by Government offices, the ministries. The Government has a very important role in Sweden because it has the power to decide on every big infrastructure investment; the Government is the one in the end taking the decision, not the minister concerned. The ministries are quite small in Sweden: they have only a hundred of employees. This is due to the existence of around 300 state agencies or administrations (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009) which are quite important: for example the Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten), the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket), the Swedish Road Administration (Vägverket), the Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (Luftfartsverket), the Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket)… They operate the practical work dictated by the State and they receive money for that purpose.

Then at the regional level Sweden is divided into 21 counties and political tasks are undertaken by the county council, whose decision makers are directly elected by the people of the county in general elections. The operations of the county councils are financed by government grants and county council taxes and charges. There is also the County Administrative Board led by a governor who is nominated by the government and who therefore represents the state authority on the regional scale. At the regional level there are also some public authorities such as health and medical care or public transport.

Finally at the local level there are 290 municipalities. Each municipality has an elected assembly, the municipal council, which takes decisions on municipal matters. The municipal council appoints the municipal executive board, which leads municipality work. Operations are financed by local taxes, government grants, and charges. Municipalities have the planning monopoly and decide everything when it comes to physical structures. Of course the County Administrative Board or the Government can interfere and sometimes they overrule municipalities‘ decisions, but it‘s very rare; the municipalities have an important power when it comes to housing, local infrastructures, technical systems, water management, green structures…. There is also an organisation called the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) which deals with social issues, education, planning, climate and environment for example. It is a politically controlled organisation, but not an authority (SALAR, 2009). These three levels of the Swedish model of government administration can be explained by Figure 2.1.

* Cette section reprend pour l‘essentiel le mémoire réalisé par Camille Gillet pour le KTH (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm), sous la direction de Jonathan Rutherford.

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Figure 2.1: The three levels of the Swedish model of government administration.

Source : Michael Viehhauser, Office of Regional Planning

In the Stockholm region, the County Council is in charge of regional planning, which is particular to Stockholm since its relative importance compared to other regions. The Office of Regional Planning (Regioneplanskontoret - RTK) collaborates very much with the Stockholm region‘s municipalities, but also with the state agencies and administrations which belong partly to the regional level. They also work together with the County Administrative Board and SALAR because ―they have a good structure to meet the politicians from the municipalities (…) and we often see that it is necessary to cooperate‖ (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15). Because of the planning monopoly held by municipalities, the Office of Regional Planning has to cooperate with them:

―In the plan we [Office of Regional Planning] work at the regional level saying that we have a more holistic view, whereas municipalities look only at their territory. So when we meet them, even if there was a long dialogue process in the plan, there are still things where we don‘t agree on, because we have a wider perspective and we say that some things should be done in another way that the municipalities think and they have the last word. But they must understand that there are some things that are bigger than the municipalities.‖ (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15)

Two State Agencies: the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency

This section aims at briefly presenting two state agencies which are important in the shaping and implementation of environmental and climate policies.

The Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten) is a government agency for national energy policy issues; it has around 250 employees (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). The agency has four departments: energy analysis department, energy technology department, energy efficiency department and market development department. The agency is a major financer of research and development in Sweden and produces knowledge about supply, conversion, distribution and use of energy for investigations ordered by the Government. At the moment, one of the major

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agency‘s focuses is on improving energy efficiency, because ―established climate changes and increasing energy prices make it even more important to use energy more efficiently‖ (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). This work on energy efficiency is applied in one of the agency‘s most important programmes at the moment called ―The Sustainable Municipality‖. This programme for a Sustainable Municipality is a cooperation between the Agency and more than one fifth of Sweden‘s municipalities. It is based on the participating municipalities' ambitions to make their local communities more sustainable. The Swedish Energy Agency contributes with knowledge, information and networks which facilitate and make the work done by each municipality more efficient (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009).

The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket) is the national agency for environmental protection and nature conservation as well as outdoor recreation and hunting issues. Its key tasks are to present proposals for environmental policy and legislation to the Swedish Government and ensure that environmental policy decisions are implemented. The Swedish EPA supplies expert knowledge and proposals to central government in its national, EU and international work on environmental issues. Nationally the Agency regulates, sets standards and acts as a guide, coordinator and evaluator. Funded by central government, the Swedish EPA is an independent authority acting on the basis of a government ordinance that defines its terms of reference (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). Among other responsibilities, the Swedish EPA evaluates the effectiveness of different measures in attaining the National Environmental Quality Objectives and proposes new measures where necessary.

Environmental Work

Environmental work in Sweden and specifically climate change policy, is firstly shaped by the European environmental work, which fits itself into the international environmental framework. Over a decade ago an international treaty was signed by most countries: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the European Community and 37 industrialised countries signed an addition to the treaty, the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is a legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and entered in force in February 2005. It requires the 15 countries that were EU members when it was signed in 1997 ('EU-15') to reduce their collective emissions in the 2008-2012 period to 8% below 1990 levels (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2010). In 2000 the European Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), which led to the adoption of policies and measures such as the EU Emissions Trading System5. In 2007 EU leaders endorsed an integrated approach to climate and energy policy and committed to cut European emissions by at least 20% of 1990 levels by 2020 (EUROPA, 2010).

Sweden started its work with general environmental issues quite early compared to other countries. The first important world conference on environment was held in Stockholm in 1972, 40 years ago, ―and this was the very starting point I would say which influenced a lot of stakeholders here‖ (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15). The Swedish EPA started very early, it was created in 1967 (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009), where other countries did not really care yet about environmental issues. Sweden has had these institutions for three or four decades now and this has significance on how advanced environmental work is. Then with the entrance of Sweden in 1995 in the European Community, this was even accelerated because of European grants enabling more environmental projects and research. A regional planner working at the Office of Regional Planning tells about Sweden‘s early environmental work:

5. EU ETS is an emissions trading scheme under which large emitters of carbon dioxide within the EU must monitor and annually report their CO2 emissions, and they are obliged every year to return an amount of emission allowances to the government that is equivalent to their CO2 emissions in that year (EUROPA, 2010).

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―I‘ve worked here [in Sweden] since 1997, I‘m from Germany, and I was involved in the very first so to say climate project, and the Kyoto Protocol played a role in converting the bus fleet, building logistic centres in more energy efficient housing, etc. so I would say this says a lot, we have reduced our emissions per capita by 12% between 1990 and 2005.‖ (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15)

When it comes to why Sweden started so early to work with environmental issues, I always heard this answer that Sweden ―always‖ had a tradition of taking care of its environment and natural areas. The reason could be ―this 200 year-old tradition that you are allowed to go in the nature, to pick the berries (…) even if you don‘t own the land‖ (Stockholm City Development Administration, interview, 2010-02-16). This Swedish Right of Public Access is called ―Allmansrätten‖ in Swedish and is an important part of Swedish cultural heritage.

In 2002, Sweden elaborated a Climate Strategy and set some objectives in this Bill. Concerning carbon dioxide, ―Swedish emissions of greenhouse gases are to be at least 4 per cent lower in 2010 than they were in 1990‖ (Ministry of the Environment, 2003).

In 2009 decisions were taken on a new climate and energy policy. The target is for Swedish greenhouse gas emissions, from activities not included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, to decrease by 40 per cent by 2020 (in comparison with 1990). This means that emissions must decrease by around 20 million tonnes, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents. Emissions reductions need to take place principally in the transport sector, from housing, waste management, agriculture and forestry, aquaculture and other parts of industry (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). Next to this Climate Strategy, Sweden has set goals for the future for its environment. These goals are constructed around the 16 ―Environmental Quality Objectives‖, which are for example: reduced climate impact, clean air, a non-toxic environment, a good built environment, etc. These objectives describe the quality of the environment Sweden wants to achieve by 2020 and all of them have been translated to regional and local objectives to create coherence between the different decision making levels.

• The Carbon Dioxide Tax

The carbon dioxide tax was introduced in Sweden in 1991 and it ―has played a considerable part in reducing effects on the climate in a socio economically effective manner‖ (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). It is levied on the emitted quantities of carbon dioxide from all fuels except biofuels and peat and it is intended to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels. In 2009 it reached a level of 105 öre per kg of carbon dioxide. The introduction of carbon dioxide tax has given biofuels a favoured position. Their use increased substantially in 2008, to almost 22 % more than in 2007, so that they supplied no less than 71 % of the total fuel input (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009):

―I think it was an important step forward because when the carbon tax was introduced then there were some investments in wind power, CHP plants, bio fuels and so on. (…) I think that the carbon tax was an important action and I don‘t think that the price level was the most important aspect, but just the fact that it was introduced, because the price was not so high at the beginning; but it created a consensus on climate policies.‖ (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20)

What is interesting here is the fact that the carbon dioxide tax was introduced in 1991 in Sweden, which is quite early, and that only five other countries or cities in the word at the moment have introduced it: Finland in 1990, Great Britain in 2001, where it is called ―climate change levy‖, Boulder (Colorado, United States) in 2007, Quebec in 2007 and British Columbia in 2008 (Carbon Tax Center, 2009). And apparently it was not so difficult to introduce the carbon tax in

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Sweden (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20): Sweden at that time was already not so dependent on coal because of the use of nuclear power and because of the fact that Sweden does not have any natural resource of coal, gas or oil. Coal was mostly used for electricity production, and this was not taxed at all. Therefore there was no resistance from the energy companies and nor from the district heating companies. Actually, the change for district heating companies was quite small because they had already gone very far on the reduction of fossil fuel (Swedish District Heating Association, interview, 2010-05-05).

When the carbon tax was introduced, the Social Democrats were the majority in power at the government ―but everybody wanted it‖ (Swedish District Heating Association, interview, 2010-05-05). According to the interviewee, the carbon tax encouraged people to be more creative. Indeed when the Government introduced the tax, they did not mention what should be used instead of oil, therefore the district heating producers had to find an alternative. For example, they started using waste to produce energy or the surplus heat from heavy industry, which provides hot water. Nowadays district heating producers burn bio oils and bio liquids which are coming as waste from industry; and they can be imported from anywhere because it has no values in other countries

• The Congestion Charge

The Stockholm congestion charge is a traffic congestion and environmental tax that has been imposed on the majority of vehicles in Stockholm; it is the second of its kind to be introduced in Europe following the London Congestion Charge introduced by the London Mayor, Ken Livingstone.

The Stockholm congestion charge was first introduced as a trial between 3 January 2006 and 31 July 2006. A referendum on the future of the congestion charge was held in September 2006; the residents of Stockholm municipality approved, and 14 other municipalities rejected the proposal to implement it permanently. In October 2006, the Swedish Government declared that the Stockholm congestion charge was to be introduced permanently during the first half of 2007. The income was supposed to be used to finance public transport in the Stockholm region but is now to be used partly to finance a new bypass road, ―Förbifart Stockholm‖ after the election of the Moderates/Alliance in 2006. The Swedish Road Administration is the body responsible for the administration of the charge and its systems. With this congestion charge, emissions of fossil carbon dioxide in the city have decreased by about 4 % since 2006 (SLB Analys, 2009).

• The Klimp Investment Programmes

The Swedish Government‘s support to Climate Investment Programmes, ―Klimp‖, is a tool for reaching the Swedish climate objective as formulated in the Swedish climate strategy in 2002. Klimp has enabled municipalities and other local actors to receive grants for long-term investments that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The grants have been distributed five times by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency between 2003 and 2008. The Government (Moderates/Alliance) has no plans to make any further grants. The investments are estimated to reduce emissions by 1.1 million tons of carbon dioxide per year (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009), which corresponds to about a third of the Swedish climate objective, which is to cut the level of greenhouse gas emissions by four percent over the period 2008-2012 compared to the 1990 level. Between 2003 and 2008, Klimp funding of SEK 1.8 billion was granted for 126 climate investment programmes. The grants have been invested in 67 municipalities, seven municipal associations, five county councils and four companies in all counties throughout Sweden. The City of Stockholm received in 2008 29.6 million Swedish Kronor in grants from the Environmental Protection Agency to local climate investments, which include investments in district heating and biogas (City of Stockholm, 2009). See Figure 2.2 for the repartition of the grants between the different sectors.

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Figure 2.2: Klimp 2003-2008, grants per sector.

Source: Swedish EPA's website: http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Menu/Legislation-and-other-policy-instruments/Economic-instruments/Investment-Programmes/Climate-Investment-Programmes-Klimp/

Statistics – Results

In 2008, Sweden emitted 64 million tonnes of greenhouse gases. Compared with 2007, this is a decrease of almost 2.2 million tonnes. Emissions are around 11.7 per cent below 1990 levels (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). See Figure 2.3 below to see the evolution of greenhouse gas emissions in Sweden from 1990 to 2008.

Figure 2.3: Greenhouse gas emissions in Sweden 1990-2008.

Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009

The greatest reductions in emissions over the period took place in the residential and service, agriculture, waste and some industrial sectors. Greenhouse gas emissions from the residential and service sector have decreased since 1990 due to a change from individual heating with oil to district heating, heat pumps and biomass fuels. Besides, the waste that was previously sent to landfill is now largely incinerated for district heating production.

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Conversely, emissions from the transport sector have had an increasing trend during the period 1990–2008 and were higher in 2008 than in 1990. It is freight transport in particular that is accounting for the increase, with the volume of transport following the trend in the national economy. The emissions have however been at about the same level since 2005 (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2009).

2.1.2. The Stockholm Context

Political Organisation – How the City is Governed

The City Council is the City‘s supreme decision-making body and is Stockholm‘s own ―parliament‖. The 101 councillors are appointed following general elections held at the same time as the parliamentary and county council elections. The City Council establishes goals and guidelines for the overall work of the municipality. The matters on which the councillors decide have generally already been drafted and discussed by various boards and committees. Once political decisions are referred for practical implementation, the employees of the City administrations and companies take over. If the Council functions as Stockholm‘s parliament, the City Executive Board can be thought of as its ―government‖. The City Executive Board expresses an opinion in all matters decided by the Council and bears the overall responsibility for ensuring that its decisions are executed, followed-up and evaluated. The Board is also responsible for the City‘s financial administration and long-term development. The City Executive Board consists of 13 members who represent both the majority and the opposition.

The City‘s political organisation also comprises eight Governing Vice Mayors who are full-time politicians and are appointed by the City Council. Each Vice Mayor is head of an administrative division (e.g. Environmental and Traffic Division). There are also four Oppositional Vice Mayors. Together, the Vice Mayors form the Council of Mayors. The work of the Council of Mayors is headed by the Finance Commissioner, who chairs both the Council of Mayors and the City Executive Board (City of Stockholm's Executive Office, 2010).

Concerning the political situation in the City of Stockholm, there are two big parties, two middle-sized and some small parties. The big ones are the Social-Democrats and the Moderates (former Conservative party); the middle-sized ones are the Liberals and the Left Party, while the smaller ones consist of the Green party, the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party and the local Stockholm Party. On a left-right axis the Moderates find themselves on the right, closely followed by the Liberals, while the Left Party is located on the left side. The Green Party claims to be in the middle, but frequently votes with the left. To form a majority it is necessary to have at least three parties in the coalition. If there is a victory for the left this means that the Social-Democrats have to agree on a political platform with the Left and Green parties. If there is a victory for the right the Moderates have to form a coalition with the Liberals and one of the small parties to the centre-right (Vestbro, 2004). Elections occur every four years in Stockholm and the coalition has been shifting at each election in recent years from left-green (1994-1998) to right (1998-2002) to left-green (2002-2006) to right (2006-2010) (Statistics Sweden, 2008). Therefore the party ruling during the period the interviews were conducted (between January and June 2010) was the Moderate Party, in alliance with the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party. The general elections in September 2010 confirmed the Moderates in office.

Stockholms Stad – City of Stockholm

The City of Stockholm‘s work is supported by different administrations. Here is a presentation of the most relevant ones for this study:

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Stockholm City Development Administration (Exploateringskontoret): this administration leads the work on the implementation of the plans related to the physical environment in Stockholm. This means the management, development and exploitation of the city's land.

Environment and Health Administration (Miljöförvaltningen): this department is responsible for the environment in the City of Stockholm and this can range from traffic to water issues, chemicals, air quality and hygiene. One of the administration‘s main tasks is monitoring the effects of measures taken by the City. They also work with Stockholm‘s environmental programme and with information campaigns towards citizens.

City Planning Administration (Stadsbyggnadskontoret): this department is responsible for the elaboration of strategies for the city‘s overall development. Their most important task is to ―promote an attractive and well-functioning city with attractive and functional buildings and urban environment‖ (City of Stockholm, 2010).

Environmental Work - Stockholm’s Action Programmes against Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Since 1995, Stockholm has actively endeavoured to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in conjunction with which two action programmes against greenhouse gas emissions have been carried out (1995-2000 and 2000-2005). The target of the Environmental Plan for Stockholm (1995-2000) was, by the year 2000, not to exceed the level recorded in 1990 for greenhouse gas emissions from electricity, heating and transportation, which was achieved (4.5 tonnes per capita and per year compared in 2000 compared to 5.4 tonnes per capita and per year in 1990). In the second action plan adopted in 2003, a new target specified that greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced to 4.0 tonnes per capita by the year 2005, which was achieved as well (City of Stockholm, 2010).

In 1995, at the same time as the first plan was adopted, a decision to join the ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) campaign ―Cities for Climate Protection‖ (CCP) was made. Since then, the City of Stockholm has systematically worked to comply with the five milestones of CCP:

- Conduct a baseline emissions inventory and forecast

- Adopt an emissions reduction target for the forecast year

- Develop a local action plan

- Implement policies and measures

- Monitor and verify results

At the end of the programme, when the actions have been implemented, a follow-up of the process and results is carried out (City of Stockholm, 2009).

A new programme has been released this year, in 2010: ―Stockholm action plan for climate and energy 2010-2020‖. Even if the name changed, the structure remains the same as the two previous plans: what has been done and achieved until now; what is the expected development for the different sectors, taking into account the ongoing and planned measures; and what are the conceivable measures.

In the City of Stockholm, the emissions of greenhouse gases from traffic, electricity and heating are estimated to have decreased by over 24% between 1990 and 2009. During the same period, the population of Stockholm has increased by 22%, therefore the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is estimated to be 38% per resident between 1990 and 2009 (City of Stockholm, 2010). It is the City‘s target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 3.0 tonnes per capita by the year 2015 (cf. Figure below).

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Figure 2.4: Different scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in the City of Stockholm per capita between the years 1990 and 2020.

Source: Stockholms Stad, 2010:4

The City‘s long term goal is to be fossil fuel-free by 2050 (see Figure below).

Figure 2.5: the City's climate targets.

Source: City of Stockholm, 2010:9

The City of Stockholm is clear when it comes to why such an important reduction of greenhouse gas emissions has been possible: it is mainly thanks to the expansion of district heating in the city: ―In an increasing number of properties, oil and gas-fired boilers are being replaced by district heating and heat pumps. This is the single largest reason for the decrease in emissions in Stockholm. Today, district heating is being produced with almost 80% renewable energy sources or energy from residual waste or residual waste heat. The district heating system covers over 80% of Stockholm‘s total heating needs.‖ (City of Stockholm, 2010:11). The other main reasons for this reduction of greenhouse gas emissions are energy-efficiency improvement in buildings, production of district cooling, clean vehicles and renewable fuels, congestion tax and investments in public transport (City of Stockholm, 2010). Figure 2.6. shows the share of greenhouse gas emissions in the heating, electricity and transport sectors for the city of Stockholm.

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Figure 2.6: Share of emissions by sector in Stockholm, 2007.

Source: City of Stockholm, 2010:12

Now that the overall picture of the national and local contexts has been given, let us listen to what the different actors said during the interviews; and let us analyse their discourse, keeping in mind the main question of this study: what are the interactions between energy transition policies and politics?

2.2. Analysis of Interactions Between Energy Transition Policies and Politics in Stockholm

2.2.1. Influence of Environmental and Climate Concerns on the Society

Environment and climate change concerns gain more and more interest nowadays in people‘s minds. This increased importance has an influence on institutions and administrations, and can be seen through their day-to-day work and their general organisation.

Increased Awareness Among the Society

An overall conclusion from the interviews is that there is an increasing awareness and concern about climate change and environmental issues among the Swedish public opinion. And something which can prove this statement advanced by the interviewees is this study led by the Swedish EPA and reported by The Local (newspaper giving Sweden‘s news in English): ―Swedes claim climate conscience‖. The results show that 9 in 10 Swedes consider themselves conscious of climate issues and half suffer a guilty conscience when their actions impact negatively on the environment. More precisely: Of the 1,000 Swedes polled in the survey 89 percent replied that they "absolutely" (26 percent) or "to a certain extent" (63 percent) see themselves as climate conscious. Furthermore 70 percent responded that it was considered important in their social circles to show respect for the environment.

The Swedish EPA concludes that the environment and climate change has become an important lifestyle and identity issue. The poll showed a four percent increase on the 2008 survey in the number actively striving to reduce their climate impact. The majority, 83 percent, responded that they recycle more. 78 percent replied that they re-use things, an increase from 62 percent last

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year. Eight of 10 have done something to reduce energy consumption in their homes, two of three changed travel habits, four of 10 their food habits, and a third their holiday plans.

Impact on Organisations

The increasing importance of environmental and climate issues has had an impact on institutions, companies and other organisations over the past ten years. When asked the question ―are you working with environmental issues?‖, the persons I interviewed (were they researchers, energy consultants, civil servants or working for housing companies) all answered that they were indeed dealing with them: ―(…) you cannot say that some of our programs are directly aimed at the climate issues, but everything is. It is always in the background‖ (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20).

This impact of environmental concerns on organisations is to be seen through tangible signs such as a change in the priority sector they focus on. For example, according to two energy consultants, one working at WSP and the other at the Energy Agency, there was a clear shift of focus about 10 years ago from energy efficiency and security of supply in the 80s to the climate change issue; In some companies environment has been officially declared as one of the most important issues to work with: ―[environment and energy market situation] is identified as one of our key issues to work with. (…) It‘s been declared a key issue for maybe ten years‖ (Fastighetsägarna, interview, 2010-06-02). Another tangible sign shows the influence of energy and climate issues on organisations: a change in the resources (money and/or manpower) allocated to work on environmental and climate issues. At HSB (housing company) for example, more people are working specifically on reducing the CO2 emissions, since the company signed an agreement about two or three years ago to halve them by 2020 and to cut them down to zero by 2050; at Stockholmshem (municipality-owned housing company), it is not really that more people are working on the issue but more money has been allocated to work on the reduction of energy use and of CO2 emissions, and this extra money does not come from the municipality but from the selling of the ―bostadsrätt‖6, which could be translated as tenant-ownership. At the City of Stockholm, the number of employees working at the Environment and Health Administration has doubled (from four to eight) over the past four years; but as will be seen in the next section, this can also be interpreted as an effect of the change of government that occurred in 2006, and a sign of the different parties‘ ways of working with environmental issues.

Environmental and climate concerns have had a clear impact on the society over the past ten years, but the interviews showed that they have also had an important influence on politics, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

2.2.2. Party Political Differences

Of course there are differences between political parties, and this also applies when it comes to environmental issues. But it seems like the increased awareness among the society about climate change and environment has brought about a large consensus among all parties. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the concrete influence of this increased concern and awareness on the different parties‘ ways to approach the issue and to work with it.

How do these Differences Change Over Time?

6 In Sweden, members of a housing cooperative (bostadsrättsförening) formally own the right (bostadsrätt) to inhabit their respective apartment for an unlimited time, a right that can be bought and sold on the open real estate market. This is one of the main forms of home ownership in the country, and a membership in a housing cooperative is generally held to be the same thing as owning (as opposed to renting) an apartment.

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Something that has been quite clear in all the interviews is that, according to them, the Moderates have definitely become ―greener‖ over the past four years; according to most of them they are more interested in environmental issues.

―Now it‘s amazing since the last elections, I mean now they [the Moderates] have an environmental policy, that‘s really a step forward. […] You cannot imagine what they used to say; we had a debate and one of the conservatives said that the problem with green areas is that you have a lot of small insects that sting humans; that was an argument for questioning the existence of green areas.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

―(…)The right wing got definitely greener; they are pushing for the light rail.‖ (City of Stockholm, City Planning Administration, interview, 2010-02-16)

And actually, the same can be applied to the Social Democrats, according to themselves:

―At the start, the Social Democrats was a grey party, we did not think about the environment. (…) we are more concerned now than before; (…) more people today work on environmental questions; (…) if I look to myself, ten years ago, I was a politician and I was not interested in environment; and today I am very interested.‖ (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03)

When it comes to why politicians got more interested in environment, the answers were pretty much always the same: it corresponds to an overall change in the society, and as a part of it, politicians have changed as well. The environmental awareness has risen everywhere in the society, so has it in politics:

―(…) the climate debate got really deep in Sweden and I think that one of the best signs of that is that no party can shut their eyes on the climate issue.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

Of course, one should still keep in mind that besides this genuine interest touching the whole society, since politicians are elected by the people, what is important for the voters should also be important for them. As a Social Democrat politician mentionned, regarding the elections and the Green Party that is going further with environmental questions, all the other parties want to be as good as the Green Party to win the elections: ― (…) all parties want to take the Green Party‘s questions and put them on their agenda‖ (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03).

Others have suggested that politicians supported this environmental work done in Stockholm because it helped putting the city on the map, especially with the European Green Capital 2010 award. Projects such as the green urban development in the Royal Seaport area, which has been selected as one of 17 urban development projects in the world to be supported by the Clinton Foundation‘s Global Climate Positive Programme, contribute particularly to put Stockholm in the spotlight on the environmental scene, and therefore receive political support.

Another possible reason could be the fact that once politicians committed to an objective such as the Fossil Fuel Free City 2050 objective or signed an environmental agreement, they cannot really step back.

With this evolution of environmental concerns among the two major parties, the Moderates and the Social Democrats, the Green Party had to somehow redefine its role and had to evolve as well. Since all parties now care about environmental issues and develop environmental programs, the Green Party gets more extreme and pushes further the other parties‘ ambitions.

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―For many years we were quite comfortable at working with politicians telling them that they don‘t understand the environmental issues; that it is much bigger than they think… and then this changed when other parties said as well that climate change was an important issue. Our role needed to be redefined then and now we focus on what is it that the other parties are missing now with the climate issue. (…) it is getting more diverse and deeper.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

In this context, where all parties seem to converge to the same ideas when it comes to environment and climate issues, is it possible to distinguish them in the end? And is there still a political debate going on around these issues?

Search for consensus?

It can be said that the search for consensus has been a characteristic of Swedish politics as a whole for many years, as noted by Petersson (1994:34): ―The aim of political decision-making has been to avoid divisive conflicts; an emphasis on compromise and pragmatic solutions has led to a political culture based on consensus‖. And this may also apply to the environmental politics.

If one studies the environmental programmes set by the different parties, is it possible to distinguish them on these issues? According to interviewees, even those working closely with politicians at the municipality, there are no real differences between the different parties, or to be more precise, between the Social Democrats and the Moderates. According to a planner these two parties have pretty much the same way to look at traffic, transport and buildings; only details differ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16). This was confirmed by the CEO of a housing company; according to her there are no big differences between the parties because no one today would say that they do not want to work with climate change (HSB, interview, 2010-05-07). A person working at the National Energy Agency confirms this:

―I think now parties agree so much on everything and it is almost impossible concerning the climate issue to distinguish their different views. We expected the energy and climate issues to be a headline for the next elections in autumn [2010], but I think we won‘t see any big difference.‖ (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20)

Politicians themselves admit that environmental and climate issues bypass strictly partisan or ideological differences; and a politician from the Social Democrats said that it was precisely something interesting with the Green Party: that it is a party in the middle somehow, not left nor right, and that in the end environmental issues are not a question of ideology (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03). A politician from the Moderates confirmed this point:

―(…) that was a strong point when we were talking to the jury at the European Commission [for the Green Capital 2010 award] that environmental issues are above partisan issues.‖ (Moderates, interview, 2010-04-29)

But in order to bypass ideological differences, it is clear that the different parties work actively towards reaching a consensus, and sometimes at the expense of some questions which would need a real debate. For example when working on the report about the energy‘s future in the Stockholm region, ―Stockholmsregionens Energiframtid 2010-2050‖, an issue was not discussed: the improvement of competition on the district heating market: ―(…) I believe this is one of the most important questions to address within the region but it was taken off the agenda. (…) I was a little disappointed that it was taken off the agenda but there was consensus, as always‖ (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02).

