Ago-antagonistic Systems: A case study of Risk Management ... · 15/03/19 Diapo 3 Journée «...

Institut pour la Maîtrise des RisquesSûreté de Fonctionnement - Management - Cindyniques

15 mars 2019 IMdR – 12 av. Raspail 94250 Gentilly – 0145364210 – [email protected]

Ago-antagonistic Systems: A case study of Risk Management by Safety Leadership and Preventive & Detective Management Controls on

Subcontractors in the French Alternative Energies & Atomic Energy Commission

(CEA)

Diana Paola MORENO ALARCON

Ph.D Directors: Franck GUARNIERI Aude DEVILLE

CEA HOF Experts: Jean-Francois VAUTIER Guillaume HERNANDEZ


Diapo 215/03/19Journée « Jeunes Ingénieurs et Jeunes Chercheurs »

Plan

Purpose & Motivations of the Study

Overview of the Research

• Systems thinking (ST)

• Application of Systems thinking to Safety

• Ago-antagonistic Systems (AAS)

• Examples of Ago-antagonistic (AA) Couples in the industry

Implications of Ago-antagonistic Systems in Risk and Safety Management

• Research Question

• Method and Data collection

• Case study of AAS

• Intermediate Results & Discussion

Conclusion



Purpose & Motivations of the Study

Aim of the thesis:

• Study the interactions between the actors (subcontractors, contractor & nuclear authorities) at a nuclear facility:

• Strategies that manager’s employ to manage the actions and decisions of subcontractors, to ensure:

• Procedures are performed in line with specifications [Relational risk]

• Results are obtained in accordance with commitments [Performance risk]

• Compliance with safety and security standards [Compliance & Regulatory Risk]

• Thereby, :

• Yielding a strong transmission of skills and experience between subcontractors

• preventing and mitigating subcontracting risks



Overview of the ResearchFACILITIES

ACTORS

CONTROLS

MANAGEMENT

SAFETY

RISKS

DISTANCE

OTHERMANAGEMENT

STRATEGIES

FACILITY A FACILITY B FACILITY C

Subcontractor Contractor External Regulatory Body

Social control Behavior control Output control

Informal controls Formal controls

Preventive Control Detective control

Compliance & Regulatory Risks Relational Risks Performance Risks

Distance

Subcontractor Contractor

Safety Leadership Empowerment leadership Model+

Management Control Systems

Safety Performance



Systems thinking

A system:

• “ global unit made up of a set of elements which interact together in a dynamic manner and are organized to achieve

a specific goal”

(De Rosnay, 1975, 2014)

System Thinking :

• connects the units of a system, provides a holistic vision , sheds clarity on the effect of their interactions

(De Rosnay, 1975, 2014)

• combination of organizational tools that analyze complex interactions between multiple actors, at multiple levels and the

interaction between these actors and the system.

→ global template: elements acted upon directly or indirectly by changing a parameter in parallel to the element.



Applying Systems Thinking to SafetyHelps manage complex system of interactions at every level of the organization by :

• identifying interactions, considering the complexity, assessing effects on safety

(IAEA, 2014; 2016; Leveson, 2004)

“Events” = degradation of safety performance

→ Traditional causal analysis tools → linearly ( cannot analyze complex interactions – actors- temporal -spatial

gaps- consequences ) (Goh et al., 2010)

→ Systemic modeling tools (AAS) → act upon elements of the system & account for how actions (direct-

indirect, single- multiple) affect entire system.

“only complexity can cope with complexity” (Weick, 1979)

• only complexly-designed management systems can cope with risk complexity of safety environments.



Ago-antagonistic Systems

E. Bernard-Weil formalized AAS:

• work on adrenal-post-pituitary interactions in Cancer patients.

• Vasopressin (Hormone X) and adrenal-cotico steroids (Hormone Y)

“Ago-Antagonistic” (AA) : (Bernard-Weil, 2002; 2003)

• antagonistic meaning “opposite effects”

• agonistic meaning “parallel positive effects”

→ opposite and commentary but inseparable to understanding the phenomenon

Systemic vision consider the collective impact of:

• adjusting either a single force (x or y) or both forces (x and y),

• particularly as action(s) on the couple may rebalance the overall system

(Bernard-Weil, 1999, 2003)Receiver

Regulator

Ago-antagonisticForces (x & y)



Examples of Ago-antagonistic Couples

CEA

Network Hierarchy

Centralized Decentralized

Cooperation Competition/conflict

Management Control System

Reflection ActionShort Long Term

Individual Collective

Evaluate Control

Subjective Objective Avert Detect



Implications of AAS in Risk & Safety ManagementResearch Questions

What strategies do CEA managers employ to prevent and mitigate subcontracting risks?

How can we apply systems thinking to these strategies to design new approaches to risk and safety management that take

into account the complexities of the system and overcome the limits of current Management Control Systems practices?

------- ------- -------

How do Ago-antagonistic strategies evolve over time (following an event)? Can these changes help mitigate the temporal

constraints of risk management?

How can these Ago-antagonistic strategies be applied in designing a formal mechanism (Balance Score-card) to help

managers determine the optimal balance of these Ago-antagonistic pairs?