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Here, an issue has been taken off the agenda to ensure that a consensus would be reachable. This can be directly related to the theory on power and conflict elaborated by Connely and Richardson (2004) about suppressing a subject that would possibly create a conflict to ensure consensus.

Practical Differences

Even if the different political parties can find agreements on a lot of environmental issues and try to reach a consensus as often as possible, some differences in working with environmental and climate issues still remain. These differences appear in the day-to-day work of people dealing with these issues, at the municipality or other agencies, and they somehow reflect the influence of politics on the environmental work.

For example, organisational changes and a change in the resources allocated to work on environmental and climate issues can occur after a change of the party in power in the government. This was explained by a planner: around 200 people work at this department and currently eight of them are dealing in particular with energy and climate issues and this number actually changed from four to eight when the government changed in 2006; the extra four persons are responsible for information and communication with the inhabitants on what they can actually do in their day-to-day lives to reduce their climate impact (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16). To be able to work on a project, the Environment and Health Administration has to present it to the politicians and if they accept it then the department receives money to work on it. In this case, the money received to develop information to the inhabitants of Stockholm and which enabled them to employ four more people, shows the interest of the current Vice Mayor for Environment and Traffic, Ulla Hamilton, in communication and in working with the community: ―[Politicians] think it‘s important that the inhabitants can learn about what they do and (…) think it‘s important to inform the inhabitants‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16).

The changes of government also affect the day-to-day work in institutions through a change in the areas they should focus on. As mentioned above, a particular attention was put on communication and information on energy and climate issues with the new Vice Mayor, Environmental and Traffic Division; another new focus appeared as well: working jointly with individual companies through a cooperation called the ―Climate Pact‖. Any company active in the region can take part to the programme by setting individual goals aiming at reducing their climate impact and their emissions by 10% by 2011 (Stockholm Climate Pact, Annual Report 2009). The driving force behind this cooperative venture between the City and its business community is said to be the Vice Mayor for Environment and Traffic (Ulla Hamilton), who ―worked with the companies in Stockholm before; she comes from the business sector, (…) and she was really interested in bringing businesses and the municipality together‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16). According to the last interviewee her adherence to the Moderates played a role in this interest and shows therefore the Moderates‘ particular way of working with climate issues, which is more business oriented. Other persons perceived a change in their day-to-day work when the majority changed:

―With this majority it is more like a voluntary way of working actually. Before it was an obligation for all the developers for all projects in the city to follow [an environmental program]; and when the majority came in 2006, they thought it should be a voluntary program. (…) They completely changed the direction for the environmental work.‖ ( Stockholm City Development Administration, interview, 2010-02-16)

Another concrete example was also put forward: the Moderates‘ decision to put an end to the Klimp investment program (presented above). Besides, it was expected that the program would

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have been reintroduced if the Social Democrats had won the elections coming in September 2010 (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20).

These two examples illustrate very well the differences that still remain between the Social Democrats and the Moderates when it comes to environmental policies. They do not really match the consensual way of working nevertheless put forward by both parties, as explained in the previous section. Is this consensus only a facade which hides real political divergences? Or is this consensus only valid in discourses, and then disappears when it comes to concrete actions and measures?

It was actually interesting to ask the politicians from different parties themselves what they thought were the biggest differences in working with environmental and climate issues between them. The answer confirms the questions raised above: in a way everyone claims wanting to go in the same direction, but still the pathways to reach that place are very different:

―If we only focus on climate, nowadays the division is on how ambitious you can be, (…) and then it boils down to what kind of activities or measures you want to implement. (…) Right now the two major parties in climate politics at the national level [Social Democrats and Moderates] have the same long term goal for 2020, but how you implement it is radically different. The main difference is that the current government says that we can do the hardest and most expensive measures to decrease the emissions, in the future; and we say that we need to start with them now because yes, they are expensive, but they are less expensive to do now than in the future.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

This interviewee from the Green Party even mentioned the possibility to change the long term goal, accepted by all parties, to get Stockholm to be a fossil fuel-free city by 2050. Indeed, according to her, the problem with that goal is that the Moderates did not really define what a fossil fuel free city is. The Green Party on the other side has had for several years the goal to phase out fossil fuels by 2030 instead of 2050 (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17). Therefore even long term goals which all parties agreed on, can change if there is a change of majority in Stockholm‘s government.

Here is what an assistant political advisor to the Environment and Traffic Vice Mayor answered to the same question on what are the biggest differences between the Moderates and the opposition in the measures taken to achieve the long term goals set in Stockholm‘s environmental programme:

―In one way this question is a little bit difficult to answer because we are now the majority ruling and the opposition‘s job is to say that we are not doing a good job (…). But our bottom line is really result oriented (…); in every debate you will have the opposition saying ―why don‘t you spend more on this or that?‖ and then we‘ll try to have a very prioritized environmental work and then you use your money where you can get the results, on few focus points maybe instead of very wide areas. (…) their [the opposition‘s] focus was a bit more on a lot of small projects. (…) We try to integrate [the environmental work] and to make it become something that is not on top but integrated in the whole system. (…) I think we are better [than the opposition] in getting this integrated work and getting everyone on board. (…) You should have the companies working together with the city.‖ (Moderates, interview, 2010-04-29)

Therefore, according to this interviewee, the main differences are somehow mainly a matter of approach: selecting fewer but more cost effective projects, and getting the environmental work

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more integrated. This interview was also a good opportunity to ask why the Moderates eased off the developers‘ environmental obligations, which was mentioned by a planner from the City Planning Administration. According to this political advisor, committing to a certain level of environmental requirements can lower down the developers‘ environmental ambitions: once they commit to a certain goal, even if technologies, for example, improve and can enable them to do better, they will not since they do not have to (Moderates, interview, 2010-04-29).

Finally, according to two members from the Social Democrats, the biggest conflict is about the monetary resources; they say they want to allocate more resources to the Environment and Health Administration to work more in a proactive way on informing people on how they can change behaviour (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03).

Therefore it seems that the Green Party and the Social Democrats agree on the fact that they would allocate more money on the environmental and climate work if they had the majority at the government. Anyhow, the four persons interviewed and representing the three parties recognised the fact that there are some different ways of working with environmental and climate issues between them. When asked what were in particular the areas that brought most conflicts, the answers were unanimous: the transport area, and especially the question of the construction of the new motorway ―Förbifart Stockholm‖. The Moderates think that ―it is absolutely necessary to build it‖ (Moderates, 2010-04-29), the Green Party is radically against and wants all the money to be invested in public transport instead:

―(…) I think that the only tricky question about the Green Party right now is a matter of traffic, because they are really hardcore on traffic. You know ―Förbifart Stockholm‖, the big traffic project, which is going to be a ring road which is going to remove traffic from Stockholm and put in on the side, they don‘t want it. They want all the money on public transport instead, and they really don‘t wantcars at all.‖ (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03)

The Social Democrats‘ position itself is not as clear:

―From our side, what can we say… all the party wants that car solution but right now we took the decision that we would go to the citizens and vote about this question; so right now we don‘t take it inside the party, we want the citizens to vote about it and we will follow the decision.‖ (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03)

This question of public transport versus cars is a very central one when it comes to looking at the differences between the Social Democrats and the Moderates on one side and the Green Party on the other side. A crucial point in this case is the fact that this new bypass road will be financed at 80% by money collected from the Congestion Charge (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, 2010), which represents around 23 billion Swedish kronor. The Green Party is against this project and would rather invest this money in public transport (Öjemar, 2010).

Therefore, even if all parties claim to the necessity of achieving consensus, some important differences remain. These differences bring the repoliticization of environmental issues and conflicts between the different actors, in particular on the measures or actions to be taken to achieve the goals set in Stockholm‘s environmental programme. The next section tries to look deeper into the question whether political changes and long term goals are somehow compatible or not.

2.2.3. Political Changes and Long-Term Challenges

Whereas environmental management needs a long-term perspective, usually several decades, politics is characterised by short-term changes. In Sweden and in Stockholm as well, elections

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occur every four years; and as mentioned above, there has been a shift from left to right every four years during the last 20 years. This issue is exactly the one raised by Giddens (2008): there is a challenge in thinking long-term when short-term preoccupations dominate. This section discusses how this challenge is handled in Stockholm.

Short Term versus Long Term

A particular problem arising when dealing with climate issues is the dilemma between the need for long-term change and the short-term concerns of politics. It can be hard for decision-makers to commit to costly and unpopular measures, in order to reach the ambitious long-term visions. This was explained by a person working at the Swedish Environment Protection Agency, climate division, department for energy and transport:

―One problem that is particular to working with energy and climate (…) is that it is a very long time between your actions and the consequences (…) and it is too far for politicians and people to think about the next generation.‖ (Swedish EPA, interview, 2010-06-04)

And to the question do you think that it is hard for politicians to take decisions where they see results after their mandates? This interviewee answered ―absolutely‖. A researcher at the International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics at Lund University (interview, 2010-03-18) also talked about this dilemma between the short-term nature of the political system and the fact that energy systems rely on long-term decisions; according to her there are very few strategies in Sweden when it comes to planning ahead for the future: Sweden has visions, but no strategies to reach them.

We also asked a politician from the Green Party if she thought that it was difficult to implement measures which would bring benefits in the long-term run. She answered that obviously politicians would want to take decisions which bring benefits right away, but this is so often not the case in local politics that they get used to it and in the end take the decisions that are necessary, no matter when the benefits may come (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17). In that case it seems politicians are committed to long-term visions and goals and are ready to take short-term measures.

In theory the problem of long-term versus short-term exists; but in practice, do these short-term political changes create barriers as regards environmental policies? We now examine what the persons who actually work daily with environmental, energy and climate issues think about it, and whether they perceive the change of political majority every four years as a problem or not.

Different Perspectives

It is interesting to note is that there is not one answer to that question: some think that it definitely creates barriers, when others do not think that it is such a big issue.

Here are their answers, synthesised in the box 2.1 below, with on one side those who think that it is possible to manage a long-term perspective with short-term political changes, and on the other side those who do not.

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It is possible to cope with short-term political changes in the pursuit of long-term objectives

A change of political majority every four years can bring barriers when implementing environmental work

Energy expert: it is not so hard to work with a long-term perspective whereas there is a change of government every four years because nowadays parties agree very much on almost everything. Especially on the climate issue, according to him it is really hard to distinguish their different views.

Planner (working on the urban development of an eco-district): no conflicts will arise in the particular case of this urban development between the long-term goals and the short-term nature of politics because all politicians committed for this area to be profiled as an environmental one.

Planner: the Social Democrats and the Moderates have very likely ways to look at environmental issues; and to him it is not such a big difference in his day-to-day work if it is the right-wing or the left-wing ruling.

Politician from the Moderates: Stockholm has a long tradition of working with environment and it has never been connected to who is governing; the environmental issues are above partisan issues. It is easy to maintain continuity in the environmental work in Stockholm.

Energy consultant: the change of majority every four years is a major problem to carry on environmental policies, because the policies themselves change. The politicians keep the long-term goals but change focus or who will do what. For example the requirements for buildings, that the developers have to fulfil, change with each majority and that was a problem in Hammarby Sjöstad (eco district in Stockholm developed in the 90s): it is hard to have the developers commit if the requirements change all the time.

Two politicians from the Social Democrats: ―It is always a problem when we are not in the government [laughter]. Yes, for sure, in the long-term it is always a problem. We had something we called ―Miljömilliarder‖ [one billion Swedish kroner for the environment] (…) and when the Moderates came in charge for Stockholm they just stopped it‖.

A politician from the Green Party: this change every four years can definitely be a problem because major directions are set by small decisions all the time.

Box 2.1: Different answers to the question: do political changes every four years create barriers to environmental work?

According to the replies in box 2.1, it seems that the main factor for these political changes not being a problem is that there is a broad and general interest across political parties in environmental questions. According to the interviewees, politicians from different parties are now committed to long-term goals and agree on the overall picture. However, even if the civil servants do not consider these changes as a problem or a barrier, they have to deal with some changes in the actions taken, and one of them working at the Environment and Health Administration even admitted that they were a little bit scared when the change of majority occurred in favour of the Moderates because they did not know what was going to happen with the new government, and especially because they realised that they received nearly half of the previous budget. The administration finally received money from the cooperation with the business sector, and according to the interviewee it made no difference in the end in the day-to-day work.

It is interesting to see that the interviewees who are not so bothered by political changes are civil servants and a politician from the party in power, whereas those who think that these changes create barriers to the environmental work are politicians from parties belonging to the opposition and consultants in private companies. Of course, it is risky to draw such a conclusion on such a small number of answers. One possible reason for the fact that civil servants tend to claim that they are not affected by short-term political changes, was advanced by an energy consultant: first, people working at the municipality are maybe not so keen on criticizing their own work and second, they maybe do not follow exactly the amplitude of change asked by the new politicians in power. In other words, they maybe prepare themselves for the next possible change by not absolutely following the directives dictated by the present government. This way, the change of direction in the measures taken could be easier to work with. This is be schematized by Figure 2.7.

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Figure 2.7: Possible explanation for the civil servants' answers.

Source: author's own design, inspired by an interviewee

Of course, this is just a hypothesis to explain why the people at the municipality told during the interviews that political changes were not causing so many troubles when working with environmental issues. The other explanation could be that there are indeed no major problems linked to this instable political situation.

Besides, some institutions play apparently a major role in making it possible to ensure a certain level of adherence to long-term goals.

Role played by the Institutions: can they provide a frame to enable long term goals?

• Environment and Health Administration (Miljöförvaltningen), City of Stockholm

A politician from the Green Party argued that the Environment and Health Administration at the City of Stockholm could be a reason why it is possible for the city to reach long-term goals defined in the environmental programme. Indeed she thinks that this programme has been a way to stir the discussion and to bring all the actors together; it has also been an important tool to give a direction to the institutions‘ work and to politically guide the civil servants. Besides, an interesting point is the fact that the period for which the environmental programmes are written (typically four to five years) does not correspond to political mandates, which means that one environmental programme is valid during at least two mandates. This creates therefore stability and continuity along a possible political change:

― (…) So you can have different opinions on certain issues but the environmental programme and the follow-ups give a structure and the different institutions can report how they do. This is a good way to make sure that long-term goals are possible to reach. (…) I would say that, at the local level, if we are able to stick to long-term goals, it has a lot to do with the

Change of political majority

1998 2002 2006

What the people working at the municipality actually do Amplitude of change desired by the majority ruling

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competence and the knowledge of the people working on a day-to-day basis in the institutions.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

According to this politician, the people working in the institutions are also an important factor to enable long-term goals since they are experts and non politically driven. According to a civil servant, the City of Stockholm has an important number of experts: ―We have a lot of experts here, more than at the governmental level‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, 2010-04-16).

• Office of Regional Planning (Regioneplanskontoret – RTK)

According to someone working at the Office of Regional Planning, it is their role to provide a good platform for discussion between the different actors and for information by providing hard facts to the politicians (Office of Regional Planning, interview, 2010-04-15). The regional level can be seen as a way to bring the municipalities of the Stockholm region together, which implies working beyond political differences since each municipality has its own local government. The Office of Regional Planning published the Regional Development Plan, RUFS 2010, which contains challenges for the future development of the Stockholm region and one of them is ―reducing climate impact while promoting growth‖ (RUFS 2010). The plan has a medium-term perspective, up to 2030, and a long-term perspective, up to 2050. It seems quite obvious that if municipalities do not commit to this development plan, the objectives will not be reachable.

• Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten)

The Energy Agency receives directives directly from the government. Municipalities are quite independent in Sweden, they do not have to obey to government‘s offices, but as they are bound by legislation and subsidies, there is a lever for national agencies, and in particular the Energy Agency, to control the municipalities in some way; indeed because of a legislation, municipalities have to have an energy plan and the Energy Agency is the one supposed to control that the legislation is followed. The agency‘s influence on municipalities is mainly operated through cooperation and information (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20).

• Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket)

According to someone working at the Swedish EPA, it is also their role ―to always remind about the long-term goals‖ (Swedish EPA, interview, 2010-06-04). According to this interviewee it is especially important to not forget about the long run since people tend to focus on medium-term goals for 2010 or 2020.

Therefore according to people working in these institutions, it is absolutely a part of their duty to act as a frame to sustain environmental, climate or energy policies. They can remind about the long term goals and somehow create a bridge between two successive political mandates. This can be related to the argument that institutions and organisations evolve to respond to the society‘s needs. When it comes to actions against climate change, new departments and structures have been developed, which enable somehow a stabilising mechanism for environmental policies. These institutions represent the society‘s shared commitment and values and thus have an important role to play in sustaining energy-climate policies.

The analysis of a concrete measure taken by the City of Stockholm to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is needed to understand to what extent the results found in chapter 5 can be applied in a particular case. The next chapter is a zoom in one of the major measures taken by the City of Stockholm to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: the district heating system.

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2.3. The District Heating System in Stockholm

District heating is one of the main actions taken by the City of Stockholm to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this section, we analyze the interactions between politics and the setting of environmental policies, in the particular case of the district heating system. This focus will be used to exemplify the arguments developed in the previous chapter, through answering the following questions: who are the different actors involved? What are their interests and visions? Is there a political consensus in this particular case? What are the possible conflicts arising between the different actors? Do these conflicts tend to re-politicize district heating issues?

2.3.1. Background

District heating is a system for distributing heat generated in a centralized location. It is delivered in the form of water heated at a central heating plant and transported under high pressure through a system of well insulated pipes. This water is at between 70 and 120 degrees, depending on the weather and time of year, and is fed to a district heating centre in each building. There are heat exchangers there that utilise the water to heat radiators and hot tap water. This isn‘t the same water that flows through the various systems – the cooled district heating water is returned to the district heating plant so as to be reheated in a closed circuit (Svensk Fjärrvärme, 2010).

History of the System in Stockholm

The district heating infrastructure was built in Stockholm 50 years ago (City of Stockholm, 2010). At the beginning the network was owned by Stockholm Energi, which was a state owned energy company. In the 1990s a lot of municipalities in Sweden sold their energy company and in 1998 (under Social Democrat majority) Stockholm Energi was merged with the Finnish state-owned energy company Imatran Voima (IVO). The new company was called Birka Energi (electricity and district heating) and the capital was equally shared by the City of Stockholm and IVO. In 2001 (Moderate majority) the electricity part of the company was entirely sold to the Finnish partner, which meanwhile became Fortum. The district heating part was sold as well, but with particular conditions: the City kept 9.9% of the shares of the new company Fortum Värme and 50% of the ―influence‖, which means that the City appoints 50% of the people sitting at the board but also retains 50% of the economic interests (Boucher-Hedenström & Rutherford, 2007). This led to a situation where the City‘s interests got in conflicts with the consumers‘ in the way that it is the City‘s economic interest to have a price increase, but certainly not the consumers‘. The Mayor of Stockholm and Commissioner of finance at the time said that the deal was good for Stockholm taxpayers and energy consumers since it limited the city's business risks and freed up capital that could be invested in the development of the city‘s infrastructures (Fortum, 2001).

The current situation

Nowadays the district heating system covers nearly 80% of Stockholm‘s total heating needs. The district heating network is being continuously expanded to further increase the proportion of district heating in the city (City of Stockholm, 2010). The city is supplied by four major production plants: Värtaverket, Högdalenverket, Hässelbyverket and Bristaverket (see Figure 2.8). Högdalenverket is a Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plant where wastes are incinerated to produce electricity and heat. The plant has the capacity to receive 700 000 tonnes of waste per year (Fortum, 2010).

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Figure 2.8: District heating plants in Stockholm.

Source: Fortum, presentation

Towards Renewable

Progressively, district heating companies and Fortum Värme in particular, changed their fuel mix from fossil-fuel to mostly renewable. This shift occurred firstly because of the oil crisis in the 1970s which led the district heating companies to start introducing biofuels in their mix. The second reason is the introduction of the carbon tax in the 1990s, which was quite low at the beginning, and reached an important level by the end of the 1990s: from 28 euro/t CO2 in 1991 to 84 euro/t CO2 in 2003 for fuels for heating (but there were no taxes on fuels for electricity production) (Lars J. Nilsson, 2004). This shift in the fuel mix used by district heating producers is described by Figs 2.9 and 2.10. In Fig. 2.11, it is also possible to see the introduction of heat pumps and electric boilers in the 80s due to the Swedish nuclear electricity production, which conducted to low electricity prices.

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Figure 2.9: Energy input to district heating systems, 1970-2008.

Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2009

Figure 2.10: Use of biofuels, peat etc. in district heating plants, 1980-2008.

Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2009

Fortum followed this overall trend and changed its fuel mix, as can be seen on Figure. The share of renewable in the district heating mix evolved from 20% in 1986 to more than 70% in 2006. This shift in the fuel mix is also explained by environmental concerns:

―(...)Nowadays it [the change from fossil fuel to biofuels] is more for the climate change issue [and] the carbon tax.‖ (Fortum, interview, 2010-04-19)

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Figure 2.11: Fuel mix for Fortum's district heating in 1986 and in 2006.

Source: Fortum's presentation

However, in one of the four major plants in Stockholm, Värtaverket, only 45% of the fuel is renewable at the moment (Fortum, 2010). All politicians from the City agree that coal should be phased out in this plant, but the Green Party wants this phasing out to happen earlier:

―But if you look at the climate issue in Stockholm, heating from district heating is a big part so you should do something about it. And so far it‘s been mainly the Green party but now the Social Democrats and the opposition they also agree that we should use our voice inside the company7 or we should wait for a national legislation to make the price of coal fired district heating much higher. And of course the emission trade system coming from the European level says that the plant in Värtan [nickname for Värtaverket] should buy emission rights. But so far the price for these emissions trades is too low to make it very efficient. The difference is not high enough between making fossil district heating and non fossil district heating. (…)Now they [Fortum] say that they will have a plan to phase out before 2015, and now in the green red opposition we want to have a plan on how to phase out [by 2011].‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

―I think if you talk about the red green, the Miljöpartiet [Green Party], they want to shut it [Värtaverket] down immediately, and according to us [Social Democrats] it is a longer process because you have to find ways to produce enough biogas and to collect wastes. (…) I think we have greater ambitions than the Moderates, (…) I never heard during the past four years that the leading party wants to close Värtan, I haven‘t heard it, so I don‘t think they want to do it, because it‘s a lot of money.‖ (Social Democrats, interview, 2010-06-03)

A demonstration was even organized on 29 May 2010 against Värtaverket. The action group behind this demonstration (―Shut It Down‖) was protesting against the fact that the plant is still half-fired by coal (Bolling & Svahn, 2010).

Therefore the environmental label of district heating is damaged by this plant in Stockholm, and even if all politicians agree on the necessity to phase out coal in this plant, the Green Party wants to go further and to phase out coal sooner.

7 Interviewee referring to the 50% of ―influence‖ the City has in the Board of Fortum Värme.

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The Market Situation in Stockholm

In Stockholm at the moment the market situation for district heating is a monopoly and Fortum Värme has a free price setting. Figures show that the price of district heating rose by over 30% during the period 2003-2008 (Nils Holgersson, 2009). This increase of district heating prices is highly criticized by housing companies which defend their customers‘ rights on the energy market. Fortum answers that the price is set against the prices of the alternatives (Fortum, interview, 2010-04-19). If we look at the alternatives in Stockholm, the major competitor are geothermal heat pumps. Figure 2.12 shows the heating market situation in Sweden. On this figure it is quite obvious that district heating is the leader on the heating market and that the alternatives are not real competitors when it comes to apartment buildings (the situation is different for commercial buildings and single family houses). Seeing the market situation, an interviewee questioned the fact that Fortum really sets its price against the alternatives; according to him since the alternative represent around 2% of the market, is it really relevant for a company to set its price against such a small competitor? Besides he highlighted the fact that it was a free pricing regime and that Fortum could set any price (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02).

Figure 2.12: Heating market situation in Sweden for apartment buildings.

Source: Stockholm Property Association, presentation (―Fjärrvärme=district heating, ―Elvärme‖=electric heating; ―Olja‖=oil; ―Övrigt‖=rest)

Another alternative is the development of ―passive houses‖ or ―near-zero houses‖, which are houses that consume very much less energy than regular houses. There is no real definition of what a passive construction is, but it can be said that it is ―a building with such low heat losses that the heat can be transported by hygiene airflow‖ (Sandberg, Energihus Kalkyl, 2009). In such a building you do not need as much district heating of course. Figure 2.13 shows the heat needed every month for a passive house and a regular one of the same type, with the same number of people living there. The green part of the column is electricity for the house equipment and this is about the same amount for both houses. The blue one is the heat and hot water; the amount is much lower in the passive house.

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Figure 2.13: Comparison of needed heat in a passive house (on the left side) and a regular house (on the right side).

Source: Sandberg, 2009

If the district heating prices are unacceptable for housing companies, one could think that they can use other ways to heat their buildings, but this is where the situation gets complicated, in particular when it comes to municipality owned housing companies. Since the City has a share in Fortum Värme, and since district heating is one of the City‘s major actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (City of Stockholm, 2010), what is the real possibility of choice and action for housing companies?

In this case, the different actors involved are Fortum Värme, as the only district heating producer and provider in the centre of Stockholm, the housing companies, as customers of district heating and the City of Stockholm, since they own around 10% of Fortum Värme and the public housing companies. They have different views and interests of course: the housing companies want to heat their buildings at a competitive price while Fortum Värme wants to expand its network in the Stockholm region and increase its number of customers. The City‘s position is somehow a little more confused since they are… in the middle! The next section‘s purpose is to clarify each part‘s interests and views.

2.3.2. The Different actors and their interests/Visions

The City of Stockholm

As seen in the background section, the City kept a share in Fortum Värme. It may be because the City saw the importance of district heating, and they did not want to completely lose control over it (Fortum, interview, 2010-04-19) or in order to restore confidence in the public opinion:

―(…) [I]t was a consensus between the Social Democrats and the non socialists parties to [sell Birka Energi], but of course, in the public opinion at least, it was necessary to tell them, and the housing companies as well, ―don‘t be afraid, we are still there‖. So in order to make it politically possible, you had to organize something like that.‖ (Former SABO‘s CEO, Director of Fjärrvärme Kommittén, interview, 2010-06-04)

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And besides this share in the company, the City has 50% of the ―influence‖. But what is the real level of influence of the City when it comes to price setting or other important decisions? Here are some replies from our interviewees to this question:

―The City has 50% of the influence but we have very little influence on the investments; we are one of the shareholders not investing in the company.‖ (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

―[Fortum] is a Finnish private company, so they have to make the job in business terms.‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16)

―I think that the City of Stockholm has lost its importance in the company, it is run as a private company; profit is their top priority and they have a very commercial view.‖ (Swedish District Heating Association, interview, 2010-05-05)

―My impression is (…) that they are totally without influence and of course Stockholm is a minority shareholder and it is of course a little bit difficult to first sell the company and then say to the buyer that you can‘t take the price you want.‖ (Former SABO‘s CEO, Director of Fjärrvärme Kommittén, interview, 2010-06-04)

―(…) [T]he people from the City that in Fortum‘s board, they must work for Fortum, not for the City because it is a business company; so when you are at the board, you must work for the company, no for others.‖ (Stockholmshem, interview, 2010-06-05)

―I don‘t think [that the City has an influence on the company], it is a private company and it is ruled as a private company.‖ (Fortum, interview, 2010-04-19)

These answers give a quite clear picture of the situation: even if the City has a little share in Fortum Värme and especially 50% of the board, they have no influence on price setting or even on investments; they cannot use their presence in the board to regulate Fortum‘s prices on district heating.

Besides, one could think that, as partners in one of the main measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the City and Fortum Värme would share a common view of what ―sustainable development‖ means and that they should have a common policy for expanding district heating in the city. But this is actually not the case: Fortum‘s strategies do not go hand in hand with the public housing companies‘ strategies which are supported by the City. Indeed, the public housing companies set their energy efficiency goals in terms of kWh per m²; and in that case it is easier to use heat pumps since they use less kWh: if a building requires 100 kWh one can use either 100 kWh of district heating or 33 kWh of electricity and produce heat with a heat pump. One kWh of electricity can produce three kWh of heating. This way, if no difference is made in the kind of kWh used, heat pumps seem to be the most logical choice. This is not an easy question and Fortum has a current discussion about it with the City, because the company would like to make the impact on the climate count more than the actual amount of energy used (Fortum, interview, 2010-03-19). The truth is Fortum Värme and the City do not have the same way of counting carbon dioxide emissions. The City of Stockholm uses a Life Cycle Analysis perspective on the

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fuels that are used in Fortum‘s mix8. This calculation is performed by a group of researchers at KTH, Department of Industrial Ecology. Their policy is to be totally transparent and all their calculations are easily accessible. Fortum‘s way of counting the emissions of carbon dioxide due to the production of district heating doesn‘t seem to be as clear as the City‘s:

―We [the City] tried to see what can be the true consumption [of energy] and Fortum has a producer perspective and we have a consumer perspective; and because of that we have different views. I have studied their way to do it and I found it a little bit difficult to understand it. (…) [I]t is very complicated because they produce electricity and heat in the same plants, and how much of the emissions goes to electricity and how much goes to heat? And they count in a very complicated way, we can see how they are doing it but we don‘t understand why they are doing it this way. Because as we see it, they put a lot of the emissions out in the Nordic electric system, and then when it comes back to Stockholm it is not so much emissions left, they sent it out in the electric system; and perhaps there should be more emissions in the heating system… (…) we don‘t find the same results.‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16)

―Every calculation we make, we have 100% transparency, so if somebody comes and says ―you‘ve made a mistake here‖, that‘s not a problem, you can easily see every steps of our work. I mean there are a lot of companies that claim that they are carbon neutral or all these kinds of things but you can‘t really see how they achieve these kinds of things. So for example, for Fortum, they say that they emit around 70g of CO2 equivalents/kWh9 and since district heating is a big thing in Stockholm, we calculated the emissions for the district heating mix, using these emissions factors, and we calculated that they emitted about 100g/kWh10.‖ (KTH, Industriell Ekologi, interview, 2010-03-25)

Since they do not have the same way of counting carbon dioxide emissions, of course the City and Fortum Värme do not have the same policy regarding geothermal heat pumps for example. According to the City, if a house owner decides to have a geothermal heat pump and buys electricity produced by hydropower or wind power, then this person has done a very good choice; and the City thinks this is the best way, to get customers think about what they are doing. The City wants to let them the possibility to make the best possible choice and does not think that district heating is always the best way to provide heat. Besides, the City is conscious that there is an issue with the price setting, and understands that sometimes, even in the city centre some customers choose heat pumps over district heating. In the end, ―[their] opinion is that the best way to handle this is: let everyone make their own choice‖ (City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration, interview, 2010-04-16). Thus, while the City is talking up the environmental benefits of district heating, they are not particularly promoting it towards the inhabitants. There are no agreements forcing the developers to connect to district heating, not even the municipality owned ones. For example Stockholmshem use heat pumps, which reduces

8 Since the company is working for profit, this mix can change a little according to the fuels‘ prices, but also depending on the weather: during extremely cold winters, some extra boilers running on oil will be necessary…

9 Fortum reports: ―The five-year average value of the specific emissions of electricity has decreased since 2006. In 2008, this value was below the 80 g/kWh target value for 2020‖ (Fortum, 2009).

10 KTH reports 102.5 g/kWh of CO2 equivalents emitted for the production of electricity combined to district heating (KTH, Industriell Ekologi, 2008).

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its consumption of district heating, and the City cannot intervene because otherwise ―newspapers could write about it‖ (Stockholmshem, interview, 2010-06-05). Therefore the public housing companies are ―allowed‖ to use alternatives to district heating to create a competition with Fortum, and this shows the position of the City in this conflict:

―They [the City] are more in favour of a free competition; they think that it is good that housing companies try alternatives to compete with Fortum. It‘s ok if housing companies try to get a better position, but they [the City] cannot say anything to Fortum.‖ (Former SABO‘s CEO, Director of Fjärrvärme Kommittén, interview, interview, 2010-06-04)

Fortum

Fortum is a Finnish energy company founded in 1998 from the combination of the state owned Imatran Voima (IVO) and the listed company Neste Oyj. Fortum is focusing on the Nordic countries, Russia and the Baltic Rim area. Their activities cover the generation, distribution and sale of electricity and heat and the operation and maintenance of power plants. In 2009, Fortum's sales totalled EUR 5.4 billion and operating profit was EUR 1.8 billion. The company employs approximately 11,500 people (Fortum, 2010).

There are some alternatives to heat buildings in Stockholm, and the major competitor to district heating are geothermal heat pumps. Of course Fortum as a private company working for benefits wants to expand its network of customers and therefore explains to households why they should not use heat pumps. And Fortum uses climate change as one of their arguments in order to have households choose district heating over other solutions. According to them, it is a question of education and of showing them what would be the consequences for the environment to have a heat pump instead of district heating; then it is up to the consumer to take the decision (Fortum, interview, 2010-03-19).

This environmental impact of choosing to use heat pumps in a district heating area is explained by the two schemes below (Figures 2.14 and 2.15).

Figure 2.14 shows how wastes (―avfall‖ on the figure) produced by households are used in the fuel mix and burnt to produce heat (―värme‖) and electricity (―el‖). The heat is delivered to the households while the electricity goes to the Swedish mix (―svensk mix‖). The electricity demand in Sweden is shown by the red line on the scale, which means that more electricity than needed is produced. The extra produced electricity is then exported to Europe (―Elexport till Europa‖) and contributes to improving the environmental quality of the European electricity mix since electricity production in CHP plants emits much less than electricity production in coal fired plants: ―If we produce better energy than they do in Denmark and Germany, we can export it and the carbon dioxide they save is saved in Europe, maybe not in our chimneys but in their chimneys‖ (Fortum, interview, 2010-03-19).

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Figure 2.14: Fortum's way of looking at electricity production. Source: Fortum's presentation

Another option is shown in Figure 2.15, where some households choose to have heat pumps instead of district heating.

Figure 2.15: Fortum's way at looking at electricity production. Source: Fortum's presentation

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in Figure 2.15, as previously, wastes from the households are used in the fuel mix to produce heat and electricity. Then if some of the customers decide to have heat pumps (―värmepumpar‖) instead of district heating, then less district heating is delivered to the households and some electricity is needed to make the heat pumps work. Since more electricity is needed, it might be necessary to import electricity from Europe (―importerad el Europeisk mix‖), which is produced with higher carbon dioxide emissions.

Therefore, according to Fortum, the use of heat pumps instead of district heating leads to using poor environmental quality electricity, whereas using district heating could help improving the European electricity mix.

The same kind of argument applies concerning ―passive houses‖: this type of construction uses much less energy but the energy that is used has a bad environmental quality. Indeed, as was showed on Figure 2.13, during the summer almost no district heating at all is bought by the passive house. Therefore the cheap heat produced from a waste-based fuel during the summer will have to be cooled off, since the waste has to be burnt anyway. Passive houses will only buy district heating when it is extremely cold outside and when the heat pump does not make enough heat. But the fuel that is used by district heating producers during that period of the year is partly coal and oil-based. Hence, these houses will use actually more primary energy than they were doing before and will buy electricity (that will maybe not be green) to supply their heat pumps. Basically the environmental argument used by district heating producers can be sum up this way: passive houses will buy less kWh but these kWh will have a lower environmental quality.

The housing companies

The housing companies, municipality-owned or not, somehow all share the same views on district heating: they criticize the monopoly situation because prices are too high, and they try to get more competition thanks to alternative ways of heating their buildings or trying to provide themselves from other district heating companies:

―When I was working at Svenska Bostäder, we used geothermal heating on two plots I think; and at first it was a problem with Fortum, but we had a discussion and we told them that we had to try new technologies. The City didn‘t say anything but we had to discuss with Fortum because we had an agreement with them to get lower prices.‖ (HSB, interview, 2010-05-07)

In this situation we can see that the City did not intervene, they let the housing company try new technologies which reduced the consumption of district heating. A public housing company, Stockholmshem, has a particular advantage: they still have some boilers working in the city which can deliver district heating to their buildings, which creates competition inside the city for district heating (Stockholmshem, interview, 2010-06-05).

The housing companies‘ position was also explained by someone working at Stockholm Property Association, which is an organisation for private property owners:

―Our members are upset, angry, even disgusted of the evaluation of this market and the situation right now. (…) Because it is a monopoly market, the consumer is a weak part in this market. (…) All our members are customers of district heating companies, close to 100% in apartment buildings (…) so we‘re all dependent on district heating companies.‖ (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02)

In the Stockholm region other district companies exist and they are usually cheaper than Fortum: Solentuna Energi, just outside Stockholm, has no heat production of its own. Therefore it buys all its heat from Fortum and sells it to a price that is 25% lower than what Fortum‘s customers

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pay. In other words, the same water bought from Solentuna Energi is 25% cheaper than that bought from Fortum; and within Sweden as a whole there is a price range of maybe 1:2 from the cheapest to the most expensive (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02).

The problem raised here is the fact that some competition could exist in the region since several district heating producers operate in the region, and especially since their different networks are already connected, but this competition is not possible for the moment. Customers cannot choose their district heating provider. A discussion is currently going on about this possible competition between the different district heating producers (see below).

Moreover even the environmental label of district heating is criticized since it is difficult to actually make a comparison with heat pumps or other techniques: as already discussed, it depends on how the electricity used in heat pumps for example is evaluated, compared to the electricity produced in the district heating plants (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02).

Summary of Actors’ Position

To sum up, Fortum‘s view and the housing companies‘ views are quite clear; Fortum is a private company working for benefits, they want to expand the network and connect the multi-family houses that are not connected yet. However, they are threatened by new technologies such as ―passive houses‖ and consider it as a problem (Svenskfjärrvärme, interview, 2010-05-05). But as explained in this section, against heat pumps or passive houses, district heating producers have an environmental argument: these technologies lower energy use but the energy that has low environmental performance.

On the other hand, housing companies defend their customers‘ rights on the energy market and try to lower heating prices; it is also their objective to lower their buildings‘ energy consumption by improving their buildings‘ energy efficiency. Indeed energy efficiency in housing is an area with high potential for energy consumption reduction: 50% of energy use could be cut in Sweden just by improving energy efficiency in buildings; and since they represent around 40% of Sweden‘s energy use, it means that 20% of Sweden‘s total energy use could be cut. And this could be achieved before 2050 without any major problems (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-24). A politician from the Moderates also highlighted the fact that this area could be exploited more since the City owns around 120,000 m² and that working on this would help reducing greenhouse gas emissions but would also be an interesting investment for the city in the long run: improving buildings‘ energy efficiency is economically profitable (Moderates, interview, 2010-04-29). Anyway, if housing companies manage reducing their consumption of energy, this will also reduce their consumption of heat.

The position which is the hardest to fully understand is the City‘s: as we saw in this section, the City emphasizes the environmental benefits of district heating in its environmental programmes and always allows Fortum to expand its network. But then it is up to the developers to connect to the network or not, the City cannot force them to do so. And actually, as someone working at the City said, there is no such mandatory connection so customers can make the best environmental choice (according to the City), which is to have geothermal heat pumps alimented by green electricity. And what is even more surprising is the existence of district heating pumps belonging to a public housing company, Stockholmshem. It seems as if what the director of the Fjärrvärme Kommittén said is confirmed by facts: since the City cannot use any influence inside Fortum on the price setting, the City seems to be in favour of a competition between district heating and more decentralized alternatives, and to encourage housing companies at getting a better position on the market.

These different positions are synthesized in Figure 2.16.

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Figure 2.16: Summary of the actors' position. Source: author’s own design

The next section is the presentation of a project aiming at creating competition on the district heating market in the Stockholm region.

2.3.3. The Third Part Access Project

As mentioned above, there are five major district heating producers in the Stockholm region (AB Fortum Värme, E.ON Värme Sverige AB, Norrenergi, Söderenergi and Vattenfall AB Heat Nordic), and their networks are already connected into one network, as shown in figure 2.17.

Figure 2.17: District heating producers present in the Stockholm region.

Source: Fortum, presentation

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The possibility of letting other companies use the pipes in Stockholm is called the Third Part Access (TPA), and it has been studied for some years now. The pipes would still remain Fortum‘s property but TPA would create competition in the Stockholm area between different district heating producers. A report initiated by the Stockholm Property Association and published in June 2009 describes how such enhanced competition in the Stockholm region could be realised. What is interesting to notice is that this report has been done in collaboration with the main private district heating producers present in Sweden: E.ON and Vattenfall. This shows their willingness to create competition on the district heating market in the Stockholm region: ―The parties‘ common desire is for this work to contribute to improved competition on the district heating market in the Stockholm area‖ (Dahlroth, 2009:2). And apparently, not only energy consumer organisations and energy providers are in favour of an improvement of the competition on the district heating market: politicians as well are pushing for this solution to decrease district heating prices in the Stockholm region:

Interviewer: There are no differences in opinions between the different parties on this discussion about opening the network? Politician: No, I think everybody agrees on it. (Green Party, interview, 2010-05-17)

And this was confirmed by an interview at the Stockholm Property Association: ―from left to right, they all agree that this is a development [third part access] that they wish to see‖ (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02). According to him politics plays an important role in this issue, and not only at the local level, but also at the national level with the Swedish Climate Strategy to reduce energy use and the use of non renewable, and at the European level as well. To him there is no doubt that district heating is one of the key elements that Sweden will have to use to pass the goals set in the agreements. But even if all parties agree on the necessity to change the market design, the interviewee admitted that the scenarios might differ a little according to who wins the election in September. Therefore everybody agrees on the necessity to take an action to change the market situation for district heating in the Stockholm region, and all parties are looking in the same direction, but the pathways may differ between them.

Then it is actually interesting to see what is happening on the borders between two municipalities inside the Stockholm region: there, and there only, competition exists between two district heating providers. An example can be given: in the Stockholm University area, there are some student residences and the property owners of these buildings could choose to buy district heating from Fortum, or as an alternative from Norra Energi. Thanks to this particular situation they actually made a deal with Fortum with a discount of around 25% (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02). Therefore competition already exists in some parts of the Stockholm region.

But there are some complications with the implementation of this Third Part Access and not everybody thinks that it will be implemented one day:

―I think the debate will go on for quite some time and I think this is a question that might be affected by which government will come in office after the next election. (…) Of course the opening of this kind of network has a lot of complex effects that are quite difficult to foresee. And people are kind of cowards; we know how it works now and we don‘t know how it would be; and we learned from the deregulation of the electricity market.‖ (Energy Agency, interview, 2010-05-20)

In 2005 a ‗district heating commission‘ (Fjärrvärme Kommittén) was set up by the Swedish Government and ―part of [its] assignment has been to determine what technical and other barriers exist to third-party access to the district heating networks. Here included is to analyze

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whether it is appropriate to introduce third party access on the district heating market‖ (Fjärrvärmeutredningen, 2005:31). This investigation was ordered ―to improve the customers‘ situation so that they can feel more secure in their contractual relationship with the district heating companies‖ (ibid.:32). The result of this investigation which lasted five years was explained by director of the committee himself during an interview: from a technical point of view the third part access is absolutely possible but the situation gets complicated because of the Swedish constitution and ownership rights. If the Government allows access to a network to another company, the network‘s owner has the right to ask for an economic compensation for the losses to 100%. Therefore if this other company has to pay this compensation, it would be very hard for it to compete with the network owner. The conclusion of the committee was then that this third part access was impossible to implement. Besides, according to the director of the committee, even if this could be implemented then the market situation would simply be an oligopoly where the different district heating producers could have some understandings on the price between each other; which is not a desirable situation (Former SABO‘s CEO, Director of Fjärrvärme Kommittén, interview, 2010-06-04).

What would be the solution then? Or at least, what would be another way to somehow regulate the prices on the district heating market? The Fjärrvärme Kommittén proposed the creation of a regulation committee, Fjärrvärmenämdenn and a District Heating Act to supervise the different measures for improved customer protection proposed in the report.

2.3.4. District Heating Panel (Fjärrvärmenämden)

The ―district heating panel‖ (Fjärrvärmenämden) was formally established on 1 July 2008 when the District Heating Act came into force. It has a mediation role in negotiations between the district heating companies and customers. The current board members were appointed by the government from 1 November 2009 to 31 October 2010 and they constitute an independent organisational unit from the Energy Agency. The board also acts as mediators in negotiations between the district heating companies and those who want access to the district heating pipes (Fjärrvärmenämden, 2009). An interviewee explained how this institution works in practice: as a customer you may contest the price of district heating and ask Fjärrvärmenämden to act as mediator. The interviewee also told about his experience of the panel: ―We tried that last year and Fortum said ―no, we won‘t negotiate; the price is set, nice to see you, good bye‖. We tried this twice and we got the same response‖ (Stockholm Property Association, interview, 2010-06-02).

As mentioned by the director of the ―District Heating Committee‖ (Fjärrvärme Kommittén), Fjärrvärmenämden is a rather new institution; it has been functioning for only two years. Therefore it is maybe a little soon to draw any conclusion on its success or failure. Anyhow, as the previous quotation suggests, it is already criticized for its lack of effective power and influence. Indeed, if the different parties do not commit to discuss, the creation of an arena for discussion is somehow useless.

2.4. Discussion and Conclusion

2.4.1. Influence of Energy-Climate Policies on Organisational Changes

This section aims at answering the two first research questions: what is the influence of energy-climate policies on organisations? And what is the influence of energy-climate policies on the evolution of party political differences?

Influence on Organisations

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Increased environmental concerns had an impact on the whole society: on public opinion, on institutions and on politics. Indeed people in general feel more climate conscious, more of the labour force and greater resources are allocated to work on environmental issues and all the major political parties now have environmental programmes.

In the case of the district heating system, the organisations are the three actors we studied: Fortum, the housing companies and the City. We showed that Fortum changed its fuel mix and progressively replaced fossil fuel by renewable fuel. Of course, the first reason was a matter of supply, but then the environmental concern became an equally important reason for this shift. Fortum is definitely using the increasing importance of climate issues in the public opinion to argue in favour of district heating, compared to the alternatives: according to the Finnish company, using district heating favours the production of ―green‖ electricity which would replace the ―black‖ one produced in Germany or Poland, whereas using heat pumps, for example, increases the electricity consumption, and presumably the consumption of ―black‖ electricity. Besides, district heating benefits from an environmental label that is deeply anchored in the public‘s mind. What is interesting is the fact that, when talking about district heating, the figure used the most by interviewees was: ―80% of the fuel mix is renewable nowadays‖, which is true in Sweden as an average. But one figure that is often forgotten is the 50% coal fired plant which belongs to Fortum and which is in the centre of Stockholm, Värtaverket. Fortum made the promise to elaborate a plan to phase out coal from this plant by 2015; but nothing binding has been signed.

Influence of Environmental Concerns on Party Political Differences

Let us look at the second research question: the influence of energy-climate concerns on the party political differences. According to interviewees, political differences on environmental issues are not as sharp as they used to be; some even said that they could not differentiate the two major parties, the Moderates and the Social Democrats, on these issues. If the two major parties have decided to start working with environmental questions, it is mainly because it simply corresponded to an overall change of the society, and as a part of it politicians also had to evolve. It is also quite clear that since environmental issues became more important for the people, who are the voters, politicians had to take them into account and that finally they could see the benefits for Stockholm to be internationally recognised as a leading city in environmental work. Nevertheless, the Green Party still distinguishes itself by going a little further than the other parties, and pushes environmental work forward. It was also unanimous from all interviewees that cross-party consensus was relatively easy to achieve on visions and long-term goals. The district heating system case somehow corroborates these conclusions: there is a consensus among politicians across different parties that coal should be phased out from the Värtaverket plant, but the Green Party is harder on the subject: they want coal to be phased out sooner than the other parties. Then, about the conflict on the district heating market situation between housing companies and Fortum, again all parties are in favour of creating competition in the Stockholm region. These findings tend to corroborate Mouffe‘s theory on the post-political character of politics, and especially Swyngedouw‘s theory that directly applies to climate change politics. Nowadays, people tend to think that environmental questions should bypass partisan differences and should not be a question of ―left or right‖. It was also interesting to note that a politician designated the quality of administrations‘ work as a key a factor of success of environmental policies in the city of Stockholm. This is in line with Mouffe‘s and Swyngedouw‘s argument that in a post-political framework, politics somehow tend to be reduced to a managerial issue, and ―good governance‖ of climate change to good public management.

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2.4.2. Influence of Short-Term Political Changes on Long-Term Environmental Policies

This last remark brings us to the third research question, what are the consequences of short-term political changes on long-term energy-climate policies?, and should also be directly related to Gidden‘s ―return to planning‖ argument. Indeed, whereas Mouffe and Swyngedouw criticise the consensual nature of climate politics, according to Giddens it is precisely a condition that allows to articulate short-term political changes and long-term environmental policies. In the case of Stockholm, besides this cross-party consensus, another element seems to play an important role to enable long-term environmental work: the different administrations and the national agencies. The integration of environmental work at different levels (national, regional and local) in these different governmental organisations seems to enable sustaining the long-term environmental measures taken by the City of Stockholm or by Sweden as a whole. It corresponds somehow to the second feature of Gidden‘s ―return to planning‖ argument, the integration of environmental work in all branches of government, at all levels.

An important question raised in this study was about the reality of this cross-party consensus on environmental issues: is it genuine or only a façade hiding political differences which result from and are sustained by conflictual views and tensions? We showed that there are actually differences between political parties, and even if everyone claims wanting to go in the same direction, differences still remain when it comes to the pathways used to reach the consensual goal. Even if all parties agree on the vision, they have different ways of working with environmental issues: there are differences in the resources allocated, in focus areas and in investment programmes.

In the case of the district heating system, the ambivalent position of the City shows that they do not actually know how to handle the situation. There is a discussion going on about the Third Part Access, but will this discussion lead to a tangible result? According to the person interviewed at the Stockholm Property Association, the scenarios may depend upont the results of the September 2010 elections. Therefore, under the shared idea that the market situation should change, it seems that no agreement on the action to be taken can be found and tensions remain on this subject. Thus, under the façade of consensus, the conflicts arising on energy-climate issues put them back into a political context. These tensions and conflicts also reveal some power relations in the case of the district heating system for example. Indeed, it is worth noticing that this burning issue of competition between district heating producers was taken off the agenda when elaborating the Stockholm region‘s energy plan for 205011, to be sure that consensus would be reached. This is to be related to what the literature says on the exclusion of controversial issues in order to reach agreements. The designers of the planning process managed consensus building, at the expense of a discussion which could possibly have brought a solution to the conflict between the energy producer and the housing companies. Besides, it was interesting to see that the Fjärrvärmenämden, which is supposed to be a structure creating an arena for discussion, and possibly conflicts, does not seem to fulfil its purpose; indeed, since Fortum does not want to participate to the discussion, as mentioned by the interviewee at the Stockholm Property Association, no debate and therefore no solution are possible. Therefore, by suppressing debates and conflicts, the consumers cannot have the power to improve their situation on the market.

The important question is then: since there are differences between political parties and since there are conflicts and tensions which participate to the re-politicization of environmental policies, what are the consequences of short-term political changes on long-term energy-climate policies? It was interesting to see that according to the civil servants working at the City and according to the party in power, these political changes occurring every four years do not have such a big impact on the environmental work; whereas according to consultants, researchers and

11 Stockholmsregionens energiframtid 2010-2050

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the parties in the opposition, this was a major barrier. Available statistics tend to show that environmental work in the City of Stockholm has been quite successful until now, with an important decrease of greenhouse gas emissions; maybe this shows that the City has actually found a way to ally short-term political changes and long-term needs for energy-climate work, in particular through achieving the integration of environmental work in different governmental organisations.

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3. Londres

3.1. It all starts in Woking

From the early 1990s onwards, the Borough Council of Woking, a commuter town 45 kilometres south west of London with a population of 90,000, has been at the forefront of best practice in local energy policies by initiating and developing energy efficiency actions which have become based on local production and distribution, thereby promoting autonomy in energy provision with regard to the national grid. The preliminary rationale for this policy was economic, i.e. to enable the Council and Woking inhabitants to save money on their energy bills. Through the 1990s, however, it was realised that reductions in energy consumption and in energy bills could be accompanied by a rationale of shaping energy policy to save on carbon emissions.12 Indeed, ―saving carbon is now our measure of effectiveness‖ (Ray Morgan, interview). From initial energy efficiency actions, the council moved on in the late 1990s, through the drive and encouragement of its senior officer and chief financial officer, to establish its own Energy Services Company (ESCo), Thameswey Energy Limited, which would own and operate a plant for the production and supply of electricity, heat and chilled water to customers, and develop and implement technologies for the production and supply of energy (Woking promotional material: Thameswey Energy Ltd, November 2007). Setting up Thameswey as a public-private joint venture (in which the Borough Council holds a 90% stake and a Danish company Xergi Limited has a 10% stake) allows it to bypass central government capital controls which restrict the scale of local government investments and projects. Thameswey has therefore used mostly private finance to build and operate a number of local community energy projects, including a small-scale combined heat and power (CHP) heating and heat fired absorption cooling system, a private wire renewable energy system delivering supply direct to Council owned housing and town centre businesses, and the first commercially operating fuel cell CHP system (RegenSW_99.pdf, p.1-2). Using private wire networks, Woking has avoided paying charges and costs which are imposed on power generators and suppliers accessing the national grid, e.g. the Climate Change Levy (Woking promotional material: Brockhill, March 2007). This decentralized system remains connected to the national grid (as an emergency backup), but operates autonomously.13 But national regulation in turn limits the size of the local system and the number of customers that can be supplied (RegenSW_99.pdf, p.4).

12 The senior officer in the council (and an engineer by training) had written a report on global warming in 1990, becoming convinced that ―the primary cause of climate change is centralised energy‖ (ABC Jones interview, p.2), due mainly to the heat wasted in the production of units of electricity.

13 The Holiday Inn hotel in Woking was actually built without grid supply.

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Figure 3.1: Woking Energy Station CHP system

Source: xx

The Woking project has made considerable economic, energy and emissions savings: the council itself has saved almost £5 million (RegenSW_99.pdf, p.3) and residents £700,000 per year on energy bills (Ray Morgan, p50.pdf); energy consumption in council buildings has declined by more than 50%, the energy efficiency of residential property has increased by 33% and sustainable energy self generation was at 94% in 2006; CO2 emissions are estimated to have been reduced by 81% for council activities and by 21% across the borough as a whole (RayMorgan.pdf, slide 16). Given these measures of success, Woking has been awarded Beacon status three times in the last four years, for Sustainable Energy (2005-2006), Promoting Sustainable Communities through the Planning Process (2007-2008) and Tackling Climate Change (2008-2009).14

Some of the main factors which could help to explain the success of the Woking strategy include:

- Between 1990 and 2005, no party was in overall control of the Borough Council, which made it necessary (and easier) to mobilize cross-party support;

- The formulation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to further energy and environmental objectives from 1999 (Thameswey Ltd and Thameswey Energy Ltd);

- An innovative approach to sustainable and affordable local community energy provision blending technical, institutional and economic innovation: appropriation of existing energy technologies, working at (and pushing back?) institutional barriers such as the limits of local government powers (c.f. setting up of ESCo), but keeping the energy company at arms-length (to avoid mixing public LA work and energy business), putting together the appropriate mix of financing (public and private)…;

14 There have been one or two hiccups along the way: (a) the main CHP engine in the town centre broke down massively in 2007 which led to a reliance on grid electricity while it was repaired; (b) Woking was an early adopter of PVs which at the time came from only one manufacturer, so when the manufacturer initiated a product recall, all of Woking‘s PV equipment had to be stripped off over two years. These problems have led to a dip in performance in terms of emissions reductions as PV constitutes most of Woking‘s renewable energy operations (interview).

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- Energy services have been offered to households at prices which are 5% lower than the dual fuel tariffs proposed by the major energy companies, which helps to ensure the support of the local population;

- Thameswey Energy Ltd.'s projects are privately financed (with shareholding capital and loan finance), but the intellectual property (around community CHP) remains with the council;

- The development of a local community energy system has allowed Woking both ―to avoid charges and costs which are imposed on power generators and suppliers accessing the national grid‖15 and to directly provide electricity to customers over private wires which avoids transmission and distribution losses associated with the national grid (which means its energy is more efficiently produced and used and generates less emissions);

- There is an absolute need for political will and for behavioural change (from leadership), and then ―the technology will slot in‖.