Abductive case study : "“constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data” (Wodak, 2004: 200)

Numerous Field immersions → Facility A, B & E

• 8 data collection /analysis phases , 33 recorded semi-directive interviews (42h), 266h observations

Phase 5Phase 4Phase 3Phase 2

May 2-4 (3 j)

CP6Int1

CP7Int1

May 30- June 3 (5 j)

CP8Int1

June 27- July 8 (10 j )

CP 6Int2

CP 9Int1

CP10Int1

CP11Int1

July 25-29 (5 j)

CP12Int1

CP13Int1

CP14Int1

Site 1 from May 2 – July 31 2016

Phase 1

March 14-18 (4 j)

Interviews:

MP1Int1

MP1Int2

MP1Int3

MP1Int4

MP1Int5

MP2Int1

MP3Int1

MP4Int1

MP5Int1

Analysis of

Phase 1 Data

Site 0 in 2016

Phase 7

May 27 &

June 24-25 ( 3j)

MP15Int1

MP15Int2

MP16Int1

Site 2 in 2018

Phase 6

Analysis of

Phase 2 Data

Analysis of

Phase 3 Data

Analysis of

Phase 4 Data

Analysis of

Phase 5 Data

Analysis of

Phase 6 Data Analysis of

Phase 7 Data

Site 1 in 2018

v vv

March 5&22 (2 j)

CP7Int2

CP7Int3

Phase 8

August 20-31 (10j)

MP17Int1

MP18Int1

MP19Int1

MP20Int1

MP21Int1

MP22Int1

MP21Int2

MP22Int2

MP23Int1

Analysis of

Phase 8 Data

Method & Data Collection



Case Study :


” combination of control mechanisms designed &

implemented by management to increase the probability

that organisational actors will behave in a certain way”.

(Abernethy & Chua, 1996)

→ Contain limits : observations & evaluation declared by

subcontractor.

Facette 1 Facette 2

Safety leadership

“process where leaders persuade followers [to achieve

organizational goals”.

(Simard & Marchand, 1995)

→ Leadership styles characteristics: flexibility,

development new ideas & initiatives

(Katsa & Condrey, 2005



Case Study :


Cohesive actions : effective, measurable- shaping &

controlling human behavior

→ Lack concern : motivation, flexibility & personal

development (Morsing & Osward, 2009)

Facette 1 Facette 2

Safety leadership

Non-coercive actions: loyalty, safety culture & social

dynamics,

→ difficult to quantify/ measure: leadership performance

(Morsing & Osward, 2009).

*** opposite, antagonistic effects : complement one another → impact safety management practices

*** parallel positive, agonistic effects: augmented → impact safety performance.



Case Study :

Facette 1 Facette 2

The AA model for MCS & safety leadership:

• Four components:

two forces (x, y), a regulator and a receiver

→ CEA (regulator)

→ management strategies (MCS, safety leadership)

→ safety performance (receiver)Receiver

Regulator

Ago-antagonisticForces (x & y)



Case Study : Research Setting

B



Intermediate Results & Discussion



Facility A Facility B

MCS

Independent (infrequent)

MCSSL Safety Leadership

Initially: IndependentChanges to leadership practices : dependent (daily & simultaneous)

Daily co-activity meetings: staff across 4 system levels

Formalized H&S training : « safety minute »

- led middle management

- at the end of the co-activity meeting

Documentation Meetings: formalized meeting




Facility B

MCS Safety Leadership• Maintains tension between AA forces

• Balances opposite & complementary

poles by

→ combining MCS & Safety Leadership

simultaneously in management practices


Detect inadequate

safety behaviors

→

Transforms inadequate

behaviour

Regulating safety procedures through employee

empowerment to improve safety performance



MCS & Leadership Results5 Dimensions of the Empowerment Leadership Model (Arnold et al., 2000)

1. Leading by Example- leader demonstrates their commitment to safety

2. Coaching- encourages problem solving → members share & increase knowledge

3. Participative Decision Making – encourages expression of opinions & cohesive environment

4. Informing – members are informed of changes to procedures on a regular basis

5. Showing concern/ Interaction with employees- opens dialogue & positive rapport with members of the team

ELM: amalgamates task-focused behaviours ( informing) & person-focused behaviours (showing concern)

→ Task Focused: Facilitates understanding of task requirements, operating procedures & OP compliance

→ Person-focused : Facilitates behavioral interactions & influencing attitudes essential in teamwork

→ ELM: motivates subcontractors to surpass compliance of safety standards (via formal safety systems) to encourage new

safety initiative (via informal safety discussions) that encourage reporting near misses and minor events.



MCS & Leadership ResultsCo- activity Management

• Daily meeting (vs. weekly)

• Inclusion of all staff from 4 systemic levels (vs. 2 in weekly)

Increased Interaction with employees (ELM 5) → subcontractors voice suggestions for daily operations

Participative Decision Making (ELM 3)→ discuss contingencies in case of unexpected Operational Changes

→ Encourages new safety suggestions & re-enforces environment to report near misses/ minor events

Health & Safety Training

• Formal Safety Minute at the end of co-activity meeting (4 systemic levels) (vs. occasional annual safety week)

Allows leaders to demonstrate their commitment to safety by Leading by Example (ELM 1)

Communication platform for safety concerns , safety reminders, identify areas that require Coaching (ELM2)

→ re-enforces organizational safety commitment & empowers subcontractors through education

Documentation

• Implementation of meetings between 1) Senior & Middle management & then 2) middle management & subordinates (vs.

notification of new documents via email)

Ensures the dissemination of crucial safety references (Informing- ELM 4)

→ Provides time-period to voice concerns with new guidelines



”Principle of Sensitive Dependence on initial conditions”

“Metaphore of the Butterfly Effect” :

event as small as the flap of a butterfly’s wings can cause changes in weather patterns.

Conclusion

Systems consist of complex network of elements: can interact in an AA fashion.

Changes or actions to one AA couples→ impact other AA couples within the system.

→ interconnectivity of the elements in the system: minor actions can create major results



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Thank you for your time & your attention

Diana Paola MORENO ALARCON

Ago-antagonistic Systems: A case study of Risk Management ... · 15/03/19 Diapo 3 Journée «...

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