3.2. From Woking to London...

Allan Jones, the senior officer who set the ball rolling and supervised the Woking policy was headhunted by Ken Livingstone and became CEO of the London Climate Change Agency with the task of ―doing a Woking for London‖, i.e. ―to deliver decentralised energy across the capital‖ (KL).16 The national exemplar in this case has been an ordinary city which the big world city has been seeking to replicate. London energy policy is now therefore dominated by ―a decentralised energy revolution‖ which recognizes that ―London has a quarter of the country‘s combined heat, power and cooling capacity. This means we can have a huge impact on reducing emissions and saving money‖ (Mayor of London Climate Change Action Plan, 2007, vii). This ‗revolution‘ is taking shape both on a metropolitan and more local level.

London The metropolitan level

The policy of London in the field of energy and climate change is characterized by the strong personal involvement of the (former) Mayor of London in this area and the fact that it is a central policy of the municipality. On a metropolitan level, the Mayor and the Greater London Authority‘s strategy is nothing less than to delink London from UK national centralized energy supply: ―The Mayor‘s top priority for reducing carbon emissions is to move as much of London as possible away from reliance on the national grid and on to local, lower-carbon energy supply (decentralised energy, including combined cooling heat and power (CCHP), energy from waste, and onsite renewable energy - such as solar panels)…17 The Mayor‘s goal is to enable a quarter of London‘s energy supply to be moved off the grid and on to local, decentralised systems by 2025,

15 ―So what we simply did in Woking was just to cut out the middle men and supply people directly. We were able to undercut the grid, we supplied energy at a lower price than you can get from the grid, and we increased our economics by about 400% simply because the retail prices is about four times that of the wholesale prices‖ (Allan Jones, former CEO, Woking, ABC Radio National, 26 July 2008). Woking avoided therefore transmission charges (for transporting electricity from the power station to the local grid supply point), distribution charges (for transporting electricity from the local grid supply point to the end user), and the taxes and levies added on top.

16 The main action of the London Climate Change Agency (LCCA) was to establish "a new energy infrastructure landscape‖ in London that takes into account all relevant sectors. In the short term, it aims to promote the use of low carbon fuels such as natural gas, prior to their replacement by renewable resources, or - especially? - by hydrogen: "The important issue here is to future proof the heat, chilled water and private wire infrastructure, serving buildings on local decentralized energy systems" (LCCA 2007, p.5).

17 Within this spectrum of technologies, current DE emphasis is on CHP plants linked to modern efficient community (district) heating networks (see e.g. Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, London First Cutting the Capital‘s Carbon Footprint - Delivering Decentralised Energy 2008…).

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with the majority of London‘s energy being supplied in this way by 2050‖ (Mayor of London Climate Change Action Plan, 2007, xxii). Furthermore, while this policy line has been imported from Woking, London has seen no reason why it cannot now be viewed as the ‗national exemplar‘ (Hodson and Marvin, 2007) or pioneer, helping to roll-out decentralized energy (DE) across the whole of the UK (and indeed the world):

―If it works here there is no reason why it should not be copied in cities around the UK‖ (Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.2)

―As the majority of the UK population live in urban areas this approach [DE] has a potentially much wider application‖ (Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.5)

The power of the decentralized energy discourse is well illustrated by the former Mayor of London when he talks about how ―The beauty of the decentralised energy solution is that at its core it is simply about using energy more efficiently and we can start implementing it straight away‖ (Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.2). In other words, DE is a solution (to problems), simple, encourages more efficient use of energy, and it is immediately available, as it does not require dramatic breakthroughs in technology, but rather relies wholly on the use of existing, technically proven solutions largely based on conventional energy sources, topped up by small-scale renewable energy generation (Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.4).18 The DE ‗solution‘ will thus reduce London‘s greenhouse gas emissions and also make it more energy independent: ―DE would reduce the level of electricity imports into London…‖ It is notable that this policy of steadily ‗decoupling‘ London from the national energy system is also perceived as beneficial for the national energy system: ―…with significant potential benefits to the National Grid‖ (Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.5).

The other dimension strongly asserted in energy policy is the fight against fuel poverty that affects half a million households in London. The Mayor‘s energy strategy aims expressly for the end of fuel poverty by 2018, mainly through actions that improve the energy efficiency of housing by subsidies for insulation work (Mayor of London 2004).

Since the election of the new Mayor Boris Johnson in May 2008, there has been a slight change of approach, although not really of direction, in energy policy on the metropolitan level. Gradual ‗decoupling‘ from the National Grid was a ‗genuine aspiration‘ before and is so now, as it develops ‗a win-win-win strategy‘ encompassing emissions reductions, security of supply (London would be ―insulated‖ if the Grid went down) and reduced costs to end users (GLA and LEP, interview). While the focus on decentralized energy remains, it is no longer the London Climate Change Agency which is tasked with delivering DE across London, but its parent organization the London Development Agency (the LDA thus becomes the Mayor‘s ―delivery vehicle‖ for DE). Indeed the LCCA has been scrapped as a separate entity and its director sacked. This is seen as partly a political choice (the LCCA was the brainchild of the former Mayor and was staffed by his people) and partly a reflection of the disappointing level of actions put in place by the agency19 (the London ESCo joint venture with EDF being the only major project). DE is no longer the be-all and the end-all of London energy policy either as the new Mayor has had to come up with a strategy for tackling energy and climate issues in the outer boroughs of London,

18 A joint study by the Mayor and Greenpeace in 2006 suggested that decentralized systems would be able by 2025 to provide 35% of energy demand in London (and up to 75% of demand in the long-term), which would reduce CO2 emissions by 33% (Mayor of London and Greenpeace, 2006).

19 Its main task was to drive through PPP investments in decentralized energy (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview).

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which elected him, but which are not high density and therefore less suitable for CHP-district heating solutions: ―the DE agenda falls away with distance from dense, central areas‖ (GLA, interview). Thus, a major energy efficiency/retrofitting programme is back on the agenda with home insulation (cavity walls and lofts), etc. (M Lockwood, GLA). Insulation of homes is also still seen as a means of reducing the number of London households in fuel poverty. Socio-technical innovation plays a leading role in London policy. Under Ken Livingstone, the assumption seemed to be that only a massive development of hydrogen technology would allow the city to achieve the targets set for reducing emissions. The Mayor therefore created the London Hydrogen Partnership to promote a "hydrogen economy" in the British capital. Under Boris Johnson, hydrogen was allegedly on the wane in favour of a focus on electric vehicles (various interviews). In either case, however, here there is a very real problem of the cost of upscaling from showcase or demonstration projects to more general use (David Hutchinson, GLA, interview).

London: The local level

On a local level, the London Development Agency is working on delivering decentralized energy through CHP plants linked to modern efficient community (district) heating networks: ―acting where markets are lacking or failing‖ (LDA, interview). This starts from the statements in the new London Plan that developers must consider (new or existing) CHP systems for heating for local projects of a certain size (above 2,500 homes?).20 According to the LDA, the scale of DE projects has to be in line with the (ambitious) plan for 25% of London electricity and heat to be supplied in this way by 2025. This means that policies need to be focused on networks/infrastructures rather than on buildings. It is estimated for example that 20% of the target can be met in new developments, but fully 80% in existing building stock (LDA, interview). Part of the role of the LDA therefore is to create a heat market through pipe-laying work (―pipework creates a market‖) connecting various heat sources.21 The strategy is ‗to grow‘ individual schemes and subsequently interconnect them through the LTG network (see box).22 The LDA has thus managed to establish the importance of energy master planning at the Greater London scale. This master planning has been developed and will be passed on to boroughs, who will use it in their planning and action plans. The borough level data will be passed back up to London level: ―It‘s obviously a top down process‖ (LDA, interview).

The primary ‗currency‘ for the evaluation of projects is carbon content, with the financial viability of projects only second (a marked difference to what Stockholm actors said).

The Barking station project in the east of London aims at capturing the heat produced by the station to supply a heat network (cf. London Thames Gateway (LTG) heat network vision map) to provide ―affordable, low-carbon heat‖ (LDA, interview). The LTG network is a £100m project over 5-10 years. It is a ―public utility‖ or infrastructure project needing public funding to get started, which will operate at a loss for the first 15-20 years and may subsequently be sold off to the private sector (if profitable). The business model for the LTG network does not consider private funding, but does consider funding by energy efficiency programmes (incl. the central

20 All major new developments should comply in order to: (a) existing building regulations; (b) possibility of connecting to existing heat networks; (c) use CHP; (d) cover 20% of energy needs through onsite renewable energy (LDA, interview). The London Plan modifications of February 2008 recommend indeed ―identifying, protecting and expanding heat networks‖ (GLA, interview; Southwark, interview).

21 In its pipe-laying work (especially for district heating trunk mains), the LDA seeks to take opportunity of: (i) current tunnelling works within the Crossrail project; (ii) disused tunnels (maintained by the Post Office).

22 The LDA benefits from funding from the EU Jessica programme (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas).

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govt‘s programme Community Energy Savings programme). The LTG network could be extended when the economic viability is clear (heat loads/demand). The LDA holds great hopes for the project: ―It could be used to provide affordable, low-carbon heat to deprived council estates and therefore contribute to fuel poverty alleviation. It could create jobs and opportunities, improve skills, support sustainable growth. It could kick-start the district heating industry nationwide‖ (LDA, interview). The LDA is negotiating with council estates to connect existing small community networks into the LTG (transmission) network. In short, it would displace high carbon content grid electricity (used especially for example in water boilers) by low carbon CHP (as in Helsinki).

The Borough of Southwark has integrated local water and energy provision (―sustainable community infrastructure‖) into its £1.5 billion Elephant & Castle regeneration project, which concerns 5,300 new homes as well as retail and leisure space on around 23 hectares (75% of which is owned by the Borough), and will quadruple the current amount of built-up land in the area (Southwark website). The project has a ‗zero carbon growth‘ objective, and, again building on the Woking exemplar, has set up a Multi Utility Services Company (MUSCo) for the delivery of this local infrastructure, e.g. ‗private wire‘ energy, which ―will operate in parallel to the grid‖. Southwark's energy strategy is thus a prime example of a London borough developing its climate change/environment agenda around local/decentralised energy: ―This is not a pilot, this is not a gesture - we have the opportunity to set the standard for the rest of the UK to follow‖ (Southwark council leader, quoted on Southwark website). District heating is seen as a good solution in Southwark because of the density of the borough and its mixed use structure (both residential and commercial with complementary energy loads, e.g. at different times of the day) (Southwark, interview).

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The MUSCo has been allocated a 35 year concession by Southwark for the provision of water, energy and broadband services: ―utilities in a joined-up way‖ (Southwark, interview).23 Part of the Borough strategy is to force residents and businesses to connect to MUSCo services: ―All consented schemes since 2007 must provide connectivity to MUSCo‖ (ppt slide 9). The Borough will use Section 106 planning agreements for this (ppt slide 42).24 This offers an extra degree of financial certainty for the MUSCo operator(s) and reduces the commercial risk involved, as with no capital from the council involved, the operator(s) bear 100% of the commercial risk. For the Borough this approach promotes greater coordination leading to lower civil engineering costs, less digging up of roads and pavements etc.

Ordinarily the Elephant & Castle development would almost double the carbon footprint of the area (ppt slide 17). But the development has been conceived to make use of biomass peak load boilers, 10% renewables and CCHP (combined cooling, heating and power) for a target of zero carbon growth (ppt slide 18). The Borough will still have a role in ‗policing‘ the carbon content of energy and the tariffs proposed to households and businesses (Southwark, interview).

One of the key factors involved in the initiation of this project has been recognized to be ‗officer will‘. The Southwark Chief Officer recognized that it was the infrastructure and not the buildings that were important in the Elephant & Castle scheme (―the pipes rather than the architecture‖), and the conviction and confidence of the Chief Officer was obviously crucial in getting the council as a whole to accept the zero carbon and MUSCo approach to the regeneration of Elephant & Castle (and particularly the reliance on 100% private sector funding for its infrastructure development) (Southwark, interview).25

Through his involvement in the London Boroughs Energy Group, the Southwark planning official came to realize that many local energy managers have been ―buried in property management rather than climate change or environmental issues‖. People with energy expertise are not usually involved in regeneration (and vice versa). But the London Plan alterations have brought energy and planning/regeneration closer together. Furthermore, the need to respond to central government‘s new indicators mean that ―energy managers will have to get involved in planning‖ (Southwark, interview).

Municipal policy grants therefore a high priority to decentralized systems (cf. also Barking & Dagenham), which raises questions about the multi-scale organization of energy on urban and national levels.

23 The MUSCo approach implies ―a special purpose multi-utility services company acting alongside the master development partner (MDP) to plan, design, construct, finance and operate the plant and infrastructure required to deliver low carbon energy, non-potable water and high speed data services‖ (sustinfra ppt slide 16).

24 Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows a local planning authority to enter into a legally-binding agreement or planning obligation with a landowner in association with the granting of planning permission. The obligation is termed a Section 106 Agreement. These agreements are a way of delivering or addressing matters that are necessary to make a development acceptable in planning terms. They are increasingly used to support the provision of services and infrastructure, including energy networks/services (http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=71631).

25 This was an observation constantly made by actors in London: ―Energy champions in boroughs are needed‖ (GLA, interview). Fitting in with the Woking case, others argued that there was the need to have the Chief Financial Officer in boroughs on board and willing to take the risk, as Energy Officers tend to be keen but low down the borough hierarchy (M Lockwood, B Fiddik, Woking).

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3.3. Institutional and national context

The first thing to remember with regard to the institutional context for London energy policy is that there was no city-wide tier of government between the mid 1980s and 2000 when the London Assembly, the Mayor and the GLA came (back) into operation. Furthermore, the powers and resources of the Mayor and the GLA to act in this area are quite limited: ―It relies to a large extent on the power of influence and political persuasion of the Mayor‖ (LDA, interview).26 Their only planning power, for example, is for strategic new developments over a certain size (and now new social housing as well).27 Otherwise, everyday planning decisions remain with local boroughs. So when we consider that the biggest source of emissions in London is buildings, this means that the GLA has no power/resources to act here (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview).28

Policies and developments in London in recent years have all been shaped within a national context which itself is in constant flux. In many ways, the government‘s 2003 Energy White Paper set out the four-pronged set of (consensual) stakes for ‗energy transition‘ that local and regional actors in London have accepted as the basis for their objectives (Will Lochhead, Government Office for London, interview) (and which we often find as the stakes for energy policy in other cities/regions and countries):

CO2 emissions reductions (UK 60% by 2050)

Secure energy supply

Fuel poverty alleviation

Economic growth/competitive (energy) markets

Actors have little trouble accepting these goals as targets to be aimed for. In the case of CO2 emissions reductions, however, the GLA (like other city/regional authorities elsewhere, cf. the Conseil Régional d‘Ile-de-France) goes beyond national government targets by aiming for 60% reductions on 1990 levels by 2025 (as opposed to 2050). It is though largely in the means, actions and resources that are necessary for working towards these targets that contention and contestation become evident (cf. also in Paris/Ile-de-France energy policy). For example, while the national government sees a return to nuclear production of electricity as a/the means to achieve both significant emissions reductions and energy security in a relatively short space of time, London government (under Ken Livingstone) disputed any need at all for nuclear energy,29 hence (in part) its promotion of a decentralized energy policy. ―If the largest city in Europe doesn‘t need new nuclear power, then who does?‖ (Greenpeace executive director, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.3).30 Greenpeace argues that national

26 The major part of the GLA‘s budget (£12 billion in total: GLA, interview) is attributed to the transport sector with only a small proportion available for strategic planning tasks. Only £175 million was allocated over three years to the Climate Change Action Plan in 2007 (GLA, interview).

27 The former Mayor increased his influence on planning applications by reducing the threshold above which developments became referable to him (from 500 dwellings to 150 dwellings). The GLA suggests that the new Mayor is unlikely to reverse this (GLA, interview).

28 The LEP argued though that the social housing stock can be an easier focus for DE than the average existing stock. With half the stock owned by housing associations and half by LAs, LAs ―can still focus on this half‖ (GLA and LEP, interview).

29 Ken Livingstone‘s stance on nuclear power has been read as ―largely rhetorical‖ insofar as there are no nuclear power stations located in London, so ―he could say what he liked‖ (interviewee, London).

30 It was notable though that with the change of London Mayor in 2008 following the election of the conservative Boris Johnson, this 2006 joint report between the Mayor of London (Ken Livingstone) and Greenpeace ‗disappeared‘ from the Mayoral website (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview). Although the new Mayor is not

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government policy is therefore ―fixated with the technologies and infrastructure of the past‖ (Greenpeace executive director, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.3), that the major stakes of climate change and resource security require more innovative policies (than the ‗political machismo‘ of big power stations for big amounts of power), and that, in short, DE is the answer because it simultaneously offers greater security of supply, reduced CO2 emissions and better value for money.

This discourse relies though on a polarization of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ approaches to urban ‗energy transition‘ (see table x) which runs the risk of overly fetishising local decentralized energy systems.31 While the GLA and the LDA see energy policy as a question of decentralized or centralized energy, the likes of EDF argue that DE is ―not the answer to everything‖ and that a combination is a better policy option (decentralized and centralized) (Angus Norman, EDF Energy, interview).

The ‘good’ The ‘bad’

Decentralised energy (DE) Nuclear energy

Small Large

Local production Out of town production

Local transmission Long distance transmission

Decentralised Centralised

High density Low density

Systems Power stations

Efficiency and re-use Squander and waste

Pioneer Perpetuate out-of-date traditions

Solution Problem

Simple Complex

Efficiency Inefficiency

Immediately available Requires years of planning

Table 3.1: Polarising the good and the bad in urban energy transition

fervently anti-nuclear like the old Mayor, he has broadly persisted with the line of policy initiated by his predecessor on decentralized energy (albeit to be managed in a different way).

31 As both the former Mayor and the director of Greenpeace argue:

―Large-scale out of town power stations squander two thirds of the energy sources they consume either as waste heat or in the process of transmitting energy around the country. In contrast, decentralised energy systems cut out most of the transmission losses by producing energy close to the homes and offices they heat and power, and by re-using heat produced in the energy generation process rather than wasting it… London with its high density of housing and commercial buildings is the perfect place to pioneer decentralised energy on a large scale‖ (Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.2).

―Our current, centralised energy system wastes a staggering two-thirds of primary energy input, mostly in the form of waste heat going up the cooling towers of large power stations. A decentralised future would rely on more, but smaller power stations close to the point of use. This approach reduces electricity transmission losses, and allows the waste heat from the generation process to be piped to nearby homes so that a much greater proportion of input energy is used, resulting in far higher overall efficiency‖ (Greenpeace executive director, Mayor of London Greenpeace Powering London 2006, p.3).

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National electricity policy/legislation has also traditionally favoured large centralized power systems focused on centralized generation and the sale of energy in bulk (at least until the Energy Act 2008 is up and running), and has been unsupportive or has obstructed local and regional attempts to develop decentralized energy production (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview; GLA, interview; LDA, interview; Woking, interview). "The barriers are not technical but regulatory and related to vested interests" (LCCA 2007, p.17). The economics and capital costs of CHP are often problematic32 (hence the view that the public sector needs to concentrate on getting private capital in to jointly fund CHP projects through PPP33), and while Woking and others have made some carbon savings, the national context does not encourage or reward this (c.f. no national heat regulation34 or policy in the UK).35 The national government thus needs to ‗back up‘ local and regional development of CHP and decentralized energy and ‗underwrite some of the inevitable risks‘ (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview). As the LDA also argue: ―Projects that entail high risks require the public sector purse‖ (LDA, interview). There are also differences in mindset and scale between national actors and local/regional actors in favour of DE. The former is persuaded that DE cannot be done on a ‗large scale‘ and yet it has ambitious targets for the proportion of renewable/low carbon energy in the national energy mix by 2020/2030: ―this implies tens of thousands of small investments instead of a thousand [more efficient?] big investments‖ (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview). More understanding is needed of how to do this at local level, as people tend to have either a ‗national‘ understanding or a ‗local‘ understanding, but rarely one which articulates both national policy context and local operational specificities (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview). Indeed, boroughs are quite wary of a national policy context which is seemingly concerned with national energy supply on the one hand, and on-site renewables or the level of individual buildings on the other hand, with little or no guidance or interest for the levels in between (Southwark, interview).

In other aspects, London energy policy is more closely intertwined, and therefore less in conflict, with the national policy context, which is partly related to the fact that climate change is still largely a national level issue (Will Lochhead, Government Office for London, interview). The London Plan developed by the Mayor and local plans developed by boroughs take into account national planning policy which, especially in the last couple of years, has formulated requirements for local authorities to set requirements for (renewable or low carbon) energy use and energy efficiency in local plans (Planning and Energy Act 2008), and for councils to take action on climate change in their development plans (Planning Act 2008). The Communities and Local Government department‘s Code for Sustainable Homes consultation proposes a target of zero carbon in new build by 2016. These kinds of planning/housing policies will create and sustain a market for renewable and decentralised energy (LDA, interview). This is not always just a top-down structure as innovative local planning regulations have been taken up in regional and national legislation, e.g. the Merton Rule (named after a local London borough that adopted a prescriptive policy of requiring large, new commercial buildings to generate at least 10% of their

32 ―You need someone to make the commitment to buying heat for ten to fifteen years‖ (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview).

33 Hence the LDA‘s attempts at ―removing market barriers [between heat and electricity?], which give access for private sector companies to high value electricity customers‖ (LDA, interview).

34 Heat is not regulated, ―but now that it is recognized as a separate commodity, government will want to regulate it‖ (LDA, interview). The first consultation on ‗energy efficiency and heat markets‘ took place in February 2009. A consultation on the regulation of renewable energies was due to be launched in the summer of 2009.

35 District heating in the UK as a whole also loses out from poor public perception as old systems which are uncontrollable individually. Its ‗socialist‘ origins and connotation clash with the culture of the UK as ―an intensely individualistic country‖. Its monopoly structure also goes somewhat against the idea of availability of choice, the freedom to change supplier with a month‘s notice, the culture of the market, etc (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview).

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energy needs from on-site renewable energy production) was taken up in the London Plan and is now part of UK planning policy (Planning Policy Statement - Planning and Climate Change - PPS1; Planning and Energy Act 2008).

As the government has also now legally bound its CO2 emissions targets (34% below 1990 levels by 2020 and at least 80 per cent reductions by 2050) in the Climate Change Act 2008, local and regional energy and climate policies will be tightly bound to contribute to these ambitious national goals.36 Likewise, the new national Energy Act 2008 outlines how new technologies, renewable energy, and policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs and smart metering will be used to meet national energy and climate goals. Nevertheless, the extent to which these national regulatory/policy changes support DE initiatives is open to debate. The ‗renewables obligation‘ has become focused towards more expensive and less developed technologies such as offshore wind, while the feed-in tariff, although produced under political pressure from local authorities and interest organizations, may artificially channel income to very small scale systems such as solar PVs rather than CHP and district heating systems (LDA, interview).

Actors Domains of action Initiatives / policies

Greater London Authority / Mayor of London

Strategic policy Development, implementation and coordination of Mayor‘s Energy Strategy and Climate Change Action Plan

London Energy Partnership Coordination and facilitation between different partners to promote sustainable energy solutions

Development of renewable energy (London Renewables group)

Production of toolkits/guides for local authorities (learning)

Work towards alleviation of fuel poverty

London Hydrogen Partnership Hydrogen technology for clean energy

Work towards the establishment of a hydrogen economy in London

Government Office for London Representing central government (policy) on a London level

Overseeing local government performance indicators

EDF Energy Energy provider (c. 80% of London electricity market)

Partner in London ESCo (decentralised energy systems)

London Development Agency Linking energy and climate issues to economic development possibilities (‗green economy‘)

Delivering decentralised energy across London, both in organisational or political terms by bringing actors together, and in technical terms by laying pipework for heat networks (sustainable energy report 2003; London First Cutting the Capital‘s Carbon Footprint – Delivering Decentralised Energy report 2008)

Bringing through DE projects for the market

Local Borough Councils Local planning and social/economic development

Planning and regeneration strategies

Local renewable energy projects

Table 3.2: Main actors and domains of action in London energy policy

36 Indeed central government now dictates that local authorities must fill in ‗performance‘ indicators on climate change (4 indicators out of a total of 200): CO2 emissions per capita, CO2 emissions in LA operations and services, fuel poverty households, adaptation to climate change (plus a qualitative statement about what they‘re doing on climate change issues (Will Lochhead, Government Office for London, interview; Bob Fiddik, London Borough of Southwark, interview).

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On a local and regional level, energy and climate issues are increasingly part of joined-up policy thinking which situates action on these issues as either transversal across sectors or as potentially contributing also to other major policy goals37: ―The recommendations we make would not only support carbon reduction and mitigation of climate change, but also the delivery of new housing which is urgently needed in the capital, as low carbon buildings could be delivered at lower cost‖ (London First Cutting the Capital‘s Carbon Footprint - Delivering Decentralised Energy 2008, p.4).

In summary, the main constraints on London energy/climate policy are at least threefold (various interviews):

- Institutional / political: London‘s energy governance remains ―too institutionally complex‖ with too many agencies present at local and regional level (GLA, interview). When one adds the national level into the mix, it becomes clear that how this multi-level governance framework (and the sectoral and transversal responsibilities that this generates and implies) continues to play out in the rapidly evolving London context is a key issue to be taken into consideration;

- Infrastructure legacy: much of London‘s infrastructure dates from the Victorian era and is difficult to adapt to today‘s needs (in terms of capacity, but also in terms of energy/climate policy);

- Housing stock: 30% of London housing dates from pre-WW1 and is therefore draughty, has a poor energy performance, and is difficult to insulate (due to solid walls, etc). Retrofitting of existing housing is expected to be one of the main new policy strands in the Mayor‘s new Energy Strategy (due out in summer 2009).

There is a surprising level of apparent consensus between many actors that the rapid carbon reductions targeted by the Mayor and the GLA for London will not be met by a continued focus on centralized infrastructure solutions. They must therefore be met primarily by decentralized heat / CHP networks: ―DE and CHP is where you get additionality in London‖ (GLA, interview). This is a view which is now filtering slowly through to the national level, e.g. the government is promoting a target of zero carbon new build homes by 2016, recognizing that there are very limited ways to achieve zero carbon and that CHP and heat networks are likely to be the most efficient method for this (GLA, interview).

Between Woking and Elephant & Castle, we have seen the emergence of a MUSCo/ESCo approach, which although quite different from each other do share some commonalities:

- They highlight the benefits of acting on the neighborhood or small borough level rather than the building level; - They rely on identifying the right dynamic people in local authorities for water and energy issues; - They offer a (somewhat controversial) means for authorities to bypass liberalization of markets and the consumer's right to choose their energy supplier (and to change supplier every month); - They push therefore at the boundaries of what is allowed in terms of national legislation;

- They prefigure a possible return of local authorities in network service provision (either more directly in the case of ESCos or as overseeing managers in the case of MUSCos) following two decades of generally reduced interest.

37 This is also the case on a national level where the new Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has joined up work previously done by the DTI (energy), the Department of the Environment (energy efficiency), Communities and Local Government, Housing and Defra (climate change).

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The success of Woking (measured in its energy consumption and economic savings and emissions reductions) compared (so far) to London might validate the GLA view that it is ―easier to deliver projects in smaller cities‖ (GLA, interview) or that ―really big changes are needed to push city-owned ESCos‖ (Matthew Lockwood, IPPR, interview). London is not Woking as the former head of the LCCA came to realize. Much of the (most visible) action being taken at local and regional level in London has yet to bear fruit. But many actors concord that initiatives need to mature (particularly given the shifting political context), and that modest schemes can grow and indeed need time to do so.

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4. Paris – Ile-de-France

4.1. Le dispositif français énergie-climat depuis les années 2000

4.1.1. Du PNLCC au premier Plan Climat

Signé en 1997 et entré en vigueur en 2005, le protocole de Kyoto a assigné aux pays développés des objectifs quantifiés de réduction de leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre à l‘horizon 2008-2012. Après répartition de l‘effort souscrit par l‘Union Européenne entre les pays membres, la France s‘est vue assigner un objectif de stabilisation de ses émissions sur la période 2008-2012 à 558 millions de tonnes équivalent (Mteq) CO2, niveau d‘émissions correspondant à celui de 1990. Pour répondre à cette obligation, le gouvernement français a adopté le 18 janvier 2000 le Programme National de Lutte contre le Changement Climatique (PNLCC) [28]. Ce programme constitué d‘un ensemble de mesures concernant les secteurs des transports, de l‘habitat, du tertiaire et de l‘industrie visait à éviter l‘émission de 62 Mteq CO2 permettant ainsi de respecter les objectifs fixés par le protocole de Kyoto.

Ainsi, en l‘an 2000, trois plans existaient en France : le Plan National de Lutte contre le Changement Climatique (PNLCC), le Plan National d‘Amélioration de l‘Efficacité Energétique (PNAEE) et le Plan National Habitat Construction et Développement Durable (PNHCDD).

Lorsque fut dressé en 2002 un premier bilan du PNLCC, la conclusion fut que ce plan n'avait pas atteint ses objectifs en matière de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Mais il fut constaté également que seuls 10 % des mesures incluses dans le PNLCC avaient été réellement mises en œuvre et que le rôle des collectivités locales dans le PNLCC avait été négligé par rapport à leur pouvoir d‘action sur les émissions [27].

4.1.2. Le Plan Climat 2004-2012 et sa nécessaire évolution

Il fut donc décidé de mettre en œuvre un nouveau texte, le plan Climat 2004-2012, publié en juillet 2004 et élaboré sur la base de scénarios du GIEC et d'une analyse des scénarios de réduction d‘émissions en 2050, faite par la Mission interministérielle de l‘effet de serre (Mies), avec l'aide de l'ONERC et de nombreux experts, de l‘ADEME notamment [29].

Ce plan Climat regroupe des mesures dans tous les secteurs de l‘économie et de la vie des ménages, en vue d‘économiser près de 15 millions de tonnes d‘équivalent carbone par an à l‘horizon 2010 et à stabiliser les émissions de gaz à effet de serre en 2010 à leur niveau de 1990, conformément aux engagements pris par la France dans le cadre du protocole de Kyoto. Il prévoit en outre une réduction par quatre de ces émissions pour 2050. Une grande part de ces mesures concerne l‘énergie qui représente en France environ 80 % des émissions.

Il comprend un plan d'action qui incluait une campagne nationale de sensibilisation et adaptation, un volet Transports durables, un volet Bâtiment et écohabitat, un volet Industrie, énergie et déchets, un volet Agriculture durable et forêts, un volet Climatisation durable, un volet Plans climats territoriaux et État exemplaire, un volet Recherche, international et prospective après 2010 [31].

Mais plusieurs éléments font évoluer le contexte français depuis l‘élaboration du Plan Climat en 2004 : l‘évolution du prix de l‘énergie, l‘entrée en vigueur du protocole de Kyoto et l‘émergence d‘un marché mondial du CO2. Ainsi, après avoir dressé en 2005 le bilan du Plan Climat 2004 et souligné la nécessité de poursuivre les actions engagées en mettant l‘accent sur les transports et le logement, un second Plan Climat a été adopté le 13 novembre 2006 par le Comité interministériel au développement durable [31]. Il ajoute des mesures de fiscalité écologique (taxation du charbon, proposition d'une taxe carbone aux frontières de l'Union européenne), d'information et

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étiquetage, ainsi que sur la mobilité, les bio- ou agro-carburants et l'efficacité énergétique des bâtiments (y compris les bâtiments anciens). Il s'appuie notamment sur un Plan National d‘Allocation des Quotas (PNAQ 2005-2007).

4.1.3. Loi POPE

La loi de programme n°2005-781 du 13 juillet 2005, baptisée loi POPE, fixe la stratégie française et les objectifs à atteindre en matière d'énergie. Pour cela la loi se base sur [32] :

- la maîtrise de la demande d'énergie ;

- la diversification du bouquet énergétique ;

- le développement de la recherche et de l'innovation dans le secteur de l'énergie ;

- la maîtrise des moyens de transport et de stockage adaptés aux besoins.

Pour cadrer les actions à conduire pour l'application de cette loi, la France se donne des objectifs chiffrés :

- Le soutien à un objectif international d'une division par 2 des émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de serre d'ici 2050, ce qui nécessite une division par 4 ou 5 des émissions pour les pays développés : en France on parle de Facteur 4 ;

- La réduction en moyenne de 2 % par an d'ici à 2015 de l'intensité énergétique finale (rapport entre la consommation d'énergie et le produit intérieur brut, cf. figure 4.1) et de 2,5 % d'ici à 2030 ;

- La production de 10 % des besoins énergétiques français à partir de sources d'énergie renouvelables à l'horizon 2010 :

o une production intérieure d'électricité d'origine renouvelable à hauteur de 21 % de la consommation en 2010 contre 14 % actuellement, soit + 50 % ;

o le développement des énergies renouvelables thermiques pour permettre d'ici 2010 une hausse de 50% de la production de chaleur d'origine renouvelable ;

o l'incorporation de biocarburants et autres carburants renouvelables à hauteur de 2 % d'ici au 31 décembre 2005 et de 5,75 % d'ici au 31 décembre 2010.

- La mise en œuvre de trois plans mobilisateurs pour les économies d'énergie et le développement des énergies renouvelables :

o Le plan ''L'énergie pour le développement '' pour étendre l'accès aux services énergétiques des populations des pays en développement ;

o Le plan ''Face sud '' dans le bâtiment doit permettre l'installation de 200 000 chauffe-eau solaires et de 50 000 toits solaires par an dès 2010 ;

o Le plan ''Terre Énergie '' pour atteindre une économie d'importations d'au moins 10 millions de tonnes équivalent pétrole en 2010 grâce à l'apport de la biomasse pour la production de chaleur et de biocarburants.

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Figure 4.1. Intensité énergétique de l’économie française (1975-2006)

Cela s‘accompagne de nombreuses mesures d‘économies d‘énergie ou de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, dont le système innovant des certificats d‘économie d‘énergie, le Plan National d‘Affectation des Quotas d‘émission (PNAQ), la révision des tarifs d‘achat de l‘électricité EnR et des mesures de fiscalité comme le crédit d‘impôt ou la TVA à 5,5%.

La loi POPE prévoit également le maintien de l'option nucléaire en France ouverte avec le lancement du réacteur nucléaire franco-allemand EPR.

4.1.4. Le Grenelle de l’environnement, les lois Grenelle I et II

A l‘initiative des pouvoirs publics, les acteurs impliqués dans la lutte contre le changement climatique (représentants de l‘Etat et des collectivités territoriales, syndicats et organisations patronales, membres du mouvement associatif) ont été réunis à l‘automne 2007 pour essayer de trouver les voies d‘un consensus sur les mesures à mettre en place dans la perspective d‘un « développement durable qui répond aux besoins du présent sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs ». Le Grenelle de l‘Environnement est le nom donné à cet ensemble de rencontres politiques organisées en France en octobre 2007, visant à prendre des décisions à long terme en matière d'environnement et de développement durable.

Il a donné lieu à un projet de loi (dit «Grenelle I») adopté par le parlement en juillet 2009. La loi Grenelle I est une loi d'orientation visant à formaliser les principes des engagements du Grenelle de l'environnement. Elle s'intitule "loi de programmation relative à la mise en oeuvre du Grenelle de l'environnement ", et vise à transformer en texte juridique les 268 engagements issus du Grenelle. Elle reprend notamment le paquet énergie-climat 20/20/20 de la Commission Européenne.

Le projet de loi dite « Grenelle II » a pour nom complet « Loi portant engagement national pour l'environnement ». Il vise, en France à décliner et appliquer concrètement la Loi dite Grenelle I. L'examen du projet de loi Grenelle II au Sénat s'est terminé (avec diverses modifications ou ajouts) le jeudi 8 octobre 2009, avec un vote par 177 voix seulement contre 135.

L‘un des six groupes de travail du Grenelle de l‘environnement était consacré au changement climatique et à l‘énergie. Les conclusions de ce groupe vont dans le sens d‘un renforcement des préconisations du Plan Climat, avec comme priorité la réduction importante de la consommation d‘énergie dans tous les domaines, notamment les transports et le bâtiment qui sont aujourd‘hui les secteurs les plus consommateurs d‘énergie.

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4.1.5. Les politiques énergie-climat nationales à l’adresse des collectivités locales

Avec les lois successives de décentralisation, de nombreuses compétences ont été conférées aux collectivités : celles-ci ont donc notamment un rôle très important à jouer dans le cadre des politiques énergétiques.

Ainsi, les engagements du Grenelle en matière de changement climatique et d‘énergie croisent toues les missions des collectivités. En effet, les choix d‘aménagement et d‘urbanisation, par exemple, conditionnent en grande partie les consommations d‘énergie des communes. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne les engagements du Grenelle portant sur l‘urbanisme, c‘est l‘intercommunalité qui est l‘échelle de référence pour mettre en cohérence les politiques liées au climat et à l‘énergie.

On estime que les collectivités territoriales peuvent agir sur 10 et 15 % des émissions nationales de GES, voire 25% si l‘on prend en compte l‘ensemble de l‘économie locale impactée. Ainsi, aujourd‘hui, l‘un des enjeux majeurs du Grenelle est de mettre les collectivités en situation de territorialiser les engagements et ainsi d‘ancrer les territoires dans la lutte contre le changement climatique.

Avec la loi Grenelle II, de nouveaux textes apparaissent et avec de nouvelles obligations pour les collectivités. La loi se fonde à présent sur les Schémas Régionaux de Climat Air Energie et les Plans Climat Territoriaux pour organiser une cohérence territoriale régionale.

• Les SRCAE

Le principe des schémas régionaux de climat, de l‘air et de l‘énergie est de renforcer la cohérence de l‘action territoriale en donnant aux acteurs des orientations et un cadrage régional [16]. A ce titre, sous réserve du contour définitif qui leur sera donné par le débat parlementaire, ces schémas intégreront en un seul document les orientations de lutte contre l‘effet de serre et contre la pollution atmosphérique, celles de développement des énergies renouvelables, de maîtrise de l‘énergie et d‘adaptation aux changements climatiques.

Ils regrouperont donc (et les remplaceront) les dispositifs antérieurs des plans régionaux pour la qualité de l‘air et des schémas régionaux éoliens. Ils serviront également de cadre aux nouveaux plans climat territoriaux. Ils s‘appuieront sur les inventaires de GES et polluants atmosphériques, le bilan énergétique régional, le potentiel d‘EnR et l‘évaluation de la qualité de l‘air. Le SRCAE servira également de cadre à l‘élaboration du schéma régional de raccordement au réseau des énergies renouvelables [16].

Enfin, le SRCAE devra inclure des scénarios à horizon 2020 (se fondant sur les différents bilans) débouchant sur des orientations climat compatibles avec les engagements dits « 3x20 » et Facteur 4 qui serviront de base à des objectifs et seuils à atteindre en matière d'énergie renouvelables et économies d'énergie.

Si l‘on s‘intéresse par exemple particulièrement aux énergies renouvelables, le schéma aboutira à une évaluation, par zone géographique, du potentiel de développement des énergies renouvelables. Il fixera des objectifs qualitatifs et quantitatifs, par zone géographique, à atteindre en matière de valorisation du potentiel énergétique terrestre, renouvelable et de récupérations, conformément aux objectifs nationaux issus de la réglementation communautaire relative à l‘énergie et au climat. Ces orientations et objectifs seront élaborés à partir d‘inventaires, de bilans et d‘évaluations. Cette partie intègrera le schéma régional des énergies renouvelables du Grenelle I.

Les schémas seront co-élaborés par le préfet et le président du conseil régional : ils seront approuvés par l‘organe délibérant du CR et arrêtés par le Préfet de région.

Cette co-élaboration devra avoir lieu dans un délai d‘un an à compter de la publication de la loi portant engagement national pour l‘environnement, loi dite Grenelle 2. Le schéma sera ensuite évalué au bout de 5 ans et révisé le cas échéant en fonction de l‘atteinte des objectifs nationaux.

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Si l‘on s‘intéresse à la hiérarchie des différents documents, la prévision actuelle (ordre de compatibilité) est la suivante [16] :

Figure 4.2. Hiérarchie des textes et documents relatifs aux politiques énergético-climatiques territoriales

• Les PCET

Les collectivités territoriales sont également appelées à se mobiliser par le Grenelle II avec notamment l‘obligation d‘élaborer des "Plans climat-énergie territoriaux" (PCET) pour les collectivités territoriales ou locales (départements, CU, CA, CC et communes) de plus de 50 000 habitants, adopté en concertation avec l‘ensemble des acteurs d‘ici le 31 décembre 2012. La loi Grenelle 2 mentionne également l‘obligation pour ces mêmes collectivités de réaliser un bilan carbone de leurs activités.

Le Plan Climat national adopté en juillet 2004 incitait déjà fortement les collectivités territoriales à s'investir dans des Plans Climat Territoriaux (PCT) afin de contribuer, à leur échelle, à la réduction des gaz à effet de serre. Cependant cette mesure incitative n‘avait pas suffit à motiver largement les collectivités.

Le Plan Climat Territorial représente un élément essentiel de la bonne mise en œuvre du SRCAE : il traduit à l‘échelle locale de la collectivité les objectifs du SRCAE [17]. Il doit permettre aux collectivités d'identifier sur leur territoire les principales activités responsables d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre de façon à déployer des plans d'action et à mettre en cohérence une politique climatique sur l'ensemble de leur territoire. Un plan climat territorial vise à intégrer la question climatique et énergétique dans toutes les politiques et compétences des pouvoirs publics.

Ces programmes d'actions doivent permettre aux collectivités territoriales (régions, départements, intercommunalités et communes) d'améliorer leur efficacité énergétique et de réduire leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Le Plan climat Territorial n'est donc pas un outil clé en main mais plutôt une démarche de développement durable axée sur l'effet de serre.

En termes de contenu, il commence par définir, sur la base notamment des bilans d‘émissions de GES prévu par la Grenelle II, des objectifs stratégiques et opérationnels en matière d‘atténuation et d‘adaptation. Ensuite il présente le programme d‘actions, notamment en termes d‘efficacité énergétique, décliné dans tous les domaines de compétences. Enfin il explicite le dispositif de suivi et d‘évaluation des résultats qui sera mis en place.

Quant à ses caractéristiques, il est rendu public et révisable tous les 5 ans, il est un outil de gouvernance locale ; les régions peuvent intégrer au SRCAE le plan climat territorial régional.

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4.2. La politique énergie-climat en région Île-de-France

Les crises énergétiques et climatiques sont des questions globales qui présentent des niveaux de responsabilités partagés. Face à la menace qu‘elles représentent pour nos sociétés et la vie sur notre planète, les objectifs s‘énoncent donc clairement tant au niveau international avec le Protocole de Kyoto, au niveau européen avec le Paquet Energie 20/20/20 de la Commission Européenne et au niveau national avec le facteur 4 en 2050 inscrit comme objectif de la Loi de programme et d‘orientation sur l‘énergie adoptée en 2005 (Loi POPE).

Cependant, les directives européennes, lois et règlements nationaux ainsi que les dispositifs d‘incitation qui les accompagnent, aussi pertinents qu‘ils puissent être, ne constituent qu‘un niveau de réponse et d‘adaptation aux enjeux énergétiques et climatiques. En effet, les enjeux énergétiques et climatiques n‘en demeurent pas moins très dépendants de décisions, d‘actions et de comportements locaux.

Cette dimension locale recouvre les activités sociales (logement, loisirs, éducation, santé, etc.) et économiques (travail, transports, production, transit, stockage, etc.) des citoyens et des entreprises dans des contextes de territoire particulier du point de vue de la géographie, de la population, de l‘économie, de la culture. C‘est à ce niveau que se forme la quasi-totalité de la demande d‘énergie (si l‘on exclut les consommations énergétiques pour produire une partie des biens de consommation dont la production n‘est pas toujours localisée sur le territoire de consommation). C‘est à ce niveau également que se trouvent les principaux leviers pour répondre à l‘exigence d‘efficacité et de sobriété énergétique et de réduction de nos émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ces leviers recouvrent une diversité d‘action avec une « granulométrie fine » que les dispositifs nationaux, voire supranationaux, peuvent difficilement appréhender.

Ainsi ces questions énergétiques et climatiques font l‘objet d‘une déclinaison selon les multiples échelles d‘interventions. En France cela se présente ainsi :

- engagements internationaux (négociations de Copenhague, protocole de Kyoto, Paquet Energie Climat 20/20/20) ;

- politique nationale à l‘adresse des collectivités locales (Plan Climat 2004, Plan climat territoriaux et Schéma Régional Climat, Air, Energie du Projet de loi Grenelle 2) ;

- politiques régionales (en Ile-de-France : SDRIF, PRQA, PREDMA, Délibérations du Conseil régional d‘Ile-de-France relatives à l‘énergie et à la diminution des émissions de GES, Plan Climat régional, Agenda 21 Régional) ;

- politiques locales (Plans climat territoriaux).

Il est nécessaire de garder à l‘esprit la nécessaire complémentarité et l‘optimisation des moyens d‘actions, ce sur quoi nous reviendrons ultérieurement.

4.2.1. Une prise de conscience progressive

Plusieurs de nos interlocuteurs ont souligné le caractère progressif et récent de la montée de la préoccupation collective en matière de changements climatiques parmi les acteurs franciliens. Le début des années 2000 apparaît à cet égard comme un tournant.

Ainsi, selon l‘un de nos interlocuteurs, les enjeux énergie-climat sont « mis à l‘agenda » en 2001. Les débats sur ces questions animaient depuis longtemps la communauté scientifique ; elles étaient traitées notamment par le GIEC. Des rapports avaient été publiés depuis les années 1990. Mais le rapport qui change la donne date de 2001 : il s‘agit d‘un rapport avec des courbes d‘évolution de la température qui va mener à une véritable prise de conscience. Cela n‘est pas par hasard : outre un rapport scientifique très volumineux, ce document contient en effet un rapport pour décideurs politiques. Il s‘agit d‘une synthèse d‘une trentaine de pages insistant sur les points

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sur lesquels il y a consensus parmi les chercheurs. Aujourd‘hui tous les ministres, et quel que soit le sujet traité, demandent une note sur les aspects relatives au changement climatique.

A l‘APUR, par exemple, les questions énergie-climat arrivent à cette époque, en lien également avec le changement d‘équipe municipale. Jusque là, ces thèmes n‘étaient pas traités dans les études d‘urbanisme, alors qu‘ils sont devenus depuis le milieu des années 2000 le principal thème des études commandées à l‘APUR. Et au même moment, ces questions émergent aussi dans l‘urbanisme opérationnel : on se pose des questions sur la consommation d‘énergie des villes, sur la traduction en énergie de l‘étalement urbain. La perception de la densité change totalement : avant elle était vécue négativement (entassement, barre HLM), maintenant on souligne ses vertus du point de vue de la consommation d‘énergie et des émissions de gaz à effet de serre.

Au niveau régional, l‘enjeu des travaux du GIEC de 2001 n‘a pas tout de suite été mesuré. Les collectivités ont des maires comme gestionnaires et l‘énergie ne représentait environ que 5% du budget de la commune : même si cela a augmenté avec les prix de l‘énergie, ce n‘est pas un poste qui pèse lourd. Ainsi les petites communes n‘étaient pas très motivées.

Toutes les politiques qui ont été menées depuis 2001 dans la région Île-de-France et dans ses collectivités n‘ont pas à voir avec une « mobilisation générale », un courant global, mais elles sont dues à l‘initiative volontariste d‘élus qui ont intégrés ces problématiques énergie-climat. Globalement, cette inertie est due à un manque de connaissance et de prise en considération.

Avant ce courant de sensibilisation sur les enjeux énergie-climat, les maires volontaires réalisaient un travail relevant de l‘artisanat, à l‘aveugle. C‘étaient des essais : de chaufferie bois, de capteurs ; des tentatives de ci de là pour diminuer les énergies fossiles. Il s‘agissait souvent d‘élus Verts, mais ce n‘était pas systématique. La sensibilisation a mis du temps à s‘opérer. Elle est due en grande partie à l‘action de pionniers porteurs d‘une sensibilité écologique et qui avaient anticipé sur les évolutions actuelles. Au début des années 2000, il n‘y avait pas de cadre législatif. Celui-ci est venu avec la loi POPE en 2005, même s‘il faut garder en tête qu‘une loi n‘est pas forcément comprise ni suivie. Aujourd‘hui on observe une grande sensibilisation des communes, qui sont nombreuses à solliciter l‘aide du CRIF pour réaliser leur Plan Climat ou une évaluation énergétique de leur patrimoine.

4.2.2. Les principaux piliers de la politique énergie-climat régionale

Les politiques régionales comportant une dimension énergétique visent toutes les mêmes objectifs généraux :

- réduire la dépendance énergétique de la région ;

- promouvoir les sources d‘énergies locales et/ou renouvelables ;

- réduire les émissions de gaz à effets de serre (facteur 4 en 2030).

Mais ce discours très ambitieux n‘a pas été systématiquement traduit en programme d‘actions volontaristes, ce qui reflète en partie le fait que les prérogatives régionales dans le champ énergético-climatique sont limitées. (Par ailleurs, il faut noter que l‘Etat intervient beaucoup dans la politique énergétique de la région ; nosu y reviendrons.)

De fait, la région a avant tout un rôle de planification : elle élabore le Schéma Directeur de la Région Ile-de-France (SDRIF) et le Contrat de Plan Etat Région conjointement avec l‘Etat. Ces documents peuvent être considérés comme des documents de planification des politiques énergie-climat de la région, comme ils sont susceptibles d‘avoir un fort impact sur les enjeux énergétiques et climatiques au niveau de la région. D‘ailleurs, ils intègrent un volet « énergie » dans leurs recommandations et prescriptions.

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L‘instrument financier majeur pour la mise en place des politiques régionales est le CPER. Mais son Grand Projet numéro 7 : « Lutter contre le changement climatique » ne concentre que moins de 2% du budget global, et représente, par exemple, moins d‘un cinquième des investissements que la Région et l‘Etat veulent consacrer au Grand Projet « Renforcer l‘attractivité de la région ».

Le Plan Régional pour l‘Energie, par ailleurs, adopté en mai 2006 et annoncé comme l‘expression de la priorité régionale de faire de l‘Île-de-France la « première éco-région en Europe », ne s‘est vu attribuer que 16 millions d‘euros dans le budget régional de 2007, l‘équivalent à 1,50 euros par habitant de la région. De plus, il est fortement orienté vers le soutien de ménages ou de maîtres d‘œuvre au cas par cas, et peine à avoir un impact au niveau régional que ce soit en matière de ressources énergétiques ou d‘émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ainsi les moyens mis en œuvre ne semblent pas être à la hauteur des objectifs annoncés [entretien 1]. Par ailleurs, le bilan établi lors des Assises de l‘Energie en Île-de-France indique que, sur les16 millions d‘euros affectés au Plan Régional pour l‘Energie en 2007, seuls 10 millions ont été effectivement dépensés.

Mais cela ne fait que refléter les limites des capacités d‘action du Conseil Régional dans le domaine strict de l‘énergie. De fait, les enjeux énergético-climatiques sont peut-être traités plus effectivement — même s‘ils le sont moins directement — dans le cadre de la politique régionale de planification stratégique. Cela est dû au fait que le rôle central de la région consiste plus en la planification régionale que dans le secteur de l‘énergie. En France, les autorités régionales et locales ont en effet des capacités limitées pour agir directement sur ce secteur, qui relève principalement des stratégies de l‘Etat et de grands acteurs industriels comme EDF ou GDF Suez. Ceci restreint leur capacité d‘action.

Ainsi le nouveau SDRIF est fortement orienté vers les enjeux énergétiques et environnementaux, et s‘avère beaucoup plus ambitieux, au moins dans ses objectifs, que les documents consacrés spécifiquement à la politique énergétique. Cependant son élaboration a suscité des divergences diverses, sur lesquelles nous revenons ci-après.

Le SDRIF

L'Île-de-France est la seule région dans laquelle la loi SRU de 2000 a maintenu une compétence de planification à l'échelle de la région. Le schéma directeur de la région d'Île-de-France (SDRIF) est un document d'urbanisme et d'aménagement du territoire qui définit une politique à l'échelle de la région Île-de-France [18]. Il vise à contrôler la croissance urbaine et démographique ainsi que l'utilisation de l'espace, tout en garantissant le rayonnement international de la région. Le SDRIF détermine notamment la destination générale de différentes parties du territoire, les moyens de protection et de mise en valeur de l'environnement, la localisation des grandes infrastructures de transport et des grands équipements. Il détermine également la localisation préférentielle des extensions urbaines, ainsi que des activités industrielles, artisanales, agricoles, forestières et touristiques.

Jusqu'à la réforme de 1995, le Schéma régional était élaboré sous l'autorité directe de l'État. Depuis la réforme de 1995, qui a transféré à la Région d'Île-de-France cette responsabilité, la Région Île-de-France élabore en association avec l'État un schéma directeur portant sur l'ensemble de cette région [35]. L'État conserve de nombreux moyens pour faire prévaloir ses volontés : la prise en compte de celles-ci s'impose d'autant plus que c'est le gouvernement qui ouvre juridiquement, par un décret en Conseil d'État, la révision du SDRIF précédent, et qui approuve la révision du SDRIF. La réglementation prévoit également que les conseils généraux, le conseil économique et social régional, les chambres de commerce, des métiers et d'agriculture sont consultées lors de l'élaboration de la révision du SDRIF.

Le SDRIF est présenté par la région comme un document de planification exemplaire censé offrir une trajectoire durable à la région pour les 20 prochaines années. Ce plan s‘articule autour

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de 3 enjeux majeurs : réduire les disparités sociales et spatiales, renforcer l‘attractivité de la région et anticiper les évolutions liées au changement climatique et au prix croissant de l‘énergie.

Les problématiques de l‘énergie et du climat sont centrales dans l‘orientation générale du SDRIF, qui vise à « promouvoir une organisation urbaine qui anticipe les transformations liées au climat et à l‘énergie ». Ce plan vise en effet d‘atteindre les objectifs de réduction à la fois de la consommation régionale d‘énergie et de ses EGES (« facteur 4 » d‘ici 2030) grâce à une ville compacte, ville de la proximité spatiale et temporelle, notamment grâce à un processus de densification de l‘agglomération urbaine centrale et des villes secondaires, ainsi que par la promotion des transports en commun.

Ainsi, le SDRIF est fondé sur une vraie reconnaissance des enjeux énergie-climat. La différence avec les politiques énergétiques régionales est qu‘on traite ces enjeux de manière moins directe, en considérant que l‘organisation urbaine a un impact potentiel important sur la consommation énergétique de la région ainsi que sur ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Dans le domaine de la fourniture d‘énergie, par exemple, le SDRIF repose sur l‘idée que la densification des aires urbaines pourra favoriser le développement de réseaux de chaleur fondés sur une exploitation intensive des ressources géothermiques de la région.

Nous reviendrons plus loin sur le contenu du SDRIF, dont les objectifs explicites en termes énergie-climat sont :

L‘atteinte du « facteur 4 » avant 2030

« Aller vers » une région énergétiquement indépendante

Les contrats de projet Etat-Région

La réalisation concrète des objectifs du SDRIF passe par le contrat de plan État-région et les contrats région-département qui en établissent la programmation et en assurent le financement.

Un contrat de projets État-région (CPER), anciennement contrat de plan État-Région, est un document par lequel l'État et une région s'engagent sur la programmation et le financement pluriannuels (sept ans pour les CPER en cours) de projets importants tels que la création d'infrastructures ou le soutien à des filières d'avenir. Le gouvernement, par l'intermédiaire du préfet de région, s'accorde avec l'exécutif de la région sur la réalisation de projets relatifs à l'aménagement du territoire régional et sur la part de chaque entité dans le financement. D'autres collectivités (conseils généraux, communautés urbaines...) peuvent s'associer à un CPER à condition de contribuer au financement des projets qui les concernent.

En Île-de-France, le contrat de projet état-région pour la période 2007-2013 a pris la suite du contrat de plan 2000-2006, qui prenait en charge la réalisation d'une partie des objectifs du SDRIF de 1994. Près de 5,5 milliards d‘euros seront investis par l‘État (37%) et la Région (63%) en Île-de-France sur la période 2007-2013 [14]. Les trois grandes priorités affichées sont les transports collectifs, l‘enseignement supérieur et la recherche, et l‘aménagement urbain des territoires. Elles mobilisent à elles seules 90% de l‘enveloppe totale et bénéficient d‘une augmentation de crédits de l‘État de 13% par rapport à la période 2000-2006 [13].

En ce qui concerne précisément les enjeux énergético-climatiques, le contrat de projets Etat Région 2007-2013 prévoit un volet consacré à la lutte contre le changement climatique [14]. Il correspond au Grand Projet 7 qui s‘intitule « lutte contre le changement climatique ». Le problème est envisagé de la manière suivante : la maîtrise de l‘énergie et le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables dans le secteur de l‘habitat et du tertiaire doivent permettre de répondre à l‘enjeu du changement climatique grâce à la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre.

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Ce programme a été établi dans le prolongement des actions menées en partenariat avec l‘ADEME sur la période 2000-2006, la Région ayant adopté en mars 2006 une délibération relative à l‘énergie, élaborée avec le soutien de la délégation régionale de l‘ADEME et de l‘ARENE.

Ainsi la Région et L‘Etat (via l‘ADEME) se sont accordés sur les 3 grands objectifs suivants :

- Relancer des actions de maîtrise de l‘énergie thermique et électrique dans les secteurs du logement social et des bâtiments tertiaires;

- Augmenter la production d‘énergie thermique et électrique de source locale et renouvelable;

- Renforcer la sensibilisation et la communication en matière d‘énergie.

Dans le texte du CPER, le budget est réparti comme suit (les libellés ne sont malheureusement pas plus explicites) :

Tableau 4.1. CPER Etat - Ile-de-France. Grand Projet 7 (Lutte contre le changement climatique)

Les objectifs du CPER dans les domaines de l‘énergie et du climat correspondent exactement à ceux de la délibération CR 44-06 de mai 2006 intitulée « Plan régional pour la maîtrise de l‘énergie, le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables et la réduction de l‘effet de serre dans l‘habitat et le tertiaire sur la période 2006-2010 » [12].

Ce plan expose les grands objectifs que la Région se fixe dans ce domaine et les mesures qu‘elle compte appliquer pour les atteindre. Cela se traduit ensuite concrètement par les modalités, les critères et les conditions des aides accordées conjointement par l‘ADEME et la région à certains maîtres d‘ouvrage.

Le cadrage budgétaire de cette délibération est le suivant :

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Tableau 4.2. Financement du Plan régional pour la maîtrise de l’énergie, le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables et la réduction de l’effet de serre dans l’habitat et le tertiaire sur la période 2006-2010.

Le Conseil Régional partait en 2006 de l‘hypothèse d‘une participation de l‘Etat (via l‘ADEME) dans le cadre des contrats de projets Etat-Région de 50,0 M€, l‘apport régional aurait été ainsi ramené de 121,30 M€ à 71,30 M€. Finalement comme on a pu le constater plus haut, le budget consacré à ce point n‘a été que de 93 M€. Mais la région y a effectivement investi plus de 71 M€. Le CPER ne présente pas un budget plus détaillé, ce qui nous aurait permis de voir comment la réduction de moyens alloués s‘est répartie.

Cette délibération faisait suite à la délibération relative à l‘action régionale pour la maîtrise de l‘énergie et le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables pour la réduction de l‘effet de serre adoptée le 28 juin 2001. C‘est cette dernière délibération qui marque l‘origine de la politique de la Région Ile-de-France en matière de maîtrise de l‘énergie et de développement des énergies locales et renouvelables dans le secteur de l‘habitat et du tertiaire. Elle se destinait plus particulièrement aux collectivités locales et territoriales, aux bailleurs sociaux publics et privés et aux syndicats mixtes de production de chaleur.

Cependant, lorsque le bilan de cette délibération fut dressé en 2006, le constat fut fait que les actions entreprises n‘étaient pas en mesure de respecter les engagements pris, à la fois au niveau du protocole de Kyoto en matière de réduction de gaz à effet de serre mais aussi dans le cadre de la loi POPE du 13 juillet 2005 qui se fixait pour objectif d‘accroître d‘ici 2010 la part des énergies renouvelables [12]. En effet, les initiatives prises jusqu‘alors par les maîtres d‘ouvrage relevaient exclusivement du volontariat car les textes réglementaires en vigueur (directives, lois et programmes gouvernementaux, même s‘ils fixent des objectifs ambitieux, notamment en matière de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre) n‘étaient pas assortis d‘obligations et de sanctions. De plus, s‘agissant des collectivités locales, le faible poids de l‘énergie dans leur budget (bien qu‘à la hausse ensuite) n‘incitait pas celles-ci à souscrire aux objectifs de l‘élaboration de

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plans patrimoniaux. Par ailleurs ce dispositif n‘était pas forcément adapté aux petites communes qui préféraient réaliser leurs investissements ponctuellement. Certains observateurs ont également soutenu que la mise en œuvre de la politique régionale aurait dû s‘appuyer sur une communication accrue auprès des différents acteurs consommateurs, producteurs et professionnels de l‘énergie ainsi que sur un accompagnement au plus près des maîtres d‘ouvrage. Dans un cadre plus général, enfin, on constatait qu‘au regard du potentiel francilien de collectivités locales et de bailleurs sociaux publics et privés susceptibles de souscrire aux objectifs de la politique régionale en matière de maîtrise de l‘énergie et de développement des énergies locales et renouvelables, ce bilan était mitigé [12].

Ainsi, dans le prolongement des actions du Conseil Régional menées depuis 2001 en la matière, il fut proposé la mise en œuvre d‘un nouveau plan régional pour la maîtrise de l‘énergie, le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables et la réduction de l‘effet de serre dans l‘habitat et le tertiaire sur la période 2006-2010, ayant comme objectifs une utilisation plus rationnelle des énergies fossiles et de l‘électricité, un recours accéléré aux énergies locales et renouvelables et une modification des comportements individuels et collectifs.

Un second bilan fut dressé lors des Assises de l‘énergie le 16 mai 2008 [11]. On a alors estimé que les actions menées depuis l‘établissement de la politique énergétique régionale en 2001 avaient permis d‘éviter le rejet dans l‘atmosphère de près de 150 000 tonnes de CO2 par an et que 28 millions d‘euros de subventions régionales, complétées presque à parité par celles de l‘ADEME, avaient été engagés.

Tableau 4.3. Bilan du Plan régional pour la maîtrise de l’énergie (2001-2007)

Cependant, le Conseil régional pense que malgré ces bons résultats, il existe encore un déficit de communication et de sensibilisation sur le thème de l‘énergie auprès des collectivités [11]. Suite au Grenelle de l‘Environnement, c‘est la maîtrise de l‘énergie qui constitue le plus grand gisement d‘actions. Or, avant 2006, la politique du CRIF, en partenariat avec l‘ADEME, affectait l‘intégralité des subventions au développement des énergies renouvelables qui avaient besoin d‘être soutenues. Le volet maîtrise énergétique était considéré comme relevant des particuliers (changement de chaudière, isolation, etc.). Ainsi, aujourd‘hui, les travaux de maîtrise de l‘énergie commencent juste à être financés par le Conseil régional et par l‘ADEME. Avec l‘émergence des bâtiments basse consommation, puis à énergie positive, des sauts technologiques doivent être entrepris dont le coût est élevé. La Région doit donc se repositionner pour augmenter les performances des opérations de maîtrise de l‘énergie. C‘est dans cette optique, que l‘appel à projets « Bâtiments basse consommation et à énergie positive » a été présenté au Conseil régional le 26 juin 2008.

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4.2.3. Plans Climat Energie Territoriaux en région Île-de-France

La région Île-de-France, « en retard » par rapport à la majorité des régions françaises, a lancé l‘élaboration d‘un plan climat régional fin 2009. Au Conseil Régional, c‘est le service chargé de l‘Agenda 21 et de l‘Ecorégion qui élabore ce plan climat régional, en collaboration avec le service Air, Energie et Bruit. Un rapport intermédiaire a été publié en février 2010 [20]. Ses objectifs généraux sont de limiter le changement climatique, d‘anticiper ses effets et de s‘adapter aux évolutions du climat. La version définitive du plan climat IDF est prévue pour 2011.

Notre intention initiale était de répertorier les collectivités ayant déjà un Plan Climat ou étant engagées dans l‘élaboration de celui-ci. Nous avons réalisé cet état des lieux à partir de la consultation de sites internet des collectivités, complété par la consultation du site de l‘ADEME. Nous avons étudié le cas de 64 collectivités franciliennes (les 8 départements, les intercommunalités de plus de 50.000 habitants, les grandes communes des Hauts-de-Seine et de la Seine-Saint-Denis). Devant le très petit nombre de collectivités concernées nous avons choisi de mentionner également celles ayant réalisé un Bilan Carbone de leur territoire, celui-ci étant « l‘étape Zéro » du Plan Climat.

Si l‘on dresse un bilan rapide, on peut constater le faible nombre de collectivités officiellement engagées (voir tableau). 38 des 64 collectivités (60%) n‘affichent aucune démarche en matière de Plan Climat, de Bilan Carbone ou d‘Agenda 21. Seul un quart des collectivités réfléchit à élaborer, est en train d‘élaborer, ou a déjà élaboré un Plan Climat. On remarque des différences considérables d‘avancement entre les collectivités. On ne peut à ce stade qu‘émettre des hypothèses sur les raisons de ces écarts (différences de capacités financières, organisationnelles ou humaines ; de contexte territorial ; de nature des activités économiques principales (industrie, services, agriculture) ?).

Tableau 4.4. Mise en œuvre du plan climat-énergie territoriaux par les collectivités d’Ile-de-France

Source : Les auteurs. Enquête auprès de 64 collectivités (départements, intercommunalités, grandes communes). Printemps 2010.

Afin de préciser ce diagnostic, nous avons mené plusieurs entretiens avec les responsables Développement Durable de quatre collectivités locales (communes et EPCI) de plus de 50,000 habitants en Seine-Saint-Denis et dans les Hauts de Seine. Il en ressort que certains collectivités (encore minoritaires) ont mis en place des politiques ambitieuses, toujours à l‘initiative d‘un(e) élu(e) ou d‘un(e) responsable des services particulièrement mobilisé(e). Mais la mise en œuvre de ces politiques rencontre de nombreux obstacles : manque de moyens financiers et humains ; organisation généralement sectorielle des administrations locales, inadaptée aux politiques énergético-climatiques qui sont de nature transversale ; insuffisante cohérence entre les actions locales et les politiques nationales ; manque de formation et de compétence des acteurs publics et privés ; absence d‘une proirisation pérenne de ces actions au plan local.

S‘ajoute à ces éléments le constat fréquemment fait par nos interlocuteurs (ceux précédemment mentionnés et ceux que nous avons rencontrés dans les services techniques de l‘Etat en Ile-de-France, de la Région et de la Ville de Paris) d‘un défaut de cohérence d‘ensemble des orientations nationales. Certains d‘entre eux déplorent ainsi le fait que certaines dispositions législatives ne soient pas respectées, comme l‘obligation de facturation individuelle des logements pour les bâtiments équipés d‘un chauffage collectif. Par ailleurs, ils regrettent un manque de coordination entre les textes de loi (lois Grenelle notamment) et les autres documents comme le Plan Climat. Selon eux, l‘évolution du cadre législatif est trop rapide pour permettre un réel travail en

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profondeur et l‘ensemble manque de cohérence. Par exemple, l‘un des problèmes aujourd‘hui dans le bâti est le cas des bâtiments existants. Cette question n‘est pas véritablement traitée au niveau national. En effet, le dispositif Grenelle considère l‘isolation comme la solution universelle aux problèmes thermiques des bâtiments, alors que cette solution est manifestement inadaptée dans de nombreux cas.

Nos interlocuteurs soulignent également l‘importance de la fiscalité, seule manière de changer véritablement et profondément les comportements et les mentalités. Des bâtiments très performants, par exemple, ne produiront leurs pleins effets que si se développent concomitamment les pratiques en matière d‘économies d‘énergie. Un dispositif fiscal peut s‘avérer précieux dans cette perspective. D‘ailleurs, souligne l‘un de nos interlocuteurs, l‘efficacité réelle d‘une fiscalité est prouvée. Ainsi, le dispositif actuellement en place pour les opérations de rénovation de bâti (crédits d‘impôts, prêts à taux zéro), conjugué avec un prix croissant de l‘énergie, a entraîné de nombreuses actions de la part des ménages.

4.3. Politiques Energie-Climat régionales : enjeux et tensions

L‘un des objectifs ici est de contribuer à l‘étude de la mise en œuvre dans les politiques locales des grands objectifs énergético-climatiques d‘aujourd‘hui et des enjeux que cette mise en œuvre peut soulever. Nos analyses, encore exploratoires, reposent sur un recueil d‘information et une analyse à partir des documents produits et utilisés par les différents acteurs impliqués et sur des entretiens avec des acteurs responsables des politiques locales, impliquées dans la formulation et la mise en œuvre des politiques dans les domaines énergétique et climatique, ainsi que sur une revue de presse sur le processus de consultation sur le projet de SDRIF.

Nous avons vu dans la section précédente comment les objectifs généraux des politiques énergie-climat se traduisent dans les textes. Nous examinons ici, à l‘aide d‘exemples tirés des entretiens, comment ceux-ci peuvent se traduire en modalités concrètes d‘action publique (changements organisationnels au sein des administrations locales, choix de priorités financières, mécanismes incitatifs, etc.).

Nous exposerons également certaines tensions inhérentes aux processus de traduction des grandes orientations en matière énergético-climatique, leur nature, leurs modalités d‘expression, la manière dont elles sont prises en compte par les acteurs, et leurs effets effectifs ou potentiels sur la soutenabilité des politiques énergético-climatiques. Nous verrons que ces tensions peuvent être de divers ordres : entre politiques publiques (notamment entre politiques énergético-climatiques et politiques industrielles) ; entre niveaux institutionnels ou territoriaux (une mesure souhaitable à un niveau peut être indésirable à un autre niveau) ; entre politiques et contraintes électorales, etc. Nous évoquerons plus largement les enjeux que la traduction de ces politiques soulève. Nous conclurons en proposant quelques enseignements provisoires de cette étude quant à la signification et la portée de l‘engagement des pouvoirs publics sur la permanence d‘orientations de politiques publiques sur une période de trente à cinquante ans.

4.3.1. Tensions liées au contenu du SDRIF38

The process of constructing and negotiating the SDRIF plan and getting it adopted on a regional level was (and still is) fraught with fractious debate and conflict as the multiple actors involved assessed, and often contested, the proposed measures according to their very divergent sets of interests. This took place during and after the large-scale consultation process between June 2005 and January 2007 which associated all local and regional actors (authorities at all levels, private companies, third sector organisations, inhabitants) to obtain feedback and criticism on the plan

38 Voir Coutard et Rutherford (2010).

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from numerous public seminars and questionnaires. Furthermore, for the first time the SDRIF takes precedence in the overall planning domain, having the potential to supersede local plans, a fact which has not gone unnoticed by local politicians. We focus in this section on the three main areas of inter-actor tensions relating to broad energy-environmental questions raised by the SDRIF plan, namely urban form, mobility and the subordination of regional ecology and sustainability to the imperative of global competitiveness. This analysis is based mostly on analysis of the SDRIF itself, various documents and reports and an extensive press review of regional policy debates between 2005 and 2009. Although the analysis of press reports can be held to have its limitations in terms of the selectivity and partial representation of relevant arguments and debates, it does highlight the controversies and politics of the actual planning negotiation process, and thus helps us to get beyond strictly normative concerns with what should be done. The centrality of energy-concerned policy questions to strategic urban/regional planning and the inherently political nature and outcomes of these questions offers a distinctive urban/regional perspective on systemic sustainability transformation processes.

Tension 1: How compact should the ‘compact city’ be?

Despite representing 19% of the French population and 29% of national GDP, the Ile-de-France region is responsible for only 15% of national energy consumption and 9% of national greenhouse gas emissions (excluding air transport and indirect emissions39). This is clearly related to the fact that the most heavily energy-consuming (and polluting) industries (chemical, steel, etc.) are located in other French regions. But regional actors argue that it also shows something of the ‗virtues‘ of compactness and high density in Ile-de-France (Région Ile-de-France 2008, 36). These virtues were to be pursued and more actively sought through the SDRIF, the central tenet of which was to promote ‗the city of spatio-temporal proximity‘ in which homes, jobs and transport are drawn closer to each other, thus putting the emphasis on forms of mobility which are more economic in terms of energy consumption.

The move toward a more compact city is presented in the plan as beneficial for all from every perspective. Economically speaking, it would reduce commuting costs and social costs of urban functions (water supply, sewage, refuse collection and treatment...). At the same time, it is assumed to reduce social and functional segregation. From an environmental angle, it is seen as diminishing the carbon footprint of the average inhabitant as a suburban dweller allegedly produces three times more CO2 than a city centre dweller in her/his daily mobility.40

In the housing domain, the consequences of the SDRIF's promotion of dense urban living are a firm rejection of the individual suburban house, which for the vice-president of the Regional Council in charge of the SDRIF were responsible for an 88% increase in home-work commuting distances in 10 years in the Ile-de-France region: ‗Why keep supporting the idea that happiness is owning one‘s individual house, when at the same time this model generates unacceptable transport needs. What is needed is to arouse a new desire for the city‘ (AFP, 10 Feb. 2007).

Inevitably, the SDRIF's densification policy led to widespread local and regional debate concerning notions of the ideal, or achievable, degree of compactness and where restrictions to urbanisation should be located, which varied substantially between local elected officials. The

39

I.e. emissions from activities located outside the region but which benefit the region, but including transit

traffic.

40 Some studies show however that if long distance, weekend and holiday trips are included in the picture, then

the city-centre dweller produces more CO2 than her/his suburban counterpart. Revenue and social category are

key explanations of this difference: on average, wealthier urban dwellers travel more (both for leisure and work)

than suburban ones. Yet the question remains open whether, all other things being equal, a ‘desire to escape’

high density city centres significantly contributes to the propensity to long distance, weekend and holiday travel

(see, for example, Orfeuil and Soleyret 2002; Holden and Norland 2005).

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SDRIF does provide an explicit yardstick by stating that all new residential building projects should include at least 35 dwellings per hectare. Furthermore, building too close to forest areas and rivers was prohibited, as was any intensive urbanisation in the region's green belt. The urbanised areas of villages and small towns in the Region were not to be able to grow by more than 15% in the period to 2030. This last point in particular was an area of strong contention with local authorities. Several mayors of the department reacted strongly to the maps included in the SDRIF draft prohibiting urbanisation in areas where it was already planned... or even already achieved! Right-wing departments argued against the SDRIF because it limited too much their urban and economic development possibilities (Les Echos, 5 Jul. 2007). The State representative in the region (the préfet d’Ile-de-France) also voiced concerns about the reduction in space for urban development, but more from a constitutional angle which prevents the control of a local authority by another local authority (Speech of the préfet d’Ile-de-France in front of the SDRIF convention, 29 Nov. 2006).41 Even the socialist president of the predominantly rural Seine-et-Marne department insisted that ‗we are not opposed to growth, even though we wish to fight urban sprawl which destroys farming land‘ (Le Parisien, 18 Dec. 2006). In sum, ―for many local councillors, including left-wing ones, the ambition of the region to concentrate [new housing projects] in the central suburbs is illusory. Due to the lack of available land (there will be a need to first demolish in order to be able to build) and due to high land prices, the plan will require building at least 30,000 new dwellings per year [half of the figure planned] in outer suburbs, hence supporting urban sprawl‘ (Les Echos, 29 Nov. 2006). This issue is far from settled as the French President himself recently outlined plans for the construction of 70,000 new homes per year in the region to 2030 as part of his Grand Paris project, supported by a ‗loosening‘ of planning regulations (Le Monde, 30 Apr. 2009).

Tension 2: Accommodating or penalising car use?

A second area of tension concerned transport policy, a key instrument in energy-environmental policy as outlined in the SDRIF. There is a wide consensus among local actors in favour of public transport and ‗soft transport modes‘ such as walking, cycling and roller-skating. But there is a divide between those in favour of mainly penalising car use and those in favour of more ‗balanced‘ approaches, as revealed by debates about the SDRIF, but also about the Atmospheric Protection Plan (PPA), the Paris Travel Plan (PDP), and the State-Region contract.

Party political membership was a key criterion here. Members of the Green party constitute an important part of left-wing local majorities both at the regional and Paris municipal levels. In both cases, this political configuration has led to a transport policy which explicitly aims at curbing (the growth of) car traffic. In Paris, this has resulted from 2001 in a policy explicitly aimed at reducing road space available for car traffic and parking, while increasing road space reserved for buses and ‗soft‘ modes (separate bus and cycle lanes, enlarged pavements). The Regional Council has also strongly prioritised public transport in the region‘s expenses in contrast with State priorities: ‗with [the SDRIF], the regional council in fact opposes the large-scale road and expressway projects advocated by the State‘ (Le Figaro, 29 Nov. 2006). Furthermore, the Ile-de-France Region (like the other French regions run by left-wing majorities) has raised taxes on petrol up to the legal maximum and plans to increase significantly other car-related taxes. In addition, both the Paris municipal government and the regional government have criticised pro-car (or insufficiently anti-car) state policy, in particular the State-established Atmospheric Protection Plan (PPA) for Ile-de-France of July 2006. The PPA was criticised by the Paris municipality as ‗inefficient, incoherent, provocative‘, because of the absence of a target in terms

41

Regional officials countered that the SDRIF’s superseding role does not amount to ‘control’ by one local

authority over another, insofar as the planning regulations included in the SDRIF leave enough room for local

governments to develop local plans.

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of car traffic reduction on a regional level, the exclusion of measures against greenhouse gas emissions and insufficient measures against local air pollution (Le Monde, 2 Aug. 2006; AFP, 11 Sept. 2006; Le Monde, 15 Sept. 2006).

This anti-car orientation raised strong and recurring objections from the municipal and regional right-wing minority – ‗We are in favour of public transport, but we refuse the war on cars‘ – and from the State's regional préfet who insisted he ‗cannot approve the fact that the most recent decisions of the Minister for Transport [two major urban motorway extensions] are not taken into account‘. In Paris, projects for additional separate bus lanes met with fierce opposition by right-wing borough mayors and residents who argue that they are ‗useless, costly and potentially dangerous‘ (Libération, 1 Feb. 2006). The political consensus within the Paris council gradually decomposed. The Paris travel plan (PDP) provides for substantial additional measures aimed at reducing car traffic in the city by 2025, but all political groups in the municipal council, except the Greens, insist that this new ‗anti-car‘ plan has to be preceded or accompanied by a substantial improvement of public transport (Le Parisien, 11 Feb. 2007).

Hence the question whether car traffic should be accommodated or penalised, and to what extent, was a matter of growing local controversy between the left and the right since the election of left-green majorities both at the regional level (1998) and at the Paris municipal level (2001). Rising energy-environmental concerns have given additional arguments for anti-car policies, but the controversy is unresolved with municipal transport policy adopting a more flexible line to car use following the re-election of the Mayor in 2008 (Le Monde, 22 Mar. 2008). On a regional level, the recent unveiling of the Presidential project for a Grand Paris (in which transport is central) re-animated debate over the increasingly divergent (and competing) visions and plans proposed by the different actors (Le Monde, 30 Apr. 2009).

Tension 3: The economy or the environment?

A third area of dispute concerned the balance (or the imbalance) between environmental/ecological protection and economic development objectives. This was at the same time representative of a clash over the rationale and motive for the SDRIF: was it mainly about protecting and securing the current and future resources of the region, or was it more about growth and extending regional influence well beyond the frontiers of Ile-de-France?

In any case, organised economic interests all loudly disapproved of the SDRIF. The regional associations of large enterprises (MEDEF) and small- and medium-sized enterprises (CGPME) joined the Paris and the Ile-de-France Chambers of Commerce in addressing fierce criticism of the regional executive. They considered that the plan ‗does not meet the requirements for a sustainable, job-creating growth of the region over the next 20 years that would allow it to win the competition between the large world metropolises‘ (AFP, 28 Jun. 2007). More specifically they pointed to five main weaknesses of the plan: undue limitations placed on the development of the region‘s growth poles; insufficient surface and air transport infrastructure; insufficient land availability; lack of explicit reference to economic activities in land use allocations; and inconsistencies between elements of the plan that generate legal uncertainty (Les Echos, 27 Jun. 2007). Both right-wing departments and the national government shared these criticisms on the lack of ambition of the SDRIF in terms of economic development and regional competitiveness (Les Echos, 5 Jul. 2007; Le Monde, 12 Jun. 2008; Le Monde, 23 Sep. 2008).

Economic-environmental tensions were strong with regard to airports. The development of the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airport to the north of Paris has always been a keystone of regional economic development policy, and is likely to remain so, even if this enters into clear conflict with explicitly environmental regional policy goals. It was notable, for example, that at the end of June 2007, just as the Ile-de-France Region was announcing its intention to ‗self-tax‘ all its CO2 emissions and use the revenue obtained for regional energy efficiency measures, the French

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President was opening the brand new satellite 2E at Roissy (cost 645 million Euros, capacity 8.5 million passengers per year) and stating that ‗If Ile-de-France wants to remain a major financial centre, if it wants to remain a scientific centre, if it wants to remain shoulder to shoulder with London for the establishment of company headquarters, it must develop Roissy‘ (quoted by Reuters, 26 Jun. 2007).

More generally, there are clearly diverging visions between the Regional Council and the national government (supported by some local governments, such as the Hauts-de-Seine département) as to the overall purpose of ‗(sustainable) regional development‘ in Ile-de-France.42 For the former, logically enough, the SDRIF is about balancing the social, economic and environmental sustainability of the whole region, but it is also an instrument for tackling the main issues of everyday life in the region (and not just a means to develop large projects) (Béhar and Estèbe 2006). For the latter meanwhile, Ile-de-France seems to be more of a resource on which to draw for national goals of economic competitiveness and growth, and therefore State strategy for the region can be, at least to some extent, quite spatially selective and growth-based, and less concerned with territorial cohesion and planning.

This obviously leads to divergent conclusions as regards the limits to growth that can be imposed for energy or climate reasons. The government has so far refused to validate the definitive SDRIF plan, judging it to lack ambition in terms of economic development as it anticipates annual growth of ‗only‘ 2% and annual job creation of ‗only‘ 28,000. These figures are held to be unsatisfactory for the capital region of France, even in the midst of a global economic crisis. This controversy would also seem to reflect a conception common to both parties that climate or other environmental strategies cannot constitute an economic opportunity (cf. the debate on the introduction of a national ‗carbon tax‘ in summer 2009).

4.3.2. Tensions concernant l’articulation institutionnelle et politique entre le débat sur le « Grand Paris » et la mise en œuvre du SDRIF

Assez rapidement après son élection en 2007, le nouveau président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy, a lancé une réflexion et une consultation sur le « Grand Paris », qui concerne globalement le même territoire que le SDRIF, mais qui propose une vision de l‘aménagement différente. Le hiatus entre la Région et l‘Etat, patent au début du mandat de N. Sarkozy, s‘est d‘ailleurs traduit par le blocage du processus d‘approbation du SDRIF.

Pour nos interlocuteurs membres des services techniques, la raison du contentieux entre l‘Etat et la Région n‘est pas technique : « si l‘on faisait discuter des experts entre eux, des solutions satisfaisantes pour le territoire et ses habitants se dégageraient ». Le problème est perçu comme l‘affrontement entre deux visions politiques qui s‘opposent. Cet affrontement renvoie à des visions différentes de l‘aménagement du territoire et du développement de l‘Ile-de-France et à des enjeux politiques plus larges. La dimension politique est rapidement devenue déterminante, conduisant à un blocage du projet de SDRIF (cf. infra) alors même que les différents services techniques avaient contribué à l‘élaboration du projet depuis le début et en avaient, selon nos interlocuteurs, avalisé toutes les étapes.

Deux visions d’aménagement du territoire qui s’opposent

42

These divergences are evident in the fact that during the finalisation of the SDRIF plan in 2008, the French

President both created a new Secretary of State for the Capital Region with the task of elaborating a new

planning and economic development strategy for the Paris region (and implicitly therefore countering the

SDRIF), and initiated a consultation project with ten teams of international architects for proposals for the

development of a Grand Paris.

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La première chose à noter est que les capacités de programmation entre l‘Etat et la région diffèrent beaucoup : pour la région cela passe essentiellement par des contrats (Etat-région et région-département), alors que l‘Etat peut utiliser la loi et dispose d‘outils privilégiés d‘aménagement (OIN, PIG).

La région considère que, suite au succès de Jean-Paul Huchon aux dernières élections régionales, c‘est le SDRIF qui est le document légitime sur le territoire, alors que le Grand Paris est vu comme un outil « dictatorial » qui vise à lui ravir, ou du moins à lui contester, les compétences qu‘elle possède sur le territoire régional. Le SDRIF est présenté comme largement porté par les acteurs locaux : il est fait « par et pour » les collectivités. C‘est pourquoi, notamment, les notions d‘équilibre (centre/périphérie, est/ouest, etc.) sont importantes. Aux yeux des experts régionaux, les propositions de l‘Etat, qui mettent l‘accent sur le développement économique (régional mais aussi national), reposent en revanche sur une logique d‘expertise peinant à prendre en compte les spécificités régionales.

On retrouve la même différence d‘approche dans le domaine du transport : la conception des transports des élus de la région consiste à les utiliser pour densifier, mieux répartir les emplois par rapport aux logements, protéger les espaces ouverts (agricoles, etc.) et gérer les interdépendances entre espaces. Le projet de l‘Etat obéit, quant à lui, à une logique de pôles reliés par une infrastructure de transport. La création de dix pôles de développement économique qui concentreraient tous les financements du projet traduit la conception de l‘Etat selon laquelle le développement économique et l‘innovation suffiraient à entraîner le reste du territoire. La région conteste le projet de transport du « Grand Paris » : ce projet ne ferait que relier les pôles économiques ; le projet Arc express, en revanche, permettrait une véritable irrigation du territoire.

Le blocage du SDRIF par l’Etat

Le SDRIF a été adopté par la Région en septembre 2008. Il a ensuite été transmis au gouvernement, mais ne l‘a transmis au Conseil d‘Etat pour approbation qu‘en juin 2010, soit près de 2 ans après, dans le cadre d‘un accord entre le président de la République et celui de la Région. L‘approbation du document est attendue à l‘automne 2010 ; il n‘est donc pas encore applicable et, en particulier, il n‘est pas opposable. En outre, le fait que le SDRIF ne soit pas approuvé retarde la révision des autres documents de la région. Les acteurs régionaux interprètent le blocage de la procédure d‘approbation du SDRIF comme une manière de contourner les priorités de la Région sans contrevenir au SDRIF puisqu‘il n‘existe pas encore.

4.3.3. Logiques de positionnement ou d’affichage politique vs logiques d’efficacité dans le long terme

De l‘avis de l‘ensemble de nos interlocuteurs, les actions dans le domaine énergético-climatique devraient transcender les clivages partisans et être portées politiquement au delà de l‘échéance des mandats successifs. L‘un d‘entre eux considère même que ce sont des questions « qui relèvent de la physique », situées par conséquent hors ou au-delà du débat politique. Nous venons pourtant donc de voir sur l‘exemple du SDRIF que les rivalités politiques peuvent affecter significativement la mise en œuvre des politiques régionales, y compris dans le domaine. D‘autres exemples évoqués par nos interlocuteurs soulignent les effets de formes de concurrence ou de rivalité politique43.

« Faire mieux que le voisin »

43 Les exemples mentionnés dans cette section sont cités pour mémoire, mais chacun d‘eux repose sur un témoignage unique et nécessite par conséquent une investigation complémentaire.

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Pour l‘un de nos interlocuteurs, le Plan Climat de la Ville de Paris a résulté d‘une volonté de faire « très bien », de marquer les esprits, plutôt que de faire « raisonnable » ou réaliste ; et cela a conduit à des objectifs et à des préconisations qu‘il juge irréalistes, ou du moins comme n‘étant pas les plus appropriés à l‘atteinte des objectifs de type « facteur 4 » affichés par la Ville, ainsi qu‘à une précipitation contre productive dans le choix des premiers projets.

Pour un autre de nos interlocuteurs, si la région a décidé d‘atteindre « le facteur 4 en 2030 », c‘est principalement pour afficher des objectifs plus ambitieux que ceux de l‘Etat. Or, cet objectif est, selon lui, inatteignable ; en tout cas, les moyens mis en œuvre ne sont pas en adéquation (crédits insuffisants, notamment). A ses yeux, le problème est de savoir où placer le curseur, entre l‘ambition politique et le réalisme technique.

Certaines actions sont décrites comme des « opérations médiatiques » qui relèvent également du registre de concurrence politique. L‘un de nos interlocuteurs a évoqué ce qu‘il a désigné comme des opérations « coup de poing », menées à Paris il y a quelques années. Il s‘agissait de réhabilitations totales de bâtiments, opérations fortement médiatisées et présentées comme exemplaires, mais dont le coût très élevé interdisait en fait la généralisation.

Des positions « idéologiques » conduisant à des choix techniques inappropriés

L‘une des personnes interrogées indique qu‘à l‘époque de la discussion sur le Plan Climat de la Ville de Paris, le Conseil Municipal de Paris considérait que le premier domaine dans lequel il fallait agir concernait les bâtiments haussmanniens chauffés au chauffage électrique. En réalité il n‘y avait aucune urgence : ces bâtiments sont assez performants du point de vue des émissions de GES : les radiateurs électriques sont aisément réglables, les habitants de tels logements ont un comportement attentif vis-à-vis de leur consommation et la rénovation de ces bâtiments soulève des énormes enjeux techniques et patrimoniaux qu‘on ne commence qu‘aujourd‘hui à appréhender. Pour notre interlocuteur, cette priorité mal placée, « alors que les vrais enjeux concernaient les bâtiments chauffés au fioul ou au gaz où la consommation n‘est pas maîtrisée », s‘explique par le fait que les Verts, qui faisaient alors partie de la majorité au conseil municipal de Paris, étaient opposés au chauffage électrique et ne voulaient pas en entendre parler. En effet, le chauffage électrique renvoyait pour eux à la question du nucléaire, et le combat contre le nucléaire était leur priorité, davantage même que la diminution des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. De même, une note de l‘APUR préconisant l‘installation de compteurs individuels dans les logements collectifs chauffés avec des énergies fossiles et recommandant dans certains cas de préférer un chauffage électrique à un chauffage à gaz aurait été « censurée » à la demande d‘un élu Vert.

4.3.5. Le processus d’élaboration du SRCAE : un analyseur des hiatus de la politique énergético-climatique

Au printemps 2010, le Conseil Régional d‘Ile-de-France, la DRIRE et l‘ADEME sont chargés des travaux préparatoires à l‘élaboration du schéma régional climat air énergie (SRCAE) de la région Île-de-France, qui doit être élaboré conjointement par la Région et l‘Etat. Les responsables au sein de ces institutions travaillent en collaboration afin de définir la logistique préalable à mettre en œuvre, les études à lancer, les méthodes à employer.

L‘élaboration des SRCAE soulève un certain nombre de questions et de difficultés.

Une première question concerne la manière dont vont s‘articuler les plans climat nationaux, régionaux et territoriaux. Les PCT devront être compatibles avec les SRCAE, mais certaines régions ont déjà leur PCT : ils devront donc être revus. De plus tous les SCOT et les PLU

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devront être revus, car ils devront également compatibles avec les SRCAE. Pour l‘instant rien de précis n‘a été convenu quant aux procédures qui seront mises en œuvre.

Une deuxième question porte sur le point de savoir comment vont travailler ensemble et s‘organiser l‘Etat, les régions et les différents acteurs territoriaux. L‘un des objectifs du SRCAE est d‘éclaircir la manière dont les acteurs vont se fédérer, se répartir les tâches au niveau régional, etc. L‘enjeu de l‘organisation de la concertation avec les collectivités infrarégionales, les acteurs locaux et le public n‘est pas à négliger : il faut que tous partagent ces grands objectifs régionaux. La difficulté devant laquelle on se trouve est le grand nombre d‘échelons et d‘acteurs au niveau national, qui rend notamment difficile la détermination d‘un responsable. Le succès de cette entreprise des SRCAE va beaucoup dépendre de la volonté politique nationale et des conditions de collaboration entre l‘Etat et les régions.

Une troisième question résulte de l‘existence de deux projets distincts pour la région capitale, renvoyant à deux visions différentes du développement de l‘Ile-de-France : le SDRIF porté par la région et le projet de Grand Paris porté par l‘Etat. La question est de savoir sur lequel des deux projets le SRCAE doit être fondé. Et l‘accord récemment (juin 2010) conclu entre la Région et l‘Etat ne clarifie pas pleinement la situation, puisque cet accord prévoit que dès l‘approbation du SDRIF par le Conseil d‘Etat (prévue à l‘automne 2010), il faudra engager sa révision.

Un quatrième point, évoqué par l‘un de nos interlocuteurs, renvoie à ce que ce dernier décrit comme une rivalité politique entre la Région et l‘Etat (incarné en l‘occurrence par la DRIRE) qui, chacun, cherche à s‘assurer la maîtrise « politique » de l‘élaboration du document. Mais notre interlocuteur souligne que, si de nombreux aspects du processus d‘élaboration du SRCAE sont, de ce fait, conflictuels, les divergences ne sont pas fondamentalement d‘ordre technique, mais relèvent pour l‘essentiel du positionnement politique.

Un dernier point concerne la méthode de mesure des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. L‘élaboration du SRCAE nécessite en effet un travail méthodologique conséquent ; beaucoup de méthodes existent (dont celle du Bilan Carbone de l‘ADEME), qui ne donnent pas les mêmes résultats. La comptabilisation des émissions liées à l‘activité des deux aéroports internationaux de la région, par exemple, est une question ouverte. L‘un de nos interlocuteurs souligne l‘intérêt qu‘il y aurait à s‘accorder sur une méthode commune à l‘ensemble des parties concernées, qui faciliterait les échanges ainsi que les comparaisons entre les différentes approches. Un autre indique que la controverse autour des méthodes, chaque partie défendant « sa » méthode, est dépourvue de fondement véritable, les écarts de résultats entre les deux méthodes étant moindres que les incertitudes propres à chacune des deux méthodes, notamment lorsqu‘on les applique sur un « système » aussi gros et complexe que la Région Ile-de-France.

4.3.6. Consultation de la population

La préoccupation de l‘opinion pour les questions environnementales en général et climatiques en particuler s‘avive. Elle explique en partie les succès électoraux récents des Verts. Nos interlocuteurs soulignent donc l‘importance, mais aussi la difficulté, de la consultation du public en matière de politiques énergético-climatiques, par exemple lorsqu‘il s‘agira de recueillir son avis sur le projet de SRCAE ou de PCET. La participation du public à des procédures de consultation relatives à des documents à fort caractère technique ne va en effet pas de soi.

4.4. Conclusion

Cette étude exploratoire sur la dimension politique des processus de transition énergétique en Ile-de-France a mis en exergue la complexité et la fragilité générales de l‘élaboration et de la mise en œuvre des politiques énergie-climat en Ile-de-France. Certes, il s‘agit (s‘agissait ?) en quelque sorte

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d‘une période transitoire en attendant notamment l‘élaboration des SRCAE (Schémas régionaux du climat, de l‘air et de l‘énergie) et l‘implémentation « territoriale » des objectifs de la Grenelle II. Mais loin du consensus et de la coordination institutionnel et politique souvent évoqués dans ce domaine, l‘étude illustre le manque d‘entente entre les acteurs (y compris à l‘intérieur d‘une seule institution) et les nombreux obstacles (manque de ressources financières et humaines, divergences sur l‘orientation des actions…) que chacun devrait surmonter pour mettre en place une action efficace, cohérente et transversale ressemblant à une vraie politique territoriale.

D‘abord, il faut relativiser l‘existence de politiques locales de transition énergétique. Une enquête sur 64 collectivités territoriales en Ile-de-France (de plus de 50 000 habitants) montre que presque 60% de ces collectivités n‘affichent aucune démarche en matière de Plan Climat, de Bilan Carbone ou d‘Agenda 21. Seul un quart des collectivités se sont engagées sur la voie du Plan Climat (réflexion à son élaboration, élaboration en cours, Plan Climat existant). Les rythmes d‘action au niveau local sur le plan énergie et climat sont donc très variables.

Ensuite, il existe un véritable décalage entre discours et pratiques, entre mesures « symboliques » (« faire mieux que le voisin » avec des objectifs irréalistes et déraisonnables) et actions concrètes, entre rôles et réalités administratives et budgétaires. Ce décalage est assez généralisé et ne reflète pas systématiquement des rivalités partisanes ou des différences idéologiques afférentes. Il reflète plutôt des ‗faiblesses‘ ou des ‗limites‘ dans l‘organisation administrative et financière au quotidien dans les collectivités sur différents plans :

- la place des services énergie-climat dans l‘organigramme (un rattachement à un Directeur général étant préférable pour promouvoir un travail transversal, visible et légitime) ;

- l‘importance du portage politique de ce travail (avec une hiérarchisation politique favorable aux projets énergétiques) ;

- le problème du suivi des actions menées « sur le terrain » (il est difficile à la fois de suivre les acteurs et de chiffrer les investissements et les « gains » : cf. problème de méthodologie pour les émissions de gaz à effet de serre) ;

- la compétence et la volonté d‘aller chercher des subventions (ex. auprès de l‘ADEME pour l‘élaboration d‘un Plan climat) ;

- le manque de moyens humains (et financiers) ;

- des choix techniques opposés : ville ‗post-carbone‘ vs. ville sobre en consommation énergétique vs. ville d‘énergies renouvelables (cf. l‘enjeu du chauffage électrique à Paris) ;

- le jeu d‘acteurs lié à certains choix (ex. le lobbying des industriels autour de l‘efficacité énergétique des réseaux de chaleur) ;

- le bornage imposé par les mandats politiques (« tout ce qui se fait est un exercice contraint dans le temps » et doit avoir avant tout une valeur symbolique)…

Symbole de toutes les difficultés dans ce domaine, cette commune de la Seine-Saint-Denis qui a initié un Plan Local de Maîtrise de l‘Energie et qui a recruté un technicien afin de le mettre en place. Mais le plan « n‘est absolument pas suivi » : son pilotage est très difficile, car il nécessite un travail transversal entre les services, qui sont trop occupés par ailleurs et qui ne souhaitent pas y consacrer du temps. De plus un trop petit budget y est consacré : les quelques idées sur lesquelles on se met d‘accord ne peuvent pas vraiment se concrétiser par manque d‘argent. Le technicien recruté a énormément de mal à « lancer la machine », et finit par se démissionner devant les difficultés de pilotage (organisation interne), le manque de moyens et les querelles humaines.

D‘ailleurs, les enjeux énergétiques et climatiques n‘apparaissent pas vraiment comme des enjeux clés des choix politiques ou institutionnels. Si les acteurs rencontrés sont, par leur fonction, plutôt

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convaincus de l‘importance de ces sujets au niveau régional, les chiffres parlent contre eux. La faiblesse des sommes engagées, le relatif faible effectif des professionnels travaillant sur ces sujets reflètent le manque de moyens alloués à ces enjeux. On pourrait aussi noter l‘absence de « grandes actions » structurantes, initiées par l‘Etat ou bien la Région, qui donneraient un cadre solide et très précis aux différents acteurs (pour le moyen terme, pour permettre par exemple de dissocier mandats politiques et politiques énergétiques). L‘action de la Région reste basée sur le volontariat des maîtres d‘ouvrage. Le conflit entre le SDRIF et le Grand Paris englue les bonnes volontés et empêchent (pour l‘instant) de grandes initiatives de voir le jour.

En fin de compte, l‘étude suggère que les tensions et les conflits qui caractérisent les politiques urbaines de transition énergétique traduisent toute la difficulté de « territorialiser » des principes et des objectifs « universels » (et donc post-politiques) dans des contextes fortement marqués par des configurations d‗acteurs et d‘intérêts (multi-niveaux) qui sont contingentes (spécifiques à chaque contexte et donc peu généralisables), dynamiques (en mouvement perpétuel et donc jamais fixes) et toujours antagonistes (très politicisées et donc rarement en consensus : notamment par rapport à la question de quel acteur et quel niveau de gouvernement est souverain/légitime sur un territoire donné).

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Conclusions et perspectives de recherche

Cette recherche à caractère exploratoire sur la dimension politique des processus urbains de transition énergétique visait à éclairer trois thématiques interdépendantes :

Il s‘agissait d‘abord, en replaçant les processus en cours dans leur contexte historique et national, de mettre en lumière la place jouée par les enjeux énergético-climatiques dans les évolutions politiques ou institutionnelles observées, en posant notamment deux questions :

- Les enjeux énergétiques et climatiques apparaissent-ils comme des enjeux clés des choix politiques ou institutionnels ?

- Les différentes options politiques (partisanes) ou institutionnelles correspondent-elles à des choix collectifs différents dans les domaines énergétique ou climatique ; ou en sont-elles indépendantes ?

Nous souhaitions ensuite examiner dans quelle mesure les politiques de transition sont affectées par les évolutions politiques et institutionnelles, en prenant notamment en considération les éléments suivants :

- les objectifs quantitatifs (réduction de la dépendance aux énergies carbonées, réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre...) et leur réalisation ;

- les choix des secteurs d‘action prioritaires (logement, transports, industrie...)

- les instruments privilégiés (nouvelles technologies visant la sobriété énergétique, amélioration des performances énergétiques des bâtiments ou des véhicules, développement d‘énergies renouvelables et peu ou pas émettrices de gaz à effets de serre, organisation urbaine, action sur les modes de vie, taxes et/ou subventions, réglementation, incitations, compensation des émissions...)

- les changements organisationnels dans l‘appareil administratif local et la priorité financière accordée — ou pas — aux questions énergétiques-climatiques

- les « gagnants » et les « perdants » des politiques menées, dans une perspective d‘urban political ecology44.

Enfin, nous voulions nous attacher à mettre en lumière les implications en termes prospectifs de cette « mise en politique » des processus de transition énergétique, en examinatn en particulier :

- si l‘enjeu du changement climatique tend à produire un nouveau référentiel de l‘action collective, garantissant la stabilité des actions menées en dépit des évolutions institutionnelles et des vicissitudes politiques ;

- si telle modalité d‘action, tel instrument, telle cible prioritaire paraît plutôt vulnérable ou au contraire plutôt résistant aux fluctuations institutionnelles ou politiques.

A l‘issue de ce travail, résumons-en brièvement les principaux enseignements par rapport à ce triple questionnement.

1) Sur le premier point, les éléments rassemblés dans cette recherche conduisent à conclure, d‘une part, que les enjeux environnementaux en général et énergético-climatiques en particulier

44 « To the extent that cities are produced through socio-ecological processes, attention has to be paid to the political processes through which particular socio-environmental urban conditions are made and remade […] Then, urban political ecology asks questions about who produces what kind of socio-ecological configurations for whom » (Heynen, Kaika, Swyngedouw, 2006, p. 1). Cette perspective conduit à développer une analyse critique de la concurrence entre des principes de durabilité urbaine affectant de manière partielle et sélective les espaces urbanisés et leurs habitants (Heynen, Kaika, Swyngedouw, 2006 : 10).

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ont une importance croissante dans les agendas politiques locaux et dans les débats électoraux ; mais, d‘autre part, que leur caractère discriminant ne s‘accroît pas. L‘environnementalisation des agendas affecte l‘ensemble des partis politiques de gouvernement, même si des nuances existent, les élus de gauche, sous l‘influence ou dans le cadre d‘alliances de gouvernement avec les écologistes, tendant à accorder une priorité légèrement plus forte aux politiques environnementales par rapport à leurs homologues de droite. Dans aucune des trois villes étudiées, en tout cas, nous n‘avons observé une stratégie de positionnement politique fondée sur une contestation de l‘importance élevée des politiques énergético-climatiques, et même de l‘urgence à les mettre en œuvre. Cet état de fait renvoie sans doute au consensus scientifique croissant sur les effets des activités humaines sur les changements climatiques, mais aussi à la montée des préoccupations environnementales dans la population (qui inclut les électeurs).

En outre, notre recherche a confirmé l‘existence d‘un effet « grandes villes » (ou « grandes régions urbaines ») : dans les trois cas, les acteurs politiques locaux et régionaux affichent des ambitions plus fortes que leurs homologues nationaux, et les documents stratégiques (schémas directeurs, plans de lutte contre le changement climatique, etc.) comportent des objectifs plus contraignants que les lois nationales et les obligations européennes en vigueur. La dimension de « marketing urbain » de cette particularité (partagée avec des villes plus petites, mais pionnières dans ce domaine) est incontestable. Mais elle renvoie aussi à la perception selon laquelle les (grandes) villes constituent un gisement important d‘innovations potentielles aux plans technologique, social ou spatial.

2) Sur le deuxième point, qui concerne les éventuelles différences d‘approche entre équipes de gouvernement local successives, notre travail ne met en évidence que des variations limitées, de l‘ordre de la nuance. Les objectifs généraux ne sont pas remis en cause. Les instruments mobilisés sont souvent repris, même s‘ils ne le sont pas toujours : cf. l‘abandon du programme Klimp par les Modérés à Stockholm ; l‘accent davantage mis sur les mesures technologiques adaptées aux spécificités des boroughs périphériques par le nouveau maire de Londres Boris Johnson (qui y a trouvé une part importante de ses suffrages) ; le projet alternatif de transports collectifs proposé par l‘Etat en Ile-de-France... Chaque équipe semble ainsi privilégier une panoplie d‘actions spécifique au service d‘objectifs généraux qu‘elle ne remet pas en cause, et ce qui ressort au premier ordre est plutôt la continuité des processus que leur remise en cause à l‘occasion des changements de couleur politique des équipes gouvernantes.

Il apparaît néanmoins que les ressorts de cette continuité puissent être différents selon les contextes. A Stockholm, elle renvoie à la culture politique nationale de consensus et à l‘engagement précoce de la communauté nationale dans son ensemble en matière environnementale et énergético-climatique. A Londres, elle repose sur une conviction fortement ancrée selon laquelle « la transition énergétique » représente une opportunité de croissance économique pour la région, positionnée comme la principale région innovante en Europe, et comme « image de marque » d‘une région qui doit « donner l‘exemple ». A Paris, région dans laquelle les divergences ont été, du moins pendant une période, les plus marquées — entre l‘exécutif régional accordant une priorité forte à l‘environnement (et à la cohésion socio-spatiale) et l‘Etat privilégiant la croissance économique régionale et nationale —, la recherche d‘un compromis, facteur d‘une continuité relative, résulte peut-être avant tout des particularités du système politique français et de la « régulation croisée » qui s‘y opère encore, tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne la région capitale.

3) En termes plus prospectifs, enfin, les « résultats » de notre recherche doivent être interprétés strictement comme des pistes de réflexion, et non comme des propositions solidement étayées. Trois facteurs influant sur la pérennité des politiques énergético-climatiques nous semblent ressortir de l‘analyse.

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Le premier renvoie à la préoccupation croissante de l‘opinion pour les enjeux liés aux changements climatiques et, secondairement, à l‘énergie. Comme on l‘a noté, la prise en compte croissante de ces enjeux dans les agendas des partis politiques et dans les débats électoraux est en (grande) partie le reflet de cette « environnementalisation » de l‘opinion, même si la dynamique symétrique existe également, ladite environnementalisation résultant aussi de la présence dans l‘espace politique de discours forts en faveur de politiques relatives aux enjeux environnementaux. Cette tendance apparaît comme profonde, parce qu‘elle met en cohérence des registres très divers de préoccupations (sanitaires, alimentaires, relatives à la qualité du cadre de vie immédiat comme aux grands équilibres planétaires, etc.). Elle pourrait constituer, dans les prochaines décennies, un puissant ressort de rappel vis-à-vis des gouvernements (locaux comme nationaux) qui seraient tentés de renoncer aux grands objectifs des politiques énergético-climatiques ; et porter progressivement sur les résultats obtenus davantage que sur les objectifs affichés, les vertus en termes politiques d‘un affichage volontariste étant d‘ailleurs susceptibles de diminuer au fur et à mesure de la généralisation de ces objectifs dans l‘ensemble des collectivités locales. Symétriquement, ces préoccupations environnementales sont en « concurrence » avec, et peuvent céder le pas à, des préoccupations relatives à des risques d‘autre nature (chômage, pauvreté, grand âge et dépendance, insécurité locale ou globale...). La réarticulation de ces grandes questions de société est un enjeu majeur (de refondation) du politique en ce début de XXIème siècle.

Le second facteur se situe dans la traduction organisationnelle et institutionnelle des priorités affichées en matière énergético-climatique. Nos interlocuteurs ont souligné l‘importance, pour le portage et in fine le succès de ces politiques, d‘une organisation transversale des services techniques ; du positionnement du service en charge des questions environnementales le plus près possible du sommet de l‘organigramme ; de la formation et de la culture environnementale (acquise souvent dans le cadre du parcours professionnel individuel) des personnels de ces services ; etc. Sans céder à un « déterminisme institutionnel » naïf, on peut cependant avancer que la réforme des administrations des collectivités locales constitue à la fois un test et un « cliquet d‘irréversibilité » (relative, bien sûr) en matière de priorités environnementales, selon une modalité particulière de « dépendance du sentier ». Au plan politico-institutionnel, le cas de Londres nous a conduits à mettre en exergue un facteur potentiellement important d‘irréversibilité, qui repose sur la capacité des acteurs locaux (en l‘occurrence le Maire de Londres) à faire évoluer le cadre stratégique ou législatif national pour favoriser (ou imposer) la généralisation des solutions technologiques, financières, réglementaires, etc. expérimentées et adoptées localement. L‘adoption par l‘Etat britannique d‘une politique nationale favorable aux « énergies décentralisées » d‘abord promues (notamment) par Londres, qui illustre ce mécanisme de « montée en niveau politico-institutionnel », est susceptible d‘affecter significativement la trajectoire énergétique des villes britanniques.

Un dernier facteur tient aux instruments mis en œuvre. La frénésie actuellement observée à Londres en faveur des réseaux locaux d‘énergie (électricité, chaleur, froid) est à cet égard emblématique : si elle aboutit à la construction de tels réseaux à un niveau significatif par rapport à la consommation énergétique de la région, elle influera profondément et pour plusieurs décennies sur le « métabolisme énergétique » de Londres. L‘investissement dans les infrastructures, a fortiori dans la transformation des structures et des formes urbaines, sont un facteur considérable d‘irréversibilité à l‘échelle temporelle à laquelle nous raisonnons ici. A contrario, des mesures plus « soft », par exemple de type fiscal, sont plus aisément réversibles. Est-ce à dire que la multiplication des réseaux locaux d‘énergie à Londres soit un gage de succès pérenne de la capitale britannique en matière de sobriété énergétique, de décarbonation et de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre ? La réponse à cette question doit être nuancée à la lumière de la controverse actuellement en cours à Stockholm sur les vertus environnementales comparées des réseaux de chaleur, développés précisément il y a un demi siècle, et des formes

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plus décentralisées d‘approvisionnement énergétiques que constituent les pompes à chaleur, mieux adaptées sans doute à parc de bâtiments qui aurait atteint une « haute performance énergétique ». En outre, l‘emploi de tel ou tel instrument engendre presque nécessairement des tensions autour de sa diffusion et de ses effets redistributifs, tensions dont la dynamique à long terme peut difficilement être anticipée.

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Bibliographie

General

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AIRPARIF. 2005. Analyse de l’inventaire et du cadastre des émissions des principaux gaz à effet de serre en Ile-de-France. AIRPARIF, Paris.

Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift. 2002. Cities: Reimagining the Urban. Polity, Cambridge.

ARENE. 2009. L‘Ile-de-France face aux enjeux de l‘énergie. Les actes de la conférence Assises régionales de l‘énergie 2008. January 2009. ARENE, Paris.

ARENE and ADEME. 2006. Tableau de bord de l’énergie en Ile-de-France. ARENE and ADEME, Paris.

Avelino, Flor and Jan Rotmans. 2009. Power in transition: an interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural change. European Journal of Social Theory 12(4): 543-569.

Béhar, Daniel and Philippe Estèbe. 2006. La planification au péril du SDRIF ? Urbanisme (Hors Série) 29: 23-25.

Bulkeley, Harriet. 2005. Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. Political Geography 24: 875-902.

Bulkeley, Harriet and Michele Betsill. 2005. Rethinking sustainable cities: multilevel governance and the ‗urban‘ politics of climate change. Environmental Politics, 14(1): 42-63.

Cassin, Paul, Cyril Brun, François Lacour, Geneviève Danchin and Lucile Mettetal. 2008. Les actions régionales en Ile-de-France pour lutter contrer les contraintes énergétiques et le rechauffement climatique. Cahiers de l’IAURIF 147: 245-250.

City of Stockholm. 2003. Stockholm’s action programme against greenhouse gas emissions. City of Stockholm, Stockholm.

Conseil Régional d‘Ile-de-France. 2006. Plan régional pour la maîtrise de l‘énergie, le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables et la réduction de l‘effet de serre dans l‘habitat et le tertiaire sur la période 2006-2010. Rapport pour le Conseil Régional d‘Ile-de-France, May 2006. Conseil Régional d‘Ile-de-France, Paris.

Dodman, David. 2009. Blaming cities for climate change? An analysis of urban greenhouse gas emissions inventories. Environment and Urbanization 21(1): 185-201.

Elliott, David. 2006. Energy regime choices : nuclear or not? Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 18(5): 445-450.

Estèbe, Philippe and Patrick Le Galès. 2003. La métropole parisienne : à la recherche du pilote ? Revue française d'administration publique 107: 345-356.

European Commission (2007) Towards a ‗Post-Carbon Society‘: European Research on Economic Incentives and Social Behaviour, conference proceedings, Brussels, 24 October 2007.

Giddens, Anthony. 2009. The Politics of Climate Change. Polity, Cambridge.

Hodson, Mike and Simon Marvin. 2009. Cities mediating technological transitions: understanding visions, intermediation and consequences. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 21(4): 515-534.

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Holden, Erling and Ingrid Norland. 2005. Three challenges for the compact city as a sustainable urban form: household consumption of energy and transport in eight residential areas in the greater Oslo region. Urban Studies 42(12): 2145-2166.

Ile-de-France region website. http://www.iledefrance.fr

Jacobsson, Staffan, Björn A. Sandén and Lennart Bångens. 2004. Transforming the energy system – the evolution of the German technological system for solar cells. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 16(1): 3-30.

Lefèvre, Christian. 2003. Paris – Ile-de-France region. In Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning, ed. Willem Salet, Andy Thornley and Anton Kreukels, 287-300. Spon Press, London.

Lovell, Heather. 2008. Discourse and innovation journeys : the case of low energy housing in the UK. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 20(5): 613-632.

Mairie de Paris. 2007. Plan climat de Paris. Adopté par le Conseil de Paris, 1 October 2007. Mairie de Paris, Paris.

Massey, Doreen. 2005. For Space. Sage, London.

Mayor of London. 2004. Green light to clean power: the Mayor‘s energy strategy. February 2004. Greater London Authority, London.

Meadowcroft, James. 2009. What about the politics? Sustainable development, transition management, and long term energy transitions. Policy Sciences 42: 323-340.

Monstadt, Jochen. 2007. Urban governance and the transition of energy systems: institutional change and shifting energy and climate policies in Berlin. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31: 326-343.

Orfeuil Jean-Pierre and Danièle Soleyret. 2002. Quelles interactions entre les marchés de la mobilité à courte et longue distance ? Recherche Transport Sécurité 76.

Préfecture de la Région Ile-de-France and Région Ile-de-France. 2007. Contrat de projets Etat-Région 2007-2013. Préfecture de la Région Ile-de-France and Région Ile-de-France, Paris.

Raven, Rob and Geert Verbong. 2007. Multi-regime interactions in the Dutch energy sector: the case of combined heat and power technologies in the Netherlands 1970-2000. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 19(4): 491-507.

Région Ile-de-France. 2008. Schéma directeur de la région Ile-de-France: rapport. Projet adopté par délibération du Conseil régional le 25 septembre 2008. Région Ile-de-France, Paris.

Région Ile-de-France. 2009. Projet de Plan Régional pour la Qualité de l‘Air de la Région Ile-de-France. February 2009. Région Ile-de-France, Paris.

Rohracher, Harald and Philip Späth. 2009. The fragile dynamics of urban energy system transitions: the eco-cities of Graz and Freiburg in retrospect. Mimeo.

Satterthwaite, David. 2008. Cities' contribution to global warming: notes on the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions. Environment and Urbanization 20(2): 539-549.

Schot, Johan and Frank W. Geels. 2008. Strategic niche management and sustainable innovation journeys: theory, findings, research agenda, and policy. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 20(5): 537-554.

Scrase, Ivan and Adrian Smith. 2009. The (non-)politics of managing low carbon socio-technical transitions. Environmental Politics 18(5): 707-726.

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Shove, Elizabeth and Gordon Walker. 2008. Transition Management™ and the politics of shape shifting. Environment and Planning A 40: 1012-1014.

Smith, Adrian, Andy Stirling and Frans Berkhout. 2005. The governance of sustainable sociotechnical transitions. Research Policy 34: 1491-1510.

Verbong, Geert, Frank W. Geels and Rob Raven. 2008. Multi-niche analysis of dynamics and policies in Dutch renewable energy innovation journeys (1970-2006): hype-cycles, closed networks and technology-focused learning. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 20(5): 555-573.

Von Weizsacker, Ernst, Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins. 1997. Factor Four: Doubling Wealth, Halving Resource Use. Earthscan, London.

Voss, Jan-Peter, Dirk Bauknecht and René Kemp (eds.). 2006. Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Stockholm

Literature

Bolling, A., & Svahn, C. (2010, May 29). Nio gripna vid protestaktion mot Värtaverket. Dagens Nyheter .

Boucher-Hedenström, F., & Rutherford, J. (2007, September). La démunicipalisation du service de l'énergie à Stockholm. Les annales de la recherche urbaine , 145-152.

Bulkeley, H., & Betsill, M. (2003). Cities and climate change : urban sustainability and global environmental governance.

Bulkeley, H., & Kern, K. (2006). Local Government and the Governing of Climate Change in Germany and the UK. Urban Studies , 43 (12), 2237-2259.

Carbon Tax Center. (2009, November). Where carbon is taxed. Retrieved June 2010, from Carbon Tax Center: http://www.carbontax.org/progress/where-carbon-is-taxed/

City of Stockholm. (2009). Action Programme. Retrieved June 2010, from Stockholms Stad: http://www.stockholm.se/KlimatMiljo/Klimat/Stockholms-Action-Programme-on-Climate-Change/Action-Programme/

City of Stockholm. (2009, July 29). Klimatinvesteringsprogram - Klimp. Retrieved August 2010, from City of Stockholm: http://www.stockholm.se/KlimatMiljo/Klimat/Det-har-gor-vi/Atgarderna/

City of Stockholm. (2010, February 25). Stadsbyggnadskontoret. Retrieved 2010 June, from Stockholms Stad: http://www.stockholm.se/OmStockholm/Forvaltningar-och-bolag/Fackforvaltningar/Stadsbyggnadskontoret/

City of Stockholm. (2010). Stockholm action plan for climate and energy 2010-2020.

City of Stockholm. (2010, July 13). Sustainable energy production - district heating and cooling. Retrieved July 2010, from City of Stockholm: http://international.stockholm.se/Stockholm-by-theme/European-Green-Capital/Professional-study-visits/6-Sustainable-energy-production--district-heating-and-cooling/

City of Stockholm's Executive Office. (2010, June). How Stockholm is governed. Retrieved July 2010, from http://international.stockholm.se/Politics-and-organisation/Democracy/

Connely, S., & Richardson, T. (2004, January). Exclusion: The Necessary Difference Between Ideal and Practical Consensus. (C. Publishing, Ed.) The Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 47 (1), pp. 3-17.

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Dahlroth, B. (2009). Open district heating network in Greater Stockholm - Summary.

EUROPA. (2010, March 22). Emission Trading System. Retrieved July 2010, from EUROPA - The official website of the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm

EUROPA. (2010, August 5). Environment - Climate Change. Retrieved August 2010, from EUROPA: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/home_en.htm

Fjärrvärmenämden, E. . (2009). Fjärrvärmenämden. Retrieved June 2010, from Fjärrvärmenämden: http://www.fjarrvarmenamnden.se/sv/

Fjärrvärmeutredningen. (2005). Fjärrvärme och kraftvärme i framtiden. Stockholm.

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). Rationality & Power - Democracy in Practice.

Fortum. (2009). Fortum and Climate Change 2009.

Fortum. (2010, July 6). Fortum in brief. Retrieved July 2010, from Fortum: http://www.fortum.com/document.asp?path=14022;14024;14026;14043;14070;14071;14079

Fortum. (2001, November 6). Fortum och Stockholms Stad i affärsuppgörelse om Birka Energi. Retrieved June 2010, from Fortum: http://www.fortum.com/news_section_item.asp?path=14022;14024;14026;25730;551;9423

Fortum. (2010). Värmeproduktion. Retrieved June 2010, from Fortum: http://fortum.se/dropdown_document.asp?path=19923;22344;22361;22315;47528;47529;41707

Government Offices of Sweden. (2009). How is Sweden Governed?

KTH, Industriell Ekologi. (2008). Emission factors.

Miljöförvaltningen. (2009). Stockholm Climate Pact, Annual Report 2009.

Ministry of the Environment. (2003). The Swedish Climate Strategy - Summary Gov. Bill.

Mouffe, C. (2005). On The Political. New York: Routledge.

Nils Holgersson. (2009). Fastigheten Nils Holgerssons underbara resa ganom Sverige - en avgiftsstudie för år 2009.

Nilsson, l. J. & al. (2004, March). Seeing the wood for the trees: 25 years of renewable energy policy in Sweden. Energy for Sustainable Development , 67-81.

Öjemar, F. (2010). Förbifart Stockholm är ett vansinnigt projekt. Dagens Nyheter . March 29

O‘Riordan, T., Jordan, A. (1996). Social institutions and climate change. In: O‘Riordan, T., Jäger, J. (Eds.), Politics of Climate Change. Routledge, London.

O‘Riordan, T., Jordan, A. (1999). Institutions, climate change and cultural theory : towards a common analytical framework. Global Environmental Change (9), 81-93.

Petersson, O. (1994). The government and politics of the Nordic countries . Stockholm.

SALAR. (2009, September 24). About SALAR. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Association for Local Auhtorities and Regions: http://english.skl.se/web/About_SALAR.aspx

Sandberg, E. (2009, May). Energihus Kalkyl. Retrieved April 1, 2010, from Energihus Kalkyl: http://www.energihuskalkyl.se/menus/index/57

SLB Analys. (2009). The effects of the congestion tax on emissions and air quality.

Statistics Sweden. (2008, September 29). Kommunfullmäktigval - erhållna mandat efter kommun och parti. Valår 1973-2006. Retrieved July 2010, from Statistics Sweden: http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser

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Suleiman, L. (2010). Water Governance in Transition, KTH (dissertation).

Svensk Fjärrvärme. (2010). What is district heating? Retrieved June 2010, from Svensk Fjärrvärme: http://www.svenskfjarrvarme.se/In-English/District-Heating-in-Sweden/District-Heating/What-is-District-Heating/

Swedish Energy Agency. (2009, January 26). Energimyndigheten - energy efficiency. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Energy Agency: http://www.energimyndigheten.se/en/About-us/Mission/Energy-efficiency/

Swedish Energy Agency. (2009, January 26). Energimyndigheten - mission. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Energy Agency: http://www.energimyndigheten.se/en/About-us/Mission/

Swedish Energy Agency. (2009, April 2). Energimyndigheten - The Sustainble Municipality. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Energy Agency: http://www.energimyndigheten.se/en/About-us/Mission/The-Sustainable-Municipality/

Swedish Energy Agency. (2009). Energy in Sweden 2009. Annual report published by the Swedish Energy Agency.

Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. (2009, January 8). About the Swedish EPA. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Environmental Protection Agency: http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Menu/GlobalMenu/About-The-Swedish-EPA/

Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. (2009, June). Climate Ivestment Programmes (Klimp). Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Environmental Protection Agency: http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Menu/Legislation-and-other-policy-instruments/Economic-instruments/Investment-Programmes/Climate-Investment-Programmes-Klimp/

Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. (2009, December 15). Emissions from 1990. Retrieved July 2010, from Swedish Environmental Protection Agency: http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Menu/Climate-change/Greenhouse-gas-emissions/Emissions-from-1990/

Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. (2009, July 9). Sweden's climate policy. Retrieved June 2010, from Swedish Environmental Protection Agency: http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Menu/Climate-change/Climate-policy/Swedens-climate-policy/

Swedish Society for Nature Conservation. (2010, January 26). Trängselskatt. Retrieved July 2010, from The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation: http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/natur-och-miljo/klimat/transport-och-infrastruktur/trangselskatt/

Swyngedouw, E. (2009). Climate Change as Post-Political and Post-Democratic Populism.

Swyngedouw, E. (2007). The Post-Political City.

Sydow, A. v. (2004). Exploring Local Governance in Urban Planning and Development - The case of Lindholmen, Göteborg.

The Local. (2009). Swedes claim climate conscience: study. The Local . November 15

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2010). Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved August 2010, from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

Vestbro, D. U. (2004). Conflicting perspectives in the development of Hammarby Sjöstad, Stockholm.

Young, I. M. (1990). City Life and Difference, from Justice and the Politics of Difference. 225-256.

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Interviews

ATON Teknik Konsult AB (interview 2010-04-01), Energy specialist. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

City of Stockholm, City Planning Administration (interview 2010-01-29), Head of Environmental Section. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

City of Stockholm, City Planning Administration (interview, 2010-02-16), Urban Planner. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration (interview 2010-01-29), Coordinator. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

City of Stockholm, Environment and Health Administration (interview 2010-04-16), Project leader. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

City of Stockholm, Exploitation Office (interview 2010-02-16), Head of Environmental Section. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Former SABO's CEO, Directed the District Heating Committee (Fjärrvärme Kommittén), Retired (interview 2010-06-04) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Fortum Värme (interview 2010-03-19), Marketing Manager for District Cooling. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Fortum Värme (interview 2010-04-19) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Green Party (interview 2010-05-17), Politician. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

HSB (interview 2010-05-07), CEO. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

KTH, Industriel Ekologi (interview 2010-03-16), Researcher. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

KTH, Industriel Ekologi (interview, 2010-03-25), Researcher. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Lund University, Environmental and Energy Systems Studies, Department of Technology and Society, Faculty of Engineering (LTH) (interview 2010-03-18), Researcher. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Lund University, International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics (interview 2010-04-13), Researcher. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Moderates (interview 2010-04-29), Assistant Political Advisor of Vice Mayor Environmental and Traffic Division, Stockholm. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Office of Regional Planning (interview 2010-04-15), Regional Planner. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Social Democrats (interview 2010-06-03), Politicians. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Stockholmshem (interview 2010-06-05), Head of the Energy Department. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Stockholm Property Association (interview 2010-06-06), Energy specialist. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Swedish District Heating Association (interview 2010-05-05) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Swedish Energy Agency, Energy Efficiency Department, Sustainable local government unit (interview 2010-05-20) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Swedish Environment Protection Agency, Climate Division, Energy and Transport Department (interview 2010-06-04) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

WSP Sverige AB (interview 2010-03-04), Associate, Energy specialist. (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

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Swedish Energy Agency, Energy Efficiency Department, Sustainable local government unit (interview 2010-05-24) (C. Gillet, Interviewer)

Paris

[1] O. COUTARD, J. RUTHERFORD, LATTS, Repenser les villes dans une société post-carbone - Appel ADEME-MEEDDAT - Mars 2009

[2] A.BELTRAN, la Politique énergétique de la France au XX° siècle : une construction historique, Annales des Mines, consultable sur http://www.annales.org/ri/1998/ri08-98.html

[3] R. LAVERGNE, La politique énergétique française depuis trente ans, novembre 2004, consultable sur http://www.constructif.fr/Article_24_35_199/La_politique_energetique_francaise_depuis_trente_ans.html

[4] Bilan de l'énergie de la France 1970-2003, Observation de l'énergie, Minefi-Sircom, 2004

[5] Scénario énergétique tendanciel à 2030 pour la France, DGEMP, Observatoire de l'énergie, téléchargeable sur www.industrie.gouv/energie, sélectionner "Prospective énergétique"

[6] APUR, Consommation d‘énergie et émissions de gaz à effet de serre liées au chauffage des résidences principales parisiennes, décembre 2007

[7] APUR, Les réseaux de chaleur à Paris et en petite couronne, novembre 2006

[8] ARENE, ADEME, Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Île-de-France, édition 2010 (chiffres 2005)

[9] ARENE, ADEME, Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Île-de-France, édition 2006 (chiffres 1990-2002)

[10] CITEPA, Rapport national d‘inventaire pour la France au titre de la convention cadre des nations unies sur les changements climatiques et du protocole de Kyoto, Avril 2010.

[11] ARENE, Assises régionales de l‘énergie 2008, Actes de la Conférence, mai 2008

[12] Conseil Régional d‘Île-de-France, Plan régional pour la maîtrise de l‘énergie, le développement des énergies locales et renouvelables et la réduction de l‘effet de serre dans l‘habitat et le tertiaire sur la période 2006-2010, mai 2006

[13] Préfecture de la région d‘Île-de-France, Conseil régional d‘Île-de-France, Contrat de Plan Etat-Région 2000-2006.

[14] Préfecture de la région d‘Île-de-France, Conseil régional d‘Île-de-France, Contrat de Projets Etat-Région 2007-2013

[15] C.LELEVRIER, Préfecture de la région d‘Île-de-France, Conseil régional d‘Île-de-France, Evaluation de la politique de la ville en Ile-de-France, Note de synthèse, janvier 2007

[16] P.FRICOU, DRIRE Bureau Energie, Schémas régionaux du climat, de l‘air et de l‘énergie, novembre 2009

[17] M.GALLIOT, Le changement climatique un enjeu pour les territoires, ONERC, DGEC, avril 2009

[18] Conseil régional d‘Île-de-France, Schéma Directeur de la Région Île-de-France, septembre 2008

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[19] O.COUTARD, J.RUTHERFORD, Energy transition and city-region planning: understanding the spatial politics of systemic change.

[20] Conseil régional d‘Île-de-France, Plan Climat de la Région Île-de-France, Document de travail en vue du Livre Vert, rapport provisoire, février 2010.

Sites internet consultés :

[21]Nucléaire et politique énergétique http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Nucleaire-et-politique-energetique.html

[22] Chiffres du chômage http://www.insee.fr/fr/regions/idf/default.asp?page=conjoncture/conj_chomage.htm)

[23] Chiffres PIB http://www.idf.pref.gouv.fr/donnees/chiffres-cles/economie.htm

[24] Population IdF http://www.drire.gouv.fr/ile-de-france/extranet_ppa/consultation_collectivites/dossier_consultation_pdf/infos-gen-IdF-V22sept04.pdf

[25] Population France http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9mographie_de_la_France

[26] http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89nergie_en_France

[27] PNLCC http://www2.ademe.fr/servlet/KBaseShow?sort=-1&cid=96&m=3&catid=16032

[28] http://www.dictionnaire-environnement.com/programme_national_de_lutte_contre_le_changement_climatique_pnlcc_ID5344.html

[29]Plan Climat France http://www.euractiv.fr/actualisation-plan-climat-france-2004-2012

[30] http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Les-plans-climat-2004-et-2006.html

[31] http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/dossier/copenhague-2009-cop15/politique-climatique-dispositif-francais.html

[32] loi POPE http://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/reglementation/loi_du_13_07_2005_ecox0400059l.php4

[33] http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000813253&dateTexte

[34] Région IdF http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%8Ele-de-France

[35] SDRIF http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sch%C3%A9ma_directeur_de_la_r%C3%A9gion_%C3%8Ele-de-France

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Appendix A. The metropolitan areas under study: basic data

London

Greater London covers a surface area of 1,584 km2 and has a population of 7.2 million, making it the largest city in Europe and one of the most densely populated (over 4,000 inhabitants/km2). Estimates suggest the population will increase to over 8 million by 2020. The Greater London Authority (GLA) is the strategic regional authority for London and comprises the elected Mayor and the elected London Assembly. Local government consists of the 32 London boroughs and the City Corporation which run most of the day-to-day services across the capital. London‘s economy is based on services and worth £162 billion, accounting for 17% of the UK‘s GDP. At the same time, the city is heavily socially polarized with three of the five most deprived boroughs in England.

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Paris - Ile-de-France

The Paris Ile-de-France region is one of the largest, most populous and diverse urban regions in Europe. A population of around 11 million people (18.7% of the national population), which represents an increase of approximately 500,000 in the last decade, on a surface area of 12,000 km² (2.2% of the national territory) makes for a density of 922 inhabitants/km². Yet although the regional population is 96% urban and only 4% rural, fully 80% of the region consists of natural or agricultural land. Economically the region is responsible for 28.7% of national GDP (396 billion Euros), of which 82.8% is derived from services, 17% from industry and 0.2% from agriculture. The region is functionally and/or administratively divided on various scales: there are three main geographical zones (Paris, petite couronne, grande couronne), eight departments, and no less than 1300 municipalities. There is great intra-regional diversity therefore, for example between the relatively small, very dense central city of Paris and the large, predominantly rural department of Seine-et-Marne to the east. This situation translates into both a rather fragmented governance in which state control has been reduced (although this may be on the return) and the regional level of government is restricted in its powers, and an internal-external development tension in which tackling issues of socio-spatial inequality and 'local' solidarity must take place at the same time as reinforcing the 'global' economic position of the Paris region (Lefèvre 2003; Estèbe and Le Galès 2003).

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Stockholm

The Stockholm county covers 678,500 ha (land and water), which represents about 2% of the surface area of Sweden, and extends over 180 km from north to south. 46% of this area is forest, 18% devoted to agricultural land, 14% in built-up areas and 22% to other uses (mainly water) (Statistical Yearbook of Sweden, 1998).

The region is among the densest in Sweden with 280 inhabitants/km2, which compares to the 21 inhabitants/km2 for Sweden in general. Dense areas represent approximately 10% of the surface area of the region, where 95% of the population live.

The population of the Stockholm region was 1,890,000 in 2005. The population of the city of Stockholm was 771,000 in 2005. The region is divided into 26 municipalities, which are highly diverse in nature between the city of Stockholm (4,000 inhabitants/km2) and municipalities of the archipelago (with sometimes less than 100 inhabitants/km2).

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During the last ten years, the population grew by an average of 1% or 16,000 people per year (thanks to immigration both from other parts of Sweden and abroad). All forecasts predict a significant increase in this population (to between 2.2 and 2.4 million by 2030) and the number of housing units required. It should be noted that this region is structured around Lake Mälaren to the west of the city of Stockholm, with an increasing number of commuters travelling into Stockholm each day from outside the borders of the region.

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Energy and greenhouse gas emissions in Ile-de-France, London and Stockholm

It is useful from both a contextual and an alternative analytical viewpoint to present some data on energy consumption and climate issues (e.g. levels of greenhouse gas emissions) in London, Paris/Ile-de-France and Stockholm. We should bear in mind, however, that the diversity of ways in which such data is collected, used and interpreted makes it more indicative of past and current trends in each city than directly comparable across cities.

% national population

% national surface area

% national GDP

% urban – rural population

% national energy consumption

% national greenhouse gas emissions

Ile-de-France 18.7 (11 million)

2.2 (12,012 km2)

28.7 (396 billion euros)

96 – 4 15 945

London 12.4 (7.5 million)

0.6 (1,604 km2)

19.3 (£218 billion)

100 – 0 7 8 (excluding aviation)

11 (including aviation)

Stockholm 21.2 (1.9 million)

1.5 (6,519 km2)

29 (SEK 771 billion)

c.65-35 1246 8

Table A.1. General data on the three urban regions under study

Sources: ARENE and ADEME (2006), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2002 / Mayor of London (2007), Climate Change Action Plan / Office for National Statistics, London regional profile (2006 figures) / http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics/regional/total-final/page36187.html (2006 figures) / Årsstatistik 2009 för Stockholms län och landsting / Stockholm Business Region website / SCB / Swedish Environmental Protection Agency

Total final energy consumption (toe)47 (2005)

% change 1999-2005

Annual energy consumption per inhabitant (toe), 2002

Annual energy consumption per inhabitant (toe), 2005

Ile-de-France 24,622,000 +1548 2.04 2.14

London 13,556,900 -10.3 (from 2003)

2.05 (2003) 1.90

45 Excluding air transport and indirect emissions, i.e. emissions from activities located outside the region but which benefit the region, but including transit traffic.

46 The lower energy consumption in the county is due to the presence of low energy-consuming industries and a low proportion of Swedish industrial production, plus a high building density, thus providing a basis for efficient energy and heating solutions (Nulägesbeskrivning Energisystem Stockholms län, p.1).

47 NB. 1 MWh = 0.086 toe (http://www.manicore.com/anglais/documentation_a/equivalences.html)

48 Due notably to the transport sector.

101

Stockholm 4,221,187 +3.4 (from 2000)

2.39 (2001) 2.22

Table A.2. Energy consumption in the three urban regions under study

Sources: ARENE and ADEME (2009), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2005 / ARENE and ADEME (2006), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2002 / http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics/regional/index.html / SCB / USK

Total CO2 emissions (tons)

% change 1990-2002

CO2 emissions per inhabitant (tons)

Ile-de-France 52,074,000 (2002) -4.4 c. 4.7 (2002)

London 44,000,000 (2006) (a)

49,614,000 (2006) (b)

+3.2 (2005-2006) (b)

6.6 (2006) (b)

Stockholm 5,256,000 (2006) (a)

8,700,000 (2003) (b)

9,100,000 (2004) (c)

5,750,000 (2003) (d)

+2.0 (2005-2006) (a)

4.6 (2003) (b)

4.86 (2004) (c)

Table A.3. Greenhouse gas emissions in the three regions

Sources: ARENE and ADEME (2006), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2002 / (b) http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/galocalghg.htm / (a) Mayor of London Climate Change Action Plan exec summary, p.6 / (a) Årsstatistik 2009 för Stockholms län och landsting, p.260 / (b) Viehhauser, 2008 / (c) Nulägesbeskrivning Energisystem Stockholms län, p.33 / (d) County Admin Board Update 2005 progress towards environmental objectives in Stockholm County.pdf, p.11

Petrol products

Natural gas Fossil oils and gas products

Electricity District heating

Others

Ile-de-France

51.1 21.9 19.6 4.7 2.7

London 22.9 50.6 26.3 0.2

Stockholm 27.1 0 6.2 40.9 24.8 1.0

Table A.4. Proportion of energy consumption by fuel

Source: ARENE and ADEME (2009), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2005 / http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics/regional/total-final/page36187.html (2005 data) / Nulägesbeskrivning Energisystem Stockholms län, p.30 (2004 data)

Transport Residential Tertiary Industry Industry and

Agriculture, forestry,

102

commercial fishing

Ile-de-France

43.7 29.1 19.3 7.6 0.3

London 20.7 42.4 37.0 0

Stockholm 27.1 32.3 28.1 11.8 0.6

Table A.5. Proportion of energy consumption by sector

Source: ARENE and ADEME (2009), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2005 / http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics/regional/total-final/page36187.html (2005 data) / Nulägesbeskrivning Energisystem Stockholms län, p.30 (2004 data)

Petrol products

Natural gas

Fossil oils and gas products

Electricity District heating

Coal Others

Ile-de-France

59.0 26.4 8.7 5.9

London 22.8 28.1 47.1 2.0

Stockholm 39.6 12.1 39.6 7.7 1.0

Table A.6: Proportion of CO2 emissions by fuel

Source: ARENE and ADEME (2006), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2002 / http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/galocalghg.htm (2006 data) / Nulägesbeskrivning Energisystem Stockholms län, p.33 (2004 data)

Transport

Residential

Tertiary

Industry

Industry and commercial

Waste

Agriculture, forestry, fishing

Others

Ile-de-France

48.3 28.1 18.2 4.9 0.5

London49

22 38 33 7 0

Stockholm

44.6 14.6 8.9 14.5 8.0 7.0 2.4

Table A.7: Proportion of CO2 emissions by sector

49 Excluding aviation (which if included accounts for 34% of London‘s emissions). The consideration or non-consideration of emissions from aviation will obviously continue to be a source of tension in London energy and climate policy. It can be argued to be at the heart of the conceptualization of London as a global, multicultural city, attracting flows from afar and extending its (economic, political and cultural) influence over the whole planet. For the time being, the Mayor and the GLA prefer to disregard the issue by arguing that aviation and airport emissions "can only be addressed at national and international levels" (Mayor of London 2007, p.xii).

103

Source: ARENE and ADEME (2006), Tableau de bord de l‘énergie en Ile-de-France : données 2002 / Mayor of London Climate Change Action Plan exec summary, p.6 / Viehhauser, 2008 (2003 data)